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This dissertation explores the work of Frantz Fanon as a philosopher, psychiatrist, 
playwright, social and political theorist and anticolonial revolutionary. It is submitted 
to an academic program focused on peace studies to make a case for the relevance of 
Fanon’s intellectual and political work in this field of study and its related practices.  
Keywords: Fanon, decolonization, racism, colonialism, peace studies 
 
ABSTRACT: 
La presente tesis propone una exploración de la obra de Frantz Fanon como filósofo, 
psiquiatra, dramaturgo, teórico político y social, y revolucionario anticolonial. Esta tesis 
se presenta a un programa académico en estudios de paz con la intención de argumentar 
la relevancia del trabajo intelectual y político de Fanon en dicha disciplina y las prácticas 
asociadas a ellas. 
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When history is written as it ought to be·written, it is the moderation and long 
patience of the masses at which men will wonder, not their ferocity. (C.L.R James- 
The  Black Jacobins) 
 
Let us banish from our minds the thought that this is an unfortunate victim of 
injustice. The very concept of injustice rests upon a premise of equal claims, and this 
boy here today makes no claim upon you. (Richard Wright- Native Son) 
 
At the end of this work, we would like the reader to feel, as we, the open 





Aims and context 
This dissertation explores the work of Frantz Fanon as a philosopher, psychiatrist, 
playwright, social and political theorist and anticolonial revolutionary. It is submitted 
to an academic program focused on peace studies to make a case for the relevance of 
Fanon’s intellectual and political work in this field of study and its related practices. 
In the field of peace studies, with few exceptions (Omar, 2006), he is mostly 
approached as a figure than as a thinker, reduced to a thinker of revolutionary 
violence, or locked in his time and context, that of independence wars in Africa in the 
1960’s. This is concomitant to the absence of themes that Fanon addressed in his 
work, such as questions of race, racism, or colonialism, not only as objects of study or 
as an historical period, but as informing knowledge production itself. The absence on 
matters of race, racism and “coloniality” in peace studies has been pointed out 
(Azarmandi, 2016, 2018) yet not addressed. I shall address these aspects in the 
detailed discussion of the various facets and strands of Fanon’s work, and through the 
work of other thinkers who preceded him and came after him.   However, it falls 
beyond the objectives of this thesis to delve on the debates regarding the history, the 
conceptualizations of race, or on the different understandings of what racism is and 
how it works. 
Likewise, this dissertation could be situated as a response to the calls in peace 
studies to pay attention to the thought from the Global South. This implies 
considering the endemic forms of war, not in a strict military sense, but as the 
structural social condition experienced in the periphery and affecting the everyday 
lives, social relations, and subjectivities (Pureza and Cravo, 2005). In that vein, 




exclusion, ghettoization, and widespread different forms violence, in which the 
conditions of violence and peace are indistinguishable. Fanon’s analysis prioritizes 
the everyday experience of living amidst different forms of violence, although in 
relation to concrete historical and social structures. In any case, the importance of the 
“newest war” for this dissertation may not lie in the concept or what it describes, but 
in the sense that it expands conventional definitions of war as armed struggle, 
interstate or intrastate warfare. From an anticolonial perspective, these newest wars 
may be not so new. In both its colonial and postcolonial manifestations, racism has 
been defined as a “state of war” (Gordon, 1995), enmeshed in a broader “paradigm of 
war” (Maldonado-Torres, 2008), a “death project” (Suárez-Krabbe, 2016) or as 
“necropolitics” (Mbembe, 2003). Equating racism with war does not attempt to 
reduce racism to direct violence. But as we will see in Chapter 1, racism normalizes 
the abnormal and the extraordinary is turned into the ordinary condition of everyday 
life (Fanon, 1964; Gordon, 1995; Maldonado-Torres, 2008). As Fanon puts it, racism 
turns the everyday of the black into “hellish circle”, in which health, lives and forms 
of lives are threatened, and subjectivity, self-understanding, sexuality, family 
relations, the visit to the doctor, being a student or working as a doctor are vitiated, 
and the capacity to act in the world and in history, to generate culture, and to produce 
healthy human relations are thwarted (Fanon, 1952: 14; my translation
1
). 
This dissertation could be also situated within the commitment of the UNESCO 
Chair of Philosophy for Peace to relieve the suffering between humans and with nature. 
Johan Galtung establishes a parallelism between health studies and peace studies. 
They both proceed from diagnosis to prognosis to therapy. Health is understood as 
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peace and violence as disease, whereas therapy, for Galtung, entails the restoration of 
a system to a previous state of well-being (1996:1).  
In Fanon such simile is not only metaphorical and the process from diagnostic to 
therapy is not straightforward. I approach Fanon as a thinker of health: of social 
health, and of the interconnections between mental and social health, of the 
interrelation between history, politics and subjectivity, of the dehumanization upon 
which racism and colonialism are grounded, and the predicaments of the restoration 
of humanity. Thinking from the intersection between the medical and the political 
Fanon first puts under examination the methods, theories, and disciplines with which 
he has to carry out the diagnostic. In other words, if he analyzed the problems of 
black people with the philosophical, social, political thought and psychiatric theories, 
which, not only did not pay attention to the black condition, but also were built upon 
their dehumanization, he would obtain the same result, the construction of inferior 
and pathological types of human. For Fanon, the social meaning of health and disease 
cannot be established a priori. Fanon defines racist societies as “Manichean” (1961) 
and for Gordon (2000, 2007, 2015), in a similar vein, are characterized by a 
theodicean grammar: In a racist system, health is not at odds with the dehumanization 
of the black. A society can be considered peaceful and just on the grounds of its 
violence against certain populations. The exploitation and dehumanization of black 
and colonized people were not unjust or violent; they were part of the normative 
understanding of normality and health. In a racist normative framework, the standards 
of humanity, the meaning of health and disease, the conception normality and 
abnormality are different for the black and for the white, for the European for the 
colonized. The alienated black is normal in such context. Thus, he faces the question 




setting of oppression. If the role of psychiatry is to adapt the patients to society, his 
psychiatric practices would entail the production of harmed and alienated subjects.  
Achille Mbembe identifies in Fanon “three clinics of the real”, namely, Nazism, 
colonialism and the metropolitan France, as the encounters with violence, racism and 
dehumanization against which Fanon articulated his thought, crafted his language, 
and issued his injunction to heal. (2011:9; my translation
2
). There could be a fourth 
clinic of the real ingrained within the previous three, the psychiatric hospital. The 
encounter with madness and alienation, with the violence of the hospital and of 
psychiatry, with the suffering bodies and minds in the consultation room also shaped 
his political and social thought. These clinics of the real are not discrete entities; 
Fanon has also to be considered in motion. Fanon was also a migrant, a black 
Caribbean migrant. Like other black thinkers, he wrote in the movement between the 
Caribbean, Europe, and Africa. To be more precise, his thought is nourished by 
childhood and adolescence in his native island of Martinique, the experience as a 
volunteer soldier in the World War II, his studies of psychiatry and philosophy in 
France, his work as a psychiatrist with Francesc Tosquelles in Saint-Alban, and later 
in Algeria and in Tunis, his participation in the Congresses of Black Writers in Rome 
and Paris, in psychiatric conferences, his involvement in the anticolonial revolution 
first as a doctor and then as a journalist for the FLN and as ambassador for the 
Algerian government in Ghana. All these vital experiences shape his thought and 
appear intermingled in his work.  
Relevance  
To say that Fanon matters, and that Fanon’s matters matter, is to say that the 
different political and social urgencies that he faced, and the intellectual and practical 
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questions and responses that he offered call for require attention. In other words, there 
are political and social problems that ought to be addressed, and there are forms of 
knowledge that need to be known. 
The vitality of Fanon’s work today can be attested with the engagement of his 
work inside and outside academia. Without being exhaustive, Fanon is discussed 
today in settings as disparate and distant from his original context of enunciation such 
as the War on Terror (Anghie, 2004; Williams, 2010), the North African spring 
(Alessandrini, 2014), Black Lives Matter (Gibson 2016), South African postapartheid 
(More, 2017), student movements like #RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall (Gibson 
2016) and  shackdwellers movements (Gibson, 2011),  suicide bombing (Abraham, 
2013) or the dilemmas of nonviolence (Alessandrini, 2014) in Palestine, 
developments in Gabon  (Tonda, 2016) and Nigeria (Hansen and Musa, 2013), 
Islamophobia and torture, and new and historical forms of colonialism in the Pacific 
islands (Austin et. al, 2013), psychiatry and the pathologization of Māori resistance 
(Cohen, 2014), mental health of indigenous in Australia (Molloy and Grootjans, 
2014), or the traps of recognition in the emancipation of First Nations in  Canada 
(Coulthard, 2014), the experience of contemporary migration and its ties with 
colonialism (Taliani, 2012). 
Since 2014 until the completion of this dissertation, twelve books have appeared 
exploring the work of Fanon from different theoretical angles, delving on different 
themes and from a variety of disciplines (Gordon, 2014; Coulthard, 2014; Bird-
Pollan, 2015; Gordon, 2015; Hudis, 2015; Zeiling, 2015; Batchelor and Harding, 
2017; Gibson and Beneduce, 2017; Burman, 2018; Marriott, 2018; Byrd and Miri, 
2020; Turner and Neville, 2020). As recent as 2015 a collection of Fanon’s 




doctoral dissertation, his psychiatric writings and additional political texts written for 
the journal of the Algerian anticolonial movement were published, and its English 
translation, Alienation and Freedom, appeared in 2018. To that, it has to be added, the 
different special volumes in journals and conferences. There may be an intensification 
of engagement with Fanon’s thought and expansion of the topics and the approaches, 
but not reappearance or retrieval. As we will see in the first chapter, Fanon’s thought 
has been differently, although consistently, addressed and studied since the 1960’s. 
Outside of academia Fanon appears in the circles of hip hop, in students movements 
in South Africa, in the movement of shack dwellers, in the global Black Lives 
Matters movement, notably in the UK, United States and France (Gibson, 2016), in 
liberation activism in Palestine (Alessandrini, 2014) or in the clinic and mental health 
approaches to migrants and refugees in Italy (Love, 2015, Beneduce, 2017) or 
Palestine (Jabr, 2016).  
Scope of the research 
This dissertation approaches Fanon’s work in his immediate historical, 
geographical, and political contexts, yet I do not treat them as the alpha and omega of 
Fanon’s intellectual horizon. As it was hinted in the previous section, and will be 
expanded in Chapter 1, Fanon’s ideas have travelled and extended from the site of his 
theorization to other localities. I do not treat Fanon as an individual thinker. 
Sociologist Randal Collins argues against the figure of the great creative thinker who 
generates ideas in solitude. Instead, through a sociological study of intellectual 
history that encompasses almost 3000 years in China, India and Greece, Collins 
posits that knowledge and ideas are produced through the “interaction rituals among 
intellectuals” forming concrete or imaginary “networks”, “circles” and “chains” of 




intellectual conversation, including conflict, with predecessors and contemporaries, 
creating small, interconnected centers. For Collins, the absence of such linkages, 
conflicting intersections and bridges between networks leads to absence of creativity 
and intellectual stagnation, which in his view characterize the late twentieth century 
knowledge production despite its abundance (1998).  
Following Collins structural theory of intellectual networks, in Fanon’s work 
overlap different and varied centers in which his thought had also an effect. Namely, 
he was connected to, such as Pan-Africanism, anticolonial thought, Caribbean and 
African diasporic philosophy, Négritude, surrealism, Marxism, existentialism, 
phenomenology, psychoanalysis, Gestalt theories, institutional psychotherapy, or 
ethnopsychiatry. I do not treat these as influences on his work, but as intellectual 
communities which Fanon was a part of, in which he critically intervenes. It falls 
beyond the scope of this dissertation to provide an exhaustive and systematic account 
of these. Instead, I will engage them, and extend on them when necessary, in relation 
to the topic at hand. At the same time, Fanon’s work has become a center of 
intersecting and sometimes conflicting networks, as we will see in the first chapter on 
the secondary literature. 
Concerning Fanon’s writings, I have approached them by theme rather than by the 
different volumes. This implies delving into some questions, and leaving others 
outside. I have emphasized questions of philosophy of science, alienation and 
disalienation, history and subjectivity, language, social and political thought, and 
violence. I have paid special attention to his psychiatric writings for several reasons. 
First like his other writings, his texts are not limited to a discipline. His analysis of 
alienation and his elaboration of a humanistic psychiatry encompassed questions of 




omitted the texts that deal with pharmacological process. Second, medicine for Fanon 
was not only a profession or a nourishing activity. The psychiatric helped Fanon to 
think social and political questions, and vice versa. This does not mean that he 
psychologizes reality, as it is sometimes read. Instead, there is an imbrication between 
his social and political texts and his psychiatric thought, they nourish each other. His 
approach to mental disease from different angles, his attempts to transform the 
psychiatric hospital as a place in which human relations can be produced, his view of 
culture and language shed light on Fanon’s thought outside of the sphere of mental 
health. Third, many of these psychiatric texts reflected a work in progress, full of 
setbacks, possible solutions, and leaving open questions. Their interest also lies in 
that they reflect the process of deconstruction and reconstruction of psychiatry. 
Fourth, these texts are relevant for the history of psychiatry and medicine (Keller, 
2001; 2007). 
The choice of what to include goes hand in hand with the choice of what to 
exclude. I had to leave aside important themes in Fanon’s work such as his 
explorations of the links between colonialism and sexuality and race and desire, of 
which Fanon was a pioneer in the psychoanalytical literature (Mbembe, 2011). I have 
not analyzed Fanon’s theater except for some concrete aspects that could be related to 
the topics discussed in the dissertation. Likewise, I have neglected Fanon’s relation to 
writers such as Richard Wright and Chester Himes, who were important for his 
understanding of racism in the United States. I have referred only in passing to one of 
the questions about which Fanon was more lucid and is not yet exhausted: the 
problem of postcolonial leadership, elite formation, and the neocolonial economic 
relations. I have also omitted Fanon’s internationalism and Pan-Africanism, not as 




continent. Lastly, I have included Fanon’s theme of love, solidarity, and the 
formation of a relational subjectivity, but I have not dedicated a separate attention to 
it under the form of a section or a subsection. Instead I have touched on while 
discussing other topics. 
It is important to outline who the secondary actors would be. The first chapter 
explores the different readings of Fanon in the last forty years, the conflicts of 
interpretation and the different positions, and situates this dissertation within these 
debates. However it is important to acknowledge that my understanding of Fanon is 
notably influenced by the reading of the philosopher Lewis R. Gordon on Fanon, and 
by his own work, of which Fanon is an important influence. Gordon’s work on 
questions of philosophy of science, existential phenomenology, phenomenology of 
the social world, his systematization of Africana philosophy, and his thought on 
disciplinarity have helped me to understand the possibilities that Fanon’s thought 
offers. Likewise, the work of psychiatrist and anthropologist Roberto Beneduce 
occupies a special place in this dissertation, notably concerning Fanon’s medical 
texts. Beneduce’s work on Fanon, and his own work, has shed light on Fanon’s 
clinical sensitivity in political questions, and in the intersection of psychiatry and 
politics. 
Chapter outline 
There is generally a double reductionism in the assessment of Fanon in peace 
studies: first, as a thinker of revolutionary violence; and second, his thought on 
violence is reduced to some sentences of what he says in the opening chapter of The 
Wretched of the Earth. I have located Fanon’s controversial account of violence in 
The Wretched of the Earth as the last chapter of this dissertation for three main 




in Fanon, but it is analyzed and questioned in its different manifestations constantly 
throughout this work. Second, because what Fanon says about violence, like about 
other themes, in the opening chapter of The Wretched of the Earth cannot be 
understood without other aspects that are also present in the rest of his work: the 
sociogenic analysis, the zone of nonbeing, the relation between ethics and politics, the 
construction of the colonized, the poetic and dramatic element in Fanon’s writing and 
its relation to method, his writing on the psychiatric hospital as pathogenic space, his 
phenomenology of embodiment and oppression, and his view of humanism, among 
others. These aspects will be developed in the preceding chapters. Third, because 
Fanon’s thought on violence in The Wretched of the Earth is itself insightful. This 
does not mean that violence is the center of his thought or that I treat it as such. It 
means that Fanon did not treat violence as a substantive phenomenon that can be 
abstracted and isolated, but it is related to a variety of issues, that he did not approach 
violence from a single perspective but from different disciplines and forms of 
knowledge. It also means that violence, more than an always explicit object of 
thought was a concern that permeated his thought. With these considerations in mind, 
I have structured this dissertation as follows: 
The first chapter offers a panoramic view of how Fanon has been read from the 
1960’s until today. It also outlines the silence and the late engagement with his work 
in certain geographical contexts, namely, Algeria, France, and Martinique. The first 
chapter also assesses how Fanon has been read in peace studies. In this field it has 
mostly been associated with revolutionary violence. This raises questions on the role 
and the treatment of violence in the discipline and also explores the absence of 
questions of race, racism and colonialism, not only as a historical period and objects 




and disciplines. As African diasporic thinkers observe, the critique of modernity and 
modern science based on variations of the problem of instrumental reason, technical 
or scientific rationality is insufficient since it omits the underside of modern 
European capitalism, its racist rationality (Gordon, 1996; Henry, 2006; Maldonado-
Torres, 2008). 
The second chapter continues with the question of the intrinsic relation between 
modern science, discipline formation and racism as theorized by African diasporic 
thinkers, illustrated in this case by the work of Haitian lawyer and anthropologist 
Anténor Firmin, American philosopher, economist and historian W.E.B. Du Bois, and 
Frantz Fanon.  The three attempted to produce forms of knowledge and self-reflection 
oriented towards the emancipation of black people, and faced the question of how to 
theorize on the black condition with tools that are involved in the construction of the 
black and their pathologization. As Lewis Gordon (2008) notices, African diasporic 
philosophers bring to the forefront three fundamental and interrelated questions in 
their theorizing: what is a human being, the question of freedom, and a meta-critique 
of reason, that is, how to justify the previous ones including how to justify the 
justification itself. For Fanon, Firmin and Du Bois, this is manifested in their 
questioning methodological, epistemic and disciplinary presuppositions, the 
understanding of the human and the standard of humanity in order to discern the 
problems of black people and their emancipation. 
The third chapter follows the trail of the previous one and addresses questions of 
poetics, examination of language and method in the production of knowledge. As 
Paget Henry points out reason and poetics occupy the same position in Africana 
philosophy (2006). This chapter deals with Fanon’s theorizing of alienation through 




also analyses Fanon’s use of language, his connection with surrealism and Négritude, 
the relation between language and body, his attempts to reach the reader beyond the 
rational aspects, the poetics in his language, and the dramatic element playing also a 
methodological function. 
The fourth chapter explores Fanon’s first earliest medical writings, which show the 
first steps towards a humanistic medicine. Fanon’s doctoral dissertation in psychiatry 
shares aspects with Black Skin White Masks despite the methodological and the 
disparity of the topics. The dissertation studies a hereditary neurodegenerative disease 
in order to explore questions on philosophy of psychiatry. He raises the problems of 
the disciplinary division between neurology and psychiatry, the mechanistic 
understanding of the patient devoid of the agency of the human, the problem that this 
entails for the diagnosis, and the relation between history, sociality and mental 
disease, and the. Fanon took these concerns to the clinic in “The North African 
Syndrome”, his first published article. To the aforementioned medical problems, 
Fanon brings up the relation between racism and disease, and between the clinic and 
wider societal dynamics. Fanon’s earliest concerns on the alienating character of 
diagnostics categories, the dehumanization at the level of treatment, the spatiality of 
the hospital setting and the intricacy of the clinic and the political echoed the work 
being carried out in the psychiatric hospital of Saint-Alban to which he moved. The 
Catalan psychiatrist Francesc Tosquelles and his circle developed in Saint-Alban 
what is called institutional psychotherapy, a pioneering approach to mental disease 
and to the psychiatric hospital out of the experience of the Spanish Civil War and the 
French resistance to Nazi Occupation.  
The fifth chapter deals with Fanon’s arrival in Algeria with the intention to 




developed in situations of war, the context of Algeria upon Fanon’s arrival, one and a 
half years before the outbreak of the war, was considerably different than the Spanish 
Civil War and World War II. This chapter focuses on colonial alienation, the 
ambivalent role of medicine in colonialism, the responses of the colonized towards 
medicine, and focuses on the important role of colonial psychiatry in the construction 
of the Arab and the African, in justifying oppression, and pathologizing resistance. 
The sixth chapter explores Fanon’s psychiatric effort to reconstruct psychiatry in 
Algeria and Tunis. Fanon’s trajectory concerning the psychiatric hospital could be 
summarized by the movement that goes from his initial intention to heal the clinic 
through institutional psychotherapy to the pioneering open day psychiatric hospital as 
a form of healing with the clinic. That is, putting the weight of the healing process in  
the society. In the middle of this process, Fanon interrogates mental disease in 
relation to the local culture, religion, social institutions, and to the political situation, 
his own role of as psychiatrist in its intricacy with colonial oppression, and his role as 
an anticolonial militant and intellectual. 
The seventh chapter focuses on Fanon’s controversial account of violence in The 
Wretched of the Earth. Rather than as a defense or justification of violence, Fanon 
analyzes violence as a “problématique”, that is, violence is connected to a series of 
issues in the short and the long term. As stated, an ethical approach to Fanon’s 
account of violence risks missing the point of what Fanon says, since he articulates a 
conception of violence beyond means and ends. Likewise it was not only a chapter on 





A note on translation 
In this dissertation I have translated the writings of Fanon’s first four books: Black 
Skin White Masks, A Dying colonialism, The Wretched of the Earth and Towards the 
African Revolution, instead of using the English version, at the expense of not 
replicating the style and losing richness of the language. For the sake of legibility and 
the reader I have inserted the translated quote within the body of the text and added 
the original in a footnote. In the occasions in which the new translation modifies 
substantially the English translation, I have added an explanative footnote.  
The problems behind these translations have already been referred to (Judy, 1996; 
Gibson, 2007; Gordon, 2015; Batchelor and Harding, 2017). There are problems of 
philosophical terminology. As an instance, the fifth chapter of Black Skin White 
Masks, probably the most important, has been translated as “The Fact of Blackness”, 
instead of “The lived experience of the black”. The published translation eliminates 
the phenomenological side of the chapter and conveys a completely different meaning 
to how Fanon understands and uses blackness. The Fact of Blackness later became a 
volume of essays on Fanon. 
 There are also problems at the level of gender in the English translations. In the 
original, Fanon used masculine language, and used the French l’homme to refer to the 
human, but this has been exacerbated in some English versions with confusing 
results. There are moments when the original “the black” has been translated as “the 
black man” (Gordon, 2015). The Ghanaian philosopher Ato Sekyi-Otu in a recent 
work proposes to translate Fanon’s man as the human quoting Fanon’s words: “All 
forms of exploitation are applied against the same ‘object’: the human being.” 
(Fanon, quoted in Sekyi-Otu, 2018: 40). Sekyi-Otu writes:  
I am rendering Fanon’s l’homme in the French original as ‘the human being’ 




argument. That same fidelity to the inferential logic of Fanon’s anti-racism 
and ours constrains us to subject to relentless criticism abominable non-
racial wrongs, indeed, all forms of dehumanization in postcolonial societies,  
all inhumanities inflicted on women and men living while human. (2018: 40) 
 
Although I agree with Sekyi-Otu’s overall argument, I have kept Fanon’s gendered 
language–as it was part of the discursive context in which he wrote–in the translated 
quotations, and have used the human being instead of man when paraphrasing him. 
Also following Gordon (2015), I have not translated the original term nègre, since its 
different connotations are difficult to replicate in a English term. I have also 
maintained the French titles of The Wretched of the Earth (Les damnés de la terre) 
and A Dying Colonialism (L’an V de la revolution algérienne). Beyond the semantic 
problems in the mistranslation, the English title does not reflect the references behind 
the title. Les damnés de la terre not only refers to The Internationale, but also to a 
poem by the Négritude poet Jacques Roumain (Gordon, 2015). L’an V de la 
revolution algérienne (literally, the year V of the Algerian revolution) captures a 
precise moment of the anticolonial war, and although the themes and the character of 
the work are different, the title could be read as a hint to Marx’s The Eighteenth 
Brumaire of Louis Napoleon. In short, in both titles there is a reference to the socialist 
tradition and to traditions of African and African diasporic emancipation. 
I have not translated the new collection of psychiatric, political and theatre 
writings appeared in French in 2015. Instead I have directly used the English 
translation from 2018, except for the few cases in which I have modified the 
translation. Such choice and the different treatment in regard to the previous works 
responds to the fact that the translation of the new work is more attuned to the 
philosophical terminology of Fanon and also addresses other problematic aspects 





Introducción (versión en español) 
Propósito y contexto 
 
La presente tesis propone una exploración de la obra de Frantz Fanon como 
filósofo, psiquiatra, dramaturgo, teórico político y social, y revolucionario 
anticolonial. Esta tesis se presenta a un programa académico en estudios de paz con la 
intención de argumentar la relevancia del trabajo intelectual y político de Fanon en 
dicha disciplina y las prácticas asociadas a ellas. En el campo de los estudios de paz, 
salvo contadas excepciones (Omar, 2006), se le suele abordar más como figura que 
como pensador, o es reducido a un pensador de la violencia revolucionaria, o limitado 
a su tiempo y su contexto, el de las guerras de independencia africanas en los años 60. 
Esto es acompañado por la ausencia de temas que Fanon trató en su obra, tales como 
cuestiones de raza, racismo o colonialismo, no solo como objetos de estudio o como 
periodo histórico, sino también como constituyentes de la propia producción del 
conocimiento. La ausencia de cuestiones  de raza, racismo y “colonialidad” en los 
estudios de paz ha sido señalada (Azarmandi, 2016, 2018), aunque todavía no ha sido 
abordada. La presente tesis trata dichos aspectos como parte de la discusión detallada 
de las diferentes facetas de la obra de Fanon, y también de otros pensadores que le 
precedieron y le sucedieron. Sin embargo, una exploración detallada de la literatura y 
los debates respecto a la historia, la conceptualización de la raza, o la comprensión 
del racismo y su funcionamiento, escapan a los objetivos de esta tesis. 
Igualmente, esta tesis se puede situar como respuesta a las llamadas desde los 
estudios de paz a prestar atención al pensamiento proveniente del Sur Global. Esto 
implica tomar en consideración las formas endémicas de guerra, entendida esta no en 
su acepción estrictamente militar, sino como condición social estructural que se 




subjetividades (Pureza and Cravo, 2005). En ese sentido, Tatiana Moura (2005) ha 
llamado “nuevísimas guerras” al conflicto urbano, formas de exclusión, formación de 
guetos, y la de múltiples y diferentes formas de violencia en el Sur Global donde las 
condiciones de violencia y paz se vuelven indistinguibles. En cualquier caso, la 
importancia de la idea de “nuevísimas guerras” para esta tesis puede no residir tanto 
en el concepto o lo que describe, sino en el sentido que expande definiciones 
convencionales de guerra como lucha armada, o conflicto armado intra- o interestatal. 
Desde una perspectiva anticolonial, las nuevísimas guerras pueden no ser tan nuevas. 
Tanto en sus manifestaciones coloniales como postcoloniales, el racismo ha sido 
definido por diferentes autores como un “estado de guerra” (Gordon, 1995), 
imbricado en dentro de  “paradigma de guerra” más amplio (Maldonado-Torres, 
2008), un “proyecto de muerte” (Suárez-Krabbe, 2016) o como “necropolítica” 
(Mbembe, 2003). Equiparar al racismo con la guerra no implica reducir el racismo a 
la violencia directa. Como se analiza en el capítulo 1, el racismo normaliza lo 
anormal y lo convierte lo extraordinario en la condición ordinaria de la  vida 
cotidiana. Como indica Fanon, el racismo convierte la cotidianidad del negro en un 
“círculo infernal”, en el, cual, la salud, la vida, las formas de vida son amenazadas, y 
vicia la subjetividad, la comprensión de una misma, la sexualidad, las relaciones 
familiares, la visita al doctor o el propio trabajo de doctor, y obstruye la capacidad de 
actuar en el mundo y en la historia, de generar cultura, y establecer relaciones 
humanas saludables (Fanon, 1952: 14). 
Esta tesis también se puede situar dentro del compromiso de la Cátedra UNESCO 
de Filosofía para la Paz de aliviar el sufrimiento entre humanos y con la naturaleza. 
Johan Galtung establece un paralelismo entre los estudios de salud y los estudios de 




comprendida como la paz y la violencia, como la enfermedad. Para Galtung, la 
terapia conlleva la restauración del sistema a un estado anterior de bienestar (1996:1). 
En Fanon, dicho símil no es solo metafórico. Esta tesis aborda a Fanon como un 
pensador de la salud: de salud social, de salud mental, y de la interconexión entre 
ambas. Un pensador de la interrelación entre historia, política y subjetividad, un 
pensador de la deshumanización sobre la que se sustentan el colonialismo y el 
racismo, y de la problemática de la restauración de la humanidad. Pensando desde la 
intersección entre la clínica y la política Fanon primero cuestiona los métodos, teorías 
y disciplinas con los que tiene que llevar a cabo el diagnostico. En otras palabras, si 
tuviera que analizar los problemas de los negros con el pensamiento político, social y 
filosófico, y las teorías psiquiátricas, que no solo no prestaban atención a la condición 
negra, sino que también fueron co-constituidas junto a la deshumanización de los 
negros, obtendría los mismos resultados: la construcción de tipos de humanos 
patológicos e inferiores. Para Fanon qué significa la salud y la enfermedad en 
términos sociales no puede ser establecido a priori. En un sistema racista, la salud no 
está reñida con la deshumanización de los negros. Una sociedad pude ser considerada 
pacífica y justa basándose en la violencia que ejerce sobre ciertas poblaciones. La 
explotación y deshumanización de negros y colonizados no era injusta o violenta: era 
parte del marco normativo que define qué es normal y sano. En un marco normativo 
racista, el estándar de humanidad, el significado de salud y enfermedad, la 
concepción de lo normal y lo anormal son diferentes para el blanco que para el negro, 
para el Europeo que para el colonizado. En tal contexto, el negro alienado es normal. 
Entonces Fanon se plantea la cuestión qué significa para un negro ser un ser humano 




psiquiatría es la de adaptar los pacientes a la sociedad, sus prácticas psiquiátricas 
conllevarían la producción de sujetos alienados.  
Achille Mbembe identifica en Fanon “tres clínicas de lo real”, el nazismo, el 
colonialismo y la metrópolis francesa, como sus encuentros con la violencia, el 
racismo y la deshumanización en baso a los que Fanon articuló su pensamiento, 
elaboró su lenguaje, y pronunció el requerimiento de curar (2011: 9). Incluida en 
estas tres se podría añadir una cuarta clínica de lo real, el hospital psiquiátrico.  El 
encuentro con la locura y la alienación, con la violencia del hospital y de la clínica, 
con los cuerpos y mentes sufrientes en la sala de consultas también permeó su 
pensamiento político y social.  
Estas clínicas de lo real no son entidades separadas. Fanon también debe ser 
considerado en movimiento. Fanon también era un migrante, negro Caribeño. Al 
igual que otros pensadores negros Fanon escribió en un movimiento entre el Caribe, 
Europa y África. Para ser más preciso, su pensamiento se nutrió por sus experiencias 
de infancia y adolescencia en su isla natal de Martinica, la experiencia como soldado 
voluntario en la Segunda Guerra Mundial, sus estudios de psiquiatría y filosofía en 
Francia, su trabajo como psiquiatra en junto a Francesc Tosquelles en Saint-Alban, en 
Argelia y en Túnez, sus participaciones en los congresos de escritores negros en 
Roma y Paris, los congresos médicos, su implicación en la revolución anticolonial, 
primero como doctor, luego como periodista para el Frente de Liberación Nacional, y 
como embajador del gobierno Argelino en Ghana. Todas estas experiencias 
conforman su pensamiento y aparecen entremezcladas en su obra. 
Relevancia 
Decir que Fanon importa, y que las cuestiones de Fanon importan, es decir que las 




a nivel práctico e intelectual que ofreció necesitan atención. En otras palabras, hay 
problemas políticos y sociales que deberían tratarse, y hay formas de conocimiento 
que necesitan conocerse.  
La vitalidad y actualidad del pensamiento de Fanon se puede atestiguar con el 
abordaje de su trabajo dentro y fuera de la academia. Sin ánimo de ser exhaustivo el 
trabajo de Fanon es discutido en contextos tan dispares y distantes de su contexto 
original de enunciación como la guerra contra el terror (Anghie, 2004; Williams, 
2010), la primavera norteafricana (Alessandrini, 2014), Black Lives Matter, (Gibson, 
2016), el post-apartheid en Sudáfrica (More, 2017), movimientos de estudiantes como 
#RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall (Gibson 2016), movimientos de  habitantes de 
barracas en Sudáfrica (Gibson, 2011),  atentados suicidas (Abraham, 2013), dilemas 
de la noviolencia en Palestina (Alessandrini, 2014), acontecimientos en Gabón  
(Tonda, 2016), Nigeria (Hansen and Musa, 2013), Islamofobia, tortura y nuevas o 
históricas formas de colonialismo en las islas del Pacífico (Austin et. al, 2013), 
psiquiatría y la patologización de la resistencia Māori (Cohen, 2014), luchas 
indígenas en Australia (Molloy and Grootjans, 2014), o cuestiones de emancipación 
de Primeras Naciones en  Canadá (Coulthard, 2014), la experiencia de la migración 
contemporánea y sus vínculos coloniales (Taliani, 2012).  
Desde el 2014 hasta la finalización de esta tesis han sido publicados doce libres 
explorando el trabajo de Fanon desde diferentes ángulos teóricos, abordando o  
profundizando en distintas temas, y desde una variedad de disciplinas (Gordon, 2014; 
Coulthard, 2014; Bird-Pollan, 2015; Gordon, 2015; Hudis, 2015; Zeiling, 2015; 
Batchelor and Harding, 2017; Gibson and Beneduce, 2017; Burman, 2018; Marriott, 
2018; Byrd and Miri, 2020; Turner and Neville, 2020). En 2015 se publicó Écrits sur 




hasta la fecha que incluyen dos obras de teatro, su tesis doctoral, escritos psiquiátricos  
y textos políticos escritos para el periódico del movimiento anticolonial argelino. En 
2018 se publicó la traducción inglesa, Alienation and Freedom. A ello se le podría 
añadir los diferentes números especiales en revistas especializadas y conferencias. 
Esto puede tratarse como un momento de intensificación de la interacción con la obra 
de Fanon y de la ampliación de los temas y los enfoques, pero no se trata de una 
reaparición o un rescate. Como veremos en el primer capítulo, el pensamiento de 
Fanon ha sido abordado de forma diferente pero consistente desde los años 60. Fuera 
de los círculos académicos Fanon aparece en el ámbito de hip hop en Francia 
Sudáfrica y el mundo Árabe, en movimientos descolonizadores de estudiantes 
sudafricanos, en el movimiento global de Black Lives Matters, especialmente en 
Europa y Estados Unidos, en el activismo en Palestina (Alessandrini, 2014) o en la 
clínica y los enfoques de salud mental con personas migrantes y refugiadas (Love, 
2015; Beneduce, 2017) o en Palestina (Jabr, 2016). 
Ámbito de investigación 
Esta tesis aborda el trabajo de Fanon en su contexto histórico, geográfico y político 
inmediato. Sin embargo no trato dichos contextos como el alfa y el omega del 
horizonte intelectual de Fanon. Como apunté en la sección anterior y expandiré en el 
primer capítulo, las ideas de Fanon han viajado y se han extendido desde su lugar de 
origen a otras localidades. Al mismo tiempo, no abordó a Fanon como un pensador 
individual. El sociólogo Randal Collins ofrece argumentos en contra de la figura del 
pensador creativo y aislado que produce ideas desde la soledad. En su lugar, mediante 
un estudio sociológico de la historia intelectual de los últimos 3000 años que incluye 
China, India y Grecia, Collins argumenta que el conocimiento y las ideas se producen 




“cadenas” concretas o imaginarias, a través de generaciones. Es decir, la producción 
intelectual es social, incluyendo el conflicto, y abarca la creación de pequeños centros 
interconectados que incluye predecesores y contemporáneos. Para Collins, la ausencia 
de tales nexos, intersecciones conflictivas, y puentes entre redes lleva a la ausencia de 
creatividad y el estancamiento intelectual, que, según su argumentación, caracteriza la 
producción de conocimiento de finales del siglo veinte, pese a su abundancia (1998). 
Siguiendo la teoría estructural  de las redes de conocimiento de Collins, en el 
trabajo de Fanon se solapan diferentes centros en los cuales su trabajo también tuvo 
efecto. Concretamente, Fanon estaba conectado círculos de Panafricanismo, 
pensamiento anticolonial, filosofía Caribeña y de la diáspora africana, Négritude, 
surrealismo, marxismo, existencialismo, fenomenología, psicoterapia institucional o 
etnopsiquiatría. No trato estos círculos como influencias en su trabajo sino como 
comunidades intelectuales de los que Fanon formaba parte y en las que interviene 
críticamente. Escapa a los objetivos de esta tesis el ofrecer una consideración 
exhaustiva y sistemática de estas. En su lugar, las abordaré. Y me extenderé cuando 
sea necesario, en relación al tema a tratar. Al mismo tiempo, el trabajo de Fanon se ha 
convertido en el centro de redes que se entrecruzan, y a veces colisionan, como se 
verá en el primer capítulo de esta tesis. 
Respecto a los textos de Fanon, los he abordado por temas en vez de centrarme en 
los diferentes volúmenes por separado. Esto conlleva profundizar en algunas 
cuestiones y dejar otras fuera. Concretamente he prestado especial atención a aspectos 
de filosofía de la ciencia, alienación y desalienación, historia y subjetividad, lenguaje, 
pensamiento social y político y violencia. He prestado especial atención a los escritos 
médicos por distintas razones. Primero, como el resto de sus escritos, los escritos 




alienación y su esfuerzo por construir una psiquiatría humanista abarcaba cuestiones 
de cultura, política, economía, filosofía, sociología o religión, entre otros. He omitido 
los textos que tratan sobre procesos farmacológicos. Segundo, la medicina para Fanon 
no era solo una profesión o una actividad alimenticia. La psiquiatría permitia a Fanon 
pensar lo político y lo social, y viceversa. Esto no significa la psicologización de la 
realidad, como es leído en ocasiones, sino que hay una imbricación entre su 
pensamiento político, social y médico, unos aspectos nutren a los otros. Su 
acercamiento a la enfermedad mental desde diferentes ángulos, el intento de 
transformar el hospital psiquiátrico como un lugar en el que se puedan establecer 
relaciones humanas, su visión de la cultura y el lenguaje, arrojan luz en su 
pensamiento más allá del ámbito de la salud mental. Tres, muchos de estos textos 
reflejan un trabajo en curso, con sus obstáculos, contratiempos soluciones y dejando 
cuestiones abiertas. El interés reside también en que reflejan un proceso de 
deconstrucción y reconstrucción de la psiquiatría. Cuarto, estos textos son relevantes 
para la historia de la psiquiatría y de la medicina (Keller, 2001; 2007).  
La elección de qué incluir va de la mano con la elección de qué excluir. He tenido 
que dejar de lado temas importantes en la obra de Fanon como la exploración de la 
relación entre colonialismo y sexualidad, raza y deseo, de la que Fanon fue pionera en 
la literatura psicoanalítica (Mbembe, 2011). No he analizado las obras de teatro a 
excepción de aspectos concretos que pudieran ilustrar temas tratados en la tesis. 
También he desatendido la relación de Fanon con escritores como Richard Wright y 
Chester Himes, que fueron importantes para su comprensión del racismo en Estados 
Unidos y de la alienación. Me he referido de soslayo a uno de los temas que no está 
cerrado y sobre los que es reconocido: los problemas de liderazgo y totalitarismo en 




económicas neocoloniales. También he omitido la visión internacionalista y 
panafricanista de Fanon, no como ideales sino basada en los movimientos concretos 
de emancipación y las realidades del continente. Finalmente, he incluido el tema del 
amor, la solidaridad y el enfoque de una subjetividad relacional, pero no les he 
dedicado una atención especial en forma de sección o apartado. En su lugar, lo he 
abordado al tratar otros temas.  
Puede ser importante subrayar los actores secundarios de la tesis. El primer 
capítulo trata sobre las lecturas de Fanon en los últimos cuarenta años, los conflictos 
de interpretación, las diferentes posiciones teóricas, y sitúa con más detalle esta tesis 
entre estos debates. Sin embargo, es importante identificar la influencia del filósofo 
Lewis R. Gordon en mi lectura de Fanon. Esta no se ciñe a la interpretación que 
Gordon ofrece de Fanon sino al propio trabajo de Gordon, a partir de Fanon entre 
otors, sobre cuestiones de filosofía de la ciencia, existencialismo y fenomenología, 
filosofía de la diáspora africana y su pensamiento sobre la disciplinariedad, racismo, 
opresión y colonialismo. Asimismo, el trabajo intelectual y médico del antropólogo y 
psiquiatra Roberto Beneduce ocupa un lugar especial en esta tesis, especialmente en 
relación a los textos médicos de Fanon. Al igual que Gordon, las lecturas de 
Beneduce de Fanon y su propio trabajo clarifican la sensibilidad clínico-política en la 
intersección entre la política y la psiquiatría.  
Estructura 
Hay, en general un doble reduccionismo en las lecturas de Fanon en los estudios 
de paz, aunque tamb ién en otros ámbitos: primero, como pensador de la violencia 
revolucionaria; segundo, su pensamiento sobre la violencia se reduce al capítulo 
inicial de Los condenados de la tierra. He dedicado el último capítulo de esta tesis al  




Primero, porque la cuestión de la violencia no se puede reducir a un único capítulo 
del trabajo de Fanon, sino que es constantemente analizada e interrogada en sus 
diferentes manifestaciones constantemente en su obra. Segundo, porque lo Fanon dice 
sobre la violencia  en el capítulo inicial de Los condenados de la tierra, al igual que 
el resto de temas que aborda, no puede entenderse sin otros temas y enfoques que 
están presentes en el resto de su trabajo: el análisis sociogénico, la zona de no ser, la 
relación entre la ética y la política en el contexto colonial, la construcción del 
colonizado, el elemento poético y dramático en sus textos y sus implicaciones 
teóricas y metodológicas, su trabajo sobre el hospital psiquiátrico como lugar 
patogénico, la fenomenología del cuerpo histórico y la opresión, y su visión del 
humanismo, entre otros. Estos aspectos se desarrollaran en el resto de capítulos. 
Tercero, porque el pensamiento de Fanon sobre la violencia en Los condenados de la 
tierra es, en mi tratamiento en esta disertación, útil y perspicaz más allá de su propio 
contexto de enunciación. Teniendo en cuenta estas consideraciones, he estructurado la 
tesis de la siguiente manera:  
El primer capítulo ofrece una visión panorámica de las lecturas de Fanon desde los 
años 60 hasta hoy. También subraya los silencios y la llegada tardía de Fanon en 
ciertos contextos, concretamente Argelia, Francia y Martinica. Este primer capítulo 
también analiza las lecturas de Fanon en los estudios de paz. En este campo Fanon ha 
sido generalmente asociado con la violencia revolucionaria. Esto suscita cuestiones 
sobre el papel y el tratamiento de la violencia en la disciplina y también permite 
explorar otras ausencias relacionadas con el tratamiento de racismo y colonialismo, 
no solo como objetos de estudio o periodos históricos, sino también como 
constitutivos de la modernidad Europea, y las ciencias y disciplinas modernas. Como 




variaciones del problema de la razón instrumental, o la racionalidad técnica o 
científica es insuficiente ya que omite el lado de debajo del capitalismo Europeo 
moderno, una racionalidad racista (Gordon, 1996; Henry, 2006; Maldonado-Torres, 
2008). 
El segunda capítulo continúa con la cuestión de la relación de co-constitución 
entre la ciencia moderna, la formación de disciplinas y el racismo y colonialismo, 
desde la perspectiva de teóricos de la diáspora africana. Concretamente, según es 
teorizada por el abogado y antropólogo haitiano Anténor Firmin, el historiador, 
filósofo y economista estadounidense W.E.B. Du Bois, y Frantz Fanon. Los tres se 
esforzaron en producir formas de conocimiento y reflexión orientadas a la 
emancipación de los negros y afrontaron la pregunta de cómo teorizar sobre a 
condición negra con las herramientas que están implicadas en la construcción de la 
figura del negro y de su patologización. Esto conlleva el cuestionamiento de los 
presuposiciones del pensamiento y lis fundamentos de la producción de 
conocimiento, las asunciones metodológicas, epistémicas y disciplinares junto a la 
interrogación sobre qué es un ser humano y cuál es el estándar del ser humano. 
El tercer capítulo sigue la pista del anterior y aborda la cuestión de la dimensión 
estética y poética en relación a la metodológica y el papel del lenguaje en su trabajo. 
Paget Henry señala que en la filosofía de la diáspora africana la razón comparte el 
mismo nivel con la dimensión poética. En este capítulo se aborda el análisis de la 
alienación en Fanon a partir de la relación del caribeño y el africano con la lengua 
francesa. También el uso de la lengua en Fanon, su relación con el surrealismo y la 
Négritude, la relación entre lengua y cuerpo, su intención de alcanzar al lector más 
allá de la parte racional, y el elemento dramatúrgico también están imbricados en la 




El cuarto capítulo explora los primeros escritos médicos de Fanon. La tesis 
doctoral en psiquiatría comparte aspectos con Piel negras, máscaras blancas a pesar 
de la disparidad temática y metodológica. A partir del estudio de una enfermedad 
hereditaria neurodegenerativa Fanon realiza una intervención en filosofía de la 
psiquiatría, entre otros, cuestionando la división entre neurología y psiquiatría, la 
filosofía antropológica que trata al paciente como un mecanismo sin agencia y los 
problemas que produce a la hora del diagnóstico, y enfatiza la relación entre historia, 
el mundo social y la enfermedad mental.  Fanon llevó estas cuestiones a la clínica en 
“El síndrome norteafricano”, su primer artículo publicado. A los ya citados problemas 
médicos Fanon añade aquí la relación entre racismo, migración, medicina y 
enfermedad y sitúa la clínica en medio de otras dinámicas sociales. Su temprana 
preocupación por el carácter alienante de las categorías diagnósticas, la 
deshumanización a nivel de tratamiento, infraestructura del hospital y la complejidad 
entre lo clínico y lo político confluyen con el trabajo que se estaba realizando en el 
hospital psiquiátrico de Saint-Alban. Allí coincide con el psiquiatra catalán Francesc 
Tosquelles, que junto a su círculo desarrolló la psicoterapia institucional, un enfoque 
pionero de la enfermedad mental y del hospital psiquiátrico desarrollado a partir de la 
experiencia de la Guerra Civil española y la resistencia a la ocupación Nazi. 
El quinto capítulo parte de la base que Fanon llegó a Argelia como psiquiatra y 
con la intención de aplicar el enfoque de Saint-Alban. Pese a que la psicoterapia 
institucional se desarrolló en situaciones de guerra, el contexto que Fanon encontró a 
su llegada a Argelia, un año y medio antes del inicio de la guerra, difería 
considerablemente de la Guerra Civil española y la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Este 
capítulo explora la alienación colonial, el papel ambivalente de la medicina en el 




el papel importante de la psiquiatría colonial en la construcción del musulmán, del 
africano, y en legitimar la opresión y patologizar la resistencia. 
El sexto capítulo se centra en los intentos de Fanon de reconstruir la psiquiatría en 
Argelia y en Túnez. La trayectoria de Fanon respecto al hospital psiquiátrico se 
podría resumir como un movimiento que va desde su intención inicial de curar el 
hospital mediante la psicoterapia institucional a su trabajo en Túnez donde se centra 
en curar con el hospital a partir de un trabajo pionero basado en la creación de un 
hospital de día. Es decir, pone el peso del proceso de curación en la sociedad. 
Entremedias, Fanon interroga la medicina mental en relación a la cultura local, la 
religión, las instituciones sociales, la situación política, su propia función como 
psiquiatra en un contexto de opresión y su papel como militante e intelectual 
anticolonial.  
El séptimo capítulo se centra en el análisis de la violencia en Los condenados de la 
tierra. En vez de una defensa o una justificación de la violencia, Fanon la analiza 
como una “problemática”, es decir, a violencia está conectada a una serie de 
cuestiones en el corto y en el largo plazo. No es un capítulo sobre la violencia 
revolucionaria, ni sobre violencia física o directa, la violencia es abordad por Fanon 
como un fenómeno relacional y multidimensional. Como ya mencioné, un enfoque 
solamente moral sobre el análisis de la violencia corre el riesgo de no entender ni el 
análisis de Fanon ni su propia posición, no solo respecto a la violencia sino a toda los 
problemas a los que está ligada. En dicho capítulo Fanon articula una comprensión de 
la violencia que escapa a la reducción de la violencia como medio o como fin.  
Nota sobre la traducción 
Para esta tesis he utilizado mi propia traducción al inglés de los primeras cuatro 




En aras de la legibilidad y pensando en el lector he colocado la cita en el cuerpo del 
texto y he añadido una nota al pie con la traducción correspondiente. En las ocasiones 
en que la nueva traducción modifica sustancialmente la traducción inglesa publicada, 
he añadido otra nota explicativa. 
Los problemas tras las diferentes traducciones inglesas de Fanon han sido, en 
general, recogidos en la literatura secundaria (Judy, 1996; Gibson, 2007; Gordon, 
2015; Batchelor and Harding, 2017). Hay problemas respecto a la terminología 
filosófica. Como ejemplo el quinto capítulo de Black Skin White Masks, 
probablemente el más importante, ha sido traducido como “The fact of clackness” en 
vez de “The lived experience of the black” omitiendo todo la dimensión 
fenomenológica del capítulo traslada un significado diferente a como Fanon usa  y 
entiende blackness/negritud, o ser negro en una sociedad racista. The Fact of 
Blackness adquirió su propia vida y se convirtió luego en un volumen de ensayos 
sobre Fanon. En las traducciones inglesas hay también problemas a nivel de género. 
En el original Fanon utiliza el género masculino y el francés l’homme para referirse al 
ser humano. Sin embargo esto se ha exacerbado en inglés con resultados confusos. En 
ocasiones “the black” se ha traducido en inglés como “the black man” (Gordon, 
2015). El filósofo ghanés Ato Sekyi-Out en su reciente trabajo propone traducir el 
hombre por el ser humano, ya que citando a Fanon: “Todas las formas de explotación 
se ejercen contra el mismo ‘objeto’: el ser humano”. (Fanon, citado en Sekyi-Otu, 
2018: 40). Sekyi-Otu escribe: 
He traducido l’homme de Fanon en el francés original como ‘el ser humano’ 
(en vez de el hombre) por fidelidad a las presuposiciones igualitarias de su 
argumento. Esa misma fidelidad a la lógica ilativa del antirracismo de Fanon 
y el nuestro nos compele someter a una crítica incansable las abominables 
injusticias no-raciales, y toda suerte de deshumanización en sociedades 





Aunque de acuerdo con el argumento de Sekyi-Otu, he mantenido el lenguaje 
masculino de Fanon, al ser parte del contexto discursivo en el que escribió, en las 
citas traducidas, y he usado “el ser humano” y no “el hombre” como génerico al 
parafrasearlo. También, siguiendo a Gordon, no he traducido el término origina nègre 
ya que sus connotaciones son difíciles de replicar en inglés. También he mantenido 
los títulos franceses de sus obras The Wretched of the Earth (Les damnés de la terre) 
y A Dying Colonialism (L’an V de la revolution algérienne). Además de problemas 
semánticos en la traducción, los títulos ingleses no reflejan las referencias tras los 
títulos. Les damnés de la terre no solo hace referencia a La Internacional, también lo 
hace a Jacques Roumain, un poeta de la Négritude (Gordon, 2015). L’an V de la 
revolution algérienne (literalmente, el año V de la revolución argelina) captura un 
momento concreto de la guerra anticolonial, y aunque los temas y el carácter de las 
obras son diferentes el título puede entenderse como un guiño a El 18 de brumario de 
Luis Bonaparte de Marx. En resuman en ambos títulos puede haber una doble 
referencia a la tradición socialista y a las tradiciones emancipadoras africanas y de la 
diáspora africana. 
No he traducido la nueva colección de textos psiquiátricos, políticos y obras de teatro 
recopilados en francés en el 2015. He utilizado directamente la traducción inglesa de 
2018 excepto en los pocos casos en los que he modificado la traducción. Esta elección 
y el diferente tratamiento entre unos textos y otros obedece fundamentalmente a que 
en este caso la traducción inglesa es más cuidadosa con los problemas citados 
anteriormente y otros que no he mencionado aquí y a los que hago referencia en el 













Chapter 1. Reading, misreading and non-readings  
An Igbo proverb tells us that a man who does not know where the rain 
began to beat him cannot say where he dried his body. (Chinua 
Achebe, 2012) 
 
In the wake, the past that is not past reappears, always, to rupture the 
present. The Past—or, more accurately, pastness—is a position. Thus, 




“About Fanon, everything is still to be said”, wrote Sartre one year after Fanon’s 
death (quoted in Renault, 2011: 11; my translation
5
). Almost fifty years later Paul 
Gilroy observes that “rather than Fanon’s insights being redundant or anachronistic, 
the full impact of his political and philosophical writing has not so far been 
appreciated” (2010: 18). Although I concur with Gilroy’s statement concerning the 
possibilities that Fanon’s thought offers, it is also important to acknowledge that the 
engagement with the work of the Martiniquean thinker has been abundant, fecund and 
diverse, from a variety of contexts and from the standpoint of theoretical and political 
perspectives.  
Ten years after Gilroy’s admonition, the scholarly work on Fanon has not 
devitalized but intensified. Reading Fanon implies not only establishing a relation 
with him but also with other readers from different disciplines and historical, 
geographical contexts and political traditions. Thus, Fanon does not appear untouched 
and intact, for, as Italo Calvino puts it concerning classics, Fanon “come[s] to us 
bearing the aura of previous interpretations, and trailing behind them the traces they 
have left in the culture or cultures (or just in the languages and customs) through 
which they have passed.” (2000: 5)  
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This chapter examines how Fanon has been read and is read today. This offers a 
panoramic view of the secondary literature on Fanon, the main debates, contexts, 
themes, disciplines involved, the divergences and positions, the traces left from 
reading to reading, as Calvino puts it, and thereby to situate this dissertation within 
the literature. This chapter also addresses the readings of Fanon in peace studies. This 
leads to examine the boundaries of the discipline, how they are constituted, which 
criteria. I will focus mainly on the question of violence in peace studies. Yet this also 
leads to explore how themes addressed by Fanon, such as race, racism and 
colonialism and its aftermaths have been addressed in peace studies. To that effect I 
have structured this chapter thusly:  
The first section addresses the secondary literature following the arrangement of 
the secondary literature on Fanon by Lewis R. Gordon, T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting, 
and Renée T. White (1996) and Gordon (2015) on six stages. Although these stages 
follow a chronological order, it is not necessarily a linear progression. I have chosen 
this classification, mostly based on works in  English, over others focused on the 
geographical since it enable to see the themes, the disciplines, the political urgencies 
and the forms of activism that have been prioritized in each stage. 
The second section turns to the reception in contexts in which Fanon was directly 
related. In Martinique, France, and Algeria, for different reasons but with the 
common denominator of questions related to memory, the thought of Fanon as 
engaged relatively late, or not engaged and treated as a figure or a symbol. 
The third section explores the readings of Fanon today, in the double sense of 
reading Fanon for different historical and geographical contexts in which his thought 




The fourth section explores the readings of Fanon in peace studies. Such 
exploration is not extensive, but limited to four important journals of the field and 
volumes from important authors of peace studies. This brief review reveals that, with 
the exception of one doctoral dissertation on postcolonial studies, the thought of 
Fanon is scarcely engaged, his work is referred in passing and usually in regard to his 
view of violence as psychologically liberating. 
The fifth section delves into this silence and this reduction to violence and his 
historical context in order to examine the reasons for this absence. This section 
focuses on the question of violence and its role and position in peace studies. The 
following section addresses coloniality, race and racism and themes upon which 
Fanon theorized, and their absence in the field.  
1.1 Six stages of Fanon studies 
Lewis R. Gordon, T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting, and Renée T. White, editors of the 
volume Fanon: A Critical Reader (1996) have arranged the literature on Fanon into 
five stages according to certain common features shared. The first stage emphasize 
Fanon’s revolutionary dimension associating him with figures of the Third World 
liberation movements such as Fidel Castro, Patrice Lumumba or Paulo Freire, and the 
reaction of thinkers like Hannah Arendt or Nguyen. His ideas also influenced the 
Black Panther Party and Steve Biko who led the Black Consciousness movement. A 
second stage is marked by the biographical moment, especially in the 1970’s, with the 
proliferation of works on Fanon’s life. The third stage was dominated by social and 
political theorists and analyzed the possibilities of Fanon’s thought through and for 
social and political sciences. The fourth stage of Fanon studies is comprised by 
postmodern cultural studies and postcolonial studies. The fifth stage corresponds to 




work across the entire sphere of human studies” (Gordon et al.,1996: 6). Basically, 
the focus is upon what can be learnt from Fanon, without neither glorifying nor 
denigrating him. These works are not uniquely about Fanon, but also “with and 
through Fanon” (Gordon et al, 1996: 7; italics in the original), rather than “working 
over” as certain voices in postcolonial studies  propose (Alessandrini, 1997: 141). 
The authors of the volume lead by example and offer a diverse set of essays that 
range from sociology and psychiatry to feminism, existential phenomenology and 
Africana philosophy, without confining Fanon to a specific field. Instead, the issues 
raised are addressed to the extradisciplinary concerns that are present in the texts of 
Fanon (De Oto, 2003: 29).  In this fifth stage, which continues up to today, can also 
be included the work of Hussein Bulhan (1985) on the possibilities of Fanon’s work 
to the field of psychology, Lewis Gordon’s (1995) work on questions of philosophy 
of science and human studies. Ato-Sekyi-Otu (1996) examines Fanon for postcolonial 
African political theory. T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting (1997), employs the thought of 
Fanon for her explorations on feminist theory, Paget Henry’s (2000) considers Fanon 
as the hinge of Afro-Caribbean philosophy. Alejandro De Oto (2003) investigates 
postcolonial subjectivities and current political urgencies underlying Fanon’s thought 
on temporality and historicity. Nelson Maldonado Torres (2008) uses the Antillean 
thinker for his own developments on decolonial ethics. Jane Anna Gordon (2014) 
explores the work of Fanon for creolization theory. Achille Mbembe (2016), draws 
on Fanon to scrutinize current societal values of configurations based on enmity, 
exclusion and separation. George Ciccariello-Maher (2017) uses Fanon to rethink the 
question of dialectics. Nigel Gibson and Roberto Beneduce (2017) think with Fanon 
questions of racism related to migrants, refugees and the clinic, violence and trauma, 




order to interrogate child psychology, education and pedagogy. A sixth stage that 
Lewis Gordon (2015) subsequently distinguished goes through and permeates the five 
previous ones. It consists on self-reflection on how the work of Fanon is thought and 
studied. This list does not intend to be exhaustive and it is still open. 
1.1.1 Conflicts and Fanonism 
A common and recurrent theme of the sixth stage is the issue of competing and 
conflicting fidelities, appropriations and uses of Fanon, as it can be perceived in the 
other previous stages, and in the classification itself. These conflicts and concerns 
revolve around what Calvino, in his reading of the classics, calls the traces through 
which the work of Fanon reaches us today, and with them the “accretions, 
deformations or expansions” of original texts (2000: 5). 
The question of biography is one of the elements of the debate within Fanon 
studies. The attempt to humanize Fanon leads to some biographical license that verge 
on fiction, and in some cases, falsehood. The consequence of the biographical 
moment was that some of its traces engendered uninformed scholarship on Fanon, by 
means of a tendency to psychologize and pathologize his statements and his life 
choices. As his fellow intern Alice Cherki points out, Fanon’s ideas are superficially 
or not directly engaged. Labels such as ‘outdated’, ‘obsolete’, or ‘apostle of violence’ 
are commonly associated with Fanon’s thought (2011).  For instance, Albert 
Memmi’s article, The Impossible Life of Frantz Fanon (1973), portrays the image of a 
Fanon driven by rage. Memmi speculates on identity troubles as the underlying cause 
of Fanon’s move to Algeria: for Memmi it was a way of rejecting his Caribbean 
origins and despising his being black. In a similar line, the political scientist 
Françoise Vergès offers a psychological explanation of Fanon’s relation with his 




decision was motivated by a need of running away from the ambiguity of his creolité, 
the anxious search for a reinvention, including his masculinity, and the need of 
belonging, something that he would find among the Algerian combatants (1997: 579-
580). Attributing possible and plausible weaknesses in the work of Fanon to his 
biography is something that also bell hooks has fallen prey to. Although she generally 
offers a nuanced, not exempt of ambivalence, reading of Fanon, and argues for the 
compatibility of black male thinkers with feminist thought, hooks accounts the 
absence of the black female in Fanon’s last work, what she calls “a symbolic 
matricide”, to an alleged conflict with his mother in real life based on Fanon’s skin 
color (1996: 81, 83). Against these manifestations of what Brigitte Riera calls 
“mediocre psychologism” (2013: 25), Hussein Bulhan (1985: 15-23) and Alice 
Cherki (2011) among others, have provided biographical rigor. It is not the scope of 
this dissertation to get into the arena of the objective facts and the subjective reasons 
of Fanon’s life. As Gibson and Beneduce put it, to interpret or speculate retroactively 
on the life choices of someone whose life reached the age of 36 as if it was a coherent 
whole, is, to say the least, highly disputable (2017: 25). However, some brief 
theoretical observations may shed light on these issues. The question of rage, 
reactional and evasive behavior and self-hatred that Memmi underscores reveals a 
lack of understanding of his work. As it will be developed throughout this dissertation 
these are precisely dimensions that Fanon was constantly addressing both as a 
psychiatrist and as a social theorist. In respect of his ambivalent relation to 
Martinique, both Vergès and Memmi assess Fanon through an atomistic and liberal 
view of man which did not guide Fanon’s thought. They fail to consider the 
connections inherent in the diasporic condition, and the intimate sets of relations 




by virtue of uneven relations that were constituted, and constituting, the colonial and 
the modern world. Fanon was not a unique case. For the Caribbean philosopher and 
poet Édouard Glissant, thinkers like Marcus Garvey, Aimé Cesaire, George Padmore 
or W.E.B. Du Bois also followed similar vital and intellectual movements. What 
Glissant calls détour is  
the ultimate resort of a population whose domination by an Other is 
concealed: it then must search elsewhere for the principle of domination, 
which is not evident in the country itself: because the system of domination 
(…) is not directly tangible (1989: 20). 
 
The movement of détour, which for Glissant Fanon exemplifies, illuminates a  
“zone shared elsewhere” (1989: 26) and also involves a return, not necessarily in 
terms of geography or origins, but “to the point where our problems lay in wait for 
us” (1989: 25), “to the point of entanglement, from which we were forcefully turned 
away” (1989: 26).  In short, what Glissant brings to the foreground is the relationality 
and the “convergence of asymmetries” (Lowe, 2015: 11) of histories that are 
presented as disconnected.  
In many instances Fanon has been reduced to a biography at the expense of his 
thought. The “man of action” has eclipsed the “man of thought”, and Fanon’s life, 
deeds, experiences and context are used to replace or relegate his thought (Renaultb, 
2011).  Lewis Gordon has widely theorized on the relation between theory and 
experience and the racial and gendered dynamics involved. This relationship and its 
meaning have shifted with time. Gordon reminds us that if the biographical for St. 
Augustine went beyond the individuality of the author, for the modern liberal view of  
the human, the biographical moment refers to a portrait of the autonomy and 
uniqueness of  the man. If a thinker is conceived uniquely in terms of biography and 
experience, he or she may be historically and temporally bound to the specificity of 




2000: 24). To that, a racial dimension is to be considered: Who provides experience 
and who figures out, interprets, and makes sense of that experience is distributed 
across an asymmetrical economy of Reason: “White intellectuals provide theory; 
black intellectuals provide experience” (Gordon: 2000: 29). How to deal with a 
Reason that rejected him is also a constant theme in Fanon. The fact of providing 
meaning to his experience was for Fanon not only a form of agency and a 
reaffirmation of him as a subject. Reflection on experience is also a movement of 
expansion from the private to the intersubjective, a movement towards establishing 
relations with a community of thinkers and their experiences (Gordon, 2006: 31). 
Another debate turns around the question of loyalties, the plurality of readings or 
the misreadings of Fanon. For Stuart Hall, this debate is not a novelty, for the 
attempts to “colonize” Fanon can be traced back to the first readings after his death. 
Hall emphasizes that every reading is a re-reading (1996: 15).  Anthony Alessandrini, 
editor of the anthology Frantz Fanon, Critical Perspectives, also raises the issue of 
fidelity when he asks, without falling into an “easy unthinking pluralism”, if every 
interpretation has necessarily to be a misinterpretation. The task is, however, to apply 
his work with its insights and flaws to contemporary cultural issues (1999: 1). In the 
same volume, centered around the relevance of Fanon for cultural studies, Nigel 
Gibson departs from that line of thought by clearly stating that he will “use Fanon to 
polemicize against invented Fanons” (1999:  102). His argument is not about a naïve 
claim for the authenticity of his interpretation, or for the existence of an unequivocal 
of Fanon. What Gibson is pointing at is that beyond textual considerations there are 
also external dimensions, historical, political and societal dynamics that inform 




narratives of the end of history and the end of struggles, have removed the political 
sharpness of Fanon in certain readings in cultural and postcolonial studies. 
 E. San Juan Jr. also points out harshly the cannibalistic licenses that postmodern 
scholarship has taken with Fanon. In a similar vein, Lewis Gordon’s last work on 
Fanon has in its title a statement of intent against relativistic readings, What Fanon 
Said: A Philosophical Introduction to his Life and Thought (2015).  This might 
situate the text in what De Oto calls the limiting terrain of fidelities, especially when 
dealing with a thinker that is eminently about openness and not closure (2003: 27). 
However, this is not a form of closing off the dialogue, imposing an authorial 
perspective, and defining the boundaries of fidelities. What probably Gordon is 
referring to, is that as Italo Calvino puts it, “a classic is a work which constantly 
generates a pulviscular cloud of critical discourse around it, but which always shakes 
the particles off” (2000: 6). Therefore, an engagement with what Fanon said is an 
invitation to the social world, for a world of others is required for textual and 
contextual meanings, interpretation and evidence of what an author means to be 
presented, and for the subsequent critical discussion (Gordon, 2015: 1). 
 Thus, the question that emerges from this brief survey of Fanon studies is not 
about which Fanon to follow. Instead, the question, also raised by Alejandro de Oto, 
is however, with which texts to establish a dialogue in this diverse and seemingly 
mutually exclusive landscape of Fanon studies, where disagreement dominates. This 
is neither uncommon nor necessarily detrimental in scholarship. The added difficulty 
that Alejandro De Oto, Gordon and Nigel Gibson observe is, as commented above,  
that many of these conflicts, besides referring to the text itself, they also remit to the 
external space, for invoking Fanon already elicits tensions on different regions of 




experience, or theoretical crossroads. In sum, Fanon is interpellated from many 
diverse ideological, theoretical, contextual, and temporal regions (De Oto, 2003: 18). 
To end up with Calvino’s advice on classics, the Italian writer emphasizes the 
importance of defining one’s position, “otherwise both the reader and the text tend to 
drift in a timeless haze” (2000: 8). In this moment of choice and to establish 
priorities, my inclinations will lead to those readings that recognize the different 
dimensions of Fanon’s work as a whole, the psychiatrist, the militant, the anticolonial 
and postcolonial intellectual, the philosopher of science, of the human, of the social 
and of existence, the playwright, and the radical humanist. Once again, this is not 
about disciplines for their own sake, but in the spirit of Fanon, because the rupture of 
disciplinary borders enables a better understanding of racism, postcolonial alienation, 
and epistemic violence (Beneduce: 2016: 8). In this vein, the work of Lewis Gordon 
since the mid 1990’s that reads Fanon, against the grain of dominant theories of that 
time, as an existential phenomenologist has opened new venues of thought that have 
led to multiple directions, as exemplified by the work of Nelson Maldonado-Torres, 
Paget Henry, Linda Martin Alcoff, Sara Ahmed,  Roberto Beneduce, Nigel Gibson, 
Mogobo. P More, and Sylvia Wynter. 
1.1.2 Fanon Today 
Not unrelated to the question of readings and misreadings, uses and misues, are the 
debates concerning the applicability of Fanon’s work outside of his context. Henry 
Louis Gates Jr. famous article “Critical Fanonisms” (1999) denounced the production 
of Fanon as a “global theorist in vacuo” as opposed to “the historical Fanon” (1999: 
255). His main concern was not Fanon’s thought, but Edward Said’s aim to elaborate   
“a grand unified theory of oppression” (1999: 267). For Gates Jr., literary theory is 




from the test of time. This elicited an energetic response by Cedric Robinson in his 
essay “The Appropriation of Frantz Fanon” (1993), criticizing the article as “self-
referential debates on colonial discourse” (1993: 78), and for emphasizing the literary 
and petit-bourgeois dimensions of Frantz Fanon at the expense of the Marxist and the 
class-critique ones. Alternatively, Edward Said’s “Travelling Theory Reconsidered” 
(1994) raises interesting issues regarding Gates’ suspicions against global theory. In 
this essay, about and with Fanon, Said revisits his own previous skepticism regarding 
the applicability of theory outside of its specific historical circumstances. Against his 
initial view that the genesis of a theory is inextricably linked to its value, and the 
furthest it travels from its origin the more it is weakened, Said now posits through a 
reexamination of concepts that have been travelling from Adorno to Lukács to Fanon, 
that there is a form of theoretical re-ignition beyond adaptation and use, that leads to 
the expansion of the intellectual community when theory is not confined by 
universalisms or particularisms (1999).  
As stated in the introduction, in this dissertation I approach Fanon’s work in his 
historical context, although this does not amount to historicize him. I also treat Fanon 
as helping us to think different aspects of the present, and containing the possibility of 
engaging in dialogue with contemporary thinkers. If it is important to consider the 
history and context of Fanon is mainly because he adamantly did in his work, and this 
inscription in time and history, as several authors have pointed out, is one of the 
reasons that, paradoxically, have enabled his work to travel to other contexts, other 
times, addressing other political urgencies and to be addressed in different disciplines 
(Alessandrini, 2014; Renault, 2011; Mbembe, 2011). At the same time, Fanon also 




 The British playwright Deborah Levy asks “Why is Frantz Fanon, who died in 
1961, our contemporary?” (quoted in Alessandrini, 2014:3). This question points in 
two intersecting directions. The first points at Fanon’s texts, what he theorized about, 
what questions did he leave open, what is useful, its shortcomings, and what he did 
not theorize about; and the second direction points to the current world, the changes, 
the continuities, the transfigurations, the grey zones and the hidden connections 
between his time and today.  
It is obvious that the world is different that the world in which Fanon lived. There 
are few formal colonies, colonial empires are no longer institutionalized, there are 
new legal frameworks, anti-racist laws, societal and economic global configurations. 
Race and racism have changed their appearance several times since Fanon’s time, 
from silence, to colorblindness and postraciality, to the current overt reappearance of 
white supremacy. Yet at the same time, race as the colonial measure of humanity 
continues to define what it is to be a man or a woman, it fixes groups of human 
beings under the level of humanity. It locks people into their bodies and physicality, it 
thwarts human relations and configures relations at the spatial, economic, sexual 
level. Racism threatens life, health, and forms of living, it produces physical and 
mental suffering. The colonial logics of spatiality keep hindering physical movement, 
locking groups of people in concrete neighborhoods, migration centers, refugee 
camps, under conditions of violence and dehumanization. The war on terror 
rationalized as the spread of democracy, as a new form of the civilizing mission, 
pathologizes and targets new groups of people, constructing new problem people, as 
Du Bois put it, and enhances the economy of extraction in the Global South with the 
complicity of local elites. At the level of knowledge, racism still shapes how it is 




approaches suffering devoid of historical, social and political considerations. It 
produces more suffering through their definitions and diagnostics, it pathologizes 
abnormality and revolt. 
 
If, as we will see, Fanon’s ideas have travelled, been critically examined and 
completed, so have colonial practices. Elsa Dorlin studies how the colonial world has 
been a laboratory of techniques of repression, of knowledges of subjugation and of 
policies of security that have also travelled between the Global South and back to the 
North (Dorlin, 2017). In the same way that the military defeat of France in Indochina 
provided them lessons for their military and police tactics in Algeria, the colonies 
have also been studied for the torture and the tactics of the war on terror (Keller, 
2014) Knowledges, structures and practices, are also accompanied by concrete 
names. As an instance, Pierre Bolotte, a high civil servant in Algiers during the well-
known Battle of Algiers, would also be the prefect in charge of the bloody repression 
of the anticolonial movement in Guadeloupe in May 67. Bolotte later became the 
prefect of the region of Seine-Saint Denis, the Parisian banlieue, and in 1971 created 
the BAC (Anti-Criminality Brigade), a pioneering police force engaged in repression 
and maintenance of the social order that decades later was  expanded to other French 
departments (Dorlin, 2017).  
How the colonial condition informs the contemporary world has been theorized in 
diverse manners. Achille Mbembe defines the “postcolony” as emerging from the 
colonial regimes, their concomitant violence, and generating “a distinctive style of 
political improvisation, [characterized] by a tendency to excess and lack of 
proportion, as well as by distinctive ways identities are multiplied, transformed” 




role played by colonial continuities in its configuration. However, these continuities 
seem to succeed, to have their origin only in the past. The result is that he isolates the 
postcolony from coterminous and broader colonial-like power relations, and reduces 
the postcolony uniquely to an internal affair.  Lewis Gordon complements this by 
outlining the resemblance of Mbembe’s description of the postcolony with the idea of 
the neocolony, although he adds that it has to be situated it within “a wider, 
international geopolitical economy of power”, otherwise “the onus of responsibility 
becomes evidently local” (2008: 141). 
For Gordon, the prefix post- meaning beyond is misleading. Instead, besides the 
temporal dimension and a shared distribution of agency and responsibility, the 
postcolonial also implies questions of politics and morality; it has connotations of 
shame and lack of legitimacy. In contrast to the old colonial enterprise, postcolonies 
are colonies that “are no longer called colonies” (2008: 241). In this light, “the post 
has become the absence of colonial legitimacy in the face of colonial aspiration” 
(2008: 242).  The President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso lent 
weight to this argument when in 2007 unapologetically stated that the European 
Union is “the first non-imperial empire.” (Mahony, 2007) 
Intellectuals from the Latin American Modernity/Coloniality group like Ramón 
Grosfóguel, Walter Mignolo or Aníbal Quijano use the term coloniality at the level of 
power, being and knowledge not to identify the remainders or legacies of colonialism, 
but to refer to the historically constituted geopolitical, economic, social, and 
knowledge production relations and structures that derive from colonialism and 
European modernity. For these thinkers racial and gendered hierarchies are the 
organizing principle of relations of domination, modes of production, the 




(Maldonado-Torres, 2007).  Although these authors situate the emergence of 
coloniality in the conquest of the Americas, its manifestations across the globe are 
diverse and locally specific though related. In that sense, colonial histories are 
connected by coloniality as “a single globalized mode of domination” (Suárez-
Krabbe, 2014:20). Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2018) slightly differs with the 
coloniality/modernity thinkers. He argues that coloniality cannot capture the insidious 
nature of contemporary colonialism. For him, coloniality is included within 
colonialism. This presupposes that colonialism has not come to an end after the 
struggles for independence, it has rather mutated through simultaneous processes of 
continuity and change.  The continuity is manifested in the pervasive distinctions 
between humans and less than humans as the basis of modes of sociability. The 
mutations consist partly in hiding away the continuities themselves and their 
provenances. Movements and discourses on human rights, anti-racism or equality that 
imply a rupture and innovation with earlier times may serve to conceal the 
continuities of colonialism as a form of domination. 
Despite their differences, these understandings of the postcolonial condition have 
in common that the colonial, the anticolonial and the postcolonial overlap, something 
that already took place in Fanon’s time, although qualitatively and proportionally 
different. For the purposes of this dissertation, the significance of these 
understandings of the disguises, continuities, transformations reveal the need to look 
conjointly at the present configurations of the world and at the “habits of historical 
construction” (Robinson, 2005: 176). Cedric Robinson warns against the risk that 
closed periodization of historical events imply “when we turn from the ordering of 
things, that is chronological sequencings, to the order of things, that is the 




original). It is then important to consider, as Fanon, Cabral, N’Krumah and others 
did, that decolonization is an open and incomplete process. This requires “a long 
view” (Kelley, 2000: xxv), both backwards and forwards. A view that enables to 
understand anticolonialism differently: not uniquely as a moment, a stabilized, 
concrete historical period, but also as a dynamic, open temporal arc, and a political 
and ethical position.   
Concerning Fanon’s texts, Gates Jr. concedes that the polyvocality of Fanon’s text, 
which are “highly porous” facilitates the different interpretations and the dispersion, 
rather than the historical relocation which Gates attempts (1999: 252). Matthieu 
Renault endeavors to withdraw from this either/or logic by thinking Fanon at his 
historical and geographical situation, while at the same time “evading these 
coordinates” and “moving toward a beyond (post), in another time and place” (2011: 
107). The result of this conjoint strategy of historization and displacement is to 
consider Fanon’s thought as a “postcolonialism of war”, the kind of which 
postcolonial studies avoid engaging with, chides Renault (2011b: 116). Such 
characterization of Fanon can be understood in line with the criticisms received by 
postcolonial theorists of “academic domestication” and presenting a defanged Fanon, 
and with the scholarship that focuses on Fanon “after the postcolonial” (Gibson, 
2011b:3-4, Sekyi-Otu, 1996; Gordon, 1995; Rabaka, 2010b; Bird-Pollan, 2015). 
Concerning Renault’s intriguing formulation, Gibson and Beneduce point out that 
although the experience of war in Europe and Algeria informed Fanon’s clinical and 
political thought, it is disputable whether a postcolonialism of war is the most suitable 
way to think Fanon, and also whether there is ‘post’, and what it would mean, in 
postcolonialism and postwar (Gibson and Beneduce, 2017: 220). It is also not clear 




everyday of racism and colonialism does not conventional definitions of war.  
Likewise, focusing on Fanon as a thinker of armed struggle contexts risks leaving 
aside his concern for what he called “human things”, that is, “the pristine vicissitudes 
of the human predicament” (Sekyi-Otu, 1996: 17) interrupted by violence and 
dehumanization. To liberate Fanon without dehistoricize him, thinkers have taken the 
inverse route of Matthieu Renault, that is, to question first the meaning of the post in 
the postcolonial, as we have seen above, and then to examine what is or what is not 
profitable in Fanon for their intellectual project. Ato Sekyi Otu distinguishes between 
the Fanon of postcolonialism and the Fanon of the postcolony in order to illuminate 
the colonial political, economic, social, cultural and epistemic configurations 
remaining and mutating after African independence. 
Anthony Alessandrini and Nigel Gibson suggest two different models of 
approaching Fanon today. Alessandrini warns against the logic of using current 
struggles to show the applicability of Fanon’s ideas. Instead, he proposes to examine 
whether Fanon’s theoretical framework suits the analysis of the situation. This 
requires centering the situation to be analyzed and seeing what can be saved (2014:8). 
For Gibson “[t]he issue is not so much about decentering Fanon but decentering the 
world” (2007:41). Rather than focusing on what can be saved in Fanon he looks at 
aspects of the contemporary world that would hold Fanon’s attention. He outlines that 
the relevance does not lie in looking at the points where the world and Fanon 
converge, but at the moments of non-correspondence, and how he would respond to 
the situation.  
The authors agree that Fanon’s ideas cannot be directly transposed to current 
events without a specific elaboration in relation to their locus of origin, however, this 




contemporaries, such as Pierre Bordieu or Michel Foucault. In that vein, Norman 
Ajari wonders why the works of figures like Hegel or Kant extend beyond Prussia, or 
the thought of Hobbes and Spinoza is not reduced to the context of the European 
religious wars, and Fanon’s scope is supposed to be exhausted after the 
independences of the twentieth century. Posing the appropriate questions of one’s 
time implies also thinking beyond of the time (Ajari, 2014). What Ajari brings up is 
the aforementioned question of biography and experience in thinkers of African 
descent and its relation to theory, in which the ideas of European thinkers can be 
detached from their time and experience. To this, Gordon adds, there is an additional 
ideological dimension by which the thought of revolutionary thinkers, like Marx or 
Fanon, is treated with suspicion and as a matter of the past, in anti- or 
counterrevolutionary times (Gordon, 2015). 
1.1.3 Late arrivals to Fanon 
The above account of the intense intellectual and activist reception of Fanon’s 
work would be incomplete without the other side of the reception, the silence, 
rejection or disavowal of Fanon’s work, as the absence of Francophone scholarship in 
the genealogy presented above attests. 
In France in 1961 Les damnés de la terre was banned from publication for being 
considered a threat to national security. This did not avoid a wide circulation of the 
book with different responses. Among conservative circles it was received as a 
diatribe against European civilization in toto (Cherki, 2011).  By the left wing the 
book was treated with a paternalism that masked the discomfort that its content and 
unorthodoxy elicited. A work that implied the European working class as also 
profiting from the colonial system, and a book that directly addressed the people 




remained, however, the circle of Jean Paul Sartre, Simone De Beauvoir, Francis 
Jeanson, Charles Lanzmann, and François Maspero, who debated and diffused the 
ideas of Fanon. 
After the Algerian war and the African independences, the whole colonial history 
was “buried, or rather, encrypted” for decades (Cherki, 2000: 333), and so was 
Fanon’s work, except for the doctoral dissertation of Philippe Lucas in 1971 and 
some isolated articles. The colonial history belonged to the past and Fanon’s work 
was considered outdated, and Fanon was a disturbing figure (Cherki, 2011: Mbembe, 
2012).  Roberto Beneduce adds that the silence and the manipulation of Fanon’s 
writings is a manifestation of the pathological cycle of colonial violence and the 
unhealed colonial wounds that remain in French collective memory (2016, 9-10).  
Anxiety and malaise was not only in regard to Fanon. Rather than amnesia and 
forgetting, Laura Ann Stoler describes these phenomena as aphasia, a difficulty 
speaking and generating vocabulary. This “loss of access and active dissociation” 
(2011: 125) has affective and epistemic implications, but has also determined public 
debate and academia. Stoler reminds how thinkers with a close relationship with 
Algeria like Bourdieu, Derrida, Rancière have kept a long silence on Algeria creating 
a chasm thus between their Algerian experience and their intellectual production 
(Stoler, 2011). Also Sartre kept a long silence on the fate of the damnés after 1962 
(Riéra, 2013). 
The irruption of the study of colonial matters in French scholarship and public 
debate in the 21
st
 century brought Fanon resolutely back. Stoler wonders if this 
saturation of intellectual production is not a way of closing the circle, that is a 
redefinition of French national consciousness through morality that masks the 




has become a safe place and has a redemptive character, “not a repentance, (…)  but a 
new moral narrative, (…) a renewed pride that to be French is to rise above one’s past 
prejudices and history.” (2011: 145) In this context scholarship on Fanon went from 
initially preventing his loss and preservation to a sense of theoretical and political 
urgency as to the global debates that had been missed and to the social reality to be 
confronted (Mbembe, 2012). 
Parallel to the French aphasia, in Algeria, after independence the Fanon that 
remained was the militant committed to the revolution at the expense of the 
intellectual one. Although the hospital where he worked in Blida, a boulevard and a 
high school were given his name, his intellectual contributions thinned with the 
passage of time. Many of the less optimistic admonitions anticipated in Les damnés 
de la terre were confirmed after the Algerian war. Fanon’s radical democratic 
position, his atheism, his position towards women’s role, his warning against 
considering decolonization as mere seizure of power and replacement of regimes, and 
the discordant developments in independent Algeria made of him a bothering 
intellectual among official circles. The government position towards Fanon was to 
praise his commitment in the revolution while minimizing his intellectual influence 
and heritage (Cherki, 2011: 327-331).  As Arezki Metref explains in his article “Les 
traces de Fanon sur le sable de l’ingratitude algérienne”, the name of Fanon was 
present, but devoid of content except for within some small circles of self-taught 
intellectuals (2011). It was in 1987 with the organization of an international 
conference when Fanon’s intellectual work was brought to light, to be submerged 
again under the terror of the 1990’s (Metref, 2011). 
Finally in Martinique, the posthumous homage by Aimé Cesaire was not 




silence was broken in 1982 with a special number of the journal Sans Frontière 
featuring articles by Kwame N’Krumah, Marcel Manville, Edouard Glissant, Octave 
Mannoni, Francis Jeanson, and Ahmed Ben Bella. Raphaël Confiant observed that the 
long-lasting silence was not only due to French authorities, but also to the 
contradictions that Fanon’s voice would reveal about the Antillean elites (Riéra, 
2013: 66). In the same vein spoke one year earlier his fellow Martiniquean, the  
philosopher and writer Édouard Glissant: 
It is difficult for a French Caribbean individual to be the brother, the friend, 
or quite simply the associate or fellow countryman of Fanon. Because, of all 
the French Caribbean intellectuals, he is the only one to have acted on his 
ideas, through his involvement in the Algerian struggle; this was so even if, 
after tragic and conclusive episodes of what one can rightly call his Algerian 
agony, the Martinican problem (for which, in the circumstances, he was not 
responsible, but which he would no doubt have confronted if he had lived) 
retains its complete ambiguity. It is clear that in this case to act on one's 
ideas does not only mean to fight, to make demands, to give free rein to the 
language of defiance, but to take full responsibility for a complete break. 
(1989: 25) 
 
The discovery and diffusion of a letter of Fanon to his mother written from the 
battlefields of World War II caused a shock on the island, the demands of the 
listeners, the work of Marcel Manville, and the new progressive government 
facilitated the organization of the International Memorial in 1982 and the 
establishment of the currently active Frantz Fanon Circle in Martinique (Riéra, 2013: 
67). 
1.2 Fanon and Peace Studies 
A look to some of the major journals of the field, such as Peace Studies Journal, 
Journal of Peace Research, Peace and Conflict Studies, or Journal of African 
Conflicts and Peace Studies reveals that the engagement with Fanon has been scarce 
and reduced to a few scattered and passing mentions, mostly in regard to violence and 




revolving around similar issues. The Austrian peace scholar Wolfgang Dietrich 
observes Fanon’s influence on Paulo Freire’s pedagogy. The author implies that the 
Brazilian thinker is a radical democrat in spite of being influenced by the liberation 
discourse of the likes of Fanon and Che Guevera, “which were popular at that time”. 
Moving swiftly in the terrain of doxa, Dietrich qualifies Freire’s thought as “dualist, 
moralistic, idealist and modernizing tendencies.” For Dietrich this is “difficult to 
reconcile” with what he calls his transrational view, located in the twenty-first 
century (2013: 20). He argues that Freire’s arguments are based on a “direct 
opposition between an ‘evil’ oppressor and a ‘virtuous’ victim of oppression”. What 
he sees as an emancipatory approach characteristic of the 1960’s appears in his view 
as “naïve and unidimensional” (2013: 230). For Dietrich, the chasm is accentuated in 
Fanon’s case, since he conceived violence as a “cleansing power” that liberated the 
“suppressed” from their psychological complexes (2013: 20).  
The prominent peace scholar, Elise Boulding, less judgmentally mentions 
succinctly Fanon in her book, Cultures of Peace: The Hidden History. She situates 
Fanon within a broader framework of revolutionary utopianism, wherein violence is 
“a necessary wiping clean of the slate”. She emphasizes Fanon’s take on violence as 
“a cleansing force” and on the liberating aspects that he attributed it for Third World 
liberation struggles (2000: 36). 
In the subfield of peace psychology Fanon receives also concise treatment, 
although with a certain degree of concern for elaboration. In the Encyclopedia of 
Peace Psychology, he is posited as a pioneer of radical psychology, and briefly covers 
his discussions with Octave Mannoni on the dependency complex and 
depersonalization under colonial oppression, and the internalization of racism. The 




also hint at, according to Fanon’s view, the problems that could arise from violence 
(Christie, 2012). Andy Dawes, in his chapter “Psychologies for Liberation: Views 
from Elsewhere” appeared in Peace, Conflict and Violence: Peace Psychology for the 
21
st
 century, provides a similar outlook. Fanon is presented as an influential figure on 
South African Black Consciousness movement and on Latin American psychologists 
of liberation. Dawes emphasizes first the connection between psychology and 
politics, and second, the need of violent confrontation in order to achieve 
psychological healing. The author takes Fanon to charge for forgetting Freud’s 
warning against catharsis and also, strangely, for his excessive reliance on race at the 
expense of class analysis and a materialist critique.  
Sidi Omar’s (2006) doctoral dissertation on postcolonial studies is practically the 
only engagement with Fanon’s ideas within peace studies. Omar dedicates the second 
chapter of his dissertation to Frantz Fanon and Aimé Césaire. He situates them as 
anticolonial precursors who influenced the field of postcolonial studies. The author 
provides firstly a brief biographical account and then, without being exhaustive, a 
critical overview of important aspects of Fanon’s work, mostly based on Black Skin 
White Masks and Les damnés de la terre.  Omar does not reduce Fanon to a thinker of 
violence and outlines also other aspects such as the analysis of racism, which is not 
purely psychological, and Fanon’s view of humanism. Omar points out the 
complexity of Fanon approach to violence. Fanon uses the term violence to refer to 
different forms of violence and ascribing different meanings. Omar differentiates 
between armed struggle and Fanon’s conception of violence. Concerning the former 
he does not justify it, he thinks it is inevitable, unfortunate and related to the context 
of anticolonial wars. For Omar it is more problematic Fanon’s view that participating 




account of the psychological effects of violence. Omar concludes that Fanon’s 
reflection on violence can shed light on contemporary situations, notably on the 
responses of those suffering violence, and on the cycle of violence and 
counterviolence.  He argues that there are lessons that can be drawn in regard to 
rethinking moral positions and rational analysis concerning the dynamics of violence 
today, and for peace workers, concerning the tension between their ideas and the 
situation of victims of violence and of those for whom violence is part of their 
everyday life.  
1.2.1 Peace, violence, reality and perspective 
Stretching Sidi Omar’s argument on the possible lessons that Fanon’s thought can 
offer to peace studies, one of them is the question of disciplinarity. Fanon’s own 
approach to disciplines, social sciences and their relation with racism and colonialism 
will be addressed in the next chapter. But by now, the examination of the silences of 
Fanon on peace studies, and its consideration as a thinker of violence in the field, in 
contrast to the fecundity of his thought in different contexts, times and disciplines and 
topics can shed light on help to reconsider certain assumptions of peace studies itself.  
To Claude Debussy is attributed the statement that “music is the silence between 
the notes” (quoted in Myers, 2018: 107). That is, silences make the music. Similarly, 
another composer, John Cage posited that “there is no such thing as silence (2011: 
51). I want to use the silence on Fanon, at least implicitly to address how, as Joshua 
Myers asserts “silences “are not simply overlooked, but intentionally ignored in order 
to advance a particular regime of truth.” (2018). In other words, rather than correct 
absences it is also important to understand why were they constituted. Through the 
structuration of absences and presence one can ask how a discipline identifies itself, 




what is out, how are these boundaries articulated, how do relate with other 
disciplines, who are they located in a determined social, cultural and historical 
context, and from a specific locus of enunciation, and how does it relate with other, 
which subjects have a central and periphery role, which is the ideological charge, 
which visions of the world transmit, which it rejects, and which political 
consequences do these aspects have for social transformation. And also, which 
conception of the human being, which standard of the human being is dealing with. 
Looking at how Fanon is talked about in peace studies the few, with little 
exception, references start and stop at the chapter on revolutionary violence and his 
quote on violence as a cleansing force. Some add more context, others do not. Some 
assume that Fanon glorified violence, others try to decipher whether he actually 
defended violence or not. Debates seem to be revolving around the question of 
revolutionary violence and his position about it. The approach towards violence is 
usually premised on an ethical stance on his position. Is violence a means? Is violence 
an end in itself? Is Fanon violent or is he about violence? Those who see him as 
violent seem to be more anxious and concerned about Fanon than about violence 
itself. In any case, it is important to see how violence seems to regulate and structure 
and order things in progressive and not so progressive sectors. Henri Bergson posited 
that a philosopher, expresses one fundamental insight in his lifetime, independently of 
how vast the intellectual production, how varied the scope of his concerns, or how 
rich his thought is, “because he enjoys but one point of contact with the real.” 
(Natanson,1962: xxv). I would not dare to affirm the fundamental intuition behind 
Fanon’s thought, but I do not think that the central point of his work is that violence 




 Sara Ahmed writes that “exposing a problem is posing a problem” (2017:172), 
and describing a problem is becoming a problem (2017: 39). As we will see in the 
next chapter, W.E.B. Du Bois observed that the way black people were studied in 
social, human and natural sciences turned them into problems rather than as people 
having problems. Fanon formulated this differently throughout his work. As we will 
develop in further detail in the last chapter of this dissertation, one of the features 
through which they were constituted as problems was violence. The colonized or the 
black were not only violent but they were violence itself.  The creation of problematic 
people persists to this day, although the meaning and the ascription of problem to 
groups of people changes throughout the years. As we have seen, one of the problems 
with Fanon, or the one which turns him into a problem, seems to be his defense or 
justification of violence, which functions  as a moral purgative element and a defining 
barrier in the field of peace studies. Peace studies shifted from the scientific study of 
conflict and war, and an understanding of conflict as inherently problematic, to the 
study of peace and considering conflict as an intrinsic element of human relations. 
The field considers that the attention to violence and a polemologic perspective has 
been dominant and shifts the focus to uncover the silenced approaches and the 
valorization experiences of peace. Through this shift, peace is considered the norm 
and violence a rupture with and a deviation from the norm. Violence is denounced 
from a perspective of peace, and peace studies is conceived as an interdisciplinary 
field in dialogue with other branches of knowledge (Martínez-Guzmán, 2001).  
The role, the position and the space dedicated to violence is a site of debate within 
the field. Some peace scholars argue that violence has received scant attention, and is 
undertheorized and absent in theories of peace (Courtheyn, 2017). However, other 




“excessive attention to violence” of the peace researcher leads to “cognitive 
schizophrenia” (Muñoz, 2001; Martínez-Guzmán, 2001). The editors of Geographies 
of Peace argue that while the discipline has been “doing the important task of 
challenging the moral logic of war, it has failed to develop equally sophisticated 
theoretical engagements with, and devote sustained empirical research to, peace” 
Williams et al., 2014: 1). In their conclusion, they point out that, “to be against 
violence is not necessarily the same as being for peace” (Megoran et al., 2014:256). 
Other theorists point out that this approach functions as a call for purity, a reduction 
of the ethical and epistemic boundaries of the discipline, wherein peace is implicitly 
reduced to nonviolence (Loyd, 2015). Another problem of this boundary making is 
whether such a disciplinary approach is in tune with the predicaments, the demands, 
the options and the objectives of oppressed people. Such narrow view of the 
discipline may demand the innocence and predetermine the conditions for action of 
oppressed groups as a prerequisite for admission.  
Francisco Muñoz seeks to avoid what he considers the peaceful/violent dualism 
through the notion of imperfect peace. Thereby he proposes an understanding of 
peace as an ongoing and incomplete activity, rather than having a static character or 
being an aspiration. He conceives it as heuristically useful in order to recognize 
moments of positivity for peace research, and to highlight and valorize experiences 
and practices of peace amidst structural violence (Muñoz, 2001). Imperfect peace is 
an attempt to articulate the relation of peace with conditions of structural and direct 
violence, in which peace and violence are not external to the other. Yet, rather than 
delving into such relation, the focus is put on abstracting the moments of peace, 
which leads back to the original problem. One can wonder whether imperfect peace 




moments of positivity conceal histories of violence. The notion of imperfection is 
also implicit in Fanon’s understanding of freedom and decolonization as ongoing and 
unfinished activities projects and relations. However, Fanon does seek to highlight 
moments of positivity or negativity. Instead the question of imperfection is part of his 
philosophical anthropology, that is, imperfection and incompleteness is an intrinsic 
element of any action undertaken by the human being.  
Going back to Fanon, I remember sitting in a café with a renowned peace scholar. 
I told him I was writing about Fanon. ‘I haven’t read him, but I have heard that he 
actually did not defend violence’, he answered. In another instance, I engaged in 
conversation with a peace researcher during the break of a conference on 
decoloniality. He was working on Palestine and decolonization. I told him that I had 
been reading about Fanon and Palestine, and asked him, naively, whether he was 
using him. ‘No, no’, the scholar answered nervously and surprised. Later, during his 
presentation, he mentioned the ‘theories of Fanon’, probably referring to armed 
struggle, to refer to outdated understandings of decolonization in opposition to his 
Gandhian one.  
Fanon is usually contrasted with the nonviolent approach of Mahatma Gandhi, but 
as some works reveal their strongest differences do not lie in the question of violence 
(Federici, 1994; Kebede, 2001). Mahatma Gandhi is an important figure in the 
pantheon of pacifism. But this omits the participation of Gandhi in the war of the 
Boer against the Zulu, his call for the segregation of black people and his disregard of 
Indian workers in South Africa, his consideration of black people as infantile and 
devoid of values, and hence the need to teach them the satyagraha (Desai and Vahed, 
2015), the recruitment of Indian soldiers for the Second World War in exchange of 




against the Dalit, which reinforced their condition of damnation (Roy, 2014). By this 
I do not seek to delegitimize Gandhi’s actions, ideas, and influence; it is not a 
moralist indictment on Gandhi. It is not a call to expel Gandhi from such pantheon. 
Instead, it is a call to take him seriously and delve into a complexity that is larger than 
Gandhi as a figure, as an activist and as a thinker. It is a call to question who forms 
the canon, what criteria are used to decide what and who is inside or outside of the 
canon, what ideological dynamics are involved in the formation of the canon, how 
does it evaluate itself, and also to assess what does violence mean: what is considered 
violence and nonviolence, who counts as the victim of violence, and who is 
considered violent or even violence him or herself. It is not the scope of this 
dissertation to analyze the formation of the pacifist canon, but as we will see, Fanon 
posed some of these questions, and, beyond his answers, the mere posing of the 
questions can already help us to think about these aspects and the theoretical tools 
needed to address them. 
Despite the emphasis on peace that the discipline has established, almost all the 
above commentators on Fanon focused exclusively on the question of violence at the 
expense of the other elements of his work. The identitarian, epistemic and ethical 
boundaries of the discipline put the peace scholar in a strange position: one is 
demanded to look at peace while looking at violence in order to see whether one 
author or group of people is qualified and accepted into the boundaries. The quick 
response to such situation is to eliminate the problematic thinker out of the picture. 
As Lewis Gordon puts it, “[l]osing sight of the human element of human relations 
offers delusions of closure that, in the end, collapse disciplinary production into 
performative contradictions” (Gordon, 2015b: 11).   The author’s above pointed out 




researcher. Schizophrenia is a mental disorder that affects the patient’s relationship to 
reality.  Yet, the requirements of the field may not foster a healthy relationship with 
reality.  Rather than perspective, reality, and one’s relationship to reality, is, as 
Gordon puts it, what is at stake in the birth and the work of disciplines. By reality I do 
not mean the debates between realism and idealism, or the debates between peace as 
the norm and violence as the midwife of history. Reality as Gordon conceives it, is 
more about relationship than about perspective. Reality is incomplete, non-
ontological, and exceeds being and thinking. It is through thought, meaning and ideas 
that reality unfolds. Gordon states by way of Karl Jaspers that “[a] completely 
thinkable reality would not be reality any longer, but only an addendum of what is 
possible [in thought].” (quoted in Gordon, 2006a:46) This view of reality as broader 
and anterior to thought makes of thought and knowledge a humbling rather than a 
conquering activity. 
 Lewis Gordon notes that disciplines are born out of human efforts to establish a 
relationship with something that exceeds them, namely, reality. Thus, disciplines 
emerge from an outward movement and knowledge production arises through the 
creation of the necessary resources and practices that continuously expand the field of 
relationships in order to deal with the dilemmas at hand. This includes 
methodological resources and communicative relations with other spheres of 
knowledge. However, when the discipline folds onto itself the result is the 
subordination of reality to the discipline, the shrinkage of the world and the 
ossification and the decay of thought. He has called “disciplinary decadence” to the 
ontologization or reification of a discipline, that is, when “disciplines lose sight of 
themselves as efforts to understand the world and have collapsed into the hubris of 




decadence, Gordon points out, the sociologist criticizes the anthropologist for not 
being sociological enough, the literary critic criticizes the Marxist for not being 
literary enough, the Marxist criticizes the literary critic for not being materialist 
enough, the historian criticizes the philosopher for not being historian and, expanding 
his argument, the peace scholar would chide others for not being peaceful enough.  
In Gordon’s assertion of the risk of the discipline becoming the world, what is at stake 
is not only a debate between peace and violence, but between a discipline born to unfold 
an aspect of reality that had not been addressed and the discipline becoming the world. A 
case in point would be Johan Galtung’s following syllogism: “Nirvana is entropy, peace 
is entropy - hence, in a certain sense peace is nirvana and nirvana is peace” (Galtung, 
1985: 11) Bibhuti S. Yadav (1977: 451) outlines the silence surrounding the definition of 
nirvana in Buddhist texts: “[t]he issue is clearly methodological, of showing that a 
Buddhist must reject epistemology as the methodology of talking about Nirvana.” Yadav 
refers to the ancient Indian philosophers Chandrakirti and Nagarjuna rejection of talking 
about Nirvana in epistemic and ontological terms, since nirvana exceeds them. This is an 
illustrative instance since Gordon’s conception of reality also shares aspects with 
Buddhiss and Hinduist thought, but it is not the only one. The treatment of judo, aikido or 
the approach to indigenous lifestyles as peace practices disregarding the context, the 
struggles or their self-understanding. For Wolfgang Dietrich and John Paul Lederach 
(2013: 45), shamans exemplify the peace and conflict worker par excellence disregarding 
that they play an intellectual and genealogical role is played since the shaman works as 
the store of knowledge, and the memory of the community. They serve as timekeepers 
and masters of the calendar. Shamanistic practices are ecologically significant; shamans 
mediate with animals to assure enough hunting. They employ methods to heal diseases, 
their causes and augur future. They function as a guide for the souls of the death. The 




community (Ripinsky-Naxon, 1993: 9, 62-65). These and other functions cannot be 
extracted from specific contexts, conceptions of knowledge and being. For Viveiros de 
Castro from the Amerindian multinaturalist and perspectivist stance, shamanism is a form 
of acting that implies a form of knowing and being in the world that he defines as  
 
the manifest aptitude of certain individuals to deliberately cross bodily 
boundaries and adopt the perspective of alo-specific subjectivities so as to 
manage the relations between these beings and humans. Seeing non-human 
beings as these see themselves (as humans), shamans are capable of playing 
the role of active interlocutors in transspecific dialogues. (Viveiros de 
Castro, 2005: 42). 
 
Vicent Martínez-Guzmán has, in a general way, perceptively warned against the 
logic of replacing the dominant paradigm with another one: 
[W]e need to be critically alert for any culture or field of study becoming a 
dominant paradigm for the solutions. The nature of the problems addressed 
is such that, if some cultures or fields of knowledge present themselves as 
dominant, they become dominating and, consequently, will make other 
cultures and fields of knowledge dominated, submitted and excluded. (2005: 
24) 
 
For Gordon, interdisciplinarity is not the solution to the decay of thought. In this 
model, discrete disciplines, conceived as sovereign over particular fragments of 
reality, communicate, yet they drag their notions of autonomy, identity and 
completeness down with them; the resulting tangential convergence leaves 
disciplines, and the established disciplinary framework and communities, unaltered 
(2015b). Conversely, the vitality of thought demands the ongoing building of 
communicative relations between disciplines and communities pursuing knowledge at 
a deeper level. To that effect, notions of identity, borders, epistemic and 
methodological presuppositions are to be left aside. He proposes “teleological 
suspensions of disciplinarity”, or the decentering of the discipline with the purpose of 




discipline itself”. Ironically, he notes, these suspensions “breath life” (2006a: 34) into 
the discipline, for they enable to establish a new relationship with it, one that fosters a 
deeper understanding of the discipline (2006a: 44).  Yet the telos here would not be 
the achievement of a predetermined result, or the mastery of a particular portion of 
knowledge, the telos is to open the possibilities of disciplines by expanding or 
creating new relationships to the extent that their interplay may lead to the 
transformation of disciplines, their disappearance, or the creation of new ones 
(2015b).  
This extra-disciplinary stance may resonate with transdisciplinary practices insofar 
as the latter are not understood as an end in themselves or as an extension of a 
discipline, but as the constant and conjoint interrogation of social problems, epistemic 
limitations, and the institutional structures of the organization of knowledge. What 
Gordon does not take into account in his account of the impoverishment of thought, 
and also contribute to it, are the dynamics of power within the university that elicit 
defensive positions and the closure of ideas: funding, hierarchies within departments, 
promises and aspirations of promotions are also linked to the reproduction of 
genealogies and the lack of breathe of thought. 
In sum, what is at stake is broader than the peace perspective or the perspective of 
violence, it is the expansion of relationships that lead to the openness, the outward 
movement, and the fecundity of the field through the collective unfolding of reality, 
instead of closure, incompatibilities, and dominance over a fragment of reality.  
1.2.2 Peace, race, racism and colonialism 
  The paucity of engagement with Fanon in the field may not only be due to the 
question of violence. Relatedly, there is a significant silence in peace studies on 




(Azarmandi, 2016, 2018) or the mutations, continuities, and structural legacies of 
colonialism at the level of knowledge power and being, of which Fanon was one of 
the earliest thinkers. These silences may have to do with one of the characteristics 
that Gordon identifies in racism, evasiveness, and self-deception. As he points out, 
“the study of racism is dirty business. It unveils things about ourselves that we may 
prefer not to know.”(Gordon, 1999: ix) That is, the study of racism is not delinked 
from the problems of reality addressed in the previous section. The study of racism 
encompasses the study of society in which it is produced, in which it is studied and 
how it is studied or not studied, for racism permeates knowledge production. As Ann 
Laura Stoler observes, silences, evasions, disavowal and ignoring do not have a 
passive character:  
 racialized regimes of truth have been refracted through a more fundamental 
and durable epistemic space. They shape what issues are positioned at the 
fulcrum of intellectual inquiry and what counts as a recognizable frame of 
reference in scholarly and public debate. (Stoler, 2011: 129) 
It is important to note that Fanon does not use the term racialization as Stoler does 
above, or in the diverse ways in which it is used today referring to forms of 
governance and regulation of the social order (Hesse, 2007), formation of groups 
(Hochman, 2019), or social and bodily configurations inflicted by race, as in cultural 
studies. Fanon uses racialization as synonym for dehumanization. For Fanon race was 
a problem insofar as he understood that it is racism what produces race, and not the 
other way round. The core of the problem lies, then, in racism.  Not all race theorists 
agree with this view. Others argue that the elimination of race entails the elimination 
of racism (Zack, 1993; Appiah, 1992; Gilroy, 2000). For Fanon race is not a marker 
of identity, or morphologic or demographic category, but a relational marker of the 
distance of groups of people to the standard of humanity, that is, of belonging or not 




understood “as a biological or cultural descriptor, but as a conglomerate of 
sociopolitical relations that discipline humanity into full humans, not-quite-humans, 
and nonhumans” (2014: 3). For that matter, although Fanon privileged race in his 
analysis of dehumanization and re-humanization, he did not treat it in isolation and as 
an abstract category, but as constantly interacting with class, gender and questions of 
sexuality. 
Race as the naturalization of a hierarchy of human difference rationalizes the 
plunder of lives, land, wealth, the commodification of people and the reproductive 
control of populations in the colonial project. Like colonialism, race is constitutive of 
European modernity, or concretely it is its philosophical anthropology (Gordon, 
1995b; Maldonado-Torres, 2008; Wynter, 2015). Maldonado-Torres characterizes 
European modernity as lived in its underside as a “paradigm of war”: “one of the 
characteristic features of European modernity is the naturalization of the death ethics 
of war through colonialism, race, and particular modalities of gender differentiation.” 
(2008: 4) By war he does not refer to the usual definitions of armed conflict or 
military and organized warfare between states, but to the suspension of ethics in 
ordinary life (2008: iv).  
What Maldonado-Torres points out is that within a colonial and racist normative 
framework, in which the European man becomes the measure of humanity, notions of 
normality and abnormality are vitiated. The question of normality is important for 
Fanon in his thought on social and human sciences, his political thinking and also as a 
psychiatrist.  In “Racism and Culture” Fanon argues that in a racist society racism is 
normal. By this he posits that racism is not an anomaly or a visible and excessive 
feature of the society, instead it is normalized and rationalized in different ways: 




or ingrained in the everyday life and well-adjusted to the culture, economic relations 
and forms of knowledge (1964). In other words, in a racist society there is a shift of 
the standards: the abnormal is the norm, the extraordinary becomes the ordinary, the 
pathological becomes the healthy, and the irrational takes the place of the rational. 
This doubleness that colonialism and racism creates, as we will see throughout the 
dissertation in further detail, has implications for how to think about emancipation 
and action.  
One of the questions that guide Black Skin White Masks is the possibility of having 
normal relations between black and whites.  Fanon dedicates the sixth chapter, “The 
Black and the Psychopathology”, to examine what is for blacks in a racist society to 
be normal. But black and normality, he observes, are almost oxymoron terms within 
the racist normative framework. “A normal black child, having grown up in a normal 
family, will become abnormal at the slightest contact with the white world.” (1952: 
141; my translation
6
) The heart of the problem, Gordon argues, does not lie in the 
notion of normality and abnormality, but in the normative, which is “a perversion of 
normality”. In other words, normativity pathologizes abnormality by conflating it 
with being or the subject rather than with the functioning or the actions of the subject. 
Blacks cannot be normal because they do not meet the requirements of humanity; for 
them to achieve normality means to become white. Thus, in the racist framework a 
normal black is abnormal as a human being. And for the black to be a normal human 
being is to be an abnormal black. This Manichean framework, Gordon notes, is a 
Catch-22 situation for the black (2004:181-182; 2015:59). 
The foundational narrative of peace studies accounts for the emergence of the 
field, in the aftermath of the Holocaust, the horrors of the World War II and the 
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nuclear threat, as a response to the ultimate moment of violence in human history 
(Dietrich, 2012). Yet the narrative of the Holocaust does not enable to think the 
previous history of racism, genocide, and the slave trade of colonialism. That is what 
Aimé Césaire refers to when he pointed out that Hitler was not an anomaly and the 
World War II was the violence that was legitimate in the colonies coming back to 
Europe (Césaire, 2001). Césaire is not comparing or diminishing the violence of 
fascism, but connecting histories. Besides Césaire, other Africana thinkers such as 
Cedric Robinson, C. L. R. James, George Padmore, Ralph Bunche, and Oliver Cox, 
among others, also articulated the same point: Nazism was not a right-wing deviation 
but the logic development of Western civilization (Kelley, 2002). As W. E. B. Du 
Bois put it in 1947:  
There was no Nazi atrocity—concentration camps, wholesale maiming and 
murder, defilement of women or ghastly blasphemy of childhood—which 
Christian civilization or Europe had not long been practicing against colored 
folk in all parts of the world in the name of and for the defense of a Superior 
Race born to rule the world. (Du Bois, 2007a: 15) 
 
The importance of the narrative of the Holocaust and Nazism as the peak of racism 
and violence not only lies in that it occludes the connections with previous histories, 
it also entailed a shift of how racism was to be understood, how it was to be 
normalized and how it was reshaped and manifested after the World War II, 
concomitant to the cultural and social changes. The Holocaust and the defeat of 
Nazism elicited a condemnation of racism and debates among social, natural 
scientists and public intellectuals on the meaning and the scientific status of race. 
 In the aforementioned 1956 article “Racism and Culture”, Fanon offers reflections 
on the functioning of racism not only innovative for his own time and regarding his 
earlier work, but also fruitful to think the different expressions, occlusions and 




culture he points out that racism is a cultural element, and as such it renews itself, 
adapts and changes its modes of manifestation according to the larger cultural and 
social framework that informs it. But, he states, the relation is reciprocal. That is, as a 
cultural element racism is not “an additional element discovered by chance during a 
research of the cultural elements of a group. The social constellation, the cultural 
ensemble are deeply reshaped by the existence of racism.” (1964: 44; my translation
7
) 
He observed that the simple and brutal biological racism gradually yields to a more 
refined form of cultural racism. Both can coexist, but the racism that through 
anatomy, physiology and genetic evolution questioned the human status now targets 
particular cultures, its normative value and the legitimacy of certain forms of 
existence and being in the world. Fanon expresses the reasons behind this 
transformation through the mutual influence between racism and culture thusly: 
The memory of Nazism, the common misery of different men, the common 
enslavement of large social groups, the apparition of ‘European colonies’, 
that is the establishment of a colonial regime at the very heart of Europe, the 
raising consciousness of workers in the colonizing and racist countries, the 
evolution of techniques, all these have deeply modified the aspect of the 




Fanon points out that there are “cultures with racism and cultures without racism” 
(1964: 40; my translation
9
), and in his inextricable connection between racism and 
colonialism, the cultures with racism are colonial cultures, that is, European cultures. 
In this light, Nazism is not alien or extraneous to European culture. Following 
Césaire, Fanon notes that the anomaly of Nazism is not so much its horror as the 
enactment of colonial horror in the metropolitan territory and against its populations. 
                                                 
7
 « Le racisme n’est jamais un élément surajouté découvert au hasard d’une recherche au sein des 
données culturelles d’un groupe. La constellation sociale, l’ensemble culturel sont profondément 
remaniés par l’existence du racisme. » 
8
 « Le souvenir de nazisme, la commune misère d’hommes différents, le commun asservissement 
de groupes sociaux importants, l’apparition de « colonies européennes » c’est-à-dire l’institution d’un 
régime colonial en pleine terre d’Europe, la prise de conscience des travailleurs des pays colonisateurs 
et racistes, l’évolution des techniques, tout cela a modifié profondément l’aspect du problème. » 
 
9




The consequences of Nazism on post-war European culture shaped the definition and 
the manifestations of racism, partially as a way to distance from Nazi racism: racism, 
in its association with Nazism, is confined to the past and to forms of bad science.  
Concomitant to the transfiguration of racism, Fanon implicitly points out another 
constant characteristic of it, its denial. A double denial: a denial of racism and a 
denial of its intrinsic capacity to move and to change. Contemporary race theorists 
such as Alana Lentin or David Theo Goldberg (2006) have retaken and delved into 
Fanon’s argument on the establishment of paradigmatic events of racism such as the 
Holocaust, apartheid or Jim Crow as forms of locking racism into a racist past, 
already overcome by proper science and ethically expunged. Lentin has called this 
“frozen racisms” (Lentin, 2016). This view is often accompanied by a nominalist 
understanding of race, treating contemporary racism as the fault of pathological 
individuals, and by the disavowal of coloniality as the matrix of contemporary forms 
of racism.  As Fanon points out, the very racism shapes how racism is manifested, 
denied, identified, and even talked and thought about. 
Fanon points out that for a European the racist person would be pathologized as 
the Nazi who held biological theories on the inferiority of concrete bodies, but not the 
one who asserts the inferiority, the immaturity, or the illegitimacy of a certain culture, 
religion, civilization, worldview, system of reference or forms of being, knowing and 
relating to the world.  
For Fanon there is hardly any difference and no significant rupture between 
biological and cultural racism. What connects the different faces that racism adopts, 
is, as stated, the broader cultural, social and political framework, that is, colonialism. 
Racism is both symptom and consequence of colonialism. Thus, the necessities, the 




racism. Fanon notices that in the first stage of the domination the colonizer has to 
assert its superiority through the dehumanization, exploitation, torture, and systematic 
and collective seizure of lives. This is the stage of biological racism. However, he 
adds, racism is adapted to the needs of the society’s technological developments, the 
changes in the modes of production, and economic relations, to the extent of masking 
racism within a democratic and humanistic structures and discourses. He writes: 
At some point people might have believed that there was no more racism. 
This exhilarating impression without real foundations was simply the 
consequence of the evolution of modes of exploitation. (…) The truth is that 
the rigor of the system makes the daily affirmation of a superiority 
superfluous. The need to appeal to various degrees of compliance, to the 
native’s cooperation modified relations in a less brutal, more nuanced, more 
‘cultivated’ sense. It is not rare to see the emergence of a ‘democratic and 




In sum, assuming the narrative of the Holocaust and World War II as the 
paradigmatic events and moments of racism is not conducive to a proper 
understanding of its global manifestations through colonialism, its ongoing changes 
and transfigurations in the postcolonial world, and also does not enable to analyze 
racism and colonialism, not only as an object of study, but also shaping the way in 
which it is talked, thought and understood. 
1.2.3 Euro-modernity and its underside 
Bringing the connection of histories, ideas and events to the forefront also offers a 
relational view of modernity, not as an intrinsic European phenomenon spread 
through colonialism. Decolonial authors speak of modernity/coloniality to account for 
their co-constitution (Suárez-Krabbe, 2016), Enrique Dussel (1994) talks about first 
modernity, dating back to the arrival of the Spanish in the Caribbean initiating a 
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 « À un certain moment on avait pu croire à la disparition du racisme. Cette impression 
euphorisante, déréelle, était simplement la conséquence de l’évolution des formes d’exploitation. (…) 
La vérité est que la rigueur du système rend superflue l’affirmation quotidienne d’une supériorité. La 
nécessité de faire appel à des degrés divers à l’adhésion, à la collaboration de l’autochtone modifie les 
rapports dans un sens moins brutal, plus nuancé, plus « cultivé ». Il n’est d’ailleurs pas rare de voir 




mercantile capitalism, and second modernity referring to the Enlightenment and 
Industrial Revolution. Lewis Gordon (2013) talks about Euro-modernity to mean the 
process through which the European set himself as the legitimate present and the 
future orientation of humanity, and to signal that there have been other possible 
modernities. In peace studies this relational element is absent in Wolfgang Dietrich 
and Wolfgang Sützl definition of modernity as “the societal project characterized by 
Newtonian physics, Cartesian reductionism, the nation state of Thomas Hobbes, and 
the capitalist world system.” (1997:283) This view responds to the conception that 
modernity is an intra-European or Western phenomenon whose ideas, practices, 
institutions were subsequently spread through the European empires, rather than 
constituted in their entanglement with colonialism. Equating modernity with Europe 
is itself an element of the Euro-modern discourse through which Europe set itself as 
the future direction of humankind, and that impedes to account for the relational 
phenomenon through which the state, capitalism or Cartesian metaphysics and doubt 
emerged (Gordon, 2013). 
As David Theo Goldberg shows in the important study, The Racial State, the close 
relation between race and state is understudied also in race theory, except in what are 
considered exceptional cases such as South Africa, the South of the United States, or 
the Nazi Germany. In his work he shows that there is a “historical co-definition” of 
race and the modern state, at the level of its emergence, development, and 
transformation, at the conceptual and material levels. He points out that the project, 
the practices and institution of the state gives expression to racial subjugations and 
exclusions, but also in the way that inclusions and resistances are deflected: 
inclusions, colorblindness or celebration of multiculturalism. The racial state and its 




secondary phenomenon that obeys instrumentally to outside interests or its own 
interests, but it is contradictory, fractured and far from coherent (Goldberg 2002: 3-
5).  
The thought of Descartes must also be conceived in relation to Transatlantic 
connections, argues Enrique Dussel. He states that Descartes, contrary to what is 
considered, is not the first modern philosopher. Dussel offers evidence that Descartes 
was influenced by Saint Augustine and by Iberian Jesuits in  America of the XVIth 
century, something that Descartes did not acknowledge and expressed in mathematics 
as the basis of reasoning during the first half of the XVIIth century. Dussel traces 
back the thought on method, doubt, consciousness, the separation of the mind and 
body to the ideas and events taking place in what he called the first Modernity, that is, 
the relation between the South of Europe and America through conquest. Anticipating 
Descartes’ work, the ideas of Francisco Suárez, Francisco Sánchez or Gómez Pereira 
were articulated as a response to the dilemmas that the new and unfamiliar forms of 
human difference rose in the imperial framework. For Dussel, Descartes faced an 
anthropological aporia, with ethical and political ramifications, that he did not resolve 
but addressed by leaving the anthropological question aside and, in favor of 
epistemology as first philosophy (Dussel, 2008a). As Gordon adds, this shift to 
epistemology expelled the human dimension from scientific models premised on the 
separation of soul and body. A dehumanized knowledge that rests upon the concrete 
expressions of dehumanization taking place in America, produced and articulated first 
in theological terms, and later in secular terms with the emergence of Euro-modern 
natural and social sciences. 
 
This [Cartesian] premise of disunity was already receiving concrete 
manifestation in the presupposition of the Christian European as reality 




philosophical anthropology of the truly human as this disembodied Christian 
European archetype. (Gordon, 2013: 67-68) 
 
In peace studies, Vicent Martínez Guzmán offers a different view of modernity in 
his project for a transmodernity, which shares certain aspects with Dussel’s. 
Martínez-Guzmán talks about Western modernity as white and masculine, which 
avoids the aforementioned discourse of the uniqueness and autonomy of Europe, and 
contains the possibility of other modernities and other ways of being modern. 
Martínez Guzmán argues that peace studies disrupts modern postulates on scientific 
modes of inquiry based on neutrality. He articulates a critique of modernity through 
Nietzsche, Heiddeger, Frankfurt critical theory, poststructuralism and postmodern 
thought, communicative ethics, gender epistemologies and knowledge from the 
South. He observes that  modern Western science has imposed itsef through the 
colonial expansion and one of its manifestations is the notion of development as a 
covert form of racism and sexism.  
Martínez Guzmán, in his critique of Western modernity prioritizes the 
epistemological element in order to produce forms of knowledge that overcome 
modern forms of violence, treats the question of race as epiphenomenal to science. 
That is, science was linked to colonialism through its imposition onto other forms of 
knowledge and beings. However, this addresses one side of the coin. Considering 
race as the philosophical anthropology of European modernity one can see how race 
and racism is not imposed after the colonial expansion but was coterminous and 
integral to modern forms of knowledge production and scientific rationality. That is, 
the emergence of modern science, disciplines and racial definition, the production of 
new types of human beings, the white, the black, or the indigenous, were co-produced 
and evolved together in the colonial process (Gordon, 2013). And with them, new and 




out that, at the beginning of the Spanish conquest, the first response to the unfamiliar 
was to categorize Amerindian as women, but this posed two problems. First, if the 
Amerindians were women, what were then Christian women in Europe? Second, 
conceiving them as women entailed conceiving them, to a certain extent, as adults 
and fully formed, which was an obstacle to the project of Christianization, civilization 
and development. To that effect, Amerindians, and later blacks, were subsequently 
infantilized. 
Frankfurt critical theory, postmodern, postructuralist thought and communicative 
ethics have scarcely paid attention to what Dussel calls the “underside of Modernity”, 
and are insufficient to account for the long history of war, violence and 
dehumanization, and also the generative implications of Western ideals of the human 
at the level of science, institutions, legal framework and economic relations 
(Maldonado-Torres, 2008: 6). The question What are they? Are they human beings?  
that was posed in in the debates of Valladolid in the 1550’s, disappeared in 
Descartes, and reappeared as affirmations in Voltaire, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Hume 
and John Locke, still haunts the present condition. Black and indigenous thinkers, 
those suffering “the underside of Modernity” (Dussel, 1994), posed and still pose the 
underside of these questions. In Fanon’s words: “Colonialism forces the dominated 
people to constantly ask themselves the following question: In reality, who am I?” 




The next chapter continues with the underside of modernity, the question of human 
difference and its central role in knowledge production through the examination of 
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the interventions in philosophy of science of Anténor Firmin, W.E.B. Du Bois, and 
Frantz Fanon. As Paget Henry points out, in the Africana philosophic tradition the 
motive of reflection has been the question of racial domination and liberation, which 
is the underside of the variations of the problem of scientific rationality, positivism or 
the mechanicism of the subject that have animated European philosophical thought 
(Henry, 2006).  I do not treat Firmin, Du Bois or Fanon as outsiders to European 
modernity; in their African diasporic conditions they are both insiders and outsiders. 
They have been produced by European modernity as blacks, and at the same time 
denied their belonging to the modern world. It is from this double condition of within 
and without Europe that they issue a critique of it (Gordon, 2008). 
Their reflection being oriented towards the question of freedom entailed bringing 
up the question of the human being from the standpoint of those whose humanity has 
been denied, and also  interrogating methods, disciplinary separations, epistemic 
pressupositions and thought at its basic level since racism was not only the object of 













Chapter 2.  The human, the subhuman and modern science 
The study of racism is dirty business. It unveils things about ourselves 
that we may prefer not to know. If racism emerges out of an evasive 
spirit, it is hardly the case that I would stand still and permit itself to 
be unmasked. Race theorists theorize in a racist world. The degree to 
which that world is made evident will have an impact on the question 
of whether the theorist not only sees, but also admits what is seen. The 
same applies to the society in which the theorist theorizes. (Lewis 
Gordon, 1999) 
 
To express reality is an arduous task (Frantz Fanon, 1952) 
 
Introduction 
This chapter addresses the intricacy of race and colonialism in the emergence of 
modern social and human sciences through the work of three African diasporic 
thinkers, the Haitian lawyer and diplomat Anténor Firmin (1850-1911), the 
economist, historian and philosopher W.E.B Du Bois (1868-1963), and lastly of 
Frantz Fanon. Such choice adheres to the fact that thought on human and social 
sciences, questions of method, reality, disciplinarity and the study of the human are a 
central element in Fanon’s work. In his work, colonialism and racism were not only 
objects of thought, but also the context in which such thought is produced. Thus, it 
required addressing the very process of thought, or how to think about thought.  
I could have addressed the relation between colonialism and science and the 
centrality of race and philosophical anthropology by focusing on primary European 
literature. Starting by the theological view of Bartolomé de las Casas and continuing 
by the importance of race and human difference in Kant, Hegel, Hume, Locke, and 
Enlightenment thought in general, or its absence in Descartes, despite his mentors 
were dealing with the relation between epistemic doubt and human difference in 
America (Dussel, 2008). Instead, I have decided to address the underside of this 
question by focusing on three African diasporic thinkers with similar concerns on the 




not external to European thought, instead the sociopolitical and epistemic location of 
Africana thinkers led them to engage dominant thought, build upon it and go beyond 
it. It is, as Gordon puts it (2008), then dialectically broader. Second, because 
throughout this dissertation as I have mentioned I do not treat Fanon as an individual 
thinker, but connected to different networks of thinkers, of predecessors, coetaneous, 
and successors. In this sense, I do not treat Firmin and Du Bois as direct influences on 
Fanon –although it is plausible that he was acquainted with the work of Firmin– but 
as thinkers who shared similar political, ethical and epistemological concerns, and 
who were part of one of the different networks in which Fanon’s work is located. 
Such network is not closed, but continues in the work of Paget Henry, Nelson-
Maldonado Torres, Sylvya Wynter, Jane Anna Gordon, and Lewis Gordon. These 
thinkers, animated by similar concerns have built upon the previous ones, and will 
guide my thoughts on Firmin, Du Bois, Fanon and themselves. In order to analyze 
their work I take as the basis Lewis Gordon’s observation that African diasporic 
thought revolves around three fundamental interrelated questions out of which other 
questions arises: the question of the philosophical anthropology or the meaning of the 
human being in face of the experience of dehumanization, the question of freedom 
and action, and what he calls the “metacritique of reason”, that is, how to justify 
thought and practices, including and how to justify justification (Gordon, 2008).  
I have structured this chapter in the following way: The first section addresses 
Anténor Firmin’s intervention in the anthropological debates of his time through his 
1885 work On the Equality of Human Races. This work is more than a response to 
Arthur de Gobineau‘s famous Essay on the Inequality of Human Races, but a work on 
philosophy of science and the study of the human being. In order to challenge 




anthropology, its relations with ethnography and ethnology and the division between 
science and philosophy in the field. By challenging such limits and their object of 
study Firmin questions what a human being is and how to study it.  He carries out an 
archaeological analysis of the approaches to study the human being and natural 
history covering Aristotle, Linnaeus, Blumenbach, Cuvier, Comte, Lamarck, Darwin, 
Kant and Hegel, unveils contradictory and arbitrary typologies and outlines the role 
of science in producing the human being while studying it. The study of black people 
then could not be based on idealistic or naturalistic conceptions of the human, but had 
to take into account the historical power relations that had produced racist hierarchies 
and the society in which such ideas are produced. By means of a particular and 
contradictory positivist approach Firmin outlines a science that to call itself as such 
must favor the equality, harmony, and progress of the human being. 
The second section addresses the work of W.E.B Du Bois, a very prolific 
writercovering a wide array of themes and disciplines. I will focus on his decisive 
role in the founding of American sociology, and in the development of sociology in 
general. Although later subsumed under the subdiscipline of sociology of race, the 
question of race and black people were at the center of the birth of the discipline. In 
order to study the predicament of black people he had to address first the way in 
which they were studied, that is by pathologizing them and problematizing them 
instead of having problems. Du Bois also addressed the subjective element of 
oppression through the question of “how does it feel being a problem” and the notion 
of double consciousness and potentiated double consciousness. 
The third section discusses Fanon’s Black Skin White Masks as a work on 
philosophy of science and the study of the human. This aspect is present throughout 




black as a human being, as an active agent in the world, and to produce a form of 
knowledge oriented towards decolonization Fanon puts under suspicion methods, 
disciplines, understandings of the human, and articulates what he calls sociogeny.  
2.1 Anténor Firmin  
2.1.1 Anthropos and Humanitas 
Anténor Firmin arrived in Paris in 1883 as Haitian diplomat. In 1884 he was 
accepted by the Société d’Anthropologie de Paris, the leading forum in the budding 
field of anthropology. During the one and a half years of attending the meetings of 
the association, Firmin wrote De l'Égalité des Races Humaines (1885), a 662- page 
volume addressing the dominant debates of the society. Those discussions took for 
granted the hierarchical division of human beings in superior and inferior races, 
locating the black race at the bottom of the scale. Instead, the polemics revolved 
around the arguments to sustain such ideas, considered as absolute scientific facts. 
The main debate at the heart of the Société, and of scientific inquiry on race in 
general, was between supporters of monogenesis and polygenesis, the latter was the 
dominant view and one of the founding motifs of the institution (Bernasconi, 2008). 
Monogenesis affirms the common origin of the different races, whereas polygenesis 
defends that racial difference can be traced back to two or more separate species. To 
elucidate the contention scientists drew mainly on physical anthropology, that is, the 
scientific study of race out of morphological, physical differences through 
craneometry, phrenology or comparative anatomy. Moreover, the discussions were 
theoretically supported by the racial ideas of Arthur de Gobineau’s influential The 
Inequality of Human Races, where he posited the innate inferiority of the black race 




predominant were the explorations of applying Darwin’s theory of natural selection to 
human races. 
In this scenario, the presence of Firmin at the Société put him in an intricate 
position. Looking back at those sessions, he attributes his lack of intervention in the 
debate to the prudence of the newcomer. The book then took shape as a critical 
response to the dominant racist theories circulating unquestioned under the guise of 
science. In the preface, Firmin shows his perplexity about the compatibility of science 
and the defense of the inequality of human beings, and the lack of interrogation of his 
peers of their presuppositions, notably when his presence embodied the contradiction 
of their theories: “Is it natural to sit as equals at the same society with men whom the 
very science that they are supposed to represent seems to declare unequal?” (1885: ix; 
personal translation
12
). Such contradiction was, however, rationalized as an exception 
that confirmed the rule (Fluehr-Lobban, 2000). An instance of such incongruity took 
place on a subsequent meeting in 1892, seven years after the publication of his book. 
This time Firmin engaged in a discussion on the innate underdevelopment of African 
people by pointing out to the speaker that the causes had to be looked for in the 
social, economic and political conditions in the continent. The response of the 
president of the Société, Professor Bordier was to ask him if he had white ancestry. 
For Robert Bernasconi, “he was being asked whether his intelligence could be 
explained only in this way.” (2008: 383) But the implications of such remark also 
point to the dim position of the black thinker within the white scientific community, 
for “it showed how in an instant Firmin’s colleagues could switch from considering 
him a participant in their debates to treating him as an object of anthropological 
study” (Bernasconi, 2008: 383). This anecdote instances Oshamu Nishitani’s 
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distinction between anthropos and humanitas in Euro-modern conceptions of the 
human being. The former referred to groups of people, accepted as humans or 
considered sub-humans, conceived as objects of cognition, whereas the latter were 
subjects of knowledge. Humanitas is both the answer to the question what is a human 
being, and the ones who poses the question. Thus, humanitas emerges by dint of 
creating and recognizing anthropos as the object (Nishitani, 2006). 
Firmin does not address the arguments on the superiority and inferiority of races 
straight from the beginning. He first undertakes an epistemic journey through the “the 
historical order” of the development of anthropology (Firmin, 1885: 36).  His aim 
being the production of not only different arguments, but of another kind of 
knowledge, required addressing the paradigms of the discipline. Therefore, he 
examines how philosophical and scientific systems of thought on the human being are 
produced, how is knowledge classified and organized, and whether this knowledge is 
based on philosophic or scientific principles and criteria.  
Firmin notes that in the previous decades anthropology had enticed the attention 
of researchers and philosophers interested in predicaments of the human being. 
However, he warns that such endeavor demands “to embrace the ensemble of 
characters that constitute the human being”, since the human can “descend into the 
abysm of the deepest ignorance and take pleasure in the mud of vice, and it can also 
rise to the brightest peaks of truth, goodness and beauty” (Firmin, 1885: 3; personal 
translation
13
). The importance and the challenge for anthropology lie in the contrasts, 
contradictions, multiple facets and dimensions of the human, and the consequent 
array of questions that this complexity constantly poses for the studier. This demands 
to mobilize all spheres of knowledges while being on guard against “this exclusive 
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specialization that narrows the horizon of the spirit and turn it incapable of consider 
the objects in all their facets” (Firmin, 1885: 5; personal translation
14
). He illustrates 
the problem of establishing a closed domain by shedding light on the disputes 
between scientists and philosophers on setting the definition and the limits of 
anthropology. For Firmin, both idealism and naturalism foster a reductionist view of 
the human. In his view, Kant’s definition and distinction between pragmatic 
anthropology and moral philosophy, inherited and subsequently modified by Hegel 
and other German idealists, did not consider the definitions of scientists of their time. 
According to Kant, moral philosophy belongs to the rational and pragmatic 
anthropology is empirical. Thus, for Firmin, scientists’ study of humans belonged to 
physical geography rather than pragmatic anthropology. Likewise, for Hegel, the 
question of racial difference is treated as the natural differences between humans 
across the geographic spectrum (1885: 6-8). In that sense, both Kant and Hegel 
engage human difference through a “geographical theory of intelligence” predicated 
on a “geographical idealism” (Gordon, 2008: 60).  
For scientists, however, anthropology was understood as the natural history of 
the human. Firmin examines the systems of natural history developed by Aristotle, 
Linnaeus, Blumenbach, Cuvier, or those based on the positivism of Comte and the 
evolutionism of Spencer. The problem in these cases is that the imposition on the 
human beings of methods designed for the study of animals, plants and minerals 
omits the social dimension of the human being and its capacity to generate its own 
history (1885: 9). Firmin’s emphasis on the social and the historical breaks away with 
the prevailing notions of biological inequality and inferiority in the study of race, 
thereby he anticipates a form of social constructivism with special attention to history 
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in the formation of the social world. As it will be later detailed, this led him to look 
for the causes of inequality and inferiority in asymmetries of power and systems of 
domination  
  Firmin, consequently, attempts to bridge the gap between philosophers and 
scientists by defining anthropology as “the study of man from a physical, intellectual 
and moral point of view throughout the different races that constitute the human 
species.” (1885: 15; personal translation
15
)  He takes ethnographers to task for 
subsuming anthropology under the field of ethnography. Ethnographers consider their 
domain as the general science of humanity, and anthropology is seen as a subfield 
which concerns with the physical taxonomies of humans. Alternatively, he sees 
ethnography as the descriptive study of people, something travelers acquainted with a 
group of people could do (1885: 17).  Ethnology, adds Firmin, requires knowledge on 
anatomy, physiology and taxonomy. It differs from ethnography in that it does not 
merely describe groups of people but studies those groups from the point of view of 
races. The latter focuses on the external features whereas the former approaches 
human difference in a detailed, comparative, and systematic way (1885: 17-18).  The 
problem with ethnography is that it takes the part for the whole, a form of lazy reason 
that Sousa Santos (2014) calls metonymic reason. The problem with ethnology is that 
it functions in a teleological way because human divisions are established 
hierarchically before addressing questions of difference. For him, it is after the work 
of ethnography and ethnology that anthropology takes the stage. In his 
comprehensive view of anthropology, the field raises questions about the nature of 
the human, the development of the human potential of the different races, and the 
alleged superiority or inferiority of certain races. 
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 Therefore, the ambitious scope that he envisages for anthropology poses a 
challenge to a field of knowledge that cannot be settled within the systems of thought 
which had produced the ranking of races (1885: 19). The expansion of the scope 
requires rethinking the relationship of subordination of anthropology to other spheres 
of knowledge, to that effect, Firmin draws on August Comte’s proposal to include 
biological, philosophical, sociological and cosmological sciences as the resources 
necessaries to account for human reality (1885: 15-16).  
The influence of Comte‘s positivism is patent in the subtitle of the work, De 
l'Égalité des Races Humaines, Anthropologie Positive. Firmin considered the 
positivist sociological method of Comte the model that would enable him to 
conciliate the study of black people with the scientific rigor lacking in the conclusions 
of his time (1885: xii). Therefore, positivism was a tool to unmask the false 
positivism of the anthropological community, that is, to expose the absence of 
scientific basis and criteria in their naturalistic ranking and distinctions of races. 
Moreover, positivism situated him in a position from which the neutrality of his 
colleagues will be revealed as biased, for “they conflated the general problem of 
knowledge about the human species with the specific issue of the meaning or value of 
that knowledge” (Beckett, 2017: 11). His insistence on facts and empirical evidence 
was not at odds with philosophical reflection (Bernasconi, 2008), conversely, he 
believed that rethinking the philosophical foundations of scientific theories can 
transform dominant ideas and lead to new ways of thinking and doing science (1885: 
14).  
 Firmin’s reliance on Comte’s idea of progress and the gradual perfectibility of 
the human as an aspiration that undergirds his philosophy, although problematic for 




different manifestations of a unique human species contains the possibility of the 
progress of humanity, he illustrates this by emphasizing the role of black people in 
the history of civilization with examples from Haiti, Ethiopia and ancient Egypt, 
(1885: 582-599), in contrast to the dominant view that attributed the leading role and 
the telos of human development uniquely to white people. Thus, he rejects the 
naturalistic view of progress based on biological races in favor of considering the 
physical, moral and intellectual perfectibility of the human according to different 
degrees of civilization (1885: 124). Moreover, it is also this view of progress what 
enables Firmin to envisage a different form and role of knowledge. In his opinion, a 
science that supports the inequality of groups of people and is not driven by a 
commitment to justice, progress and harmony cannot call itself as such (1885: 644).   
When Firmin proceeds to examine the different systems of racial classification 
what he finds is a series of contradictory and arbitrary typologies, which, in his view, 
reflect the limitations of imposing an order on the irregularity of nature, since “the 
causes of differentiation are so varied and complex that they tear every artificial 
series and mock the combinations that scientists create to regulate them.” (1885: 23-
24; personal translation
16
) In order to understand the failure of those attempts of 
classification, the excessive divergences, and the inability to reach a consensus 
among scientists, Firmin delves further into the bases and the principles that 
undergird natural history and the systems of classification. The author affirms that the 
problem of biological racial classification lies in both the lack of solid principles and 
in the “preconceived systems that accommodate natural facts to certain theories” 
(1885: 127; personal translation
17
).  
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For Lewis Gordon, Firmin’s contribution is not only limited to the anthropology 
of his time but also to philosophy of science. He observes that his historical analysis 
of systems of classifications parallels Foucault’s archaeology of knowledge, for 
Firmin exposed how “the orders of knowledge of the nineteenth century were in fact 
constructing the very subject they had set out to study” (2008: 61). To that it could be 
added, as it was pointed out above through Nishitani’s (2006) articulation of 
anthropos and humanitas, that the studier is also created through scientific practices. 
Firmin states that the understanding of the discipline is linked to the point of view 
that the scientist has on the subject (1885: 14). In other words, the notion of what is 
anthropology is inseparable from the notion of what is the human, which points to the 
intricacy –though asymmetrical– of the studier and the studied.  
2.1.2 A science of equality and the problems of liberal freedom 
Through this archaeological work Firmin exposed the limitations of anthropology 
and rebuked the arguments of the biological theory of inequality, the purity of races 
and their different origins in two or more distinct species. In order to construct 
anthropology as a science at the service of the equality and freedom of the human 
being, he then shifted his attention to the social and historical processes that produce 
inequality and inferiority, and their relation to the production of knowledge. Thus, the 
society where these theories are produced cannot escape the analysis. As Beckett 
(2017) puts it, Firmin moved from biological theories of race and inequality to 
address the actual manifestations of inequality and inferiority as grounded in relations 
of power: “The anti-philosophical and pseudo-scientific doctrine of the inequality of 




1885: 204; personal translation
19
)  He observes that in the Egyptian, Greek, or Roman 
empires the notions of superiority in regard to surrounding groups differed from how 
Europe constructed the meaning of inferior groups.  
Perhaps a spirit of egoism and pride has always led civilized peoples to think 
of their superiority in regard to their neighboring nations, but we can affirm 
that there has never been a relation between this narrow patriotism (…) and 





Hereby he establishes an important distinction between ethnocentrism and racism. 
And, in line with the definition of Euro-modernity sketched in the previous chapter, 
he poignantly identifies that the creation of groups of people and the systematic 
classification and ranking of human beings through the idea of race, where one group 
functions in a god-like manner (1885: 645), is a particular practice of European 
domination without precedents in history.  For Firmin, the debates in France in the 
aftermath of the French, the Haitian revolution, and the abolition of slavery revolving 
around liberty, and equality cannot be delinked from events in the colonies. In 
contrast to most of his peers, he saw that the doctrine of racial inferiority was used to 
legitimize practices of slavery. He delivers a fierce critique of the hypocrisy of 
philosophers and scientists who reject slavery on humanitarian grounds while 
maintaining the physical, moral, and intellectual inferiority of slave. He also 
examines the contradiction between the science that legitimizes the right to submit 
inferior people and the legal measures that grant political and social equality to slaves 
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(1885: 205-209). Firmin explains this contradiction in the attunement of scientific 
thought with the “ambient ideas” in Europe (1885: 211; personal translation
22
).   
These “ambient ideas” have been consistent in the defense of equality, liberty and 
civility in the wake of the French revolution, and the development of a racist 
philosophical anthropology that places groups of people outside of the sphere of the 
human, as Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze observes concerning the Enlightenment (1997) 
and Toni Morrison calls “the parasitical nature of white freedom” (Morrison: 1992: 
57). Likewise, Greg Beckett posits that such contradictory positions are not 
incompatible, for Firmin identified in the persistence of racial theories that 
“inequality was a central organizing value of European society that served to justify 
its domination of others.” (2017:8).  
In a similar vein, Lisa Lowe’s The Intimacies of Four Continents (2015) shows the 
centrality of race hierarchies and the foundational role of colonialism in making 
possible liberal ideas on freedom, equality, sovereignty, or modern conceptions of 
personhood, civility and governance. The simultaneity and intricacy of the liberal 
political project with indigenous dispossession, African slave trade, and forced 
migrations from Asia in the Americas in late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries has been disavowed in and by modern political philosophy by means of 
what she calls an “economy of affirmation and forgetting that structures and 
formalizes the archives of liberalism, and liberal ways of understanding” (Lowe, 
2015: 3). 
 Lisa Lowe’s work shares certain resemblances with the authors examined in this 
chapter in as far as their methodological and disciplinary concerns. Whereas Firmin 
looks at the significance of race at the moment of the emergence of social sciences, 
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Lowe observes how once disciplines have solidified and established rigid boundaries 
the study of race becomes a subdiscipline, for  the foundational element of human 
difference articulated through race fades by being scattered among anthropology,  
history, sociology, philosophy, economics, literature, race and gender studies. Her 
methodological challenge to the liberal economy of forgetting is a “reminder that the 
constitution of knowledge often obscures the conditions of its own making” (Lowe, 
2015: 39). Lowe interrogates how liberalism has shaped knowledge production 
through the organization of the archives and the compartmentalization of disciplines, 
thereby occluding the linkages between interdependent histories of the Caribbean, 
Asia, Africa and Europe, reducing them to a single History with a single actor.   
She identifies both the dependency of modern liberalism on despotism, colonial 
divisions and asymmetries, and the circular logic that underpins its political project: 
the liberal idea of the human and the concomitant promises of universal freedom and 
rights were predicated on the subordination and exploitation of those whose freedom 
and rights had been denied by liberalism itself due to their distance from the 
definition of the human, which had the European man as its endpoint. Within the 
“colonial division of humanity” (Lowe, 2015: 7) the meanings assigned to groups, 
civilizations and whole continents according to their degree of proximity to the liberal 
definition of humanity delimit their suitability to be bearer of rights, freedom and 
good governance. The deviation from the norm placed them in a situation of non-
humanity.  She writes:  
Colonized peoples created the conditions for liberal humanism, despite the 
disavowal of these conditions in the European political philosophy on which 
it is largely based. Racial classifications and an international division of 
labor emerged coterminously as parts of a genealogy that were not 





She observes that abolition of slavery was not motivated by humanitarian concerns 
as the liberal narrative that traces a linear progress from slavery to liberty, wage labor, 
modern citizenship and free trade celebrates;  instead, official archives reveal as the 
causes both the fear of the spreading of Black revolutions to the rest of plantation 
societies, and the necessity to expand the economic profits in light of the exhaustion 
of  mercantile capitalism and slavery as a mode of production (Lowe, 2015: 13). The 
response to such problems laid the foundations to new, interrelated systems of 
domination and management of labor, reproduction, and social organization globally, 
based on the adaptation and combination of “colonial slavery with new forms of 
migrant labor, monopoly with laissez-faire, and an older-style colonial territorial rule 
with new forms of security and governed mobility” (Lowe, 2015: 15-16; emphasis in 
the original). The cases of Chinese and East Indian forced migrants that Lowe 
meticulously presents illustrate how distinct but connected racist logics pervaded the 
liberal account of the move from bondage to freedom. Racial classifications 
circulated, they were reoriented and improvised according to concrete conditions and 
needs; the spotlight was moved from group to group, rearranging colonial systems of 
meaning and providing the rationale for new imperial configurations thusly. If 
indigenous were assimilated to the land and eliminable or equated with the past, 
Africans were cast as chattel fit for enslavement, the rationale for Chinese and Indian 
exploitation was their suitability for indentured labor. As Lowe points out such 
impositions did not follow a linear logic. The processes of assigning racial and 
colonial meanings to human difference were interrelated, overlapping, continuous, 




2.1.3 Social regeneration 
 Firmin’s philosophical anthropology, his understanding of the social world, and 
his philosophy of history enabled him to overcome the shortages that Lowe exposes 
in liberal knowledge production, which were on the making at his time. Through his 
relational understanding of humanity, which he expresses as an “invisible chain [that] 
links all the members of humanity in a common circle” (Firmin, 1885: 662; personal 
translation
23
), he extends the impact of the doctrine of racial inequality, and every 
other form of domination, to humanity as a whole. Within that framework he 
understands equality as the inalienable condition for the foundation of solidarity and 
justice, his call for a “regenerative conciliation” (Firmin, 1885: 657; personal 
translation
24
) requires that “human beings take an interest in each other’s progress 
and happiness” (Firmin, 1885: 662; personal translation
25
). If inequality is mutually 
damaging, solidarity and regeneration are mutually enhancing.  
Both the common circle as the metaphor for humanity and his view of the theory 
of equality as “a regenerative doctrine” (Firmin, 1885: 662; personal translation
26
), 
distance him from the linear conception of progress of Comtean perfectibility. 
Throughout the book he insists that the regeneration of the black race is the goal that 
his work attempts to contribute to. The term regeneration implies the damage in 
social health produced by racism, a view shared by Fanon. Firmin’s choice of the 
term regeneration is nothing short of irony. Regeneration has biological denotations, 
it refers to qualities of living beings, and points to a previous descent of their 
condition. Etymologically, regeneration is linked to the Latin re-generare, to bring 
forth or generate again, and it is also related to gene, as in genetics, genital, 
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generation, origin or genealogy, referring to birth or descent. His use of regeneration 
is, however, not related to the biological inferiority that scientists attributed to inferior 
races, but to the social world as the living site generated by human beings. Thus, 
regeneration has a twofold direction: first, it aims at the reintroduction of the human 
capacity to create and participate the social world that the doctrine of inequality has 
erased in its naturalistic understanding of the human; and secondly, it purports at the 
humanization of relations in the social world that the racist structure has impeded. 
In  De l'Égalité des Races Humaines, Firmin anticipated debates later resumed by 
Pan-Africanists, Négritude and not yet concluded in current scholarship on race and 
postcolonialism (Fluehr-Lobban, 2000) concerning black aesthetics and the normative 
value of standards of beauty, racial mixing and hybridity, the erasure of the 
intellectual contributions of African people by Eurocentric philosophies of history, or 
the importance of Haiti in the modern world. If I have failed to cover these and other 
aspects is not due to their lack of significance and relevance, but because they fall 
outside the scope of this chapter.  
To sum up, this sketch of Firmin’s work is meant to illustrate, (1) that the question 
is not only about how race is studied, but race as part of the whole formation of 
modern knowledge production on the human being. Within that framework race and 
power cannot be separated. Race does not function as a mere descriptive category of 
human difference but it is rooted in asymmetrical colonial histories. (2) As Gordon 
(2008) puts it, Firmin’s archaeological work identifies the role of science in the 
constitution of the subject of study, to which it can be added that the studier is also 
constituted in that process. (3) The positivist anthropology that Firmin advocates is 
paradoxically exceeded in different aspects of his own work, for his comprehensive 




methodological tools. This is related to Lisa Lowe’s genealogical critique of modern 
liberal disciplinary formation and their subsequent compartmentalization resulting in 
the occlusion of the role of race in their founding moments. (4) Her examination of 
these occluded conditions upon which knowledge was produced can correlate 
Firmin’s inquiry on the society that produced the doctrines of racial superiority. 
(5)Whereas Lowe frames the discussion in terms of the conditions of possibility for 
such knowledge, Firmin’s genealogy centers his attention on the assumptions and 
presuppositions of the scientific practices of his peers.  The problem he identifies 
when he expresses his incredulity about the lack of rigor, despise of evidence and the 
incapacity of scientists and philosophers to see their relation to the world that 
produced such racist ideas, is the absence of critical self-reflection inherent in a 
model of science as made by god. In his phenomenological work, Lewis Gordon 
(2006, 2015b) has written extensively on the predicaments of the human as knower 
and the question of theory, which etymologically is related both to god and to see. In 
theoretical approaches where the human replaces god nothing falls outside of the eye 
of the theorist; both the knower and the known are complete, without contradictions, 
and theory accounts for a complete reality. Alternatively, a model of science as made 
by humans necessarily brings to the fore the relational element, also with regard to 
the self: one sees what one sees and conjointly one sees oneself as seeing. In contrast 
to the previous approach based on capturing reality, the realization that through 
seeing one establishes a relationship to the world prompts a model of humility, 
“human reality” is then incomplete, and therefore,  "greater than any effort to contain 
it” (Gordon, 2015b: 3). This approach exposes the contradictions of the model of 
humans functioning as gods, but it is not the end of the story for the knower has now 




(Gordon, 2015b: 3). Thus the relationship to reality is enlarged by these realizations 
and new relationships. This also means that the model of the human as knower is 
neither devoid of contradictions, for the question that now arises revolves around how 
to relate to this new knowledge either by admitting  or denying what is seen, which 
Gordon calls, following Sartre, bad faith, a lie to the self, resulting in the shrinking of 
reality (Gordon, 2015b: 1-4). 
2.2 W.E.B. Du Bois 
2.2.1 The birth of American sociology 
Akin to Lisa Lowe’s aforementioned argument on the centrality of race in the 
formation of social and human sciences and its subsequent sidelining from the 
canonical histories and the main practices of disciplines, South African sociologist 
Zine Magubane presents an account of the development of her field in the United 
States. She argues that according to the standard accounts, the inceptions of social 
sciences in the United States followed the model and ideals of the great European 
figures theorizing about European modernity. In the particular case of sociology she 
observes the co-constitutive relation between modernity and sociology; modernity is 
explained by sociology and, in turn, the discipline is understood as a modern form of 
knowledge production on modernity. The self-understanding of sociology’s project as 
a form of knowledge produced by and about the modern condition is rooted in a 
conception of modernity consisting in European industrialization, revolution, 
democratization and disconnected from the global colonial experience and the plight 
of indigenous and people of African descent in America (Magubane, 2016: 1-2; 
Bhambra, 2007). Sociologist Gurminder Bhambra adds that the bifurcation of 
sociology and anthropology was a decisive move in the understanding of the project 




to the study of the modern world understood as originated in European peculiarity 
and “distinct from its colonial entanglements”  (Bahmbra: 2014a: 2). 
 Against this backdrop the study of race is isolated from “issues of ‘general’ 
sociological concern”, for “[r]acism has been made an anachronistic survivor in 
tradition, rather than a constitutive part of modernity” (Magubane, 2016: 1). Thus 
race and the study of black people are circumscribed to a particular space; such issues 
have become “a topic” to be dealt within “sociology of race”, “race and ethnicity” or 
“race relations”. In other words, presenting race issues are as a subfield separated 
from general sociological inquiry impedes the understanding of the formation of U.S. 
sociology and modern societies around questions race (Magubane, 2016:2).  She 
observes that the recognition of slavery as the “signal event in American modernity” 
would cast doubt on the compartmentalization of race and the organMagubane, 
ization of sociology or “the discipline that arose to explain it [American modernity]” 
(2016: 3).  
However, as Alana Lentin bluntly puts it: “[r]acism was embedded in US social 
sciences from their inception” (Lentin, 2017: 181).  The conflation of modernity with 
intra-European events adopted also by US sociology enabled to rewrite a history of 
the discipline that occluded its role in the support of slavery, segregation and global 
colonial racism. Magubane shows how mid-nineteenth century sociological studies 
by Henry Hughes, George Fitzhugh or George Frederick Holmes were written by 
“pro-slavery imperialists” who considered slavery a modern form that depended on 
colonial expansion for its maintenance (Magubane, 2016: 6). By removing such cases 
and the concomitant racism and global colonialism from the main canon of US 
sociology the field moved closer to the European model as the study of European 




accompanied by a localist approach in the study of social matters that ignores their 
global connections; thereby the scope of the field is delimited by rigid national 
boundaries which hinder the understanding complex and broader phenomena such as 
race. As it was stated in the previous chapter, Gurminder Bhambra notes how 
privileging “particular sets of connections leads to particular understandings” 
(Bhambra, 2014a:5), this begs the question of which connections are established and 
which are masked by this manifestation of American exceptionalism in social 
sciences’ self-understanding.  
As Magubane points out, the canonical history of social sciences traces back the 
emergence of modernity in the United States to 1776, to which a fundamental 
anticolonial character is attributed. Hence, the project of sociology presents itself as 
anticolonial in orientation. The view that the United States emerged out of a colony 
nourishes the dissociation between colonialism and racism: colonialism takes place 
elsewhere and racism is treated as an endogenous multifarious matter in the narrative 
of the new nation liberated from Europe (Mugabane, 2016). The narrative of liberty 
as intrinsic to the US modernity required then the obliteration of processes of 
dispossession, extermination and enslavement. Yet in the cases in which slavery may 
be acknowledged as the background of contemporary racism, the former is not 
conceived as an internal form of colonialism informed by European coloniality, as 
Black Power scholars framed it (Bhambra, 2014b), and embedded in wider processes 
of expansion that led to what Magubane calls “the long era of global Jim Crow (1865-
1965)”. Hence, the contemporary sociological analysis of race is unframed from 
colonial histories, privileging instead social psychology and the examination of 




 The absence of race in general sociology had influence on what was to be studied, 
how was to be studied, and also on who was the studier. In other words, the 
separation of the living conditions of blacks from main concerns in the study of the 
society went hand in hand with the silencing of black social scientists, or their 
tokenization under the subdiscipline of sociology of race, or the study of “race 
relations” (Mugabane, 2016, Bhambra, 2014b). The same can be applied to the cases 
of Native American and women. For more than a century these groups have been 
consistently challenging the basic tenets of general sociology and exposing that the 
subtext of general in general sociology equates to white and male sociology. As 
Bhambra notes, despite this challenges and fundamental contributions, the racial 
segregation within the discipline has not yet been acknowledged in current 
disciplinary practices and or in specific historiographical works on US sociology. 
Alternatively, the initial exclusion of gender perspectives and the contributions of 
feminist theorists from the 1960’s on have been conceded, without that implying that 
feminism is currently part of the main agenda of the discipline (2014b: 477).  
The formation of a canon is not merely a collective process whereby certain 
authors delineate the contours of a field by means of an apparent, continuous 
conversation that delimits the insiders from the outsiders. It does not suffice to entice 
the intellectual community about the quality of an author or a text for her to be 
accredited with canonical status since these conversations do not take place in a 
vacuum. The historical context and the forces that shape social relations in which the 
discipline is embedded condition and define who is to participate in the conversation 
and which ideas are to be recognized as important (Bhambra, 2014b: 477). For Toni 
Morrison, rigidity, defensiveness and resistance to change or expansion are intrinsic 




(Morrison, 1994: 371) canonical debates since the intellectual process cannot be 
separated from the motives for the fabrication of the canon. Yet, she notes, not all 
debates elicit the same response, and not all “incursions” are perceived as a threat. 
She attributes the absence from the canon of third-world contributions not merely to 
the intrinsic rigidity, but to the fear of “miscegenation” of the Eurocentric canon 
(Morrison, 1994: 372). At stake are political interests, conceptions of culture, 
entitlement to measure and indict other cultures, and the organization of meanings 
that provide a certain understanding of the self and that legitimate one’s position 
within the debate: “Canon building is empire building. Canon defense is national 
defense. Canon debate (…) is the clash of cultures. And all of the interests are vested” 
(Morrison, 1994: 374; italics in the original). However, the alleged purity of the 
canon that the presence of colored contributions would threaten is put into question at 
the outset by their paradoxical role in the building of the canon, for “invisible things 
are not necessarily not-there”. In other words, the absences, and the “intellectual 
feats” –the refined strategies of epistemic escapism, invention, oblivion and evasion 
of contradictions– required for keeping them at distance from society are also 
constitutive part of the canon (Morrison, 1994: 378). 
2.2.2 Du Bois and the origin of sociology 
A case in point of these constitutive absences and the aforementioned strategies of 
segregation is the erasure from sociology’s historiographies of W.E.B. Du Bois –and 
the Atlanta school that he initiated and led between 1897 and 1913. Instead, his work 
is located within the subfield of “sociology of race”, “sociology of racial relations” or 
“the Negro question” (Bhambra, 2014b; Magubane, 2016; Morris, 2016, Rabaka, 
2010a). This dominant view silences his pioneering role in the development of the 




segregated institution, and a prolific career as a committed scholar, activist, public 
intellectual and institution builder.  
As it was argued above, the marginalization of Du Bois from mainstream 
sociology is rooted in the omission of race as a modern phenomenon, which also 
neglects how mainstream sociology and US social sciences are structured since their 
inception around race (Morris, 2016; Bhambra, 2014b).  Furthermore, Du Bois is not 
only overlooked in current historical narratives of sociology and undergraduate and 
graduate curricula (Rabaka, 2010), during his lifetime Du Bois also faced the 
institutional segregation reserved to black scholars who challenged the dominant 
approach to the study of race, and questioned the scientific paradigms and the 
hegemonic ideology of their time. As Gurminder Bhambra notes, “sociology itself 
was embedded within a racial logic of segregation” (2014b: 478); hence, besides the 
epistemic and methodological complicity of science with oppression, Du Bois and the 
Atlanta scholars were displaced from main academic circles by white academic  and 
political elites. Working in a black institution during segregation entailed the lack of 
peer support, the absence of recognition and scientific capital, the isolation from main 
intellectual networks, and, fundamentally, the lack of economic resources (Morris, 
2016). In his autobiography, Du Bois recalls,  
So far as the American world of science and letters was concerned, we never 
‘belonged’; we remained unrecognized in learned societies and academic 
groups. We rated merely as Negroes studying Negroes, and after all, what 
had Negroes to do with America or science? (1968: 228). 
 
Under this onerous conditions Du Bois weaved an “insurgent intellectual network” 
(Morris, 2016: 193) formed by students, scholars, leaders from religious and women 
movements, activists and volunteers. Thereby he produced a groundbreaking 
sociological work and brought forth a model of social sciences from below, 




and committed to social justice. The interplay between the academic institution and 
black communities led to a two- way relation between the scholars and oppressed 
groups. On one side, it informed the scientists methods and theories to study society, 
on other side, the critical sociology that he generated functioned as a mediator that 
aims to both understand oppression and facilitate action towards social change 
(Morris, 2016). 
Main historiographies accredit Robert E. Park and the Chicago school of sociology 
to be the initiators of sociology and race studies in the first decades of the twentieth 
century in spite of the contributions of Franz Boas or Du Bois and his group of 
sociologists. The black conservative leader Booker T. Washington had an important 
influence in the development of the Chicago school and in the marginalization of Du 
Bois and the Atlanta school. Washington explained the unequal condition of people 
of African descent by means of their inherent inferiority; he promoted programs of 
professional training as the solution to racial problems, and held an accommodating 
stance towards racial segregation that gained the favor of philanthropists and white 
intellectual and political elites. The ascendancy of Washington was felt in the ideas of 
Park, with whom he had closely worked in the industrial education programs, and in 
the marginalization of Du Bois and black radicals that confronted him and were left 
without economic support. Park and the Chicago school explained the condition of 
blacks by means of social Darwinism and Neo-Lamarckian theories that affirmed the 
cultural and biological inferiority of colored people and rationalized oppression. 
Those deemed inferior races were inevitably placed at the bottom of the racial 
hierarchy either because of genetic reasons and natural selection, or because of the 
inheritance of inferior treats derived from a common history of inferiority 




Conservation of Races” Du Bois had already taken the baton from Firmin in order to 
challenge the criteria and expose the contradictions of natural sciences in classifying 
human beings in different races according to physical characteristics. Like Firmin, Du 
Bois did not reject the concept of race, neither pleaded for its elimination. Instead he 
advanced an understanding of race closer to what today is called social 
constructionism grounded in common language, history, traditions and aspirations, 
emphasizing the social and historical without discarding physical differences but 
neither bestowing them with a central role (Du Bois, 2001: 192).  
It should be noticed that Du Bois was trained in philosophy as undergraduate and 
held doctorates in history and economics. His intellectual production work outgrew 
the boundaries of sociology (Rabaka, 2010), for it spanned philosophy, history, 
anthropology, literature, psychology, political science and international relations, also 
while doing sociological work. Yet, if we stay within the boundaries of sociology, Du 
Bois’ studies of black populations had an impact on the development of the whole 
field, for he did not treat black communities separately from the rest of society, but 
showed “their entire implication within the vital questions of modernity” (Magubane, 
2016: 13; Morris, 2016). In other words, he did not disentangle race from questions of 
gender, political economy, urbanism, agriculture, criminality, arts, religion, education 
or leisure (Rabaka, 2010; Morris, 2016). Taking race and racism seriously challenged 
dominant approaches to explain oppression and opened the path to theoretical and 
methodological innovations to study society, which decades later became standard 
models of inquiry, and were attributed to white thinkers (Morris, 2016; Bhambra, 
2014b). 
 Aldon Morris has detailed how Du Bois influence on acknowledged major figures 




on industrial capitalism as stemming from the plantation system and a worldwide 
process of colonization sparked the interest of the German sociologist who, thereby, 
reexamined his biological understanding of race. Weber considered Du Bois’ work on 
the social configuration product on the relation between race and between race and 
capitalism and as the guiding model, and put down the lack of relevance of main 
literature on the issue. In his study on the Polish peasantry, Weber drew from Du 
Bois’ work to take into consideration the role of race and ethnicity within the social 
and economic configuration of the nascent industrial capitalism (Morris, 2016: 153-
159). Du Bois’ analysis of the social and political dimensions of racial inequality and 
his description of segregation as a caste system was years later retaken by Weber’s 
reflections on the relation between social stratification, power, economics and social 
institutions (Morris, 2016: 165). Moreover, Weber’s shift towards social 
constructivism, democratic values and cultural pluralism can be also attributed to the 
intense intellectual exchange with Du Bois. Weber’s initial opposition to Polish 
migrants in Germany was sustained by a social Darwinist view that posited the innate 
superiority of German people, and by his conception of the nation which functions by 
separating biologically different groups of people. Notions of purity, essence, biology 
and nationalism were revised to the extent that Weber became the scourge of German 
eugenicist social scientists (Morris, 2016: 166). 
2.2.3 The Negro problem and the problem Negro 
  Besides the relation of social sciences with race and the anthropological question, 
in what follows I will briefly focus on two other interrelated themes of Du Bois’ work 
that share resemblances with Fanon’s concerns. In 1898 Du Bois published the essay 
“The Study of Negro Problems” in which he denounced the practical absence of 




few attempts until the date. The title itself is indicative of the orientation of the 
research; the formulation “Negro Problems” nuances the singular form “the Negro 
Problem”, and challenges the evasive and alleged symmetry of the “race relations” 
approach of Booker T. Washington and Robert E. Park. Thereby Du Bois calls to 
address the predicaments of black people within questions of power in their social, 
political and economic manifestations, that is, it points out that Negro problems are a 
symptom of the condition of the whole society. Du Bois also exposes how framing 
the issue is also entrenched in questions of power, for the race relations approach 
leaves the legitimacy of the society that produced such problems unquestioned, thus 
rendering illegitimate the assertion of the problem (Fields, 2001). In Barbara J. Fields 
words, the “Negro Problem” 
reveals without euphemism the illegitimacy of the problem in the context of 
a democratic polity. Proposing to decide the fate of people occupying the 
nominal status of citizens otherwise than with their participation and assent 
is a profoundly undemocratic, indeed anti-democratic, undertaking. (…) race 
relations as an ideological formation of the problem, popularized with genius 
by Booker T. Washington, arose precisely as a way to disguise the 
antidemocratic essence of the problem by providing for it both a definition 
and a solution apparently capable of bypassing the issue of naked power that 
lay at its core (Fields, 2001: 813-814). 
 
  At the outset, he posits that the study of Negro problems are to be treated 
as a social problem, which he defines as a maladjustment in the relation between 
conditions and actions (Du Bois, 1898: 3): “the failure of an organized social 
group to realize its group ideals, through the inability to adapt a certain desired 
line of action to given conditions of life” (Du Bois, 1898: 2). The author takes 
studies on black people to task first, because they “judge the whole from the 
part” (Du Bois, 1898: 13), which turns black people into “one inert changeless 
mass” (Du Bois, 1898: 14); and second, for disregarding the social element and 




psychological and institutional elements of the social world, in favor of 
reductionist explanations derived from “grand theories” based on natural laws 
(Bay, 1998: 44). 
so much of the work done on the Negro question is notoriously uncritical; 
uncritical from lack of discrimination in the selection and weighing of 
evidence; uncritical in choosing the proper point of view from which to 
study these problems, and, finally, uncritical from the distinct bias in the 
minds of so many writers. (Du Bois, 1898: 12-13)   
 
The implications of such analysis as we have seen was not only limited to how 
social sciences were to study race; the society in which these forms of knowledge 
were produced was also put under scrutiny. Their mutual constitution reveals the 
political possibilities for social reform or the continual degradation of racialized 
communities (Du Bois, 1898: 15). In the examined accounts, which he describes as 
superficial, unsystematic and uncritical (Du Bois, 1898: 11-12), the aforementioned 
failure becomes an inherent feature of black people and the confirmation of their 
pathological constitution rather than a symptom of broader elements of social life. 
Social scientists conflate Negro problems such as violence, alcoholism, lack of 
education or health, or poverty, with the Negro problem, “the burden [that] belongs to 
the nation” (2015: 45), which results in producing Negroes as problems: 
In effect, the Negro problems were thrown out of the sphere of human 
problems into the sphere of necessity premised upon pathologies. 
Consequently, Negro problems often collapsed into the Negro Problem—the 
problem, in other words, of having Negroes around. (Gordon, 2000) 
 
The fundamental question that Du Bois poses is how to study black people without 
replicating their production as “problematic people”. The complexity that the study of 
human beings requires finds an additional difficulty when considering that the 
humanity of the Negro is put into question. (Gordon, 2008) In order to amend the 
pitfalls of social scientific works on the Negro problem, and especially with the 




Negro,  an unprecedented systematic study of the Seventh Ward in Philadelphia, the 
most populated black urban ghetto in the North of the U.S. This study is the first 
major empirical research in US sociology. Although in histories of sociology this is 
attributed to William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki’s 1918 study on the Polish 
peasant, Du Bois work antedated the Chicago school by two decades (Bhambra, 
2014b). As Mia Bay observes, reducing the merits of this work to being the first and 
being sociological does not allow to appreciate the multi-methodological and 
transdisciplinary scope of the study in a moment when disciplines were not 
completely formed (1998: 5). Also important in the study is that it initiated a tradition 
of scientific work directed at black liberation, for Du Bois conceived a form social 
science, attuned to the African American experience, in connection with social 
reform.  
Rabaka outlines that the path was loaded with “theoretical trials and tribulations” 
and “conceptual growing pains” (2010a: 76). Du Bois faced two main difficulties, 
first, the absence of comprehensive models of social science’s research in the U.S. 
(Morris, 2016); second, the epistemic, methodological and institutional intricacy of 
social sciences with the situation he was meant to study (Rabaka, 2010a). Sociologist 
Pierre Saint-Arnaud summarizes both aspects:  
Du Bois simply had no theoretical corpus on which to base a contrary 
position. He had to build a new science from the ground up, a science 
devoted to the advancement, as opposed to the near-term extinction, of black 
Americans (quoted in Rabaka, 2010a: 72). 
 
Du Bois responded to this twofold obstacle with an anti-racist “counter-sociology” 
(Rabaka, 2010a: 71) that challenged the “armchair grand theorizing” (Morris, 2016: 
50), social Darwinism and natural laws of nineteenth-century European sociological 
systems. He dedicated careful reflection on methodological aspects that resulted in an 




community, he collected considerable qualitative and quantitative data based on the 
combination of ethnographic research, participant-observation, interviews, surveys, 
maps, archival research, statistical analysis comparative and historical analysis, and 
the cross-checking of the data obtained (Rabaka, 2010: 53). 
For Du Bois the history of Negro problems at the time of post-emancipation 
cannot be delinked from slavery and connects it to the situation of post-emancipation, 
for “one cannot study the Negro in freedom and come to general conclusions about 
his destiny without knowing his history in slavery.” (Du Bois, 1898: 12) To that 
effect, he carried out studies of blacks under slavery, tracked the migrations of 
emancipated slaves to Philadelphia, established comparisons with Jews and Italians 
communities, and delved into how the community was formed across time. 
Thereafter, he examines the internal constitution of the community, the dynamics 
within families, and the demographics, political economy, education, religion, 
criminality or health conditions. For Du Bois, “a slum is not a simple fact, it is a 
symptom and that to know the removable causes of the Negro slums of Philadelphia 
requires a study that takes one far beyond the slum districts” (Du Bois, 2007b: 4). 
Thus, The Philadelphia Negro is not solely a study of a black community, neither can 
be reduced to black sociology, rather, by examining how “oppression and 
discrimination trapped blacks in a vicious cycle of subordination” (Morris, 2016: 48) 
the author treats race within the social configuration. This entails taking into 
consideration the role of racist imaginaries, the racial organization of space, the 
origins and the effects of the exclusion from public life, or the seclusion to limited 
labor options.  
Du Bois discusses the formation of social classes in the particular context of a 




the intricacy of class, race and gender, which is particular evident in the chapters 
dedicated to income and access to labor market and, on education and illiteracy. 
Although I concur with Rabaka (2010b) when he sees The Philadelphia Negro as 
informed by a male, bourgeois perspective which flawed Du Bois’s interpretation of 
the data and gender analysis –a perspective that Du Bois shifted in subsequent works 
with a firmer anti-sexist stance– the gendered dimension is not tangential to his 
methodological proposal. The influence of black female thinkers like Anna Julia 
Cooper or Ida B. Wells is present in his work. Likewise, for his reflection on 
methodology he drew from the studies of urban poverty by Jane Addams and the Hull 
House settlement movement. Isabel Eaton, who participated in the research for the 
important Hull House Maps and Papers (1895), wrote the section on the study of 
black domestic workers for The Philadelphia Negro.  
In his autobiography Du Bois recalls that the University of Pennsylvania, which 
assigned him the project of The Philadelphia Negro, provided scarce economic 
resources, did not offer a research team, intellectual support, methodological 
instruction, neither membership nor recognition, and allotted a year time for the 
realization of the study on his own (1968: 194-198). Lewis Gordon points out that the 
project itself was embedded in the racist logic of failure mentioned above, for Du 
Bois was expected to fail as a scientist, and thereby “demonstrate that Philadelphia’s 
evils were extrasystemic, were features of the black populations, rather than 
intrasystemic, things endemic to the system and, hence, things done to the black 
populations.” (2000: 68; italics in the original). In other words, the project was 
conceived to reaffirm the pathologies of Negro populations and legitimize their 




Gordon identifies in the phenomena of “problematic people” (2000: 69) one of the 
manifestations of the theodicy of Euro-modern epistemic and political systems. 
Theodicy is the theological inquiry that arises from the presence of evil in light of the 
existence of God: If God isloving and almighty, how can evil and injustice be 
explained? The answer, not only by Christian theologists like Saint Augustine of 
Hippo, but also among African thought as the Akan,has been mainly twofold: either 
human beings ignore the deity’s plan, or it is the free will endowed by God to human 
beings and their subsequent choices that accounts for evil. In both cases, the deity is 
presumed complete and exempted from evil, which falls of the shoulders of human 
beings. For Gordon, the grammar of theodicy persists in its secularized form in the 
Euro-modern world wherein the conception of political and knowledge systems as 
complete and absolute have “taken up the void left by God” , and the imperfections 
are to be found outside of the system (Gordon, 2006b: 7).  
African diasporic thinkers have recurrently identified the theodicean grammar of 
Western political thought. Although they did not explicitly formulate it as such, the 
accounts of Firmin, Du Bois and Fanon in this chapter illustrate different aspects of 
this point. A perfect and just system, by definition, denies the existence of problems 
within the system, then, black people representing the imperfections and 
contradictions of the system are displaced outside of the system. They are rationalized 
as “problematic people” by virtue of an isomorphic relation between the problems 
they experience and what they are (2007: 125).  The theodicean grammar is not 
limited to neat inside/outside distinctions, for the recognition of systemic 
incompleteness, paradoxically, may lead to creating a new complete system:  
Even where the (white) thinker is admitting the injustice of the system and 
showing how it could be made good, the logic of ultimate goodness is 




a new system’s rigor requires, in effect, the elimination of all outsiders by 
virtue of their assimilation (Gordon, 2007: 122). 
 
2.2.4 Being a problem and double consciouness 
The theodicean relation of blacks to the epistemic and the political undergirds the 
1903 classic The Souls of Black Folk, where Du Bois perceptively warned at the 
beginning that the problem is not the so-called Negro problem, and that had far 
reaching implications: “the problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the 
color-line” (Du Bois, 2015: 1). Du Bois was not only referring to black and white 
relations in the United States, he was also alluding to the global connection between 
capitalism and racism that formed a “dark vast sea of human labor” (Du Bois, 1998: 
15) that extends over Asia, Africa and the Americas, which he addressed in 
subsequent works.  
If in The Philadelphia Negro he challenged dominant forms of study of black 
people and societal presuppositions by detailing the social character of the problems 
faced by black communities in its objective dimension through empirical research, 
The Souls of Black Folk, entailed a “shift in the theoretical attitude of the knower” 
(Maldonado-Torres, 2008: 8). Du Bois, turned his attention towards the perspective 
and the inner-life of those who live as a problem. He approached the question of 
problem people in its subjective dimension, that is, by looking from within at the 
relation between the structure and black subjectivity. To that effect he merges the 
first, second and third person and combines poetry, Negro spirituals, sociology, 
personal memories, short stories, history, and philosophy. Gordon (2000) remarks 
that what makes Du Bois’s work humanistic social sciences is that neither of both 
approaches is presumed as complete. 
The methodological critique of the study of black people is also explicit in this 




window sociologist”, to the social scientists who locate the origin of the Negro 
problem in their constitution (Du Bois, 2015: 116). Instead, he demands to treat the 
study of black people with the same level of proximity, rigor and complexity that the 
study of human issues requires, with, as stated above, the added complication that 
their humanity is questioned by society: 
We seldom study the condition of the Negro to-day honestly and carefully. It 
is so much easier to assume that we know it all. Or perhaps, having already 
reached conclusions in our own minds, we are loth to have them disturbed 
by facts. And yet how little we really know of these millions,––of their daily 
lives and longings, of their homely joys and sorrow, of their real 
shortcomings and the meaning of their crimes! All this we can only learn by 
intimate contact with the masses, and not by wholesale arguments covering 
millions separate in time and space, and differing widely in training and 
culture. (Du Bois, 2015: 103-104; own italics) 
 
Methodologically, what Du Bois proposes through such “intimate contact” and the 
inside approach to study phenomena is to take into consideration the existence of a 
black perspective and the possibility of it being communicated, which reduces the gap 
between the studier and the studied (Gordon, 2000: 92-93). Consequently, Du Bois 
sets out the problem through a question, not without sarcasm, in the well-known 
passage that follows:  
Between me and the other world there is ever an unasked question: unasked 
by some through feelings of delicacy; by others through the difficulty of 
rightly framing it. All, nevertheless, flutter round it. They approach me in a 
half-hesitant sort of way, eye me curiously or compassionately, and then, 
instead of saying directly, How does it feel to be a problem? they say, I 
know an excellent colored man in my town; or, I fought at Mechanicsville; 
or, Do not these Southern outrages make your blood boil? At these I smile, 
or am interested, or reduce the boiling to a simmer, as the occasion may 
require. To the real question, How does it feel to be a problem? I answer 
seldom a word. (Du Bois, 2015: 3-4; own italics) 
 
The question of being a problem is not only explored in terms of feelings and the 
subjective experience, but also in terms of “the strange meaning of being black” (Du 
Bois, 2015: 1; own italics). In order to unravel such meaning he directed his attention 




by consciousness. As Paget Henry (2006) shows, Du Bois explored 
phenomenologically the relationship of the black to the self and to the world from the 
perspective of consciousness by engaging  Hegel’s dialectic of lordship and 
bondage
28
, removing from it ontological considerations, and articulating the concept 
of double consciousness.   
In his view, blacks in the United States are both strangers and at home, “born with 
a veil, and gifted with second-sight” (Du Bois, 2015: 5). Being black and U.S.-
American are two irreconcilable terms for the racist project. Then double 
consciousness refers to the “strange experience” (Du Bois, 2015: 5) of being a 
problem, of constantly seeing oneself and the world, through the contemptuous eyes 
of others, or, in other words, double consciousness is looking at the world through the 
other’s eyes. The result of this external imposition on the sight is the impossibility of 
self-consciousness and the subsequent splits: “two souls, two thoughts, two 
unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body” (Du Bois, 2015: 5). This 
particular form of false consciousness entails adopting a self-deprecating image and 
accepting the validity of black people as problems. The psychological result is self-
rejection, vacillation, self-hatred, and a distorted perception of reality. 
 The Hegelian dialectics of recognition between self and other is interrupted at the 
level of the skin when deprived of its metaphorical and disembodied character and is 
taken to the concrete experience of the African-descent subject under colonial and 
racial history. Instead of the reciprocal interplay between self and Other required for 
the emergence of two mutually constituting self-consciousness, the black self is split 
in an inner clash “between two We’s”, between “two racialized and hence 
irreconcilable collective identities”. The black remains trapped in the relation 
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 Hegel’s dialectics of lordship and bondage and its treatment by Fanon will be covered in detail  




between master and slave (Henry, 2006: 7). Besides the psychological effects, double 
consciousness implies accepting as the norm the double standards produced by white 
normativity, that is, the acceptance of notions of universality, normality, justice, 
freedom, citizenship, peace or equality that are premised upon the pathologization of 
groups of people. Within the framework of double consciousness, conceiving oneself 
as problematic and inferior is normal (Gordon, 2000; 2006b). 
Double consciousness, however, contains the possibility of what Paget Henry 
called “potentiated second sight” (2006), an epistemic position that enables new 
perspectives and opens up new critical possibilities vis-a-vis white society. In his 
chapter dedicated to whiteness in Darkwater: Voices from Within the Veil, Du Bois 
writes:   
Of them I am singularly clairvoyant. I see in and through them. I view them 
from unusual points of vantage. Not as foreigner do I come, for I am native, 
not foreign, bone of their thought and flesh of their language (…) Nor yet is 
my knowledge that which servants have of masters, or mass of class, or 
capitalist of artisan. I see these souls undressed and from the back and side. I 
see the workings of their entrails. I know their thoughts and they know that I 
know. This knowledge makes them now embarrassed, now furious! (2007c: 
29). 
 
Similarly, in one of his firmest anticolonial works, The World and Africa, 
potentiated double consciousness underpins his stance on colonial paradoxes and 
contradictions: 
Perhaps the worst thing about the colonial system was the contradiction 
which arose and had to arise in Europe with regard to the whole situation. 
Extreme poverty in colonies was a main cause of wealth and luxury in 
Europe. The results of this poverty were disease, ignorance and crime. Yet 
these had to be represented as natural characteristics of backward peoples. 
Education for colonial people must inevitably mean unrest and revolt; 
education, therefore, had to be limited and used to inculcate obedience and 
servility lest the whole colonial system be overthrown. Ability, self-
assertion, resentment, among colonial people must be represented as 





Potentiated double consciousness exposes the self-deceptive and narcissistic 
character of the theodicean system, it unveils “the lived contradiction” (Henry, 2006: 
9) of double consciousness, and redirects its attention toward the contradictions of the 
society that generated problematic people. It brings into the open a society that 
functions through the generation of doubles while asserting its completeness: double 
selves and double notions of membership, but also double notions of universality, 
normality, justice, equality, freedom, or peace, in contradiction with the “lived 
reality” of white normativity, injustice, inequality, unfreedom and violence, as 
experienced by blacks despite the dominant claims. It is the experience of these 
tensions and contradictions that enables black people to question the legitimacy of the 
society (Gordon, 2000: 92).  
 In epistemic terms, potentiated double consciousness is an expansive experience. 
The black knows the white perspective that creates her as a problem, and thereby 
gains a perspective on white perspective, and questions its legitimacy. Or as novelist 
and poet James Weldon Johnson famously put it:  "I believe it to be a fact that the 
colored people of this country know and understand the white people better than the 
white people know and understand them." (quoted in Bernasconi, 2000: 182) The 
dialectical movement in this form of double consciousness enables a broader 
perspective of reality, for it covers both dominant reality and its contradictions. 
However, it is not an understanding of dialectics that leads to another closed system. 
The critical perspective gained does not propose the clashing of two universals; it is 
not an attempt to replace a god by another god, a hegemonic position by another 
hegemonic form of consciousness, or substituting white normativity by black 
normativity. Rather, paraphrasing Toni Morrison, it transforms knowledge from a 




expansive movement grounded on humility, for the realization that there is more to 
the story than what double consciousness reveals (Gordon, 2000; Henry, 2006). 
   With his articulation of double consciousness Du Bois opened up the way for the 
phenomenological explorations of Africana lifeworld (Henry, 2006; Gordon, 2008).  
Although no trace indicates that Fanon was acquainted with Du Bois’ work, the 
former delved into that path and cleared new venues by exploring the psycho-
existential and the sociopolitical implications of double consciousness. Moreover, to 
the centrality of racial liberation as the driving force of self-reflection, Paget Henry 
points out that both Fanon and Du Bois incorporated the poetic dimension as an 
inseparable element of their thought. For both authors the question of reality and 
meaning in their connection with history, politics, psychology, economic structures, 
and social institutions is brought to the forefront, and as Fanon points out, “reality 
turns out to be extremely resistant” (Fanon, 1952: 147; my translation
29
).The 
following section deals with how Fanon in Black Skin White Masks and throughout 
his work addressed this question. 
2.3 Frantz Fanon 
2.3.1 Decolonization as first philosophy 
 In 1951 Fanon submitted as his medical thesis a work that would later become 
Black Skin White Masks. Originally entitled “Essai sur la désaliénation du Noir”, such 
work caused a “scandal” at the department of psychiatry in Lyon and was rejected on 
the grounds of its excessively subjective approach (Cherki, 2011: 39). The 
department, led by neurologist Jean Dechaume favored the positivist study of mental 
illness predicated on an organicist approach, that is, it relied on a physiological 
understanding of mental illness that sought a direct correlation between symptom, 
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organic localization and medication. Within this biological orientation, shock therapy, 
injections and internment were the customary treatments recommended at the 
department to basic mental alterations (Cherki, 2011; Gibson and Beneduce, 2017). 
Fanon declares at the outset that “this work is a clinical study”, pointing out the 
intricacy of racism and health issues (Fanon, 1952: 12; my translation
30
). Yet, besides 
psychiatric literature, he relies on philosophy, sociology, anthropology, poetry, film, 
comics, popular and children stories, and personal narratives, thereby outgrowing the 
disciplinary limits, including the established boundaries of neuropsychiatry, and 
advancing a different conception of the clinical. 
Moreover, questions of racism, social exclusion, economic exploitation, violence 
and their subsequent psychic impact on black populations fell outside the scope of 
psychiatry and medicine in general. Amidst the substantial developments in 
psychiatry and psychology, the increasing concern for mental health issues, and the 
proliferation of public and private mental care facilities after World War II in the 
Europe and the United States, the mental disorders of populations of color were 
systematically ignored by researchers, policy makers and health care providers.  The 
link between health and oppression was disregarded. Except for the initiatives of 
groups of black psychiatrists and psychologists in the United States, supported by 
religious and black intellectual figures and with a strong communitarian character, 
such as the Lafargue Clinic in Harlem (Mendes, 2015), or the exceptions in Great 
Britain driven by and directed to migrant populations and students (Gibson and 
Beneduce, 2017) in the mid-twentieth century, psychiatry, shielded in scientific value 
neutrality and objectivity, stood apart from political concerns. Psychiatry’s putative 
detachment from politics occludes the role  that the field played in sustaining racism 
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and an oppressive social order, not only in the colonies, as it will be addressed in 
chapter five, but also in the western world. If matters of racism and oppression were 
alien to the field, race and racial difference, in contrast, were central elements to be 
considered in differently valuing pathologies, establishing diagnostics, defining 
treatments and building distinct doctor-patient relationships. Hence, pathologies of 
people of African descent were approached out of the stereotype that depicted them 
as criminal, violent, lazy, bewildered and inherently pathological (Mendes, 2015; 
Gibson and Beneduce, 2017). 
At the same time, as Fanon shows throughout the book, and several studies have 
delved upon (Anderson, Jenson and Keller, 2011), psychiatric theories like 
psychoanalysis travelled back and forth between the metropolis and the colony. That 
is, psychoanalysis did not emerge in a relationship of exteriority to colonialism, but as 
other Euro-modern sciences and theories, its constitution was embedded in colonial 
ideology and inseparable from the colonial project. Dominant ideas and categories 
such as primitivism, the savage mind and the darkness of the colony informed early 
psychoanalytic theories. In its turn, psychoanalysis permeated notions of culture, 
civilization and citizenship upon which the colony was examined, and 
psychoanalytical views were applied to the colonized taking as the measure the Euro-
modern bourgeois psychoanalytic subject, universal and cosmopolitan.  As Fanon 
puts it, there is a “discordance between the corresponding schemas and the reality that 
the nègre offers” (Fanon,1952: 148; personal translation
31
 ). 
Black Skin White Masks is a multilayered and transdisciplinary work in which he 
addresses different themes: a critique of Euro-modernity, the psycho-existential 
condition of black Antillean in the metropolis, the suffering and alienation of racism, 
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the possibility of understanding between blacks and whites, or the pathologies 
produced by the search of recognition, among others. Yet I concur with Jane Anna 
Gordon, (2014), Nelson Maldonado-Torres (2008, 2009) and Lewis Gordon (1995, 
2015) when they argue that the fundamental theme that undergirds this work is a 
philosophical reflection on how knowledge on the human being is limited by the 
entanglement of colonialism with human sciences. Through his analysis on racism 
and dehumanization Fanon reflects on how human sciences can account for the 
condition of those placed below the colonial standards of humanity when methods 
and models of study are designed and actively related to their creation as subhumans. 
As Maldonado-Torres (2009) observes, putting at the center the experience of racism 
and dehumanization is not solely a description of the particular condition of the black, 
it rather serves to examine and challenge the philosophical bedrock of social and 
human sciences and expose their limitations in the study of the human being, and 
simultaneously, to outline a liberation-oriented human sciences out of the experience 
and the theorization of those whose humanity is denied, that is, to produce a form of 
knowledge  that enhances their agency rather than obstructs it and pathologizes them.  
 Du Bois in the earlier cited essay from 1899 “The Study of Negro Problems” 
pointed out that despite the growing interest in the study of social phenomena 
sociology had ignored those derived from the presence in the United States of 
America of eight million persons of African descent. Besides the fact that the 
urgencies that afflicted black people demanded to be addressed, he also saw this 
situation as containing the opportunity to challenge the prevailing methodological 
presuppositions, generate new kinds of knowledge, expand the intellectual production 




Fifty years later, from metropolitan France, Frantz Fanon faces a different 
landscape, although the heart of the problem remains untouched. The aftermath of 
Nazi horror was followed by a general response against racism and the gradual turn 
away from racial-biological science in the West. In this vein, the UNESCO 
declaration of race from 1950 issued by a group of anthropologists and geneticists 
affirms the common belonging of humankind to a single species, attempts to shed 
light on the concept of race, its scientific use,  and assert the equality of human beings 
within “the ethic of universal brotherhood”  (UNESCO, 1952: 103). Fanon seemed to 
be acquainted with this declaration and in the opening pages of Black Skin White 
Masks Fanon addresses the liberal values that undergird the changing approach to 
race and racism of his time:  
Toward a new humanism. . . .  
Understanding among men. . . .  
Our colored brothers. . . . 
Mankind, I believe in you. . . . 
Race prejudice. . . .  
To understand and to love. . . . 
From all sides dozens and hundreds of pages assail me and try to impose 
their wills on me. But a single line would be enough. Provide a single 
answer and the black problem would lose its seriousness. 
What does man want? 
What do blacks want? 
Even if I risk provoking the resentment of my colored brothers, I would 




Ethical appeals to a common humanity, brotherhood, equality, compassion or love 
between abstract human beings add layers of sediment to the problem instead of 
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 « Vers un nouvel humanisme... 
La compréhension des hommes... 
Nos frères de couleur... 
Je crois en toi, Homme... 
Le préjugé de race... 
Comprendre et aimer... 
De partout m'assaillent et tentent de s'imposer à moi des dizaines et des centaines de pages. 
Pourtant, une seule ligne suffirait. Une seule réponse à fournir et le problème noir se dépouille de 
son sérieux. Que veut l'homme ? 
Que veut l'homme noir ? 





shedding light onto it. “I am not as innocent to the extent of believing that appeals to 
reason or respect of the human can change reality. For the nègre who works in the 
sugar plantations in Le Robert, there is only one solution: the struggle.”  (Fanon, 
1952: 218; my translation
33
)  Devoid of attention to matters of history, power, to the 
meanings and values ascribed to the human beings, to conflict, and to the systemic 
dehumanization of the colonized, liberal values uphold the system and block the 
possibility and the scope of change. Is the black a human being? What is a human 
being? What is the standard of the human and what is the relation of the black to such 
standard? These, and their concomitant historical, political and cultural trajectories, 
are questions that the humanism of the UNESCO declaration skips in their hasty 
ethical leap and that Fanon implicitly and explicitly addresses with his initial 
question. He writes: 
By appealing to humanity, to dignity, to love, to charity, it would be easy to 
prove or to make admit that the black is equal to the white, but my goal is 
different: what I want is to help the blacks to liberate themselves from the 
arsenal of complexes that has sprouted in the colonial situation (Fanon, 




 Likewise, in Les damnés de la terre Fanon alludes to the “the human person” of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. Fanon writes:  
But this dignity has nothing to do with the dignity of the ‘human person’. 
The colonized have never heard of this ideal human person. What the 
colonized have seen in their land is that they could be detained, beaten and 
starved with impunity. And never a priest or a professor of morals came to 
receive the beatings in their place or to share their bread with them. (Fanon, 
1961: 47; my translation
35
 ) 
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 « Nous ne poussons pas la naïveté jusqu'à croire que les appels à la raison ou au respect de      
l'homme puissent changer le réel. Pour le nègre qui travaille dans les plantations de canne du Robert1, 
il n'y a qu'une solution : la lutte. » 
34
 « en faisant appel à l’humanité, au sentiment de la dignité, à l’amour, à la charité, il nous serait 
facile de prouver ou de faire admettre que le Noir est l’égal du Blanc. Mais notre but est tout autre : ce 
que nous voulons, c’est aider le Noir à se libérer de l’arsenal complexuel qui a germé au sein de la 
situation coloniale. » 
35
 « Mais cette dignité n'a rien à voir avec la dignité de la « personne humaine ». Cette personne 
humaine idéale, il n'en a jamais entendu parler. Ce que le colonisé a vu sur son sol, c'est qu'on pouvait 
impunément l'arrêter, le frapper, l'affamer; et aucun professeur de morale jamais, aucun curé jamais 





Samuel Moyn points out that the notion of the human person was one of the most 
disputed elements of the text–for its conservative undertones–between liberals and 
communitarians. Christian in its origin, the individualistic and moralistic notion of the 
human person became its central tenet; at stake was also the underlying Christian 
framework of the Declaration (Moyn, 2010). Throughout his work, Fanon skipped the 
debate between liberals and communitarians and, although closer to the later, 
articulates a relational philosophical anthropology in which the subject is inherently 
bound to and responsible for the other, as Maldonado-Torres puts it, “to the point of 
substitution”, that is, the “subject lives and works for the Other.” (2008: 154-155; 
italics in the original) In this vein, dignity for Fanon is not an inborn quality of the 
human being, but is rather an achievement; it is something to be struggled for and 
related to action. “Was my freedon not given to me in order to build the world of the 
You?” (Fanon, 1952: 223; personal translation
36
; italics in the original) Fanon links 
the question of the human being and subjectivity to freedom, agency and 
responsibility. As Maldonado-Torres (2009) points out, Black Skin White Masks is 
guided by decolonization as first philosophy, and it is from that angle that he 
interrogates the human, social sciences and conceives the possibility of action. For 
Fanon the problem is political, and as we will see, racism disrupts the relation 
between ethics and politics upon which good-willed declarations and liberal political 
theories are based. For Fanon, decolonization is not tantamount to the demands or the 
struggle for equality, recognition or justice. Instead, it is a historical process through 
which the colonized subject intervenes actively and responsibily in the world after 
liberation, and human relations at the level of economics, land, knowledge, sexuality, 
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the understanding of the human being and the normative framework are radically 
transformed. 
The very question “What do blacks want?”, that is not posed and Fanon demands 
to be posed, entails the existence of the interiority, the perspective, and thus, the 
humanity of the black, which itself is a challenge to colonialism and racism. If Du 
Bois accessed black interiority through the question “What does it feel to be a 
problem”, for Fanon the question of desire, “What do blacks want?”, guides him 
through both the denied interiority of the black and the societal, cultural and historical 
structures that inform such desire. It is then not only a question about subjectivity. At 
the same time, the question of desire brings to the forefront the question of reality, 
which drives his thought on alienation and social sciences. To that effect, as we saw, 
he drew on multiple disciplines and perspectives. But as he puts it, “the analysis of 
the real is a delicate issue. (…) The key is not to accumulate facts and behaviors, but 
to disclose their meaning.” (Fanon, 1952: 163; my translation
37
 )  Miraj Desai points 
out that for Fanon reality is not purely psychological, but also phenomenological. It 
entails unfolding the meaning of “the world, self, others, objects, media, 
race/ethnicity, political and economic structures, and collective traditions as they are 
given in lived experience and the lived world.” (Desai, 2014:63-64)  
Also, the question of desire is linked to the aforementioned aspects of action, 
freedom and subjectivity. In this sense, desire is not only a lack, but can also be 
affirmation, agency and connection:  
I ask to be considered on the basis of my Desire. I am not only here-now, 
locked into thinghood. I am for somewhere else and for something else. I 
demand that my negating activity is taken into account insofar as I pursue 
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 « L'analyse du réel est délicate. (…) L'essentiel pour nous n'est pas d'accumuler des faits, des 




something other than life, insofar as I fight for the birth of a human world–




However, amidst the chatter of the many pages that assail him, Fanon finds a 
piercing silence. In the introduction he asks why to write a book that nobody had 
asked for, especially those at whom it was addressed (Fanon, 1952: 7). To his own 
question, Fanon “calmly” responds that “there are too many imbeciles in this world. 
And after having said that, now I have to prove it” (Fanon, 1952: 7; personal 
translation
39
). Who are these imbeciles
40
? Unlike Du Bois’ aforementioned article, 
Fanon was not only addressing his writing to the scientific community, but also to a 
black readership. Paradoxically, as Jane Anna Gordon (2014: 64) notes, the fact that 
this book was not required by black people indicates the extent to which it was 
needed, for evasion is one of the mechanisms of oppression that Fanon addresses 
throughout this work. 
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 « Je demande qu'on me considère à partir de mon Désir. Je ne suis pas seulement ici-maintenant, 
enfermé dans la choséité. Je suis pour ailleurs et pour autre chose. Je réclame qu'on tienne compte de 
mon activité négatrice en tant que je poursuis autre chose que la vie ; en tant que je lutte pour la 
naissance d'un monde humain, c'est-à-dire d'un monde de reconnaissances réciproques. »  
39
 « Alors, calmement, je réponds qu'il y a trop d'imbéciles sur cette terre. Et puisque je le dis, il 
s'agit de le prouver.» 
40
 The English version of this passage translates imbeciles as idiots. Both have been used as 
medical terms to describe degrees of mental weaknesses, but they are not synonymous. In Ancient 
Greece the idiot referred to those who did not participate in public affairs, and thus would be pertinent 
to describe the ethical approach to racism devoid of its political consideration. Imbecility, from Latin 
imbecillus, is etymologically related to baculum or walking stick, denoting physical weakness, which 
was extended to mental weakness in medical French and subsequently it became an insult. Another 
sense of imbecility is connected to the Latin im bellum, without war; an expression that Romans used 
to refer to people who were physically or mentally weak for war. Imbecile is also related to the Greek 
baculus, or scepter. The royal stick here would not imply weakness but it would refer to the positive 
value of having knowledge and experience. Thus, the imbecile is here the one who lacks baculus, that 
is, who constantly vacillates, is between two minds, and evades decision (Erneut and Meillet, 2001). In 
other words, the one that is too young and lacks experience, judgement and support, that is, maturity, 
which as Lewis Gordon (1995, 2015) has extensively developed, is one of the central elements of 
Fanon’s philosophical anthropology.  This connects with a passage where he states that “this book 
should have been written three years ago… but back then these truths where burning in me, today I can 
tell them without feverishness” (1952: 9). In this sense, Black Skin White Masks may also be a personal 
departure from imbecility, from the weakness that racism fosters in the black through the evasion of 
reality, locking her in an enforced infancy, and a move towards responsibility for one’s learning, 




2.3.2 Questioning methods and disciplines 
As stated, Fanon conceived Black Skin White Masks as a clinical inquiry, but the 
study of the black condition requires a reformulation of the conception of the clinical, 
that is, addressing questions of economics, history, culture, value, being and meaning, 
and like the study of the human being, it cannot be entrusted to a single discipline. 
When I started this work, having completed my medical studies, I thought of 
submitting it as my thesis. But the dialectic required redoubling my 
positions. Although in a certain way I concentrated on the psychic alienation 
of the black, I could not overlook certain elements which, however 
psychological they may be, originated effects that bear upon the domain of 




As we have seen throughout this chapter, disciplinary segmentation functions as a 
technology that shapes and filters, content and occludes the embeddedness of Euro-
modern social sciences with colonialism (Lowe, 2015). In Black Skin White Masks 
and throughout the rest of his work, including his more orthodox psychiatric writings, 
he develops an implicit critique of methods and disciplines through a particular anti- 
or extra-disciplinary approach. In Gordon’s terms, Fanon takes psychiatry as his 
starting point, but it is by privileging the problem what enables him to stretch out 
towards the domains of philosophy, sociology, anthropology, political economy, 
history or literature without being subjected to the disparate existing scholar 
communities and disciplinary constraints, that is, the centripetal forces of their 
epistemic, methodological and identitarian guidelines and boundaries.  
This would not be best described as interdisciplinary. In this model, discrete 
disciplines, conceived as sovereign over particular fragments of reality, drag their 
notions of autonomy, identity and completeness down with them; the resulting 
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 « Quand nous avons commencé cet ouvrage, parvenu au terme de nos études médicales, nous 
nous proposions de le soutenir en tant que thèse. Et puis la dialectique exigea de nous des prises de 
position redoublées. Bien qu'en quelque sorte nous nous fussions attaque a l'aliénation psychique du 
Noir, nous ne pouvions passer sous silence certains éléments qui, pour psychologiques qu'ils aient pu 




convergence is tangential, which leaves disciplines, and the established disciplinary 
framework and communities, unaltered (Gordon, 2015b). Instead his work could 
resonate with certain transdisciplinary practices insofar as these are not understood as 
an end in themselves or as an extension of a discipline through the addition of diverse 
texts and actors. Anthropologist José Juncosa (2014), with the struggles for 
emancipation of indigenous and black people in mind, casts doubt on the 
emancipatory potential of transdisciplinary approaches since they may serve to 
sustain the hegemonic conception of knowledge within an endogamic system of 
disciplines. He argues that the critique of interdisciplinarity can be applied to 
transdisciplinarity if the latter is premised on the assumption that each discipline can 
learn something from other disciplines because of their coincident scopes. In his 
view, this approach reinforces the discreteness of disciplines, and lacks the political 
impulse to upend the institutional framework of knowledge production and 
organization. In a similar vein, although treading carefully and avoiding a critique in 
toto, Maldonado-Torres (2015) distinguishes different forms of transdisciplinarity. He 
warns that transdisciplinary thought blunts its critical possibilities when it prioritizes 
already existing disciplines and methods over the epistemic, ethical, and political 
urgencies that outgrow the framework of disciplines. Paying attention to this aspects 
is what he calls “decolonial transdisciplinarity”, which he identifies in the work of 
Fanon, Du Bois, Sylvia Wynter and Gloria Anzaldúa. 
If Fanon’s work may be described, in today’s language, as transdisciplinary it is 
ironically, because it was not sought.  He developed an anti-disciplinary stance out of 
the necessity that results from the constant and conjoint interrogation of social 
problems, epistemic limitations, and questions of power relating the structural 




thought and methods, “syntheses and mixture are not pursued for their own sake” 
(Gordon, 2014: 3), instead, “the imperatives of the inquiry itself prevail over what 
might be mandated by dictates of disciplinary membership.” (Gordon, 2014: 4) But 
such approach does not stop at the level of critique; what emerges from these “forms 
of mixture that were not supposed to occur” (Gordon, 2014: 11) are “fresh ways of 
addressing urgent political debates” (Gordon, 2014: 3). 
In the previous chapter, the notion of disciplinary decadence was discussed in one 
of its manifestations, the ontologization of the discipline, or the discipline becoming 
isomorphic with the world. Another form of decadent knowledge that Lewis Gordon 
identifies is what he calls the “fetishization of method”, or how establishing an 
isomorphic relation between method and reality produces another inward movement 
of the discipline. In this instance, methods subordinate reality instead of mediating 
between the studier and the reality to be studied. In other words, method becomes 
“Reality” itself (2015b). In this vein, Fanon, before starting his dialogue with, among 
others, Freud, Lacan, Sartre Jaspers of Hegel, first casts methods under suspicion 
through what Ato Sekyi-Otu  calls “his detective hermeneutic of Western reason” 
(1996: 17): 
It is considered appropriate to introduce a work on psychology with its 
methodology. I will not hold to the custom. I leave methods to the botanists 
and the mathematicians. There is a point in which methods are resorbed. 




 This is not a method-less approach; it is, in phenomenological language, the 
bracketing or suspension of method, or in other words, a method that demands radical 
reflection on method itself. It implies examining from the root how knowledge is 
produced and legitimized before addressing the what, or the outcomes. Anne Norton 
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 « Il est de bon ton de faire précéder un ouvrage de psychologie d'un point de vue 
méthodologique. Nous faillirons à l'usage. Nous laissons les méthodes aux botanistes et aux 




points out that methods are not neutral, they are inseparable from culture, politics, 
and the institutional dynamics in which they are employed. “Methods are allied with 
particular regimes of truth. Methods are governed by assumptions.” (Norton, 2004: 
82) Hence, method cannot be taken for granted since it both shades light and casts 
shadows; it enables to see certain things and impedes seeing others. Fanon understood 
that to elucidate the black condition requires to “shake the worm-eaten roots of the 
edifice” (Fanon, 1952: 11; personal translation
43
), that is, addressing the problems 
that racism poses for knowledge at the fundamental level. In other words, he 
examines how to think about and through racism and colonialism when these are 
ingrained in the whole process of knowledge production. In this sense, the suspension 
of method “outlaws the movement of a colonizing episteme as a legitimating process” 
(Gordon, 2006b: 27).  Through the medical term resorption, meaning the process of 
gradual dissolution of cells or tissues until their disappearance or their assimilation 
into the circulation, he underlines that the how and the what of knowledge production 
are not separable. Thus, methods are not merely external tools to be applied, but are 
to be submitted to critical inquiry as an inseparable element of the research problem.  
By leaving methods to botanists, Fanon expresses that the study of the human 
cannot follow the model of natural sciences, for “[s]ociety, unlike biochemical 
processes, does not escape human influence. Man is what brings society into being” 
(Fanon, 1952: 11; personal translation
44
). Thereby he rejects naturalist and 
mechanicist understandings of the human and their predetermined approach to human 
action as functioning like natural or structural proceedings that can be explained 
through laws or rules. This cannot account for the multiple human dimensions and the 
variety of responses, attitudes, stances or desires. Fanon instead locates human 
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agency–and thus the possibility of change–at the center of his methodological 
perspective. As Jane Anna Gordon posits, the previous approaches “cloaked the very 
contorted agency that Fanon sought to uncover in the most constrained of conditions” 
(Gordon, 2014: 74).  
 Phenomenologists’ suspicion of methods, adds Maldonado-Torres (2008: 98), 
results from the understanding of human reality as incomplete, unfixed and, therefore, 
exceeding methodological constraints. This requires a different approach than those 
aspiring for exhaustive and complete explanations. Fanon emphasizes that scientific 
and popular literatures have created too many stories about “nègres”. These are too 
many to be silenced, and a quantitative approach misses the mark. Instead the “real 
task is to reveal the mechanism. The essential is not to accumulate facts and 
behaviors but to disclose their meaning” (Fanon, 1952:164; personal translation
45
). 
Austrian philosopher Alfred Schutz outlines the fundamental difference between the 
distinct type of realities that natural sciences and human studies deal with in terms of 
his conception of action –understood as the self-conscious meaning provided by the 
actors. Methods of natural sciences deal with “first-degree constructs”, namely the 
natural scientist observes objects within the observer’s field which “does not ‘mean’ 
anything to the molecules, atoms, and electrons therein” (Schutz, 1962: 5). Social 
sciences address second-degree constructs, or “constructs of the constructs made by 
the actors on the social scene” (1962: 6). In other words, the object of social sciences 
–human beings acting, thinking and living with other humans– have previously 
interpreted and given meaning to the world and their actions. The task of the social 
scientist is then, for Schutz, the interpretative understanding (Verstehen) of the 
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meanings that humans bestow to their actions. Gordon expresses Fanon’s point 
otherwise: 
 It is easier to study what does not think and cannot return the look and study 
you. As signifying beings, the action by human beings always points beyond 
the human. The human being is always involved in future-oriented activity 
that always tests the scope of law-like generalizations. This is why human 
studies at best derives principles and is an interpretive affair (2006b: 33; 
emphasis in the original).  
 
2.3.3 Sociogeny 
Fanon weaves his concerns on method, human action, the constitution of 
meanings, subjectivity, history, structure, philosophical anthropology, and the study 
of the human being through what he calls sociogeny. Although he only referred to it 
once in his writings, the sociogenic is the form of analysis that permeates his whole 
political and psychiatric work enabling him to study the question of desire, the 
encounter of the black with the white society, alienation, the black in relation to the 
notions of normality and abnormality, mental disease, the psychiatric hospital, the 
meaning of health and disease, the pursue of freedom, or violence. 
In response to the constitutionalist tendency of the late nineteenth century, 
Freud demanded through psychoanalysis that the individual factor be taken 
into account. He replaced the phylogenetic thesis by the ontogenetic 
perspective. But as we shall see the alienation of the black alienation is not 
an individual question. Alongside phylogeny and ontogeny, there is 
sociogeny. (Fanon, 1952: 11; personal translation
46
 )   
 
Phylogeny refers to the study of the origin and evolution of organisms initiated by 
Darwin and Lamarck’s work. In this perspective then the human being is treated as a 
natural species. Fanon posits that for Freud, a uniquely phylogenetic approach could 
not account for the distinct historical developments at the individual level. Ontogeny, 
as a complement to phylogeny, does not break with its biologist bases, but puts the 
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focus on the development of the individual history, where the human as unity 
becomes the notion of human being.  In both cases, the human being is fixed to the 
biological and left adrift either to natural processes or to historical structures. And in 
both cases the black belongs outside the realm of the human or is located at the 
bottom of a human hierarchy.  Sociogeny does not reject or replace the other two; it is 
located “alongside”.   
Sociogeny does not exactly amount to social constructivism. It rather brings to the 
forefront the basic relationality and the interplay in the formation of the self and of 
society. Starting from the aforementioned existential phenomenological insight that it 
is the human that brings society into being, it aims at exploring the twofold process 
through which meanings in the intersubjective world and the social structures are 
produced by human beings, while at the same time, such meanings and social 
structures constitute the human being. Thus, Fanon emphasizes again human agency 
in the formation of the historical, cultural and societal structures, institutions, 
meanings, and values, in which the human beings are enmeshed and constituted. 
Thereby Fanon links the individual and the collective, the private and the public, the 
objective and the subjective, the historical with everyday life, the passive and the 
active side of the human, or what in Husserlian phenomenology is called “the 
problem of constitution” (Gordon, 1995), the creation of meanings in a world were 
meanings are already established. In Fanon’s work, this problem takes the form of the 
creator and the created: “White civilization and European culture have imposed an 
existential deviation on the black. (…) what is called the black soul is a white 
construction.” (Fanon, 1952: 14; my translation
47
) The white is the creator and the 
black is created as a deviation from the human, which makes of her a “phobogenic 
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object” (Fanon, 1952), a creature, a monster, as Gordon remarks (2015). In a racist 
society the alienated black desires to be human and attempts to overcome such 
imposed deviation through evasion, imitation, and forms of reactivity, self-
deprecation, self-closure or self-transformation, which limit her own agency and her 
capacity to intervene in the social world, that is, the black as creator. Through the 
sociogenic analysis Fanon carries out an archaeological exploration of the 
construction of the black, theorizes the journey of the black through the structures of 
the racist society and seeks venues for pursuing freedom. 
That the human is what brings society into being draws forth the existentialist 
axiom that existence precedes essence. This is patent in his rejection of static and 
presumed notions of human, whether biological or structuralist. For Fanon, the 
human being cannot be contained and conceptualized before action. His search for a 
“concrete and ever new understanding of man” (Fanon, 1952: 20; my translation
48
) 
starts from the notion that the human is inherently free, and lives and acts in an 
existential situation which defines her and strongly limits and conditions her. The 
situation could be equated with the options available for human action generated by 
other human beings. In this view, the human is enmeshed in a web of relationships 
with the world, institutions, social structures, structures of meaning, cultural 
sedimentations, or forms of knowledge. These limiting elements, however, do not 
determine the meaning that humans give to the lived situation. Indeed, it is in this 
interplay between human freedom and the situation where meanings are created. The 
conception of the human as freedom resides in the capacity to act, to choose, to define 
herself and to create meanings within her existential situation (More, 2018). By 
bringing agency to the forefront Fanon keeps the human being open, in the making, 
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or as Sylvya Wynter’s captures it, “humanness is no longer a noun. Being human is a 
praxis” (Wynter,  2015: 23; italics in the original). Thus, sociogeny is not only a way 
of studying human affairs, at issue, is the very understanding of what a human being 
is. These two questions, the anthropological and the methodological are for Fanon to 
be addressed conjointly. By emphasizing the role of science in the formation of the 
ideas of the human, of normality and deviance, sociogeny responds to the delicate 
matter of transforming the study of the human being, and redefining it without 
foreclosing it. Fanon’s project, as Sylvya Wynter puts it, and her own work also 
exemplifies, is an effort to move “after Man towards the human”. He writes: 
There is a drama in the so-called human sciences. Should one postulate a 
type of human reality and describe its psychic modalities, taking into 
account only its imperfections, or should one not strive unrelentingly for a 





Yet there is an additional component. As Walter Mignolo (2009) observes, 
sociogeny is an intervention in the geopolitics of knowledge.  Whereas Darwinian 
and Freudian ideas of the human as biological species or as individual-unity are 
premised on the cultural and sociohistorical experience of European societies, Fanon 
draws on the experience of colonized societies to raise the question of the human. By 
taking as a starting point those whose humanity has been denied Fanon questions the 
meaning of the human, and also challenges the legitimacy and authority of who 
decides, and upon which criteria, who is a human and who is not. In the colonial 
world the “white gaze” bears the legitimacy to classify, to name, to measure, to give 
meaning, and to ascribe and deny humanity to groups of people:  
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The white gaze, the only real gaze, dissects me. I am fixed. Having prepared 
their microtome, they cut off objectively the slices of my reality. I am 
betrayed. I feel, I see in those white gazes that a new man has not come in, 
but a new type of man, a new genus. All in all, a nègre!” (Fanon, 1952: 113; 
personal translation
50
 ; italics in the original)  
 
Fanon represents the construction of the black–a new genre– by the detachment of 
a scientist studying an insect in the laboratory.  Yet, the epistemic authority of the 
white gaze extends beyond the scientific domain; the everyday life is turned into a 
testing room under the weight of the white gaze. The interpellation of the French 
child, “look, a nègre!” (1952: 109; personal translation
51
), is not radically different 
from the slur “[d]irty nègre!” (1952: 107; personal translation
52
), from the meticulous 
scientist: “the underwear of the nègre smells like nègre, the teeth of the nègre are 
white, the feet of the nègre are big, the large chest of the nègre” (1952: 113; personal 
translation
53
), or from the words of the white philosopher, Sartre, “a friend of colored 
people” (1952:130; personal translation
54
), considering the creative efforts of 
Négritude to bestow meanings to blackness and black liberation as the negative 
moment of a dialectic.  
In Fanon, the need to redefine humanity and question the normative status of 
whiteness as human is inseparable from the themes of desire, double consciousness 
and the problems of recognition. What the black wants is to be human, what the black 
in double consciousness attempts is to escape this conflict within herself, where 
blackness is perceived as the embodiment of negativity and deviation from the norm, 
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 « Déjà les regards blancs, les seuls vrais, me dissèquent. Je suis fixé. Ayant accommodé leur mi-
crotome, ils réalisent objectivement des coupes de ma réalité. Je suis trahi. Je sens, je vois dans ces 
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 « Tiens, un nègre ! » 
52
 « Sale nègre ! » 
53
 « le linge du nègre sent le nègre — les dents du nègre sont blanches — les pieds du nègre sont 
grands — la large poitrine du nègre (…) » 
54




by being recognized as human through the adoption of whiteness. Throughout his 
work Fanon warns about the predicament of inclusion: 
Western bourgeois racism with regard to the nègre and the bicot is a racism 
of contempt; it is a racism which minimizes. But bourgeois ideology, which 
is the proclamation of an essential equality between men, manages to appear 
coherent to itself by inviting the sub-human to become human through the 
adoption of the type of humanity that the Western bourgeoisie incarnates 
(Fanon, 1961: 158; personal translation
55
; own italics) 
 
If humanity is measured according to a standard that posits the human being as 
Western, white, bourgeois and mostly, male, the colonized affirmation of their 
humanity could not be premised on a model of the human that is based on their 
exclusion from belonging to humanity. Fanon shows how such attempts are doomed 
to failure at the individual and systemic levels. As Gordon (2015: 23) notes, pursuing 
recognition from the white, accepting the invitation of Western liberalism, encloses 
the black within a hellish circle of reactions and evasions. Either the attempts are 
directed towards radicalizing the deviation, claiming one’s originality or imitating the 
standard, such moves foster a relation of dependency with the white, who is 
reinforced in its normative position, and maintains the subordination of the black.   
Thus, sociogeny responds to a threefold task, methodological, anthropological and 
political. It is due to this fundamentally relational view of the human that the scope of 
sociogeny is not exclusively dedicated to the study of the black or the colonized. 
Black and white, men and women, structure and culture, self and society, the 
subjective and the objective elements are to be studied together. Hence, although it 
has a solid geopolitical component, Fanon’s concerns are directed to the study of the 
human being in its multiple dimensions, and the transformation of the ways of 
studying it (Maldonado-Torres, 2009).   
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2.3.4 The zone of non-being. 
Another important element that Fanon barely mentioned a couple of times but is 
present throughout his work in order to account for racism and colonialism is the 
zone of non-being. For Fanon, the black finds herself below the level of humanity. He 
states:   
There is a zone of non-being, an extraordinarily sterile and arid region, an 
essentially stripped incline from which an authentic emergence can be 
sparked. In most cases, the black cannot take advantage of this decent into a 




The zone of non-being has been widely referred to, differently read and applied: in 
psychological, sociological, cartographical, geopolitical, theological, existential terms 
or concerning the historicity of the black and colonial categories forms of 
representation. It falls beyond the scope of this chapter to review these readings, 
which are not always mutually exclusive. Instead, it may be first necessary to answer 
what does Fanon mean by an “authentic emergence”? What is this hell to which the 
black cannot have access to? What are the positive connotations of hell that the black 
misses? Where is the black then?  
Hence, a possible way to answer these questions and to understand Fanon’s zone 
of non-being, as Maldonado-Torres (2016) points out, is in conversation with Jean-
Paul Sartre’s early phenomenological ontology. In Being and Nothingness the French 
philosopher argues against the notion of human nature and the concomitant 
understandings of the human as determinate, definite, self-justified and necessary. 
Instead he affirms the contingency and the indeterminacy of the human being, which 
he equates with embodied consciousness and with freedom: “there is no difference 
between the being of man and his being-free” (Sartre, 1992: 60). Sartre identifies two 
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essentiellement dépouillée, d'où un authentique surgissement peut prendre naissance. Dans la majorité 





fundamental domains of being, which he describes them as an “indissoluble dyad” 
(Sartre, 1992: 176) and “capable of a valid coordination” (Sartre, 1992:  98). Being 
(being-in-itself) is the world of non-conscious things. It is an inert region of positive, 
self-coincident substances, fixed, solid and filled with themselves. He characterizes it 
as fullness. Being-in-itself is not the phenomenon, but the “being of the phenomenon” 
(Sartre, 1992: 7). The region of nonbeing (being-for-itself) is “an emptiness, a 
nothingness which is distinguished from the thing only by a pure negation” (Sartre, 
1992: 245), it is the region of transcendence. Nonbeing is devoid of substances, 
empty, or, as he calls it, nothingness, which is the core of pre-reflective 
consciousness, and hence, of human freedom. It emerges from being-in-itself through 
the intentional acts of consciousness. Sartre takes Husserl’s notion of intentionality to 
point out that if consciousness is always consciousness of something, then 
consciousness is the lack of being, and more precisely, to be conscious of something 
implies “not being that being” (Sartre, 1992: 242).  Consciousness arises out of a 
relation with a being that is not consciousness. This negativity is what makes 
consciousness free. By transcending what is and grasping what is-not, human beings 
are capable to disengage or detach from the world, which makes them free 
(Anderson, 1993: 13). In short, nothingness, unlocked from being, is the basis of 
human freedom. If consciousness is not something but the intentional act, freedom is 
neither a quality nor a property, but “the stuff of my being” (Sartre, 1992: 553). 
Following the existential axiom that existence precedes essence, consciousness is 
self-determining for it is a “being whose existence posits its essence” (1992: 24).In 
other words, the human being is freedom as non-being through choice, self-creation 




For Sartre, as he puts it in Existentialism is a Humanism, there is no escape from 
freedom, human beings are “condemned to be free” (Sartre, 2007: 29). In this sense, 
freedom can have a hellish dimension; it elicits anguish in the face of its ambiguity, 
of the unavoidability of choice and action, and the concomitant responsibility that it 
entails. The attempt to escape from freedom is what Sartre calls bad faith. In other 
words, bad faith is the denial of one of the poles of the human condition, either 
reducing the human to pure facticity, or to complete transcendence. Facticity are the 
given antecedents such as race, nationality, class, birth, character, psychophysical 
structures or the past, which escape one’s own choosing and limit the possibilities of 
choice, but not choice itself. Transcendence, for Sartre, are the possibilities derived 
from choice. Pure facticity would turn the human being into a thing, whereas absolute 
transcendence would be the attempt of make a god of the human being. In Being and 
Nothingness, Sartre sketches, but does not elaborate further, that overcoming the lie 
to the self of bad faith is not through sincerity, but through a “self- recovery of being” 
(Sartre, 1992: 116) that he calls authenticity.  
Another obstacle that freedom finds, according to Sartre, is the freedom of the 
Other. Freedom, as the human being, is also situated, it is lived with others; the social 
world is in this perspective the meeting of freedoms.  As Simone de Beauvoir puts it, 
“the existence of others as a freedom defines my situation and is even the condition of 
my own freedom” (Beauvoir, 1948: 91). Situations exceed, limit and define one’s 
own choices, however, despite, and also because of, theses “resistances and 
obstacles” one can confer new meanings to situations through “the free choice which 
human reality is” (Sartre, 1992: 629). Sociality and the relations between 
consciousness are described by Sartre as the fundamental site of conflict, in his own 




conceives the social world as consisting of reciprocal relations of objectification 
which make inviable the meeting of two mutually recognizing freedoms (Sartre, 
1992: 529). The negation of the Other as a subject poses a challenge to her freedom 
and self-definition, but not to the comprehension of herself as subject, which, in turn, 
incites her to maintain the objectification of the Other. In other words, the way to 
escape the Other’s locking me into facticity and turning me into a thing is through the 
same response, which reaffirms my status as subject. This is what he refers to when at 
the end of his short play No Exit he declares that “[h]ell is–other people!” (Sartre, 
1989: 45)  Although Fanon may be in dialogue with Sartre, and shares the 
understanding of the human being as freedom, it does not entail that he fully 
subscribes Sartre’s premises on intersubjectivity. Fanon continues: 
Man is not only possibility of recapture, of negation. If it is true that 
consciousness is an activity of transcendence, we should also consider that 
this transcendence is haunted by the problem of love and understanding. 
Man is a yes that vibrates to cosmic harmonies. (Fanon 1952: 8; my 




The important point by now is that what he does, as he would do with Hegel, 
Lacan, Merleau-Ponty and other European thinkers and medical theories, is to show 
that their theories of alienation, intersubjectivity  fail when applied to  the experience 
of a the black in a racist society. The zone of non-being, as used by Fanon, may not 
be the region where the black finds herself, but instead where the black does not find 
herself, that is, where the black is not. Where is the black then if she cannot descend 
into hell? Is it because she is already in hell?  Or, is she most probably in a “limbo” of 
a multilayered hell, as Lewis Gordon (2015) observes? Or, in a region below being 
and non-being, as Maldonado Torres (2016) remarks?  
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In any case, rather than a purely psychological reading or a cartographic bird-eye 
view, the two latter authors have emphasized the inside, the impossibility of the black 
to descend to the world of sociality, self-identity and authenticity that Sartre 
characterizes as hell. In this literally hellish region, the black is situated below the 
level of sociality, ethics, and, all the more, conflict. For Gordon, this epitomizes the 
above mentioned political and epistemic theodicean dimensions of racism. The self-
other relation between human beings is turned into a non-self and non-other relation 
in a racist setting. In a setting without ethical values, the colonized is a thing and the 
white is a master.  Thereby, Fanon poses a challenge to theoretical perspectives, 
particularly to modern liberal political theory, which presuppose an already existing 
ethical substratum, a Self-Other relation, that upholds the pursuit of the political 
good. In a world where groups of people are placed outside of the sphere of 
humanity, ethical claims risk of acquiescence with a system that threats the existence 
of groups of people without losing its legitimacy as a just and humane system. In 
other words, the relation between ethics and politics needs to be inverted; political 
action is to be prioritized and oriented towards the creation of new ethics out of which 
to base politics (Gordon, 2008, 2015). What is at stake, then, in Fanon’s account of 
the zone of non-being is not authenticity and self-identity as in Sartre’s, but the very 
existence of the black. Like Du Bois, Fanon cultivated action that fosters radical 
subjective and structural transformation at the expense of pursuing authenticity and 
identity as ways of coming into being (Maldonado-Torres, 2016; Posnock, 1997).  
In epistemic terms, racism, as we will see in further detail, is not the problem of 
the Other, of the fear of the stranger or the unknown. In this sense, the celebration of 
the figure of the stranger and the ethics of alterity and love for the stranger as they 




frail challenge to racism. The other in racism is a non-other and is not a stranger, it is 
overdetermined, loaded with meaning and historicity, it is too familiar. For Alejandro 
De Oto and Leticia Katzer (2014), the limbic character of the zone of non-being has 
an epistemic and political character. Fanon conceives it as the possibility from which 
to start thinking the political emancipation in an-other way that the zones of being 
and non-being do not provide.  For the authors, it reflects the problems of 
representing the heterogeneity foreclosed by colonial markers, and the complexity for 
the colonized to constitute herself as a subject amidst the piles of reductive 
categories. It is then closely link to temporality.  It recognizes how colonized bodies 
are bound and constituted, historically and from outside, and it is in that moment, and 
from that lived experience of alienation where the political emerges and claims 
another form of historicity.  The incertitude and instability of the zone of Fanon’s 
non-being is a critique and a way to escape the Manicheism inherent in colonial 
conceptual configurations and descriptive impositions that lock colonized bodies into 
objects, and from which a different landscape to talk about colonial subjectivity can 
be generated. In that sense, they argue, the zone of non-being is a region of specters 
in which colonial identities lose their rigidity, and from which one can think the 
emancipatory politics out of relations and not out of substances.  
2.3.5 An existential ontology 
Racism, as Fanon points out, entails a relation of subordination and exploitation 
which produces the non-other. In other words, racism entails a relation that eliminates 
relations. Another related move that Fanon undertakes in order to account for the 
reality of the black is the rejection of ontology.   
Ontology, once it is finally admitted as leaving existence aside, does not 









Fanon is not rejecting ontology in toto, but signaling that an ontology that neglects 
existence and treats being as abstract and eternal, is not only meaningless, but by 
systematically ignoring the role of race in shaping relations of subordination, it 
contributes to objectification and oppression. Such ontology “ascribes necessity 
instead of contingency to being” (More, 2014: 7). In other words, it does not entail 
the possibility of change and that things can be otherwise. Fanon considers futile the 
studies of Placide Tempels and Alioune Diop on Bantu ontology. Following Césaire’s 
scathing critique of La philosophie bantoue, Fanon unveils the political character of 
studies that praise Bantu’s lack of ambition for material wealth, metaphysical 
richness, pristine morality and harmonic notions of peace while a strike of black 
miners in South Africa ends up with dozens of miners killed and thousands injured by 
the police (Fanon, 1952: 178). “Since Bantu thought is ontological”, Césaire, 
caustically remarks, “the Bantu only ask for satisfaction of an ontological nature. 
Decent wages! Comfortable housing! Food!” (Césaire, 2001: 58). Leaving aside by 
now their point on the different forms of complicity of the intellectual with 
colonialism and capitalism
59
, what I want to underscore here is that for Fanon an 
ontology that does not consider the concrete existence of colonized functions as a 
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  Christopher Wise notes that Césaire and Fanon’s criticisms have not lost their validity in light of 
the continuing attempts to “commodify African being, especially for the sake of merely enriching the 
West's powerful university system” (1999: 2). Haitian anthropologist Michel Ralph Trouillot (2003) 
calls the “savage slot” to the functioning of certain non-Western groups as forms of radical alterity, 
untouched by European modernity, and serving to illuminate Western debates on alternative paths to 
modernity. To this logic obeys the persistent celebration of African traditional ontology, to which 
indigenous and Eastern spirituality could be added, in first-world scholarship. Besides abstracting the 
group from their material and historical conditions, it also omits the intricacy of these with the 




perverse distraction from the urgency and the political character of the problems at 
hand: 
Be careful! It is not a question of finding Being in Bantu thought while 
Bantu existence is situated at the level of the non-being, of the 
imponderable. (…) We know that Bantu society does not exist anymore, and 
there is nothing ontological about segregation. Enough of this scandal. 




He raises a similar point in his critique of Octave Mannoni’s work on the 
psychology of colonization. Mannoni, a Lacanian psychiatrist who lived several 
decades in Madagascar, identifies an acute sense of inferiority and dependency 
complex in Malagasy society to the extent of needing and awaiting to be colonized. In 
addition to rebuking Mannoni’s imposition onto the colonized of psychoanalytical 
arguments circumscribed to the experience of European subjects, Fanon exposes the 
limitations of Mannoni’s phylogenetic approach:  
What Mannoni has forgotten is that the Malagasy does not exist anymore; he 
has forgotten that the Malagasy exists with the European. Alterity for the 
black is not the black but the white. The arrival of whites to Madagascar has 
distraught the horizons and psychological mechanisms. (…)An island like 
Madagascar, invaded overnight (…) underwent destructuralization. (…) The 
introduction of a new element required the attempt to understand the new 
relationships. The landing of the white in Madagascar opened an absolute 
wound. The consequences of the European irruption in Madagascar are not 
only psychological, since, there is an internal relationship between 
consciousness and the social context (1952: 94; personal translation
61
 ; italics 
in the original). 
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 « Attention ! Il ne s'agit pas de retrouver l'Etre dans la pensée bantoue, quand l'existence des 
Bantous se situe sur le plan du non-être, de l'impondérable. (..)  Or, nous savons que la société bantoue 
n'existe plus. Et la ségrégation n'a rien d'ontologique. Assez de ce scandale. » 
 
61
 « Ce que M. Mannoni a oublié, c'est que le Malgache n'existe plus; il a oublié que le Malgache 
existe avec l'Européen. Le Blanc arrivant à Madagascar a bouleversé les horizons et les mécanismes 
psychologiques. Tout le monde l'a dit, l'altérité pour le Noir, ce n'est pas le Noir, mais le Blanc. (…)  
Une île comme Madagascar, envahie du jour au lendemain (…) connut une destructuration. (…) Un 
apport nouveau étant intervenu, il fallait tenter la compréhension des nouveaux rapports. Le Blanc 
débarquant à Madagascar provoquait une blessure absolue. Les conséquences de cette irruption 
européenne à Madagascar ne sont pas seulement psychologiques, puisque, tout le monde l’a dit, il y a 





The sociogenic analysis prioritizes lived experience over ontological claims in 
order to understand what it is for the colonized to live in a world where “being, value, 
reality, and possibility are white” (Gordon, 2014: 69). Focused on action, Fanon’s 
investigations depart from the non-being, or how the weight of colonial histories 
shapes the concrete existence of embodied subjects, thereby making certain groups of 
people function as human and others as non-human. As Maldonado-Torres puts it, 
(…) for Fanon, beyond a science of being we must engage a science of the 
relation between being and non-being, describing how the exclusion from 
being is performed and how non-beingness is lived or experienced. 
(Maldonado- Torres, 2008: 105) 
 
This is what he refers to when he declares that Bantu or Malagasy society do not 
exist anymore. He is not implying the total passivity, cultural extinction or complete 
dormancy of colonized societies. Instead he refers to the historical process that expels 
them from them from the possibility of being for others except through relations 
based on subordination. As he explains, the black experience the dislocation of 
having to resituate themselves in relation to an enforced system of reference which 
contradicts and obliterates their social, cultural and psychological practices (Fanon, 
1952: 108).  
2.3.6 The lived experience: Embodiment and alienation 
One of the ways in which Fanon carries out a meta-critic of social sciences is  
phenomenologically through the poetic dimension of his work, as we will see in the 
next chapter. Yet, phenomenology also enabled him to theorize out of the 
predicament of the black, the colonized and the patient in his analysis of the 
alienation of racism, oppression in the colony, and also in the clinic, by focusing on 
the lived experience of the black in the metropolis, the colonized in a restricted and 




Hourya Bentouhami (2014) points out, although Fanon uses the terms with precision, 
he does not position himself in relation to the Husserlian phenomenological tradition  
or conceive phenomenology as a field of knowledge to be followed or from which to 
borrow, he actually uses phenomenology for his analysis of racism, colonialism or 
mental disease, and expands, reconstructs and disrupts the premises of the field. 
The experience of the black in a racist society, Fanon points out, is not an 
exclusive, subjective experience, which cannot be understood by the white or by 
others. Lived experience (Erlebnis) does not conceive experience as a fact, an event 
or an external happening onto which meanings are subjectively projected from the 
inside. Lived experience understanding of consciousness is not psychological but 
phenomenological, that is, consciousness is intentional, it is always consciousness of 
something. It addresses how phenomena appear to consciousness as an object of 
thought and are constituted, and enables to grasp how the world unfolds to 
consciousness. Likewise, it takes into account that consciousness is embodied, 
situated, entangled and active in a shared social and historical horizon, an already 
constituted world, in which one encounters categories, organization, frameworks and 
a flow of meanings that are “phenomenologically real”. Thus, consciousness and the 
body are not things, but are in relation to a social world. So are meanings, which are 
produced in the active engagement with the intersubjective world. Lived experience 
has also a temporal aspect. Meanings do not derive from the immediate course of 
experience, but in the elapsed and explicit reflection.  
Yet, Fanon’s phenomenology In Fanon’s work, the body occupies a central role, as 
a social thinker, as a doctor, and also as a writer. The body is not treated as an 
anatomic-physiological structure, or as a thing. In phenomenology, the body is 




also exposed to the world. This dynamism and interaction between the body and the 
world, transcending Cartesian dualism between body and mind, is what Merleau- 
Ponty analyzes in Phenemonology of Perception. In Black Skin White Masks, Fanon 
refers to the corporeal schema of Merleau-Ponty in order to understand through the 
relation of the black to his body and to the world, what it means being black in the 
metropolis.  In a passage similar to that Merleau-Ponty, Fanon describes how a 
person sitting in a desk knows that if he wants to reach a packet of cigarettes at the 
other side of the table, he has to extend his arm and grab the packet. He knows that 
the matches are in the left drawer, and that he has to slightly lean himself backwards, 
and open the drawer. He adds:  
All these gestures are not made out of habit, but out of implicit knowledge. 
Slow construction of the self as body within a temporal and spatial world, 
this seems to be the schema. It is not imposed upon me, it is rather a 
definitive structuration of me and the world – definitive, because between 





In such schema, Fanon posits, the knowledge of one’s body is third-person 
knowledge. “The body is surrounded by an atmosphere of certain 
incertitude.” (Fanon, 1952: 108; my translation
63
) Fanon hints Merleau-Ponty’s 
assertion that “if I wanted to express perceptual experience with precision, I would 
have to say that one perceives in me, and not that I perceive.” (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 
223; italics in the original) However, the dynamism of the body, open to the world, 
moving effortlessly and integrated in the world known implicitly of the corporeal 
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 « Et tous ces gestes, je les fais non par habitude, mais par une connaissance implicite. Lente 
construction de mon moi en tant que corps au sein d’un monde spatial et temporel, tel semble être le 
schéma. Il ne s’impose pas à moi, c’est plutôt une structuration définitive du moi et du monde — 
définitive, car il s’installe entre mon corps et le monde une dialectique effective. » 
63




schema does not take place in the case of the black man in a racist society, Fanon 
notices. He writes:  
Below the corporeal schema I had elaborated a historic-racial schema. The 
elements that I used had not been provided for me by ‘residuals sensations 
and perceptions of a tactile, vestibular, kinesthetic and visual order’, but by 
the other, the white, who had woven me out of a thousand details, anecdotes, 
stories. (1952: 109; my translation
64
; own italics) 
 
Fanon adds to the body a historical depth, and a social and political density that the 
phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty does not capture. The historic-racial schema refers 
to the discourses and practices of racism, the social order and the organization around 
the colorline that had historically constituted the black body and are sedimented 
beneath the skin. Because of its historical condition and because it is located beneath 
the skin, it precedes the arrival of the black, who is not necessarily aware of such 
schema. To the historic-racial schema, Fanon adds: “Then, the corporeal schema, 
attacked at various points, collapses and is replaced by an epidermal-racial schema.” 
(Fanon, 1952: 110; my translation
65
) The epidermal schema locks the black into the 
surface to the extent that the black becomes his or her skin. Every accomplishment, 
every failure, every individual feature or every condition of the black is explained by 
the color of the skin.  
Fanon notices that the black arrive open to the world and to the other, but the 
“other, through gestures, attitudes and the gaze, fixes me, in the sense that one fixes a 
preparation by a colorant”. The epidermal schema emerges from the white gaze. 
Fanon explores what it means for the black body to be seen by the white gaze, a gaze 
that only sees the color of the skin and constantly sends the black back into it: “Mom, 
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 J’avais créé au-dessous du schéma corporel un schéma historico-racial. Les éléments que j’avais 
utilisés ne m’avaient pas été fournis par « des résidus de sensations et perceptions d’ordre surtout 
tactile, vestibulaire, cinesthésique et visuel », mais par l’autre, le Blanc, qui m’avait tissé de mille 
détails, anecdotes, récits. 
65
 « Alors le schéma corporel, attaqué en plusieurs points, s’écroula, cédant la place à un schéma 




look the nègre”, says a child, or the “Look, a nègre” in the train, the interpellation 
does not go further than the skin and its color. A gaze, he says, that fixes and dissects, 
leaves him “locked in a crushing objectivity.” (Fanon, 1952: 107; my translation
66
) 
As Hourya Bentouhami notices, rather than fixing the object in a detached way and 
keeping it at distance, the white gaze fixes itself onto the Arab and the black until 
their paralysis, petrification and objectification (Bentouhami-Molino, 2014). It is not 
only the scientific gaze, it also takes place in everyday conversations, in the street, in 
the train, in the doctor, in the classroom. Fanon insists in the mundaneness and the 
repetition of the ‘external stimuli’ that imprisons and stops the black body; it is also 
in the temporal dimension, as we will see in the next section, where the dynamism 
between the black body and the world is interrupted. ‘The black doctor’, ‘the black 
professor’, ‘the dirty nègre’, ‘the beautiful nègre’, ‘the smart negro’, ‘the black is a 
human like us’, ‘the black is civilized like us’, the self-declared negrophile, ‘we love 
you despite your color’, ‘we dislike you but it is not because of your color’. From the 
example of the body reaching the packet of cigarettes to the example of the 
interpellation, there is, as Sara Ahmed puts it, a shift from an active body successfully 
accomplishing actions in the world, to a body that is “negated or stopped  in its 
tracks” by an hostile world (Ahmed, 2006: 110).  It is in the costant repetition and the 
disruption of the corporal schema where alienation and the pathological emerge. He 
writes: 
In the train, it was no longer a question of knowing my body in the third-
person, but in a triple-person. In the train, instead of one place I was left two, 
three places. (…) I could no longer find the feverish reference points of the 
world. I existed in triplicate: I occupied space. I went to the other… and the 
evanescent other, hostile but not opaque, transparent, absent, disappeared.  
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 « et l’autre, par gestes, attitudes, regards, me fixe, dans le sens où l’on fixe une préparation par 




(…) I was at the same time responsible of my body, my race, my ancestors.   




The corporeal schema as the consciousness of one’s own body, and also in its 
social dimension that approaches the body as an opening to the other is interrupted 
for the black body in a racist society.  The world through which one moves and 
intervenes by an implicit knowledge of it, has a strange character. The black is 
“disoriented”, writes Fanon, “Where do I place myself? Or, if you prefer where do I 
get myself into? (…) Where do I hide? (…)  My body was sent back to me flat, 
disjoint, shattered, grief-stricken.” (Fanon, 1952: 111; my translation
68
) As Sara 
Ahmed summarizes: 
For Fanon, racism "interrupts" the corporeal schema. (…) race does not just 
interrupt such a schema but structures its mode of operation. The corporeal 
schema is of a "body at home." If the world is made white, then the body at 
home is one that can inhabit whiteness. As Fanon's work shows, after all, 
bodies are shaped by histories of colonialism (…). This is the familiar world, 
the world of whiteness, as a world we know implicitly. Colonialism makes 
the world "white," which is of course a world "ready" for certain kinds of 
bodies (2006: 111). 
 
In his earliest writings Marx referred to alienation as the strangement of the worker 
derived from the capitalist mode of production. The human is alienated from the 
product of labor, from the act of production, from “his species being” 
(Gattungswesen), and from other humans. These include the alienation from one’s 
individuality and one’s own body (Marx, 1988: 78). Fanon also took into account the 
role of political economy and the international division of labor in the analysis of 
racism. Although his views changed according to time and the context: In his earliest 
works such as Black Skin White Masks and in the article “Antillais at Africains” he 
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 « Dans le train, il ne s’agissait plus d’une connaissance de mon corps en troisième personne, 
mais en triple personne. Dans le train, au lieu d’une, on me laissait deux, trois places. (…). Je ne 
découvrais point de coordonnées fébriles du monde. J’existais en triple : j’occupais de la place. J’allais 
à l’autre... et l’autre évanescent, hostile mais non opaque, transparent, absent, disparaissait. (…) J’étais 
tout à la fois responsable de mon corps, responsable de ma race, de mes ancêtres. » 
68
« Où me situer ? Ou, si vous préférez : où me fourrer ? (…) Où me cacher ? (…) Mon corps me 




argues in Marxian terms that racism is the superstructure that responds to the 
economic conditions and relations of production. Whereas in Les damnés de la terre 
he affirms that the relation between substructure and superstructure is not 
unidirectional, and that there is no such division between these spheres. The objective 
and the subjective, culture, the symbolic, the psychic, the ideological, and the 
economic are inseparable: 
In the colonies, the economic substructure is also a superstructre. The cause 
is the consequence: one is rich because one is white, one is white because 
one is rich. This is why the Marxist analysis must always be slightly 
stretched when dealing with the colonial problem. Likewise, the concept of 
precapitalist societies, well studied by Marx, requires to be rethought here. 




Whether this responds to an overall change in his thought or to an adaptation of his 
analysis to the African context instead of the Caribbean and metropolitan France, falls 
beyond the scope of this chapter.  In any case, despite the various meeting points 
between Marx’s and Fanon’s understanding of alienation, Fanon’s phenomenology of 
black embodiment adds two dimensions, the depth of history and the flatness of the 
surface that are concomitant to the knotted body of the black in a racist society. 
Hence, in racist societies the black skin is a naturalized marker of a “damnation” (De 
Oto, 2011) that precedes dispossession from labor. It signals and explains which 
beings are able to appear in the realm of politics, labor, sociality and humanity, and 
which beings are able of self-possession. Comparing with anti-Semitism, Fanon notes 
that the Jew “is not integrally what he is.” The anti-Semite waits for the Jew to reveal 
himself: the actions, behaviors and the practices of the Jew are what determine his 
Jewishness for the other. In contrast, the black is “overdetermined from without. I am 
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 « Aux colonies, l'infrastructure économique est également une superstructure. La cause est 
conséquence: on est riche parce que blanc, on est blanc parce que riche. C'est pourquoi les analyses 
marxistes doivent être toujours légèrement distendues chaque fois qu'on aborde le problème colonial. Il 





not the slave of the ‘idea’ that the others have of me, but of my appearance.” (Fanon, 
1952: 113; my translation
70
; own italics) Fanon uses here the verb “apparaître”, to 
appear. Gordon notes that existence, from the Latin ex-sistere, is etymologically 
related to emerge, to stand out, and to appear. To exist is “to emerge from 
indistinction” (Gordon, 2008: 132). The body in its dimension of being seen by others 
“is a necessary condition of appearance, since to be seen is to be seen somewhere.” 
(Gordon, 2015: 137). Hence, being a slave of one’s appearance delimits where the 
black can and cannot appear, and also what the black is. In Fanon’s existential 
ontology, as we saw, existence exceeds and cannot be contained by being; the latter 
rules out the possibility of contingency, freedom and change. Being a slave of one’s 
appearing entails that the emergence and the existence of the black are arrested by 
being. The black is ontologized, complete, it is what it is, and what appears “is not a 
new man (…) but a new type of man, a new genus. All in all, a nègre!” (Fanon, 1952: 
113; personal translation
71
; italics in the original) As I will develop in Chapter 7, the 
question of appearing, of who and where can one be seen, is central in Fanon’s 
understanding of violence in Les damnés de la terre.  
2.3.7 Temporality, alienation and Euro-modernity 
As stated above, Fanon identifies that both being and non-being are the effect of a 
historical relation which expels non-being from the sphere of relations, sociality and 
ethics (Gordon, 2015). He puts forward this fundamental mechanism of racism and 
colonialism when he points out that ontology is meaningless to understand the black, 
for the black must be black in relation to the white, to which he adds that this 
circumstance is not reciprocal, since, he continues, in a racist world the “black has no 
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 «Il n’est pas intégralement ce qu’il est. (…)  Je suis surdéterminé de l’extérieur. Je ne suis pas 
l’esclave de « l’idée » que les autres ont de moi, mais de mon apparaître. » 
71
 « ce n’est pas un nouvel homme (…) mais un nouveau type d’homme, un nouveau genre. Un 




ontological resistance in the eyes of the white” (Fanon, 1952: 108; personal 
translation
72
). The white, structurally, is neither required to exist with nor to be in 
relation with the colonized. That he has a perspective and interiority is not questioned 
by the black or other whites; the white functions as a human and is perceived as such 
by others (Gordon, 2015). However, the being of the black does not emanate from 
herself, from her interiority, but as we saw, from the flatness of the epidermis. The 
black is “overdetermined from outside” (Fanon, 1952: 113; personal translation
73
), 
that is, the constitution of meaning is anterior and exterior: “It turns out that is not me 
who creates a meaning for myself, but the meaning was already there, pre-existing, 
waiting for me.” (Fanon, 1952: 131; personal translation
74
) In Black Skin White 
Masks, he points out that the black arrives “too late” to the meaning making for there 
is a “white world” in between that has already imposed meanings and values:  
‘Dirty nègre’ or simply‘Look, a nègre!’ I came into the world yearning to 
give meaning to things, my soul was eager to be at the origin of the world, lo 
and behold I discovered myself an object among other objects. (…) All I 
wanted was to be a man among other men. I would have wanted to arrive 
smooth and young into a world that is ours and build it together. (Fanon, 




Kelly Oliver notes that the kind of alienation Fanon describes is nothing like 
Heidegger’s or Sartre’s account of the estrangement of arriving into a preexisting 
world of meanings, yet being also part of the world and responsible for meaning 
making. This is the predicament of all humans as meaning making beings. 
Alternatively, the tardiness that Fanon exposes in relation to racist alienation refers to 
the specific arrival into a white world that has constructed and determined the black 
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 « Le Noir n'a pas de résistance ontologique aux yeux du Blanc. » 
73
 « surdéterminé de l’extérieur. » 
74
 « Et voilà, ce n'est pas moi qui me crée un sens, mais c'est le sens qui était là, préexistant, 
m'attendant. » 
75
 « J’arrivais dans le monde, soucieux de faire lever un sens aux choses, mon âme pleine du désir 
d’être à l’origine du monde, et voici que je me découvrais objet au milieu d’autres objets. (…)Je 
voulais tout simplement être un homme parmi d’autres hommes. J’aurais voulu arriver lisse et jeune 




as a monster. As less than human, the black is deprived from the capacity to make 
sense of the world, the responsibility for the meaning of the self and of one’s own 
body is circumscribed to the white (Oliver, 2004: 16). 
 Maldonado-Torres points out that related to the suspension of method and 
ontology, Fanon’s privileging of the lived experience of the black also “brackets” 
History –from which the colonized are pushed outside (Maldonado-Torres: 2009). 
However, time, temporality and historicity occupy a central role in Fanon’s reflection 
on alienation and other phenomena. He opens Black Skin White Masks pointing out 
that   
The architecture of the present work is rooted in temporality. Every human 
problem demands to be considered from the perspective of time. The ideal is 





 Time is at the core of his understanding of the human being, which, he posits, “is 
movement towards the world and towards his fellow” (1952: 39; personal 
translation
77
; own italics). In this conception of the human as a process the subject is 
incessantly formed by and forming social relations in his disposition towards the 
future. The human being, he adds in his medical dissertation, is experienced as “a 
latency of action” by other human beings (2018: 219). From this perspective, human 
action and existence are not static but situated in a present continuous, and 
subjectivity, social relations and time are not dissociated. Fanon extends and endows 
a political character the concerns of neurologist Constantin von Monakow and Gestalt 
thinkers who argue for a “chronogenic” approach that would take seriously “the 
temporal integration of phenomena” (Fanon, 2018: 215). Hence, the importance of 
temporality is felt in his approach to mental illness, the functioning of the psychiatric 
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 « L’architecture du présent travail se situe dans la temporalité. Tout problème humain demande à 
être considéré à partir du temps. L’idéal étant que toujours le présent serve à construire l’avenir. » 
77




institution, while it also informs his political thought on racism, alienation, liberation 
embodiment, spatiality and his conception of culture.  
The Malagasy and the Bantu that do not exist anymore, the black Caribbeans 
overdetermined from outside who arrive too late to their construction as an 
abomination, “cannot be thought outside of the history that has constituted them as 
such.”  (De Oto, 2003: 105).  The peculiar entanglement of colonial and racist 
histories on the body binds the black to a perpetual present under the weight of such 
past, thereby putting a curb on the motion towards the future, which in his own words 
is a precondition of human existence: “the human is human to the extent that he is 
totally turned towards the future” (2018: 257). The impediment of this orientation 
towards the future, is another form through which “white civilization, European 
culture have imposed an existential deviation on the black” from the vicissitudes 
inherent to the human condition (Fanon, 1952: 14; my translation
78
). Whereas in 
Black Skin White Masks this perpetual present revolves around the embodied 
subjectivity of the alienated black–“living his neurosis to the extreme and finding 
himself paralyzed” (1952: 135; personal translation
79
)–in Les damnés de la terre, 
Fanon extends his analysis to the “motionless, Manicheistic, compartmentalized 
world” (1962: 53; personal translation
80
). 
  If the alienated black looks to the future the option available is a path already 
trodden for her by the white: “The black wants to be like the white. For the black 
there is only one destiny. And it is white” (1952: 221; personal translation
81
). In a 
racist world, the only way for the alienated black to become human, in temporal 
terms, that is, to have a present that is oriented towards the future, is to be white. 
                                                 
78
 «La civilisation blanche, la culture européenne ont imposé au Noir une déviation existentielle. » 
79
 «  vivant à l'extrême sa névrose, et qui se découvre paralysé » 
80
 « Monde compartimenté, manichéiste, immobile » 
81




Given the impossibility of being white, accepting the white destiny encircles the 
black in the psycho-existential and psycho-social drama of a perpetual present. 
Fanon’s articulation of the problem of racism and colonialism in regard to time 
contains and buttresses an aspect of the definition of modernity and Euro-modernity 
advanced in the first chapter by Lewis Gordon. Gordon puts forward that the term 
modern fundamentally means that the legitimacy of the present of a society is linked 
to it being oriented towards the future.  In other words, to be modern is to be in a 
present which is in motion towards the future; such orientation legitimizes the present 
existence and brings value to the past. Throughout history, he points out, there have 
been many moderns, that is different societies which have defined the practices that 
would lead their coetaneous to the future.  This, however, changed with European 
colonialism and the creation of new types and hierarchies of humans. In Euro-
modernity, the headlight of humanity and the validity of the existence in the present 
would not be defined by a set of practices to be imposed and adopted by others, but 
by belonging to a specific group of people, that is, being modern becomes isomorphic 
with being European. The colonized that strives to be attuned to the self, to the other 
and to time by desiring to be modern/white and following the path to the future paved 
by European modernity, which is premised on their rejection as belonging to the 
future and an illegitimate present, faces an existential conundrum: “A feeling of 




It is also considering temporality that Fanon examines initiatives directed to set the 
black out of stasis and alienation, and expresses his skepticism of the political 
possibilities of certain Négritude currents. Concretely, those focused on the splendor 
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of ancient black civilizations in order to sustain black self-affirmation, or Leopold 
Senghor’s emphasis on rhythm and emotion as a way out of the existential stagnancy. 
Rhythm, emotion and irrationality are important elements in Fanon’s poetics, as we 
will see in the next chapter. However, in Fanon’s reading of Senghor, African art, 
dance and poetry are the expression of an African sensibility and an ancestral black 
metaphysics which stand in opposition to white reason, objectivity and mechanicism. 
Senghor’s proposal of a black substance ultimately elicits in an initially enthusiastic 
Fanon notions such as retrieval, origin, primordial, essence, or source, which belie 
Fanon’s idea of setting the black in motion towards the future.  Although seemingly 
expansive, for Fanon such proposals have a restrictive effect for they enclose the 
black in a relation of dependency with its opposite, the white, also alienated, but 
ontologically resistant to be particularized, and who has the last word:  
The black vis-a-vis the white has a past to valorize, a revenge to take; the 
contemporary white vis-a-vis the black feels the need to recall the 
anthropophagic period. (…) Certain men want to inflate the world with their 
being. A German philosopher had described this process as the pathology of 
freedom (Fanon, 1952: 219; personal translation
83
).    
 
Fanon makes reference here to Günther Anders’ 1937 essay “The Pathology of 
Freedom: An Essay on Non-Identification”. Although animated by different concerns 
and taking distinct directions, the central role that freedom, contingency and 
experience play in the early philosophical anthropology of Anders explains Fanon’s 
interest in the German philosopher for his own reflections on psychiatry and 
politics
84
. In the cited essay, Anders, instead of attempting to capture, define or 
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 « En face du Blanc, le Noir a un passé à valoriser, une revanche à prendre; en face du Noir,  le 
Blanc contemporain ressent la nécessité de rappeler la période anthropophagique. (…) Certains 
hommes veulent enfler le monde de leur être. Un philosophe allemand avait décrit ce processus sous le 
nom de pathologie de la liberté. »  
84
 Günther Anders was a student of Edmund Husserl. His influence is felt on theorists of the 
Frankfurt school, German phenomenology, French existentialism and also psychiatry, among others. In 




elucidate a human essence, he conceives the human as constantly being defined 
through action. As he puts it, “artificiality is man’s nature and his essence is 
instability” (Anders, 2009: 279). Thus, instead of a priori models of explanation, he 
approaches the human in its concrete situation and puts the focus on the relation that 
the human establishes with the world. This is derived from the understanding that, 
unlike animals, which belong to the world and are adjusted to it, the human being is 
both part of and excluded from the world.  For Anders human freedom resides in the 
act of detachment from the world and retreat into oneself: “To be free, this means: to 
be strange, to be bound to nothing specific, to be cut out for nothing specific, to be 
within the horizon of the indeterminate”. The separation and having to establish a 
relationship with the world may be experienced as a condemnation; in return to the 
indeterminacy, the possibilities for action and self-definition and the lack of fixity 
that emanate from freedom, humanity experiences its own contingency and becomes 
“the victim of its own liberty” (Anders, 2009: 280). From this non-identification with 
the world emerges “the desire to render the world congruent with oneself, more 
exactly, to force the world to become the I” (Anders, 2009: 293). Two related 
manifestations of this unfreedom are the nihilist and the “historical man”. For Anders, 
the nihilist man is overwhelmed by his contingency. He is determined by 
indetermination and pre-destined to instability, hence, he fails at the identification 
with the self and with the world. The pathological dimension derives from the fact 
that “he does not realise his freedom in practice, in the constitution of his world” 
(Anders, 2009: 294). The historical man does not stand in opposition to the nihilist 
but alongside a continuum, wherein one can also contain the other. The historical man 
attempts to exceed human contingency and achieve a form of identification by 
                                                                                                                                           
pathology of freedom, a view which Fanon shared and developed throughout his work, in contrast to 




situating the problems of strangeness and contingency as a past experience upon 
which he can look back and thus overcome it. “Through his history, which becomes 
one with him and envelops him, man escapes from the strangeness of the world and 
from the contingency of his ‘being-precisely-me’” (Anders, 2009: 300). This 
synthesis of the shocked self of the past with the current self extends beyond the 
individual biography to encompass the past of “other beings and other persons” 
(Anders, 2009: 301). Yet, this seemingly firm identification with the world and the 
self through the possession of his life and his history reveals its slippery character in 
the encounter with other selves in the social world, where he “must comply with and 
answer to the claim to identity that the world places in him” (Anders, 2009: 304), 
hence its pathological character (Anders, 2009: 305). 
Fanon identifies the pathology of those “men who want to inflate the world with 
their being” in the black that seeks self-affirmation in black history or in a black 
essence rooted in the cosmos, as well as in the white man, the “defender of European 
purity” (Fanon, 1952: 219; personal translation
85
). Although he shares with these 
trends of Négritude the importance they attribute to the historical and cultural 
processes in which the black subject is enmeshed and constructed as the negation of 
the human and the need for self-affirmation, creation and action, his main objection 
lies in the different value and role they ascribe to the past as the site from where 
reconstruct meanings and affirm the black humanity. For Fanon, history is a “site of 
intersections and not purifications”, as De Oto puts it (2003: 177). The past is not to 
be retrieved, but it receives its meaning in view of the action in the present that is 
oriented to building the future (De Oto, 2003: 125). The dismissal of temporality by 
Négritude intellectuals makes their effort not only insufficient in order to understand 
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and act upon alienation, but is also an expression of the aforementioned pathologies 
of freedom. Fanon writes:   
The problem considered here is rooted in temporality. Those nègres and 
whites will be disalienated insofar as they will have refused to let themselves 
be locked in the substantialized Tower of the Past. For many other nègres, 
disalienation will come from refusing to accept the present as definitive. 






As Alejandro De Oto (2003) remarks, Fanon does not view the present as 
something to be dispensed with and subordinated to a prescribed point of arrival in 
the future. It is instead in the present, at the heart of the everyday experience of 
alienation and the embodied subjectivities produced by racism from where he thinks 
the ongoing task of disalienation and decolonization. In his view, disalienation hinges 
upon two elements which are intrinsic to alienation itself: an essentialized past, of 
which any strategic use is disallowed, and a perpetual present that is not oriented 
towards the future. In Fanon the present is the tension between stasis and movement. 
It is the lived site of imposed and fixed identities, existential paralysis, and the 
psycho-social split resulting from colonial practices and discourses that tell the 
colonized that she is the negation of the human. Yet, the present as the site of 
temporality is also where the colonized remembers her historicity and faces and 
responds to such practices. By recognizing how the colonized is enmeshed with the 
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 « Le problème envisagé ici se situe dans la temporalité. Seront désaliénés Nègres et Blancs qui 
auront refusé de se laisser enfermer dans la Tour substantialisée du Passé. Pour beaucoup d'autres 
nègres, la désaliénation naîtra, par ailleurs, du refus de tenir l'actualité pour définitive. »  
87
 Fanon’s choice of words was not fortuitous. The English version translates “auront refusé” (will 
have refused)  with the present simple “who refuse to” (2008: 176). The use of the future perfect in the 
original echoes Anders’ view of the future perfect as going beyond the imprisonment of the present 
framework by “anticipating memory” (Anders, 2009: 291): “That man can declare ‘I will have been’ 
and that he can outlive himself in thought constitutes an astonishing act of freedom and of self-
abstraction” (2009: 290). David F. Garcia perceptively notes the problem of translation and the 
meaning that each tense conveys, but he places the core of the problem in the first part of the sentence, 
“Seront désaliénés”, which he translates as “will have been disalienated” (2017: 174). However, in 
that part Fanon uses, again not accidentally, the simple future of the passive voice of the verb, that is, 
être desaliéné” instead of the active verb desalíéner in future perfect as Garcia translates. In my view, 
Fanon’s attention to temporality considers disalientation, in the simple future, as an unfinished process;  
hence his emphasis on the action of refusal as a finished act in the future is what enables the self to 




colonial plot to the extent of conditioning and limiting the visions of the future, and 
by exposing the décalage between colonial discourse and her own everyday 
existence, the possibility of agency of the colonized is set in motion and the 
movement from object to subject is initiated. It is amidst this tension, at the interstices 
of colonial discourses, that action is possible and thus the opening up of politics. 
Within this process Fanon finds a new sense of historicity that emerges from the lived 
experience of the colonized. This new sense of historicity is based on temporality and 
contingency, that is, it is a historicity that is unfixing and open to change since it 
starts in and because of the awareness and refusal of the determined relationship with 
the world that has been imposed onto her (De Oto, 2003).   
Thus, in underscoring the relation between time and subjectivity in the process of 
disalienation Fanon locates liberation in the political action that takes place “not only 
in but upon the present” (Garcia, 2017: 175; italics in the original). In other words, 
politics implies a shift from the black as a construction in the stifling present of Euro-
modernity to the black as an agent that opens up a new sense of temporality. 
In sum, as Paget Henry comments, Fanon locates the historical dimension at the 
center of the existential, the social and the psychological. In this view the edifice of 
personality and the psycho-existential complexes that inform it are “thoroughly 
historicized” (2000: 81), that is, the individual is permeated by the historical and the 
cultural. Yet for Fanon the relation between history and the psyche is not 
unidirectional; in his medical dissertation he conceives history as “the systematic 
valorization of collective complexes” (2018: 257). Hence, history for Fanon would 
not only be entangled in the psyche, but it would also be the manifestation of the 
“collective psychic life” (Gibson and Beneduce, 2017: 42). As Gibson and Beneduce 




psychic life brings forth understandings of normality and alienation: “normality is 
acting within history and alienation is the suspension of the existential link to time; 
thus, madness means removing oneself from history and renouncing action within it”.  
This has not been an exhaustive account of Fanon’s temporality, but mostly 
limited to the relation between time and the alienation of the black in the metropolis. 
As stated, Fanon’s thought is heavily rooted in the temporal, it permeates other 
subjects of his work as we will see in this dissertation. The next chapter partly covers 
how in his writing and his poetic and aesthetic dimension is an intervention in and 
upon the present and entails a rupture with Euro-modern temporalities.  
Conclusion 
The questioning of method, interrogating the fundamental assumptions of thought, 
the relation of the tools of reflection and knowledge production with colonialism and 
the unveiling of reality is also a central element of the next chapter, which addresses 
Fanon’s reflections on language and his use of language in his writing. The theme of 
Caliban and language is recurrent in Caribbean thought. Caliban, the slave, receives 
his language from his master. The posibility of emancipation requires then to pay 
attention to the language that has been imposed onto him.  The reflection is not only 
in the language that he uses, but also in how it was received (Gordon, 2006a). 
The reflection of language, as the fundamental tool of communication, of making 
and conveying meaning, of establishing relations with enables Fanon to shed light on 
how racism and colonialism thwart intersubjective relations. Fanon analyzes 
manifestations of racist and colonial alienation through the use and the relation of the 





Fanon’s use of language is also an intrinsic element of his attempt to produce a 
form of knowledge oriented towards liberation. As Paget Henry points out, in 
Africana philosophy, “reason has always had to share the metaphysical stage with 
poetics and historical action.” (Henry, 2006: 19)  Fanon’s singular style of writing is 
not an ornamental device, but is entangled with methodological, political and 
pedagogical considerations. What Fanon says has to be read alongside with what he 
does in his texts with language. That is, the use of humor, the images, poetics, the 
different voices and the theatrical element in his writing are embedded in theoretical 











Chapter 3. Poetics of disalienation 
In this study I endeavored to touch on the misery of the black –at the 
tactile and the affective levels. I have not wished to be objective. 




Fanon was also a playwright and is evident in his social, political and psychiatric 
writings. This chapter addresses the question of language in Fanon’s work, both in his 
theorizing and in his use of language. Language as he explicitly puts it in the opening 
chapter of Black Skin White Masks is a central concern in his thought. Language is a 
tool of communication, of expressing subjectivity, making meaning. And as element 
of human interaction and in the relation with the world, language is a central concern 
in his thought. As such, language is embedded with power relations. In its important 
role in the process of subjugation and civilization, language can serve to trap the 
black Caribbean in the vicious circle of looking for white recognition, but it can also 
be appropriated for emancipatory purposes.  
Like surrealists and Négritude thinkers, Fanon’s language is animated by this 
double concern of domination and liberation. Through his writing Fanon questions 
and transforms the French language, the terms and the categories received. At the  
same time he crafts a language that enables him to render and analyze the 
complexities and ambiguities of the colonial situation, and also to convey the 
experience of colonialism to the reader at the level of the senses, affects and reason. 
However, language and writing itself is to be accompanied by action, which is what 
what he seeks to elicit in the reader.  
Many readers have treated Fanon’s language as an excessive ornament which has 




However, form and content are related. The images, the theatrical element, the 
different voices that appear in the texts, the contradictions, the ambiguities, the 
humor, the rhythm and the corporeal quality of his language also play a role in the 
content of his work at the level of politics, method and also at the pedagogical level. 
In sum, in order to grasp what he means it is important to pay attention to what he 
says, how he says it, and to what he does in and through his writing, for there is a 
performative quality in his work. I have divided this chapter into several sections: 
The first section addresses Fanon’s analysis of language in the colonial world, in 
Black Skin White Masks and in relation to the chapter on the radio in L’an V de la 
revolution algérienne. In the former he delves into the intricacy of colonial language 
and power; his analysis of the use and meanings and values ascribed to the French 
language enable him to shed light on the relations between whites and blacks, 
between the colonized. Thereby he delves into the alienation of the black Caribbean 
as manifested in his or her relation with the colonial language and expressed through 
language. In the latter, he shows the process of transformation of the meaning of the 
colonial language linked to collective, political action. Rather than self-
transformation and demanding admission, it is the transformation of the social 
structure that leads to the appropriation and the shift of the values ascribed to French 
language. From a language of subjugation, French is turned into a language of 
liberation. 
The second section addresses an important influence on Fanon at the level of ideas 
and of the aesthetics, Aimé Césaire, and its relation with surrealism. Césaire’s 
theorization on aesthetics, language, creativity, and poetic and scientific knowledge 
had an impact on Fanon, but the latter diverges in certain aspects. Namely, Fanon 




theoretical tools, and does not endow an extraordinary value and a privilege position 
to his poetics and to the aesthetic dimension in general. 
The third and the fourth section deal with the relation between language and the 
body, the oral quality of his work, the use of humor and the different metaphors and 
images. The fifth section covers the dramaturgical element in his work, the different 
voices and characters, and how they are intertwined with the theoretical dialogues 
that he undertakes. I have used the example of his approach to psychoanalysis in 
Black Skin White Masks, but this will be expanded in the seventh chapter.  
  3.1 Caliban and Language 
Paget Henry points out that the poetic dimension is an indispensable element in 
African diasporic thought and inseparable from other dimensions: “[i]n the Africana 
tradition, reason has always had to share the metaphysical stage with poetics and 
historical action” (Henry, 2006: 19).  Henry seems to imply that dealing with poetics 
and the creative dimension of language is a matter of necessity. This is partly related 
to the need to create suitable concepts that describe the complexity and the 
ambiguities of the condition of Africana people. And more fundamentally, the issue 
of words and language lies also in its entanglement with colonialism at the level of 
method, as Gordon puts it (2006a). Namely, how colonialism affects thinking and the 
way one thinks about thinking, which in turn inform the directions of action, as Henry 
points out above. Thus inquiry requires addressing the fundamental levels of thinking, 
including language as a tool for making sense of the world and for liberation. 
The question of language, knowledge and colonialism is present in Shakespeare’s 
play The Tempest, addressed by many Caribbean thinkers. The main character, 
Prospero, the magician, inventor and possessor of knowledge arrived on an island in 




language in exchange of his enslaved work. Miranda, Prospero’s daughter, 
admonishes the protesting Caliban: 
Abhorrèd slave, (…) I pitied thee, 
Took pains to make thee speak, taught thee each hour 
One thing or other. When thou didst not, savage, 
Know thine own meaning, but wouldst gabble like 
A thing most brutish, I endowed thy purposes 
With words that made them known.  
(Shakespeare, 2006: 144). 
 
Language, the fundamental tool to participate in the world, make sense of their 
experience, communicate with others and to generate and express meaning, is 
received from Prospero; the language that created Caliban is the same that made him 
into a monster and a slave. Double consciousness risks to appear, then, in efforts of 
liberation premised on the language received.  Therefore, the question goes deeper 
than a particular language or words, it rather points to the intricacy of method and 
language: critical reflection on what is received, words, must be accompanied by 
critical reflection on how it is received (Gordon, 2006a), for “we convert what we 
receive into possessions, a conversion that often hides the conditions of having 
received, as if the possession is too simply ‘already there’” (Ahmed, 2006: 126). As 
Gordon (2006a) puts it, rather than epistemic and linguistic, this points out the 
obstacle that colonization poses at the very level of method. 
Language is a constant concern in Fanon, in his writing and also in the way he 
writes. The opening chapter of Black Skin White Masks, addresses the question of 
language in the colonial context. Language, he observes, is a fundamental element to 
“understand the dimension of being-for-others of the colored man, since to speak is to 
exist absolutely for the other.” (Fanon, 1952: 15; italics in the original; my 
translation
88
) Language, he argues, constitutes subjectivity, as in an element in human 
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 « compréhension de la dimension pour-autrui de l'homme de couleur. Etant entendu que parler, 




interaction, participation in the constitution of the intersubjective world, and in the 
appropriation of the world. The one who possesses a language “possesses, as a result, 
the world expressed and implied by this language. (…) There is an extraordinary 
power in the possession of a language” (Fanon, 1952: 16; my translation
89
) Yet, this 
does not amount to a deterministic view of language, and Fanon does not imply that 
language shapes cognition and thought. Instead, it is the black who is already 
alienated, the one who rejects blackness, identifies with metropolitan values, and is 
obsessed with mimesis and assimilation, who conceives language in a deterministic 
way (Gibson and Beneduce, 2017).  
 Hence, Fanon begins his analysis of black alienation in colonial societies through 
the exploration of language and its intricacy with power. To speak, he writes, is 
“above all to assume a culture, to carry the weight of a civilization.” (Fanon, 1952: 
15; my translation
90
). Through the relationship of the colonized with the colonial 
language, Fanon explores the intersubjective world, the values and the meanings, the 
relation between colonizer and colonized, between Caribbean and Africans, and the 
different manifestations of colonial alienation related with and also expressed through 
language.  
He notices that the black does not speak in the same way in the Caribbean than in 
the metropolis, but also the Caribbean returning from France suffers from a radical 
transformation. In the colonies, French language is linked to positive values, not only 
literature, philosophy and elevated forms of culture, also the administration, 
technology, medicine, trade, the aspirations of the bourgeoisie, in sum, progress and 
civilization are expressed through the French language. Creole and other vernacular 
languages are associated with values of negativity and backwardness. The alienated 
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 « le langage possède par contrecoup le monde exprimé et impliqué par ce langage. il y a dans la 
possession du langage une extraordinaire puissance. » 
90




black conceives French language as a form of affirmation and escaping blackness; 
mastering and possessing the French language is a means to enter French society, the 
white world and, hence, becoming a human being. Thus, the Caribbean is resolute to 
speak proper French, the French of the colonizer, and to distance themselves from the 
African, who in turn, and for the same reason, attempts to speak creole.  What could 
be a movement of self-affirmation, empowerment and openness is for the alienated 
black a trap into a neurotic circuit. He writes that “all colonized people (…) in whom 
an inferiority complex has been ingrained (…) position themselves in relation to the 
language of the civilizing nation” (1952: 16; my translation
91
). This reveals the 
circular logic in which the colonized is enmeshed. There is, alienation derived from 
the deprecation and devaluation of the humanity of the colonized, in which language 
plays an active part, but the same language becomes their resort to achieve 
civilization and the elevation into humanity. 
The exultant Caribbean arrives in France decided to change, to become someone 
new, but is received by one of the daily mechanisms that lock the black into the 
colonial image, the petit-nègre. The petit-nègre, the simplified French that the black 
is supposed to speak, is the linguistic correlate of the colonial image created for the 
black and reproduced through language. The black is simple, devoid of history, past, 
civilization and culture, it is locked in an eternal childhood, hence, the paternalistic 
mode of being addressed by the white, the condescending tone, the simplified 
grammar. Fanon describes its effects as a form of imprisonment: To make the black 
speak petit-nègre is to “fix him to his image, to snare and imprison him in an eternal 
essence, an appearance of which he is not responsible.”( Fanon, 1952: 32; my 
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 « Tout peuple colonise (…) au sein duquel a pris naissance un complexe d'infériorité (…) 






; italics in the original) And to answer in petit-nègre to the black is “to 
lock the black, to perpetuate the conflictual situation in which the white infests the 
black of foreign and extremely toxic bodies.”( Fanon, 1952: 33; my translation
93
)  
In this situation the black faces a dilemma: either claiming a black past, or aspiring 
to whiteness, but both are reactive responses, and the latter is an understandable one. 
One of the most glaring illustrations of the experience of escaping blackness through 
language and its material impact in the body is the description of the black 
determined to learn the phonetics and the pronunciation of the metropolis:  
The black arriving in France will react against the myth of the R-eating-
Martinican. He will become aware of it, and he will declare the war against 
it. He will practice not only rolling the R, but decorating it. Secretly 
scrutinizing the slightest reaction of others, listening to his own speech, 
mistrusting his tongue– such a lazy organ–he will lock himself in his room 





Fanon notices that the colonized is not only struggling with the unyielding R, but 
also with his tongue, with his own body. As Gibson and Beneduce point out, for the 
colonized, “language is lived in the flesh and inscribed on the body” (2017: 65). In 
the understanding of the body as politically constituted, the decolonization of 
language must go hand in hand with the decolonization of the body, the senses and 
the imagination, just like sexuality.  Fanon attempted to identify the “deep traces of 
alienation embodied in gestures and speech” in everyday life. In this sense, the 
disciplined training of the body with the expectation of being admitted and 
recognized is for Fanon the symptom of a broader pathology (Gibson and Beneduce, 
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 « c'est l'attacher a son image, l'engluer, l'emprisonner, victime éternelle d'une essence, d'un 
apparaître dont il n'est pas le responsable. » 
93
 « c'est enfermer le Noir, c'est perpétuer une situation conflictuelle ou le Blanc infeste le Noir de 
corps étrangers extrêmement toxiques. » 
94
 « Le Noir entrant en France va réagir contre le mythe du Martiniquais qui-mange-les-R. Il va s'en 
saisir, et véritablement entrera en conflit ouvert avec lui. Il s'appliquera non seulement a rouler les R, 
mais a les ourler. Epiant les moindres réactions des autres, s'écoutant parler, se méfiant de la langue, 
organe malheureusement paresseux, il s'enfermera dans sa chambre et lira pendant des heures — 




2017: 70). He continues with the episode of another Caribbean in a bar struggling 
with the R, with tragicomic results: 
‘Waiterrr! Bing me a beeyya.’ We witness here a true intoxication. 
Determined not to fit the image of the R-eating-nègre, he hoarded a good 





The entrance into the white world is premised upon the condition that the black fit 
the image that the society has prepared for them, that is, that they remain fixed in the 
stage of infancy, otherwise they arise suspicion: “When a nègre speaks about Marx 
the first reaction is the following: ‘We have educated you and now you turn against 




As Gordon notes, seeking in this way transformation through language is 
insufficient since the black is looking for recognition from the one who oppresses 
them. This assumes the legitimacy of the oppression, and amounts to the re-
affirmation of the oppressive system. Transformation requires then more radical 
questions: questioning what is legitimate, what one values and why one values what 
one values, and questioning what and who constitute the standards. In other words, 
the black has to put questions beyond his or herself, since the alienated black who 
seeks transformation through language actually seeks self-transformation and remains 
trapped in the narcissism that Fanon diagnosed throughout the work (Gordon, 2015).  
Fanon’s analysis of language is very specific and contextually-attuned. In “The 
Voice of Algeria” Fanon describes that in Algeria the relation of the colonized 
towards the French language is different from the Caribbean and the metropolis. The 
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  « ‘Garrrcon ! un vè de biè.’Nous assistons la a une véritable intoxication. Soucieux de ne pas 
répondre a l'image du nègre-mangeant-les-R, il en avait fait une bonne provision, mais il n'a pas su 
repartir son effort. » 
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 « Quand un nègre parle de Marx, la première réaction est la suivante : ≪ On vous a élevés et 
maintenant vous vous retournez contre vos bienfaiteurs. Ingrats ! Décidément, on ne peut rien attendre 




Algerians educated in French schools also present an ambivalent and hesitant relation 
to the French language as the above-described. However, lay Algerians openly 
rejected it since it was considered a tool of domination; it was perceived with hostility 
and associated with the injunction, the insult and the threat, the three domains of 
contact between the colonizers and the population. Nationalist organizations also 
rejected the French language as a form of cultural resistance and to reaffirm the 
national singularity through the Arab language. However, Fanon notes, the use of the 
French language, together with the Arab and the Kabyle, in the radio communications 
during the revolution entailed a radical change of the values ascribed to the French 
language. The same message conveyed in the three languages “unifies the 
experience” and liberates the French language from “its historical meaning.”  (Fanon, 
1959: 74; my translation
97
). This change of meanings were also noticed at the level of 
psychopathology; in patients with hallucinations the voices in French were no longer 
aggressive and related to rejection but to support and protection. At the political level, 
revolutionary congresses and national councils were held in French, disconcerting the 
colonized.  I quote at length: 
The French language loses its accursed character, revealing itself capable of 
conveying, for the healing of the nation, the messages of truth that the latter 
awaits. Paradoxically as it may appear, it is the Algerian Revolution, the 
struggle of the Algerian people, what facilitates the spreading of the French 
language in the nation. (…) The occupation authorities have not measured 
the importance of the new attitude of the Algerian toward the French 
language. Expressing oneself in French, understanding French does not 
amount anymore to treason or to an impoverishing identification with the 
occupier. (…) The French language becomes also an instrument of 
liberation. We see that the ‘native’ almost assumes responsibility for the 
language of the occupant. (Fanon, 1959: 74-75; my translation
98
) 
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 « ses significations historiques. » « unifie l’expérience » 
98
 « La langue française perd son caractère maudit, se révélant capable de transmettre également, à 
l’intention de la Nation les messages de vérité que cette dernière attend. Aussi paradoxal que cela 
paraisse, c’est la Révolution algérienne, c’est la lutte du peuple algérien qui facilite la diffusion de la 
langue française dans la Nation.(…) Les autorités d’occupation n’ont pas davantage mesuré 
l’importance de l’attitude nouvelle de l’Algérien en face de la langue française. S’exprimer en français, 





Besides the contextual difference with Black Skin White Masks, in contrast to the 
futility of self-transformation by adopting French language as a tool of evasion and 
admission, Fanon is here pointing out a process of appropriation of the French 
language concomitant to a transformative action at the level of society. Such action 
first reveals that values and meanings are not fixed and then questions and shifts the 
values of colonial societies, without necessarily rejecting colonial elements. The 
societal transformation and the process itself, entails new form of relations and the 
construction of new meanings. In Fanon’s words, “To use the French language is both 
to domesticate an attribute of the occupant and to show oneself permeable to the 
signs, the symbols and to a certain order of the occupant. (Fanon, 1959: 76: my 
translation
99
) This process of appropriation, twisting and permeability through action 
that transforms the French language from a tool of subjugation into a language of 
liberation is present in Fanon’s own way of writing, to which we dedicate the rest of 
the chapter. However, one missing element in Fanon’s account of language, is as 
Larose Parris (2015) remarks, the absence of explorations of the emancipatory 
possibilities of Caribbean creole languages. 
3.2 Négritude and surrealism 
In terms of language, Fanon faces the same predicament as the Négritude 
movement by which he was influenced, particularly by Césaire in the aesthetic sense 
and not without divergences, also in political terms. The Négritude, initiated by the 
founders of Presence Africaine Léon Damas and Aimé and Suzanne Césaire aimed at 
the revalorization of black identity and cultural production through poetry. Although 
                                                                                                                                           
avec l’occupant.(…) la langue française devient aussi un instrument de libération. (…) On assiste à une 
quasi prise en charge par « l’indigène » de la langue de l’occupant. » 
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there has been an homogeneization of the group in certain critiques of essentialism 
and of retrieving a lost Africaness, the group was not homogenous, there were 
different trends, targets, goals, aspirations and means to achieve it. What they shared 
was centrality of the question of black identity and cultural production, and the role of 
aesthetics, poetry and working through language and arts. Césaire found in surrealism 
both a source of inspiration and a confirmation of his own concerns, that is, of a  
poetry as the way to deal with language not merely for aesthetic experimental 
purposes but with the intention of expressing a political critique. As he says, 
“Surrealism provided me with what I had been confusedly searching for.”(Césaire, 
2001: 83) Surrealists’ critique of modern societies and their anti-capitalist and anti-
imperialist position relied heavily on psychoanalytic elements expressed through 
languages, or seeking transformation through language, looking for the irrational.   
The relation between Césaire, the Négritude movement and the surrealists was not 
unidirectional. The Négritude movement, with a less psychoanalytical emphasis, 
inspired and outgrew the concerns of surrealists, introduced new ideas, and 
approaches which had a bearing on surrealists. Césaire, Fanon’s high school teacher 
and mentor, attempted to revalorize and built a new image of the black, and propose a 
new society, expose the situation and critique, but also to imagine something 
different, or “to see the future in the present”  (Kelley, 1999: 23). These qualities are 
not only present in the poetical or the strictly literary work of Césaire, if a strict 
distinction between the literary and his work in essays form can be held. Robin 
Kelley, who proposes to read Césaire’s essay Discourse on Colonialism as a surrealist 
text permeated by an understanding of the revolutionary function of poetry, would 
probably not maintain such separation:  
“Césaire's text plumbs the depths of one's unconscious so that colonialism 




of anger, full of humor. It is not a solution or a strategy or a manual or a little 
red book with pithy quotes. It is a dancing flame in a bonfire. (Kelley, 2001: 
10) 
 
 Despite its lyrical prose, Discourse on Colonialism is formally more restrained 
and has predominantly an argumentative character. Rather than at the forefront, the 
poetic element and the surrealism that Kelley describes is what animates and lies at 
the heart of his critique of what he calls the decadence and self-deception of Europe. 
In Césaire the poetic is not necessarily a formal or a rhetorical strategy, but as he puts 
it in his essay “Calling the Magician: A Few Words for a Caribbean Civilization”, a 
“spirit”, “[o]nly the poetic spirit corrodes and builds, erases and invigorates (…) links 
and reunites (Césaire, 1996a: 120-121). The poetic spirits strives to “re-establish a 
personal, fresh, compelling, magical contact with things” (1996: 122). This requires 
“a new attitude towards the object”, which, “[o]nce generalized, this attitude will lead 
us to the mad sweep of renewal. I’m calling upon the Enraged.” (1996: 122) 
In philosophical thought the question of attitude occupies a more fundamental 
level in knowledge production than methodological and epistemic concerns, notes 
Maldonado-Torres. Edmund Husserl distinguished between the natural attitude and 
the change of attitude that the phenomenological reduction entails. The change of 
attitude also appears in Heidegger and Habermas. Foucault conceives modernity as an 
attitude instead of a period (Maldonado-Torres, 2015). Steve Biko conceived the 
Black Consciousness movement as “an attitude of the mind and a way of life” (Biko, 
2002: 91). Likewise, Fanon pays a considerable attention to attitude beyond strictly 
psychological considerations. As he remarks, “attitude points at the intention” 
(Fanon, 1952; my translation
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), that is, attitude is an orientation towards the world 
which manifests itself in actions. Hence, as noted, the importance of the question of 
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desire which guides Fanon’s first book.  In Black Skin White Masks he announces that 
he attempts to ascertain “the attitudes of the black in the white world” and those of 
the white about the black (Fanon, 1952: 13; my translation
101
). His following work, 
L’an V del la revolution algerienne, delves into the “new attitude” (1959), the 
different forms of relating that Algerian people developed during the decolonization 
struggle towards norms and values imposed by colonialism, the inner structures of 
Algerian society, and their own subject formation. Maldonado-Torres reads Du Bois, 
Firmin, Fanon, Biko and Césaire’s work, among others, as impelled by what he calls 
a “decolonial attitude”. Such attitude brings forth the silencing of the problem of the 
colorline, its centrality in the constitution of Euro-modernity and in the formation of 
modern subjectivities, delves into the perspective of those silenced, and revolts 
against the attitudes, structures and  forms of relating that sustain the problem of the 
color-line (2015). What I want to underscore from Maldonado-Torres’s reflection is 
that attitude is a basic orientation in one’s form of relating. Thus, it shapes one’s 
disposition towards the world and sets the course for knowledge and action.   
Césaire reflected on the new attitude that he demands on “the Enraged” in “Poetry 
and Knowledge”, a conference delivered in Haiti in 1944, which can be read as a 
manifesto of the political and epistemic character of poetry. Poetry, he states, “is that 
attitude that by the word, the image, myth, love and humor places me at the living 
heart of myself and of the world.” Such attitude, unleashes imagination’s “demented 
impulse.” (Césaire, 1996b: 145), which takes epistemic and political shape in what 
Césaire calls “poetic knowledge” as opposed to science.  Thus, at the outset he 
declares that “[p]oetic knowledge is born in the great silence of scientific 
knowledge.” (Césaire, 1996: 134). Following the Aristotelian and Nietzschean thread, 
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Césaire argues that science does not reach to the heart of things. It classifies, 
enumerates, judges and fixes, yet it offers a parochial and superficial perspective of 
the world and demands the purge of the human element of the knower: feelings, 
desires, fears and any trace of subjectivity are to be ruled out for scientific knowledge 
to be produced. The result is an “impoverished knowledge for, at its origin, whatever 
its richness in other ways, lies an impoverished man”. Poetic knowledge offers 
instead a holistic account of the human experience through the intimate connection 
with life’s forces. At the root of the poem lies “an astonishing mobilization of all 
human and cosmic powers” (Césaire, 1996b: 134). Poetry is not grounded on a gifted 
intelligence or a special sensibility, he adds, but on “experience as a whole” (Césaire, 
1996b: 138). It is by placing the human amidst and within the vast energetic 
movements that antinomies between humans and with nature are bridged, and results 
in the “blossoming of man in the world’s measure” (Césaire, 1996b: 140). As Ronie 
Scharfman summarizes:  
 (…) poetry only is capable of saying both self and world, of sounding the 
bitter absurdity of the world, the irrationality of life, the richness of the 
universe, the injustice of colonial history, and the suffering of a people 
formerly enslaved.  (Scharfman, 2010: 115) 
 
Césaire stresses in his lecture that the holistic character of poetic knowledge and 
the unity of the self with the world do not amount to the “poet’s disarment” (1996b: 
141).  By equating poetry to a weapon he makes clear that he parts company from 
irenicist understandings of poetry, for the relations that constitute the human can be 
harmonius as they can also be absurd, brutal and violent.  It is precisely out of the 
penetrating insight gained through poetic knowledge that poetry acquires the political, 
rebellious and anticolonial character, and connects theory and practice. 
For that reason he mistrusts Apollonian approaches to poetry that attempt to 




with the instability, the “vital movement (…), the creative impulse” (Césaire, 1996b: 
139) which animates life. Nourished by “the revenge of Dionysus over Apollo” 
(1996b: 136), poetry as knowledge (connaissance) is also poetry as co-naissance
102
, 
or the mutual birth of the subject and the poem.  
Ronie Scharfman (2010) understands the knowledge of poetry and co-naissance as 
“self-knowledge” in regard to the anthropological question that haunts the African 
Diaspora, also present in Césaire’s work, arising from colonial de-individualization 
and dehumanization: “Who are we and what? Admirable question!”, asks Césaire in 
Return to My Native Land (1969: 56). Scharfman remarks that in the poetry of 
Césaire “subjectivity and écriture are co-extensive, that with each poem, the poetic 
subject is born and born anew, differently, in the incarnation of each text. (2010: 
114). Yet the emergence of the self rather than a purpose or an outcome is the 
condition of a tragic moment that extends beyond the self to the community. Eva 
Figes notes that tragedy is the “sad story” of the protagonist, who, “deliberately or by 
accident”, challenges the basic and naturalized order of the society. The protagonist, 
“bringing disruption on himself and the community within which he lives, is 
eliminated, whereupon peace and order are restored.” (Figes, 1976: 12).  Such a 
conflict painfully brings forth what has been evaded by the community, catharsis, 
which, in its Dionysian form takes place in ecstatic dance and liberation of energy. 
Amidst a “climate of fire and fury” (Césaire, 1996: 141), poetry melts fixities, 
questions colonial values and morals, challenges the legitimacy of the colonial order, 
shakes its foundations, ignites imagination and unshackles horizons.  
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 A version of “Poesie et connaissance”, contains a part of Césaire’s lecture which was omitted in 
the original publication in Tropiques in 1945. Therein, he links the French word for knowledge, 
connaissance, with co-naissance (birth or emergence together), by way of the poet Paul Claudel: “In 
times were knowledge was co-naissance in the Claudelian sense of the word. I refer to the times 
everything was born together” (Césaire as quoted in Harcourt, 2016).  Bernard E. Harcourt (2016) 
interprets Césaire as referring to the relation between art and ancestral knowledge situating poetic 




3.3 Fanon: poetry and home building 
As it was noted, Fanon had a formative relation with the Négritude movement and 
notably with Césaire, with who Fanon is in conversation throughout his work. 
Besides his explicit and political divergences with the Martinican poet, Fanon would 
differ from Césaire’s poetics on two aspects. First, Fanon adamantly opposes to the 
ascription of a creative value or potential to madness through the association of the 
mad person with the freedom and the visionary character of the poet, as argued in 
surrealism, Lacanaian psychoanalysis and also present in Césaire. Second, and more 
important for the scope of this section, instead of opposing science to art, Fanon deals 
with the “great silence of scientific knowledge” to which Césaire alludes to, by 
seamlessly merging art with other forms of knowledge. The inherent incompleteness 
of science, added to the bad faith of modern social, human and natural sciences of 
ignoring the colonial situation in spite of its constitutive role in their formation, led 
Fanon to mobilize all literary, and linguistic recourses in order to account for the 
complexity of the colonial condition and to convey to the reader the subjective 
experience of the colonial subject that he seeks to destroy.  
 In other words, Fanon does not situate art and aesthetics on a separated level or 
considers them as more elevated concerns than other human activities. Illustrative is 
an editorial of the journal of the hospital that he directed at Blida. Therein he 
responds to those that consider unworthy of the space dedicated in the journal the 
writings of the boarders exposing and criticizing the quality of the food at the 
hospital. Fanon appeals to the sensory to argue that eating “is not inferior to thinking, 
and I don’t see why considerations about food should yield to aesthetic concerns.” 
(Fanon, 2018: 332). For, he continues, the patient who asks for “food that caresses the 




nuance.” Fanon actually sees that the observations of the boarders represent “a highly 
elevated form of sociability”. In another issue of the journal, he links aesthetics to 
other fundamental aspects of humans living together in a human way when he writes: 
“people need love, affection and poetry in order to live. Patients show this privation 
in their illnesses by closing up inside themselves.” (Fanon, 2018: 333).  
These two passages have to be understood in the context of Fanon’s attempts to 
recreate a society in the psychiatric hospital as way of healing the and in the asylum. 
Yet precisely for this reason his conception of the aesthetic expression as inseparable 
from the rest of human activities that constitute the human world can be discerned. 
Poetry, rather than a mode of writing or a skill for the gifted is here related to how 
human beings configure and furnish the world, turn space into place, or as Gordon 
summarizes it, aesthetics is part of the means through which “human beings in effect 
make themselves at home with reality” (2018: 20).  The metaphor of home is also 
present in Audre Lorde’s essay “Poetry is not a Luxury”: “poetry is not only dream 
and vision; it is also the skeleton architecture of our lives” (Lorde, 2007: 38).  Lorde 
sees the necessity of poetry as part of the everyday resistance and opening up of 
possibilities against oppression whereas Fanon here sees the lack of poetry as the lack 
of an outward activity through which humans intervene and participate in the 
symbolic world, such a lack leads to the withdrawal into the self, which as we will 
see is one of the effects and signs of alienation. Fanon’s earthly view of aesthetics, 
grounded on the everyday and inseparable from other dimensions of the human being, 
is substantiated when he puts it at the same level than seemingly more mundane 
concerns such as food.  As Gordon notes, this is not to belittle aesthetics but to affirm, 
as the proverb says, that humans do not live by bread alone, to the extent that even 




“esthetics of everyday life”. That is, food is also embedded in making livable the 
ordinary intersubjective affair through which meanings are brought and values are 
generated –including the meaning of the ordinary, the mundane, and the livable 
(Gordon, 2018: 19). Gordon adds: 
Aesthetics is not, then, the dessert we have after our nutritional needs have 
been met but instead, as perhaps also dessert should be understood, part of 
the entire constellation of meeting such needs. It is as central to what it 
means to live a human life as the various other converging dimensions of 
human existence. (Gordon: 2018: 24) 
 
Gordon notices above that living an ordinary human existence implies not only the 
everyday activity of furnishing the world, of home building, at issue is also the meaning 
and the value of what is ordinary, normal, or human.  As stated in the previous chapter 
in the analysis of temporality and alienation, for Fanon the black arrives “too late” to a 
world that has already imposed meanings and values onto the black as less than human. 
That is, racism and racist alienation entail and existential deviation from common 
human problems, including those of alienation and liberty. Ato Sekyi-Otu punctuates 
this aspect when he observes that for Fanon the drama at the heart of racist and colonial 
dehumanization is not the fall from a “black nirvana” and the loss of a paradisiac and 
ancestral particularity, as certain Négritude proponents might have seen it, but “a 
deviation from the regular predicaments of human intercourse, normal prospects, and 
pathologies of the paths of liberty” (Sekyi-Otu, 2011: 50). 
The world that Fanon finds at his arrival is a world of twoness, of double 
standards, as Du Bois also identifies, where notions of normalcy or humanity are 
selectively and asymmetrically assigned to certain type of beings and practices at the 
expense of those considered pathological and inhuman.  As Fanon points out racism 
is not an aberration or an anomaly; the racist person in a racist society is “normal” 




and intersubjective spheres of coloniality. In Black Skin White Masks, and also in the 
rest of his work, Fanon puts the emphasis on the everyday of racism and colonialism, 
in the relation to language, sexuality, family relations, the oxymoronic character of a 
black philosopher, the mistrust that provokes the educated black, the relations to the 
means of production and to technology, the disbelief in the Arab patient at the clinic, 
the doctor of color that constantly needs to prove himself, the Caribbean that returns 
to his or hers native land, the relation of the body to space and time.  
If, in a world of double standards, racism is normal, the quotidian of the black 
person implies living the abnormal as if it is the normal. Hence, Fanon’s focus on 
how racism and colonialism permeate and thwart quotidian activity reveal, in 
Gordon’s phenomenological treatment, that under oppression the ordinary is the 
imposition of the extraordinary given as ordinary (1995). Hence, daily life under 
racism “demands extraordinary choices and efforts to be lived mundanely. There is 
the mundane for the white and the mundane for the black” (Gordon, 1995: 42).  
Therefore, what Fanon strives for is “to reintroduce the extraordinary back into the 
extraordinary” (Gordon, 1995: 62). The understanding that the normalcy of racism 
turns ordinary life into an extraordinary endeavor, that it forces an existential 
deviation from human predicaments, and the view of aesthetics as another aspect of 
the human being, not necessarily antithetical to science as Césaire and the surrealists 
argue, but as an ordinary human activity of world building, helps to illuminate on the 
extraordinary function and the character of aesthetics in Fanon. 
3.4 Language in the flesh 
Fanon’s purpose in Black Skin White Masks, is to “help blacks to liberate 




(Fanon, 1952: 18; my translation
103
; own italics). This demands more than the mere 
description and a well-argued critique of the colonial situation, but also the “total 
lysis of this morbid universe” (Fanon, 1952: my translation; own italics). In the book 
Fanon makes reference to Marx’s well-known eleventh thesis on Feuerbach where the 
German philosopher proposes a shift in philosophy that goes from describing the 
world to a philosophy directed to change it.  As a thinker, Fanon’s position is clear: 
one cannot sit on the fence. 
The analysis of the real is a delicate issue. The researcher can adopt two 
attitudes concerning the subject. Either he limits himself to describe, like 
those anatomists who are surprised when, in the middle of the description of 
the tibia, they are asked how many fibular depressions they have. This is 
because their research always addresses others and never involves them (…) 
Or after having described reality, the researcher attempts to change it. In 
theory, moreover, the intention of describing seems to imply a critical 
approach, and hence the demand to go farther towards a solution. (Fanon, 
1952: 163; my translation) 
 
However, at least implicitly, Fanon adds some nuance to Marx’s dictum, for before 
changing reality one has to see it as it is, understand it, and engage it. Let us recall 
that the question that initially guides his research is that of desire, “what do blacks 
want?”, which contains in it the question of reality and the false reality that is 
accepted under colonialism, or the mechanisms of avoidance, reactivity, and 
delusions.  
Fanon attempts to offer in Black Skin White Masks a “mirror with a progressive 
infrastructure, through which the black on the way to disalienation can get his or her 
bearings.” (Fanon, 1952: my translation) Such a mirror binds different dimensions of 
the human being, in a way that attempts to transmit the colonial experience in its full 
being and contribute to provoke reflection, raise reflection and consciousness, that 
leads to action, which is for Fanon the crux of the matter. As Gibson and Beneducce 
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posit, for “Fanon, the movement from understanding to knowledge, and the critical 
work of each, necessitates action (2018: 73). In other words, Fanon attempts to insert 
the reader within the traps of colonial alienation and the search for white recognition, 
and move him or her out the “hellish circle” (Gordon, 2015)  
Francis Jeanson notes that to grasp the meaning, to figure out the sense of a limit 
experience, requires recreating the “stage of disintegration: passage through 
nothingness and a descent into the true hell” (1952: 16; my translation
104
). In line 
with Césaire’s argument above, an argumentative approach does not suffice for this 
task. There are nooks of the human being where philosophy, sociology or psychiatry 
cannot reach. Hence, one of the functions and the effects of his poetics in its synthesis 
with the former forms and fields of knowledge is to bridge the distance between 
description and action, to have an effect on the reader of a book that is addressed to a 
scientific and intellectual community but also, the alienated black, and, albeit to a 
much lesser extent, to alienated and alienating whites.  
Thus, rather than plain descriptions of the colonial situation Fanon is concerned 
with bringing up an understanding that engages and binds the different  aspects of the 
human being, including the cognitive, somatic, and affective dimensions.  
Colonialism not a form of domination or economic exploitation, it is also lived in the 
flesh, it informs embodied subjectivities, the psychic, the affective and the sensory 
levels, it reaches as Du Bois puts it, also the Souls.  Thus, besides the domain of 
cognition it also shapes the domain of the senses, the receptive, the perceptive, and 
poses a limit to imagination In this sense, as stated, decolonizing the mind is 
inseparable from decolonizing the body, a body that feels, touches, hears and speaks. 
The body, as we will see, is conceived as the site of contact with the world, with other 
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humans in relation to space and time, it is historically, socially and politically 
constituted.  
The relation between the body and language is an important dimension of Fanon’s 
crafting his own language, a language that “goes from body to words, from the 
‘muscular tension’ to ‘conscientisation’.” (Cherki, 2011: 182; my translation
105
) A 
review of Fanon’s L’an V de la revolution algérienne appeared in the American 
Journal of Sociology affirms that “none of Fanon’s books is really a book. None was 
composed with care and long reflection, in successive drafts, for a clearly conceived 
audience. Fanon was a dictater, not a writer.” (Celarent, 2011: 2064). Besides the 
question of the authority of the written over the oral word, this statement is all the 
more questionable and surprising when one considers the reviewer’s overall favorable 
stance on the book, since, as we argue in this chapter, language plays more than an 
ornamental role in his writing. Form and content in Fanon go hand in hand, that is, it 
is not always possible to understand what he means without paying attention to how 
he says it, what he does in his writing, and how the political, the methodological, the 
pedagogical and the poetical are intertwined.  
Echoing Fanon’s aforementioned description of a body in movement, Alice Cherki 
declares that Fanon dictated his books and most of his articles “pacing back and forth 
in the manner of an improvising orator; the rhythm of the body in motion and the 
breath of a voice punctuate the style.” Although later edited, she adds, this way of 
writing as if speaking to a preferably close person, transmits the sensation of 
movement, directedness and the proximity of the spoken word (Cherki, 2011: 56; my 
translation
106
). As Cherki points out, Fanon binds the spoken and the written world, 
and language and the body. Fanon quoted Paul Valéry, who posited that language “is 
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 « tout en marchant de longue en large comme un orateur qui improvise ; le rythme du corps en 




the god gone ashtray in the flesh” (quoted in Fanon, 1952: 16; my translation
107
) 
Language stems from an embodied subjectivity and a breathing body, hence the 
cadence, modulation, hesitation, silence, emphasis, vibration and rhythm. Language is 
for Fanon an incarnated vehicle of communication through which a living body tries 
to reach another one.  
As stated above, decolonizing language and the mind is also decolonizing the 
body, the senses, the tactile,  the visual, and the kinesthetic from all the obstacles that 
the colonial world puts to human interaction. The closing of Black Skin White Masks 
epitomizes the call to the decolonization of embodied subjectivities and human 
relations. After the warning of a latent explosion that opens the book, the ensuing 
serenity and the rejection of enthusiasm, the anger elicited by the racist episode, the 
tears of disappointment and self-deception due to Sartre and Négritude, and the 
subsequent revelation of reality, Fanon ends up with a prayer to his own body: 
 
Superiority? Inferiority? 
Why not simply trying to touch the other, feel the other, to reveal oneself to 
the other? 
Was my freedom not given to me in order to build the world of the You? 
At the end of this work, we would like the reader to feel, as we, the open 
dimension of consciousness. 
My final prayer: 
O my body, make me always a man who questions! (Fanon, 1952: 225; my 




The sealed body, historically constructed by racism and colonialism, is turned into 
a body that questions and reflects on a world that denies its capacity to do so, but the 
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 « le dieu dans la chair égaré » 
108
 « Supériorité? Infériorité? 
Pourquoi tout simplement ne pas essayer de toucher 
l'autre, de sentir l'autre, de me révéler l'autre ? 
Ma liberté ne m'est-elle donc pas donnée pour édifier 
le monde du Toi ? 
A la fin de cet ouvrage, nous aimerions que l'on sente 
comme nous la dimension ouverte de toute conscience. 
Mon ultime prière : 





body is also turned into a question, that is, an open site for thinking, feeling, and 
touching the other, of contact with the world. 
As Alice Cherki remarks, Fanon attempts to transmit the reader the subjective 
experience of a black in a white world, to communicate that which cannot be 
communicated with ideas (2011: 53). To render the subjective experience, an 
affectively extreme experience as it is lived requires expanding the language beyond 
the semantic and the conceptual, where a deeper understanding of lived things can be 
reached, and a new reflection can lead to action (Cherki, 2000; Jeanson, 1952).  In 
this sense, his editor in France, Francis Jeanson, remembers Fanon’s answer when 
asked for the clarification of a word or a passage:  
This sentence is unexplainable. When I write such things I try to touch the 
reader affectively, that is, irrationally, almost sensually. For me, words carry 
with them a load. I feel incapable of escaping from the sting of a word or the 





In the same letter Fanon alludes to Césaire’s way of breathing a new life into 
words as a reference for his writing; “as he does”, Fanon would like to be able, “when 
necessary, to sink beneath the staggering lava of words that have the color of frantic 
flesh” (Fanon quoted in Jeanson, 1952: 16; my translation
110
). For Fanon, Césaire’s 
use of language epitomizes the piercing power of words so that they can trespass 
flesh and blood and seep into the deepest corners of the reader. In Les damnés de la 
terre Fanon comments on the style of the colonized intellectual struggling with 
language and with the colonial experience. I will quote the passage at length since it 
condenses almost all the elements discussed so far: 
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 « Cette phrase est inexplicable. Je cherche, quand j’écris de telles choses, à toucher 
affectivement mon lecteur... c’est-à-dire irrationnellement, presque sensuellement. (…)Les mots ont 
pour moi une charge. Je me sens incapable d’échapper à la morsure d’un mot, au vertige d’un point 
d’interrogation.» 
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A spasmodic style, full of imagery since the image is the drawbridge that 
enables the unconscious energies to strew over the surrounding meadows. A 
nervous style, animated by rhythms, pierced by an eruptive life. A colored 
style too, bronzed, sunny and violent. This style, which once astonished 
Westerns, does not obey to a racial character, as some have said it. Above 
all, it conveys a corps-à-corps, it reveals the necessity of this man to inflict 
injury in himself, to actually bleed red blood, to free himself from a part of 
his being which already held the germs of putrefaction. A swift and painful 
combat, where inevitably the muscle had to replace the concept. (Fanon, 




Language is a constant theme in Fanon’s theater, both in its use as the author and 
in the characters themselves: In “The Drowning Eye”, one of the character shows that 
the existential struggle is not separated from language: 
Mere words, you say? 
But words the colour of pulsating flesh. 
Words the colour of mountains on heat. 
Of cities on fire. 
Of the resurrected dead. 
Words, yes, but battle flag words. 
Words like swords. (Fanon, 2018: 97) 
 
And in the tragedy of “The Parallel Hands”, the main character states, 
“But words avoid me  
The only tragedy, language beats my thought” (Fanon, 2018: 154),  
 
while at the same time, expresses the insufficiency of language devoid of action: 
“If I could …  





3.5 The colonial wound 
The textural character in Fanon’s use of language, and Alice Cherki’s observation 
above relating to his intention to communicate ideas that cannot be communicated 
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 « Style heurté, fortement imagé car l'image est le pont-levis qui permet aux énergies inconscientes 
de s'éparpiller dans les prairies environnantes. Style nerveux, animé de rythmes, de part en part habité 
par une vie éruptive. Coloré aussi, bronzé, ensoleillé et violent. Ce style, qui a en son temps étonné les 
occidentaux, n'est point comme on a bien voulu le dire un caractère racial mais traduit avant tout un 
corps à corps, révèle la nécessité dans laquelle s'est trouvé cet homme de se faire mal, de saigner 
réellement de sang rouge, de se libérer d'une partie de son être qui déjà renfermait des germes de 
pourriture. Combat douloureux, rapide, où immanquablement le muscle devait se substituer au 
concept. » 
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through words resonates with psychologist Julian Jaynes posture when he argues that 
“language is an organ of perception, not simply a means of communication.” Jaynes 
ascribes an important role to metaphors in the formation of the self and relate them to 
the expansion of the possibilities of reflection and action: “metaphors increase 
enormously our powers of perception of the world about us and our understanding of 
it, -and literally create new objects.” (2000:  50). Aimé Césaire, through the vivid 
language of Négritude and thus with human affirmation in mind, emphasizes the 
expansive power of the image and the metaphor, for it “overthrows all the laws of 
thought”(Césaire, 1996b: 142), it lays bare the absurdity of the world and the richness 
of life. He associates the image with the surpassing of patterns of thought, safe 
pathways of for thinking and the limitations set to the imagination. As opposed to 
judgement, the image unbridles identities, unleashes contradictions, and melts 
antinomies. As he puts it, the object of thought A does not have to be A, it can 
simultaneously be non-A, or neither of both. Thus, the image “ceaselessly sublates 
the perceived because the dialectics of the images transcends antinomies” (Césaire: 
1996b: 144).  
Fanon’s depiction of the experience of colonialism are not direct and unequivocal, 
it abounds in metaphors, images and similes that do not have a mere lyrical function. 
They rather attempt to delve where literal language does not reach. Filling his 
descriptions of colonialism with the perceptual and the nonverbal, alluding to light, 
color, temperature, taste, touch, texture, or tone, may do not offer the reader a 
straightforward understanding of colonialism. But as part of his explicit intention of 
trying to touch the reader affectively and sensually, metaphors provide a thread to be 




is tangible and can be communicated. Thereby metaphors play a role in the expansion 
of language and senses. 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s important work Metaphors We Live By (2003) 
exposes the ubiquity of metaphors in everyday experience and how they shape the 
understanding and the perception of abstract concepts. In this vein, there has been 
wide empirical research that analyzes the impact of metaphors and their transference 
to feelings and behaviour. A study carried out by psychologist Adam Fetterman et al. 
(2016) shows that those who tend to think and express themselves through metaphors 
are prone to meet more easily than literal or concrete thinkers the “representational 
challenge” (2016: 469) that experience poses. Metaphors, they argue, help to make 
sense of experience; people who use metaphor thinking present a sharper 
understanding of emotions, greater benefits from therapy, and a higher impact in their 
feelings and actions.  
Fanon draws from to a wide array of semantic fields in order to build the images in 
his work. Medical, and psychiatric terms (“the lysis of the morbid universe) lexicon 
of war (“arsenal of complexes”), theological references (“true hell”, “the fall from 
paradise”), or from the world of magic and spirituality, among others. Yet not all 
metaphors elicit the same kind of response. A psychological study led by Paul H. 
Thibodeau, Lera Boroditsky (2011) shows that the character of a metaphor has 
different impact on the reasoning and the action of the receiver. In the experiments, 
participants read reports of a city with high levels of criminality and were asked to 
provide solutions. A group read reports that described crime in the city with 
metaphors of animals such as a ‘‘wild beast preying on a city’’, whereas the reports 
of the other groups used metaphors of disease like crime infecting the city like a 




caging it” or “catching and jailing criminals and enacting harsher enforcement laws.” 
Alternatively, the second group suggested “investigating the source of the virus and 
implementing social reforms and prevention measures to decrease the spread of the 
virus” (2011:2).  
Illuminating how such results may be, Fanon does not offer a report addressed to a 
third person, an observer, in order to apply solutions to a distant situation. He instead 
attempts to embed the reader within a context that he presents as a plot, the dramatic 
work of the colonial situation whose characters have internalised alienation and 
dehumanization and built a series of fictions to deny, avoid and justify reality. Fanon, 
among others, used both kinds of metaphors. He uses “theriomorphic language” 
(Gordon, 2015: 50), to describe animals or beasts, and metaphors of monstrosity, in 
order to refer to the dehumanization of the black: “The language of the colonizer 
when he speaks of the colonized is a zoological language.” (Fanon, 1961: 45; my 
translation113) He also used psychiatric and medical language and images, although 
the line between the metaphor and the clinic in his use of medical terms is blurry and 
delicate. For instance, about the role of psychiatry and the psychological language, 
Ato-Sekyi-Otu (1996: 6-8) argues that such elements in Fanon’s work have rather a 
metaphoric character than actually expressing or reflecting psychological content and 
theories. I partly agree with Sekyi-Otu’s point, yet this partially may demand some 
explanation. Fanon’s language and images are built upon all the linguistic and 
rhetorical resources at his disposal. In this sense the anatomical, the psychiatric, the 
clinical, as well as theological language, surrealism, Négritude, the language of 
drama, or the lexicon of war, or spatial metaphors can be considered rhetorical 
devices that go beyond the rethorical, as it was stated above.  However, the limitation 
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of Sekyi-Otu’s stance may lie in that treating the psychiatric as rhetorical element 
risks fragmenting and driving a wedge between an important side of Fanon, his 
profession, and his political and social thought, and also between the affective, the 
somatic and the physiological impact on racism. When Fanon says that people revolt 
because for many reasons they cannot breath, he is talking as a doctor and as a 
political thinker, he is talking about the physiological act and metaphorically about 
the attacks of racism on life. This is something that Sekyi-Otu acknowledges and  
justifies it on the grounds that colonial alienation is “occasioned by the language of 
political experience” (1996: 8). Thinkers of colonialism and racism have frequently 
resorted to medical metaphors. For instance, Gloria Anzaldúa talks of the “colonial 
wound” (2007). Malcolm X in an interview compares racism in the United States to a 
knife stuck in the back and calls to “heal the wound”, to which he adds that “they 
[whites] won’t even admit the knife is there” (quoted in Ambar, 2014: 122). These 
two examples of metaphors illustrate some of the points mentioned above in a propos 
of the depth that the metaphor alludes to and its expansive possibilities. However, in 
Fanon, the use of medical and the psychological has a different quality than in those 
examples, also when it is used metaphorically. Psychiatry was for him not merely a 
day job, it provided him with a clinical lens, a medical sensitivity, a language and 
theoretical tools with and through which to raise questions and address the problems 
of suffering, as Gibson and Beneduce argue (2017).  Moreover, his social and clinical 
work is closely intertwined; they nourish each other and hence are not to be 
subordinated one to the other since both are part of a continuum where he introduces 
the clinical into the political sphere and conceives the medical as imbued by politics. 




and points to a close interplay between both –notably in racist societies where 
particular forms of mental suffering and the social context could not be dissociated.  
3.6 Method and drama 
However, in his important work Fanon and the Dialectics of Experience (1996) 
Sekyi-Otu offered a refined reading that reveals that the complexity and nuances in 
Fanon’s work also lie in the theretofore almost ignored relation between the formal 
and the epistemological. Concretely, the Ghanaian philosopher underscores the 
dramaturgical aspect not only within the different texts taken in isolation, but also, in 
his work as a whole, which for the author constitute “one dramatic dialectical 
narrative” (1996: 4), bound to its dialectical content. Whether this attempt to 
systematize Fanon’s work is an excessively elastic hermeneutic exercise is open to 
question. The important point for now from Sekyi-Otu’s approach is that linking form 
and content, shape and substance, that is, treating the aesthetical as an intrinsic 
element of his politics, methodology and epistemology, enables to cast new light on 
Fanon’s work. 
As Alejandro De Oto (2003) observes,  many readings of Fanon treat his language 
– usually deemed as tragic, fiery and passionate– as something that has to be set aside 
in order to reach to the depths of his ideas. Such readings are based on the premise 
that underneath his writing lies occluded a transparent and closed area of meaning 
that leads to what De Oto calls “utopian prescriptive project” (2003: 88) associated 
with certain political traditions. Similarly, Sekyi-Otu points out, readers of Fanon 
have tended to “bestow upon utterances in his texts the coercive finality of 
irrevocable propositions and doctrinal statements” (1996: 4). Both authors concur that 
such readings of Fanon search in him an authorial voice that sounds clear, univocal 




between surface and depth fails to consider that the themes on the surface run parallel 
to his ideas, the ways in which Fanon navigates through the linguistic and theoretical 
difficulties to offer an account of the colonial reality, and relatedly, how Fanon faces 
the heterogeneity and the complexity of such reality.  
The colonial discourse offers, and attempts to impose, a rigid and unequivocal 
world by means of obstinate ontologies, reductive conceptual categories and a rigid 
representation of the constitution of the colonial subject (De Oto and Katzer, 2014).  
The challenge that Fanon and other anticolonial face is how to offer a critique of the 
colonial world –a world that appears as fixed and definite– and how to think 
liberation, without anchoring it in the sealing and the certitudes of colonial discourses 
in which Fanon is embedded. Thus, the poetic is also linked to the disruption of 
colonial temporality and the historicity of the colonized subject addressed in the 
previous chapter. Through the drama Fanon enmeshes the colonized subject in 
colonial history and its closed forms of representation, it takes such representations to 
the extreme and exhausts its limits, and simultaneously contains the latency of 
resistance and invention (De Oto, 2003) 
 This compels Fanon not to subject categories, concepts and ideas to any 
mechanism of homogenization and closure. As De Oto points out, at the 
epistemological and political level his writing is itself a space of opening and 
instability (2003: 23).  Such opening is achieved by means of what De Oto identifies 
as a poetical and political ambivalence. By ambivalence he does not refer to 
detachment or not taking sides, rather he uses ambivalence to describe how Fanon 
holds the tensions between distinct theoretical and political views without clearly 




and the difficulty to provide a straightforward analysis of it, or, simply put, there is no 
instructions manual for the reality he was analyzing.  
3.7 Drama and theory 
Fanon’s view of violence cannot be understood without the poetic dimension of 
his writing, as we will see in further detail in Chapter 7 of the present dissertation. 
However, like other elements, Fanon’s theoretical and metatheoretical accounts can 
neither be detached from the poetic and dramatic elements. In this section I will 
illustrate the relation between the aesthetic and his critique and metacritique of 
psychoanalysis.  
By taking the dramatic element into consideration, the writing of Fanon acquires a 
choral quality that submerges his voice as an author within a plot of different first and 
second persons and third persons; he juxtaposes characters, presents conflicting 
voices, accumulates positions and attitudes, where irony, paradoxes and feigned 
contradictions contribute to offer different and simultaneous planes and perspectives, 
and bestows a motion-like quality within and to the “critical narrative”  (De Oto, 
2003; Sekyi-Otu, 1996). The choral and polyhedral nature of the work complicates 
distinguishing Fanon’s as a single, protagonist and authorial voice, it impedes to 
isolate statements as concluding, unambiguous and univocal, to bestow them a 
prescriptive character and a marked direction, and to take his positions as definitive 
instead of in constant reconsideration (Sekyi-Otu, 1996: 5). As Sekyi-Otu explains:   
the relationships between utterance and proposition, representation and truth, 
enacted practice and authorial advocacy, are rendered quite problematic. It 
means, furthermore, that an utterance or a representation or a practice we 
encounter in a text is to be considered not as a discrete and conclusive event, 
but rather as a strategic and self-revising act set in motion by changing 
circumstances and perspectives, increasingly intricate configurations of 





To emphasize the open and flexible character of Fanon’s writing does not amount 
to a relativistic hermeneutics – although it may lend itself to it – if relativism is 
understood as the lack of criteria for validity. This would be at odds with his aim of 
social transformation; if everything is valid, everything could also be invalid (Santos, 
2014).  Instead, what these qualities bespeak is the relativity inherent in Fanon’s 
work, that is, he does not provide an immediate final word on many topics. As 
Alejandro de Oto argues, such partiality and incompleteness serve as a 
“counterweight to the seduction of a final formula in order to construct mechanisms 
and figures of resistance and opposition” in a world that appears as closed and static 
(De Oto, 2003: 110-111). 
 As Lewis Gordon notes (2015: 98), in Fanon’s writing coexist two intertwined 
texts, with epistemic and political implications. There is the critical narrative of the 
tribulations of the black Caribbean, the Arab patient at the doctor, or the colonized 
under a colonial regime; and simultaneously, Fanon juxtaposes a self-critical and 
metacritical text that puts the focus on the critical narrative as an object of reflection. 
In Black Skin White Masks, this plurivocality reflects and critiques one of the 
elements of Euro-modernity stated in the previous chapter: the creation of a group of 
people identified as black, who are at the same time rejected by the world which has 
created them. Fanon follows the vicissitudes of the black Caribbean who, trapped in 
his or her black body, searches for admission in and by the white world. This would 
lead to a series of “failures” upon which Fanon puts the focus, “‘failures’ as we talk 
about an engine malfunctioning.” (Fanon, 1952: 21; my translation
114
) The alienated 
black assumes the negative meanings under which blackness has been constructed 
and fails in his or her attempts to achieve humanity by assimilating into whiteness 
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through language, culture, romantic relations, or pursuing formal education. The 
black also resorts to the affirmation and transvaluation of blackness of the Négritude 
movement.  Fanon acknowledges the potential of Négritude proposals for shifting 
from created to creator: “It is the white who creates the nègre. But it is the nègre who 
creates Négritude” (Fanon, 1959: 29; my translation
115
). But for Fanon this 
reinventive impulse is weakened, as we saw, t entails a reactive position towards 
colonial values and is entangled in colonial alienation.   
As mentioned above, to the critical narrative that constitutes the drama of the 
alienated black Caribbean, Fanon intertwines a self-questioning and meta-theoretical 
narrative. In the introduction Fanon declares that “we think that only a psychoanalytic 
interpretation of the black problem can reveal the anomalies of affect responsible for 
the structure of the complexes” (Fanon, 1952: 10; my translation
116
). Throughout the 
work, he establishes a conversation with Sigmund and Anna Freud, Lacan, Jung, 
Marie Bonaparte and Helene Deutsch or Octave Mannoni, among other psychiatrists. 
Fanon seems to guide the reader through the journey of the alienated black by 
seemingly assuming the arguments provided by different schools of psychoanalysis. 
However, the sentence above and the acts of ventriloquism of Fanon exemplify what 
Gordon calls “demonstration by failure” (1996: 76), wherein Fanon proceeds to 
disentangle, deny, and contradict what he had previously asserted. Throughout the 
book he proceeds to show how different psychoanalytic are insufficient to shed light 
on black alienation. 
Fanon makes reference to Lacanian psychoanalysis in three instances. First, in a 
long footnote on the theory of the mirror stage and how it would differ in regard to 
the Caribbean. In Europe, Fanon argues, the specular counterpart of the self is another 
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peer. Whereas in the Caribbean, he argues “historical and economic realities” shape 
the imaginary, not only differently than in Europe, but in delusive way to the extent 
that produce a chasm between the imaginary and the real. In his own words, “in the 
Antilles perception takes place on the level of the imaginary” (Fanon, 1952: 159; my 
translation
117
). The result is that in the Antilles the perception of the self and of one’s 
fellow is the same as in France, that is, white. The black Caribbean expects the other 
to perceive him or her as white.  The internalized image of the white and  of the white 
imaginary, or as it was mentioned in the previous chapter by means of Du Bois, 
double consciousness,  manifests itself in inferiority complex, fears, aggressiveness, 
Negrophobia, self-hatred, and diverse mechanisms of imitation and evasions. A case 
in point that he brings up is that of a black student of medicine who has the “hellish 
impression” (Fanon, 1952: 57) of not being recognized as a human in France. After 
joining the army as an auxiliary doctor he refuses to be transferred to a colonial unity 
because he wanted to be in charge of whites: 
As a boss he should be feared or respected. This is what he wanted, this is 
what he was looking for: to lead white people to have an attitude of blacks 
towards him. Thereby he took revenge of the imago that had always 
obsessed him: the scared nègre, trembling, humiliated in front of the white 




Second, Fanon also denies the centrality and “fecundity” of the Oedipus complex 
in the development of neuroses, and question its universality: “We too often forget 
than neurosis is not a constitutive component of human reality. Whether you like it or 
not, the Oedipus complex is unlikely to appear among nègres.” Relying on 
ethnographic works he asserts that it could be argued that, due to cultural and 
historical reasons, Oedipal neuroses are almost absent in Antillean families (Fanon, 
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1952: 149; my translation
119
). He also questions the Lacanian view of the family as 
“psychic circumstance and object” (Lacan, quoted in Fanon, 1952: 139; my 
translation
120
), where the psychic conflicts taking place in the adult life are incubated. 
The view that there is a correlation between the family and the social milieu in 
concerning values, organization and behavior towards authority cannot not be 
extrapolated to the colonies, Fanon argues, for “ a black child having grown up within 
a normal family will become abnormal with the slightest contact with the white 
world” (Fanon, 1952: 141; my translation
121
). The contact with the white world is 
what triggers colonial neurosis and trauma.  
Fanon agrees with Freud that a “determined Erlebnis” (1952: 142; my 
translation
122
), in this case the contact with the white world, lies at the cause of 
trauma. However, Fanon disagrees with Freud in two important points. First, the 
traumatic experience in colonial and racist settings for Fanon is not triggered by a 
single event or a shocking episode, but it is caused by repetition (Bird-Pollan, 2015: 
136). Second, Fanon differs from Freud in the role of a pillar of psychoanalysis, the 
unconscious. Whereas for the early Freud trauma is repressed and stored in the 
unconscious, for Fanon the colonial trauma is not covert and contained, but takes 
place in plain sight and in the everyday life: 
 the racial drama is played out in the open, the black has no time ‘to make it 
unconscious’. (…)  The nègres’ superiority or inferiority complex or the 
feeling of equality are conscious. These feelings constantly traverse them. 
Blacks embody their drama. There is none of the affective amnesia that 
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In chapter four, he discusses the work of Octave Mannoni who had diagnosed an 
inherent disposition of Malagasy people towards their colonization on the basis of 
their pre-colonial inferiority feeling and a dependency complex towards Europeans. 
Mannoni proposes to explore the unconscious life of Malagasy through their dreams. 
But for Fanon “the discoveries of Freud are of no use.” (1952; 101- 102; my 
translation
124
) In a psychoanalytic interpretation of the recurrent appearance in the 
dreams of Malagasy children of black bulls chasing them, or the presence of armed 
Senegalese soldiers, the symbolic would stand in the way of the real. Instead, he 
demands to “place the dream in its time (…) and in its place” (Fanon, 101-102; italics 
in the original; my translation
125
), that is, in the concrete time and place of colonial 
violence which, he asserts, had eighty thousand natives killed (Fanon, 1952: 101). In 
this light, the phobic or fear inducing character of blackness is not to be found in 
“unconscious neurotic dispositions” (Fanon, 1952: 104; my translation
126
), but in the 
presence of Senegalese troops at the service of the colonial enterprise. In the dreams 
of the Malagasy children the black bulls do not represent a phallic symbol but an 
actual chase, the black men do not symbolize ancestry and “the rifle of the Senegalese 
soldier is not a penis but a real rifle Lebel 1916.” (1952: 104; my translation
127
).   
 As Gordon points out, Fanon’s assessment of psychonalysis is phenomenological, 
by exposing that in the colonial context psychoanalysis confounds the symbolic and 
the real Fanon shows the theoretical inadequacy of psychoanalysis to assess colonial 
phenomena from a perspective that transcends its own presuppositions (1996). The a 
priori application of an interpretative framework based on universal categories, as in 
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Mannoni’s analysis, inverts cause and consequence with the resulting pathologization 
of Malagasy psychology. His demand to consider the contextual and socio-historical 
elements of the pathology entails the provincialization of psychoanalysis.  Yet Fanon 
does not advocate for an ontological difference of the black psyche or black suffering, 
neither seeks the solution in mere cultural attunement or the adjustment of 
psychoanalysis to the socio-cultural context.  As Maldonado-Torres puts forward this 
is not a relativist position: 
Fanon is not satisfied with only indicating that what these thinkers say may 
be valid ‘there’ in the territory of the colonizer and not ‘here’ in the territory 
of the colonized. He wants to show that what happens ‘here’ is related to 
what happens ‘there,’ and conversely as well. This conceptualization 
demands new and more sophisticated theories and critical ventures. (2008: 
99) 
 
Referring to psychoanalysis Fanon states that “reality, that is our only resource, 
impedes such operations” (Fanon, 1952: 148; my translation
128
). That is, besides the 
aforementioned Eurocentrism and the production of problem people by 
psychoanalysis, Fanon’s critique implies that colonial and racist alienation exceeds 
psychoanalytical interpretations and reductive understandings of the psyche and 
individual approaches to psychic phenomena at the expense of the social and the 
political. For him “the real source of the conflict” is located in the social structure 
(Fanon, 1952: 98; my translation
129
). In other words, racist societies are pathogenic 
sites. Therefore, the psychiatric practice should face the double task of making 
conscious a historical and internalized drama, and eliciting action towards social 
change (Fanon, 1952: 97). It is in societal structures and institutions where the focus 
is to be put on, since “‘the black becomes abnormal’ because of white society’s 
internalization of its image of the black.” (Gibson and Beneduce: 2017: 82). For such 
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society the black problem is “the problem of the increase of blacks, of the black 
peril.” (Fanon: 1952: 195; my translation
130
). As Gibson and Beneduce (2017) recall, 
Fanon’s analysis resonates with Richard Wright’s words to Sartre. To the question of 
what was the “black problem” in the United States Wright answered that there was no 
black problem but a white problem.  
Like Du Bois referred to the problem of the color-line, Fanon observes that the 
problem is not limited to those “blacks living among whites”, but also those 
“exploited, enslaved and despised by a colonial and capitalist society that happens to 
be white” (1952: 195; my translation
131
). As we have seen, in order to diagnose racist 
alienation and to assess its role in the formation of the subjectivity of the colonized 
Fanon develops a sociogenetic approach that encompasses the relation of  the subject, 
understood as embodied consciousness, with the social world and its historical 
constitution, including the generation of meanings, socio-cultural elements, the 
political experience, relations of power, economic structures and ideological 
formations.   
In sum, the “drama [that] is played out every day in colonized countries” (Fanon, 
1952: 142; my translation
132
) has its correlate in the text in the simultaneous 
metatheoretical narrative. Or, paraphrasing Gordon, to the dilemmas of the colonized 
facing and questioning the everyday life marked by colonialism and racism Fanon 
juxtaposes the “unveiling of an unveiling”, where the metacritique questions and 
illuminates the act of questioning itself (Gordon, 2015: 98).  
This double layer in the text has a methodological and epistemic role, and also a 
pedagogical and political function. Exposing the embeddedness of theory within the 
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political and historical dynamics of colonialism and racism does not amount to 
equating theory with colonialism and rejecting theory in toto. Instead, this initiates 
the search for other forms of theorizing, of producing knowledge and of transforming 
the theoretical knowledge at hand.  
David Macey (2001) argues that Fanon did not properly understand 
phenomenology, Marxism or psychoanalysis.  Yet, this unidirectional view omits that 
how Fanon’s theorizing is also an intervention in these fields. In line with Hourya 
Bentouhami-Molino’s remarks it is important to notice that Fanon does not merely 
borrow, “he reconstructs, and therefore disrupts the premises of the scientific fields 
from which he is supposed to borrow” (2014: 38). The dialogues with Freud, Lacan 
or Mannoni addressed above do not entail the rejection of psychoanalysis, but its 
expansion and reformulation. The same could be argued with his dialogue with Sartre 
or Merleau-Ponty on the corporeal schema. Theorizing the experience of the alienated 
black and their concrete social and political situation, for which the disciplines and 
theories were not directly conceived, requires the displacements of their 
presuppositions, which, in return broadens the fields and bestows them with a 
political dimension for the study of racism. Thus, instead of measuring how Fanon 
follows Freud, Merleau-Ponty or Marx, how he is positioned with respect to their 
respective traditions, or what he owes to them, a more perceptive question, in order to 
both understand Fanon and to apprehend the possibilities that his work offers, would 
be to ask what Fanon does with and to psychoanalysis, phenomenology, or Marxism, 
among others (Bentouhami-Molino, 2014: 40).  Thus, Fanon’s metacritique of 
psychoanalysis and phenomenology is both psychoanalytical and phenomenological 
itself, in the sense that he analyzes their failures, and questions the presuppositions 




Another form in which the political traverses Fanon’s poetics is his view of 
“politicization” as the invention of souls: “to politicize is to open the spirit, to awaken 
the spirit, to put the spirit in the world. It is, as Césaire said, ‘to invent souls’.” 
(Fanon, 1961: 187; my translation
133
) The words of Césaire which Fanon recalls are 
from his conference “L’homme de culture et ses responsabilités”. In this essay, 
Césaire takes on the aforementioned issue of the colonial separation between the 
creator and the creature, and the function of aesthetic creation and the “man of 
culture” in activating the consciousness of the people. As he states, in colonial 
societies “there is not only a hierarchy of master and servant. There is also a 
hierarchy of creator and consumer.” (Césaire, 1959: 118; italics in the original; my 
translation
134
) Hence, the disruptive quality that Césaire attributes to every creative 
act, for “every creation, just because it is creation, is participation in the struggle for 
liberation” (1959: 117; my translation
135
).  Césaire, in a reference to Stalin, writes 
that “some might have said that the writer is an engineer of the soul”. However, he 
insists on the different nature of the political and pedagogical work that separates the 
technician from the artist: “we are propagators of souls, multipliers of souls, and, if 




Fanon’s adaptation of inventing souls as politicization besides the cultural 
encompasses the political, the pedagogical, and the anthropological, in an educative 
work that exceeds a goal oriented or instrumental understanding of political education 
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 « politiser c'est ouvrir l'esprit, c'est éveiller l'esprit, mettre au monde l'esprit. C'est, comme le 
disait Césaire, « inventer des âmes ». 
134
  « Dans la société coloniale, il n’y a pas seulement une hiérarchie maître et serviteur. Il y a 
aussi, implicite, une  hiérarchie créateur et consommateur. »  
135
 « toute création, parce qu'elle est création, est participation à un combat libérateur. » 
136
 « Certains ont pu dire que l'écrivain est un ingénieur des âmes.  (…) nous sommes des 




as instruction, bringing information or leading people’s thought in a specific 
direction.  
to politicize is to open the spirit, to awaken the spirit, to put the spirit in the 
world. It is, as Césaire said, ‘to invent souls. To politicize the masses is not, 
cannot be to deliver a political speech. Political education means to persist 
feverously in making understand the masses that everything depends on 
them; that if we stagnate it is their responsibility and that if we move 
forward it is also because of them, that there is no demiurge, that there is no 
illustrious man responsible for everything, but that the demiurge is the 
people themselves and the magic hands are ultimately only the hands of the 
people (Fanon, 1961: 187; my translation137) 
 
 
Political education, which involves “enlarging the brain of the people” and also 
working on spirit and soul, is directed towards enlivening the means and setting the 
conditions so that people can edify a world where power is organized and circulates 
in a way that improves the life conditions of humans rather than at the service of 
control, domination and abuse
138
. In short, the notion of power with which Fanon is 
concerned and is reflected in his poetic, is closer to empowerment. 
There is, however, another side of Fanon’s view of the pedagogical related to the 
poetical, the political and his conception of the human being that is implicit 
throughout his work, and that Paulo Freire grasped and elaborated further. This aspect 
points paradoxically to the absence of explanation of his methodological decisions. In 
general, Fanon barely explains his methodological movements, or conceptual 
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 Or, politiser c'est ouvrir l'esprit, c'est éveiller l'esprit, mettre au monde l'esprit. C'est, comme le 
disait Césaire, « inventer des âmes. Politiser les masses ce n'est pas, ce ne peut pas être faire un 
discours politique. C'est s'acharner avec rage à faire comprendre aux masses que tout dépend d'elles, 
que si nous stagnons c'est de leur faute et que si nous avançons, c'est aussi de leur faute, qu'il n'y a 
pas de démiurge, qu'il n'y a pas d'homme illustre et responsable de tout, mais que le démiurge c'est le 
peuple et que les mains magiciennes ne sont en définitive que les mains du peuple.»(…) «rendre 
humain » 
138
 Fanon’s view of power and his reference to magic, soul and spirit parallels a notion of power as 
understood in the ancient Egypt or KMT. As Gordon notes, predating Latin notions such as potis or 
autoritas, the ancient word pHty means “godlike strength” and refers to the type of power of the 
authority, the kings. Yet prior to that there is the word HqAw or Heka, “which activates the ka 
(sometimes translated as ‘soul, spirit,’ or, in a word, ‘magic’) that manifests reality.” Heka is a 
precondition also for pHty, and therefore, also for gods’ creative force; the former is thus a form of 
power that enables the realization of things. Gordon defines this enhancing and life generating kind of 
power “as the ability with the means to make things happen.” (Gordon, 2017: 41) We will elaborate 




decisions; as stated, the way he elaborates his argument demands reading what he 
says alongside with what he does. And as much as he attempts to reach the reader 
through and beyond argumentation, this absence of explanation leaves the reader a 
space to build his own understanding. As Paget Henry notes, about his “creative and 
synthetic strategies Fanon does not really speak. He leaves us completely on our own, 
and at the mercy of our own creative and synthetic capabilities.” (2006:20) In other 
words, the lack of explicitness in his writing, which results from the combination of 
poetics with psychiatry, philosophy, sociology or experiential vignettes, responds to 
the rejection of a paternalistic relation with the reader, who is treated as an agent 
actively thinking and bestowing meaning, in line with his constant concern to make 
human beings “actional” (Fanon, 1952: 151). 
Conclusion 
The next chapter deals with another aspect of Fanon, his earliest psychiatric 
writings and his medical work in France. However, the concerns that animate his 
clinical writing and practice are not unrelated to those previously covered. As stated, 
the psychiatric and the political aspects of Fanon do not follow parallel paths, but 
intersecting ones. His doctoral dissertation shares elements covered in Black Skin 
White Masks. In the former he departs from a clinical case of a degenerative disease 
in order to question the distinction between neurology and psychiatry, and  above all 
to interrogate understandings of the patient as a humannot as a physiological body or 
a mind but as an agent and a social and multimensional being in its and to produce 
medical knowledge that uncovers rather than obstructs the agency of the patient. This 
enables to discern the historical and social aspects of the disease. This has also 
implications at the level of diagnostics and also for the face to face relation between 




important article in Fanon’s work as it connects aspects addressed in the dissertation, 
with the problem of racism in the consultation room, the expansion of the clinical to 
society as addressed in Black Skin White Masks, and also with the problems that he 
would later face in his medical practice in Algeria regarding the complicity of 
medicine and racism. 
This chapter has focused on Fanon as a writer, but he also paid attention to the 
other side of the communicative relation, the listener. The side of Fanon as a listener 
is mostly related to his psychiatric work, in which language is a central aspect, and is 
related to a different set of problems. Putting the patient at the center is one of 
fundamental tenets of institutional psychotherapy, an avant-garde approach 
elaborated in the psychiatric hospital of Sint-Alban which sought to create the 
conditions for the speech of the patient, enhance its agency, humanity and freedom. 
 




Chapter 4. A medicine of the human 
Without the recognition of the human value of madness, it is man 
himself who disappears. (Francesc Tosquelles, 2014) 
 
Introduction 
This chapter deals with Fanon’s earliest concerns with the need to humanize 
medicine and psychiatric practice. Fanon’s concerns with a humanistic medicine had 
started in his doctoral dissertation. Therein, very subtly he questioned the 
neuropsychiatric positivism of his department and the epistemological and 
disciplinary assumptions of theories of mental health. Yet, the underlying problem 
was the view of the patient as a physical or a psychic entity, as a mere body or as a 
mind. Through examining a hereditary neurodegenerative disease Fanon also 
questions the anthropological assumptions, the understanding of the human being, 
and the importance of the social and historical dimension in the disease.  
In “The North African Syndrome”, Fanon links concerns addressed in his 
dissertation concerning the understanding of the patient as a psycho-physical entity 
with the problems of racism is society and in the clinic. In such setting, the patient is 
not a patient but the North African patient. This raises a different set of problems. 
Fanon links migration, citizenship, exclusion with the clinic and “the politics of 
diagnostics” (Gibson and Beneduce, 2017). Fanon questions the medical attitudes, 
episteme, and structures that take a toll on the patient, and against a human doctor-
patient relationship. This also implies a different approach to disease in relation to the 
society 
The two year stay with  François Tosquelles at the Hospital of Saint-Alban was an 
important formative experience and at the same time a confirmation of the concerns 
that had guided his writings in the doctoral dissertation and in “The North African 




site of a pioneering experience to reconceive the theoretical approach to mental 
illness and the practices of mental care. Mental illness was conceived in its physical, 
social, political and somatic aspects, and the treatment of mental disorders had to start 
by transforming the psychiatric hospital itself, considered as a sick and generator of 
sickness itself. I have structured this chapter as follows: 
The first section reads Fanon’s dissertation, not exhaustively, but in light of Black 
Skin White Masks. As stated, the latter was initially submitted as the doctoral 
dissertation but was rejected. Fanon wrote a second dissertation on a different topic 
and with a different methodological approach. But the obvious differences reveal 
some commonalities when one considers both as interventions in social in human 
sciences, as attempts to build a social science that liberates the human. In his doctoral 
dissertation, among other things Fanon questions the epistemological and 
anthropological foundations of neuropsychiatry that conceive mental disease as a 
damage in the body or in the psyche. 
The second section addresses an important article in Fanon’s work, “The North 
African Syndrome”. Through an ethnographic account of the consultation room and 
the relations between doctor and patient delves into the relation between the clinic 
and the wider social oppression in which it is part, at the level of attitudes, 
epistemology, and the structures of the hospital setting. The problems of the North 
African migrant do not adjust to the medical model and the North African becomes 
itself the problem. This requires a whole shift in the ethical, social and political 
understanding of the clinic, and of disease.  
  The third section covers the influence of Francesc Tosquelles, a committed 
antifascist and a decisive figure in the history of European psychiatry, on Fanon 




the Spanish Civil War, his stay in the concentration camp of Septfonds, and 
especially in the psychiatric hospital in Saint-Alban during the Vichy France. In 
Saint-Alban, Tosquelles and Jean Oury gathered a transdisciplinary group which 
transformed the treatment of mental health by questioning the organization, the 
structure, and the hierarchies within the psychiatric hospital. Many of the aspects 
developed in Saint-Alban had an impact on Fanon’s philosophy and psychiatric 
thought. Although at the same time, his stay with Tosquelles also served as a 
confirmation of the questioning of the clinic and his understanding of mental disease 
that he had advanced in “The North African Syndrome” and in his medical 
dissertation.  
4.1 The patient as agent 
As stated, Black Skin White Masks was submitted as Fanon’s doctoral dissertation, 
and was rejected on the basis of not fitting the methodological, the thematic, the 
disciplinary boundaries and the implicit political concerns of the field. Parallel to this 
work Fanon had been researching on patients with Friedreich’s ataxia, a rare 
hereditary disease derived from the degeneration of the nervous system. Thus, he 
submitted a second dissertation with the title Mental alterations, character 
modifications, psychic disorders and intellectual deficit in spinocerebellar 
heredodegeneration: A case of Friedreich’s ataxia with delusions of possession, 
which deals with the mental disorders related to such disease. The topic of the 
dissertation, its empirical approach and disciplinary delimitation seemed to be best 
suited to fulfill the academic requirements of the field, and the intellectual 
environment of the department. However, what Fanon actually does is to skip such 




Despite the disparity of topics, the perspective adopted, and the methodological 
orientation there is a singular continuity between both works. This continuity is 
manifested in a twofold way. First, at the level of certain theoretical elements and 
analytical positions that Fanon adopted and were to remain central in Fanon’s clinical 
and political thought throughout his work, such as the clear opposition that he 
establishes between madness and freedom, the importance of embodiment, sociality, 
history, language, temporality, or the socio-cultural in their relation to subjectivity for 
the study of alienation. Second, and more important for the scope of this chapter, 
there is a significant continuity at the level of the underpinning question that guides 
both works, that is how to study human beings in a way that it can contribute to set 
them free, instead of turning them into an object.  
In Black Skin White Masks he does so by exposing the limitations of human 
sciences, and their imbrication with their colonial world, to study the human being 
through the constraint condition of black people under racism and colonial 
dehumanization (Maldonado-Torres, 2009). In other words, he explored how to study 
the black and the colonized without turning them into a problem. In his dissertation 
he addresses the question of how to study and treat a patient suffering from hereditary 
spinocerebellar degeneration when disciplinary, epistemic and anthropological 
presuppositions of neurology and psychiatry lead to conceive the patient as an object. 
However, in contrast to the transdisciplinary work of his first book, his dissertation 
apparently remains within the confines of neuropsychiatry and positivism to issue a 
philosophical critique from within of his own medical training, and the limitations 
that entail looking at illness without considering the social and historical dimensions 




His research on Friedreich’s ataxia enables him to enter one of the main debates 
concerning the distinction between neurology and psychiatry and the relation between 
neurological and mental disorders. Fanon distances himself from the debate between 
the organogenesis and the psychogenesis of mental illnesses. The former locates the 
origin of illnesses in the altered physiology of the patient whereas for the latter 
mental illnesses start in the psyche. Fanon does not reject a priori any of the positions 
but considers both stances insufficient and the debate, unproductive. At the heart of 
neurological and psychiatric models, Fanon observes, lies a conception of the human 
being either as an organic mechanism or as an independent psyche, which has 
significant implications for the understanding of what illness means and, thus, for the 
identification of the problems of the patient. By bringing to the foreground a 
relational conception of the human, and hence what illness means socially and 
historically, he complicates notions of symptoms, lesions, and mental health or illness 
premised on purely organic or psychic causality. Yet, what is at stake in such 
theoretical debate is the character of the relation between the psychiatrist and the 
patient at the therapeutic moment, either a relationship based on a conception of the 
patient as an actor or as an object. 
At the outset Fanon notes that neurological illnesses such as paralysis can be 
frequently accompanied by psychiatric symptoms. In those cases, the tendency in 
medicine is to look for “causal or mechanistic explanations” (Fanon, 2018: 206) in 
order to create a nosological entity, that is, a unified category that gathers the 
neurological and psychiatric symptoms of the illness.  In the case of Friedreich’s 
ataxia, the rare presence and the disparity of the types of mental disorders complicates 
any attempt to establish a law-like relation between both types of disorders. This 




derived from organic illnesses, and also whether the very division between the 
neurological and the psychiatric is actually appropriate to account for the illness: 
At a time when neurologists and psychiatrists are striving to define their 
disciplines as pure sciences, that is to say a pure neurology and a pure 
psychiatry, it is good practice to set among the debate a group of 
neurological diseases that are also accompanied by psychic disorders, and to 
ask the legitimate question about the essence of these disorders. (Fanon, 
2018: 206) 
  
In his view, the reason that this century old problem has turned into a crisis of 
knowledge lies in “today’s very powerful urgency towards specialization, and thus 
towards boundaries.” He continues:  
What are the respective limits of neurology and of psychiatry? What is a 
neurologist? What is a psychiatrist? In such a situation what, then, becomes 
of the neuropsychiatrist?  Far from proposing a solution – I believe a life of 
study and observation is required. (Fanon, 2018: 247; own italics) 
 
These are not rhetorical questions, neither is Fanon’s answer elusive. Nigel Gibson 
and Roberto Beneduce argue that Fanon was claiming for the autonomy of psychiatry 
in relation to neurology (2017:41). In my view, Fanon takes a different direction. His 
requirement to study and observe is a call to put the problem to be addressed at the 
center and to part company from the loyalty that identitarian understandings of 
disciplines demand. Otherwise, if neurology, psychiatry or neuropsychiatry function 
as discrete, complete and autonomous what will fall by the wayside are the 
pathologies of the patient who is not aligned to their models or methods and what will 
remain is the patient as an obstacle. As we further develop, Fanon shows the 
limitations of reducing the patient to an object, devoid of the human element; 
likewise he now proposes a relationship between the studier and the studied, the 
physician and the patient, as humans.   
Fanon offers an historical overview of the illness first described by the neurologist 




degeneration reported the existence of motor debility affecting the musculature, 
hearing and vision without presenting psychic alterations. Throughout the medical 
literature different psychic impairment are observed in scarce proportions; between 
1894 and 1949 the reported mental disorders consisted in language disorders, 
progressive dementia, hallucinatory psychosis, delirium, schizophrenia, affective 
lability, sudden negativity, apathy and inattention, bouts of rage, irritability, or 
anxiety. Despite their rarity and variability, theorists such as Bleuler and Walder paid 
considerable attention to the mental alterations and have defined the mental problems 
associated to Friedreich’s disease as a “psycho-organic syndrome” in their attempts to 
systematize and delimit the syndrome (Fanon, 2018: 212).   
Fanon warns that these attempts to delimitate the illness do not enable to draw 
categorical conclusions. Yet, more important, is the direction he takes when he 
wonders whether the low rate of psychiatric disorders obeys to the neurologist’s lack 
of interest in psychiatric symptoms and the disattention to the mental state of the 
patient (Fanon, 2018:214). Fanon poses thus the question whether the very 
compartmentalization of medical science is blinding the scientist, the physician or the 
therapist from the problems of the patient. In short, what falls by the wayside is the 
patient as a human. Thereby he attempts to shift the orientation of the issue: from a 
conception of medicine where the pathologization of the patient lurks when the 
disease does not fit the established diagnostic framework, to another where the 
problems of the patient require expanding the interrogation beyond the clinical to 
include the historical, social and institutional aspects of illness.  
This leads Fanon to question what illness means beyond purely anatomical or 
psychic understandings. Conjointly, he challenges the naturalistic view of the patient, 




neurological and psychiatric models. In other words, even in the case of a hereditary 
disease from organic origin Fanon exposes the insufficiency of naturalistic and 
empiricist categories to account for the whole range of human experience, and 
therefore for the aetiology, pathogeny and treatment of mental illness. First, he 
underscores the necessity of considering the temporal dimension of illness. Second, 
he focuses on the intersubjective and the social dimension of the illness. In the first 
case, the lack of understanding of the problem is due to  
the fact that our thinking is scarcely able to liberate itself from the anatomo-
clinical. We think in terms of organs and focal lesions when we ought to be 
thinking in terms of functions and disintegrations. Our medical view is 
spatial, where it ought to become more and more temporal. (Fanon, 2018: 
215) 
 
For Fanon the heart of the problem is the underlying Cartesian division between 
body and soul. In this view, neurological and mental disorders, are unrelated, or, at 
best, “contingent coincidence” (Fanon, 2018: 215). Attempts to exclusively localize 
spatially mental disorders lead for Fanon to a blind alley, as the cases of Parkinson or 
multiple sclerosis with mental modifications that he reports also attest. Alternatively, 
supported by the work of neurologists Von Monakow and Mourgue and by Gestalt 
theorists, he advocates for a holistic view of the human, wherein the physical and the 
mental are not dissociated but intertwined; for Kurt Goldstein, argues Fanon, “no 
absolute, local symptom exists” (Fanon, 2018: 258). In that vein, Julián de 
Ajuriaguerra and Henri Hécaen argue that Henri Ey’s excessive attention to and 
valorization of the symptom misleads the direction of the problem, for “the symptom 
must be divested of all fixity” (Fanon, 2018: 258). Ajuriaguerra and Hécaen warn 
against confusing lesion and function. Contra Ey, they posit that a neurological 
alteration is a global alteration, which requires shifting the attention to the 




Von Monakow and the Gestalt school prioritize the study of disease from the 
perspective of temporality instead of the spatial localization of pathological 
phenomena. Fanon associates the hormè with Henri Bergson’s idea of èlan vital, both 
the neurologist and the French philosopher put time and the creative force as the 
organizing principle of life at the center of their thought. For Von Monakow, the 
hormè or vital impulse is the creative energy that contains the memory of the species 
and drives them towards the future (Harrington, 1999). According to Von Monakow’s 
chronogenetic perspective, instincts must be subordinated to the hormè, for pathology 
occurs when this relation is inverted. Fanon assents with him that “the human is 
human to the extent that he is totally turned towards the future” (2018: 257). Thinking 
illness in relation to time is a constant element in his clinical analysis, which, as we 
saw, he extends and endows it with a political character in his analysis of racist and 
colonial alienation.  
Secondly, Fanon adds that it is necessary to go beyond the individual and the 
family levels and take into consideration the social implications of the disease, that is, 
to examine the impact of organic disorders on the patient’s social relations and how it 
in turn affects the mental equilibrium. By taking into consideration that the patient is 
a human being whose actions are embedded in time and within a world of others, 
“[h]umanity loses its mechanistic character. It is no longer passively moved. It 
discovers itself as actor.” (Fanon, 2018: 218)  In contrast to an atomistic and 
substantive view of the human, a relational conception of the human pervades 
Fanon’s thought since his earliest writings. He affirms that it is through the encounter 
with another fellow human that the self is constituted. Hence one cannot speak of the 
human as a fact, but “a mosaic of facts”, bereft of all stability and substance:  
A human being always exists in the process of …. He or she is here with 




her action. This means that the human being, as an object of study, demands 
a multi-dimensional investigation (Fanon, 2018: 218). 
 
Fanon criticized neuropsychiatric approaches that conceived the body as the 
“anatomo-physiological” (2018: 219), that is, the alpha and omega of the approach to 
health and disease. Instead, he points out, one has to consider the relation between the 
body and the ego and how the limited motricity has an impact on the appropriation of 
the body by the personality: 
the personality no longer appropriates muscular activity, the individual has 
the feeling of passively submitting to walking movements; he is not the one 
who walks, but instead he is, as he says, ‘transported as if I was in a car’. 
The result of this deficit is that the notion of the ego, of the personality, gives 
out to such a point, the patient says, that if he did not stop, he would lose 
consciousness. (Fanon, 2018: 231) 
 
Yet, the corporeal is also a site of relations, and a dimension that makes human 
interaction possible. In other words, when looking at a person who suffers from 
degenerative paralysis, Fanon does not conceive his or her body as a thing to be 
examined, but as a layer of an actor whose outward orientation to form and engage in 
a web of social relations is cramped.  
It is thus difficult to admit that a disruption ending in deficits in the stock of 
relationships would nonetheless leave a consciousness normal. In other 
terms, a young man of eighteen, seeing the progressive limitation of his field 
of action, cannot conserve an intact psyche. I would have liked to show the 
step-by-step progress of this limitation, which is first biological, then 
psychic, and lastly metaphysical. (Fanon, 2018: 19) 
 
In this early work he outlined some of the key elements of his view of alienation: 
the relation between the muscular and personality and hence, to movement and the 
social world. In short, the shrinkage of the person’s possibility of acting in time 
starting at the corporeal level. The social dimension plays a key role in his 
understanding of mental disease. Not only in the matter of the relations of the patient 




Fanon analyzes then seven cases where the disease is accompanied by mental 
disorders, which are attributed to a mechanical origin. Nigel Gibson and Roberto 
Beneduce underscore the Kuhnian character of this methodological move. By treating 
these mental alterations as anomalies Fanon puts into question the adequacy of the 
existing paradigm and exposes the necessity of further analysis on the relationship 
between neurology and psychiatry (2017: 39). He describes six relevant cases from 
the medical literature. Four of them consist of spinocerebellar heredodegeneration, 
followed by two cases of Friedreich’s ataxia. The seventh one was personally 
observed by him. It addresses the case of Odile, a patient suffering from Friedrich’s 
ataxia with “delusions of possession and hysterical structure” (Fanon, 2018: 243) 
which were observed for the first time in the literature of the disease. Three of Odile’s 
brothers had died from paralysis and presented similar neurological problems, but 
none of them showed mental problems. Fanon provides a detailed description of her 
family and personal background, and of the evolution of the disease. He also carefully 
describes the evolution of the mental disorders, which he points out may have 
emerged because of “the atmosphere” (Fanon, 2018: 244) of the asylums in which 
she was hospitalized, and the responses of the patient to the psychiatrists.  
Then, Fanon delves into the scope of psychiatry and neurology by examining the 
relation of the psychic with the neurological through the theoretical debates between 
Henri Ey, Jacques Lacan, Kurt Goldstein, Hector Ajuriaguerra and somatic medicine. 
Fanon, as we said, leaves the debate purportedly open and does not reject but neither 
totally concurs with any of their overall arguments; indeed he had already distanced 
himself from all of them considering that he had already elaborated his sociogenic 
approach to mental illness. Beyond the debate between organogenesis and 




also in terms of understanding how Fanon built up his own psychiatric and social 
thought by adopting, rejecting and transforming different aspects of their thought. 
However, dedicating an analysis of these theoretical debates is beyond the scope of 
this chapter. Instead, what I want to emphasizes, besides the already mentioned point 
of intersections with Black Skin White Masks, is that this dissertation represented a 
first interrogation of the epistemological and anthropological basis of neuropsychiatry 
in the search for a medicine that approaches the patient not as a passive object to be 
scrutinized but as a human and, thus, as an agent. These concerns would be taken to 
the actual doctor-patient encounter in the consultation room, to which we now turn.  
4.2 The North African Syndrome 
“The North African Syndrome”, was the product of another parallel research he 
was undertaking and became the first work that he published, in early 1952. This is an 
important article in Fanon’s work for several reasons. First, because of its “strange 
currency”, as Alice Cherki notes (2011: 38; my translation
139
); second, because it 
blends the political and sociohistorical aspects of racism outlined Black Skin White 
Masks with his concerns for a humanistic medicine exposed in his doctoral 
dissertation about the obstacles posed by science itself that preclude a human 
relationship between the physician and the patient; and third, because it anticipates 
the imbrication of medicine with oppression that Fanon would address, although to a 
lesser extent, in Saint-Alban, and would definitely inform his practice in Algeria.  
The setting of the dramatic ethnography that Fanon offers is the consulting room 
and the face to face encounter between the medical staff and the North African male 
migrant in France. Yet the backdrop of the critique points also beyond the room, 
namely, to the origin of the attitudes and practices in medical schools and health 
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institutions, and their role in the reproduction of racism. The article opens by posing 
the question of responsibility in light of the dehumanization of the North African: 
It is a common saying that man is constantly questioning himself, and he 
would deny himself were he to pretend he is no longer so. Yet it is possible 
to describe the basic dimension of all human problems. More precisely, all 
the problems posed on the subject of man can be reduced to this question: 
“Have I not, because of what I have done or failed to do contributed to the 
devaluation of human reality”? The question could also be formulated 
thusly: “Have I in all circumstances reclaimed and called forth the human 




The North African migrant attends the consultation room with a disease that 
puzzles the medical personal. He feels pain everywhere, he says that he is going to 
die. The doctor addresses the patient with a condescending tone, in petit-nègre. He 
examines, he poses questions. Yet what he hears is vagueness, lack of precision, an 
odd conception of time, and elusiveness to his questions. The doctor finally 
establishes an approximate diagnostic and treatment, but the patient returns soon after 
the visit and before finishing the prescribed treatment. The doctor loses patience, the 
patient does not listen. He is cloistered in his own pain, he is an incarnated pain. The 
doctor’s distrust, derision and condescension exacerbates the fear and insecurity of 
the patient, on his guard:  “It is because I am Arab that they don't heal me like 
others.” (Fanon, 1964: 13; my translation
141
) 
The patient goes to another doctor. This time he explains himself in detail; he 
mobilizes all his being: 
And he explains his pain, a pain that turns increasingly his own. Now he 
talks about it with loquacity. He seizes it in space, he puts it before the nose 
of the doctor. He grasps it, touches it with all his fingers, he unfolds it, he 
                                                 
140
 « On dit volontiers que l’homme est sans cesse en question pour lui-même, et qu’il se renie 
lorsqu’il prétend ne plus l’être. Or il semble qu’il doit être possible de décrire une dimension 
première de tous les problèmes humains. Plus précisément: que tous les problèmes que se pose 
l’homme au sujet de l’homme peuvent se ramener à cette question:  « N’ai-je pas, du fait de 
mes actes ou de mes abstentions, contribué à une dévalorisation de la réalité humaine ? » 
Question qui pourrait se formuler encore: « Ai-je en toute circonstance réclamé, exigé l’homme 
qui est en moi ? » 
141




exposes it. It grows noticeably as he speaks. He puts it all over his body, and 
after fifteen minutes of gestural explanation, the interpreter (disconcerting as 




4.2.1 The patient as problem 
And the cycle starts again, examination, tests, approximate diagnostic and 
treatment. At issue is not only a problem of language at the level signs and symbols, 
but of broader problems that thwart the possibility of an intersubjective encounter. 
Maurice Natanson puts it that [“t]he speech of the Other announces the bridge to his 
spirit, a way of crossing the zone of his objectness and exteriority and arriving at his 
person-hood.”  (Natanson, 1969: 101) However, there are different obstacles in this 
medical encounter that stand between a human doctor-patient relationship, and 
between expectations of the patient’s desire to be understood and treated, and the 
doctor’s willingness or duty to understand, diagnose and to cure. For Natanson, the 
face-to face situation of the consulting room is marked by these expectations and 
obligations. The patient expects and desires that his concerns, problems and anxieties 
are treated “in his uniqueness” rather than into “typified causal terms.” But this raises 
a paradoxical situation for the doctor, who also wants to comprehend the patient in 
his uniqueness and at the same time must generalize as part of his or her job. “A 
paradox within a paradox is generated: the problem of uniqueness replaces the unique 
person, and the former is itself typified.” (Natanson, 1969: 105) Natanson here refers 
to psychiatry and not to general medicine. In the case of psychiatry this paradox 
constitutes a serious concern since the access and the comprehension of the patient’s 
world is more delicate, but the expectation to be understood and the need to approach 
the patient both as unique and as general also apply to general medicine.  
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 « Et il raconte sa douleur. Qui devient de plus en plus sienne. Il l’expose avec volubilité 
maintenant. Il la saisit dans l’espace, la met sous le nez du médecin. Il la prend, la touche de ses dix 
doigts, la développe, l’expose. Elle grossit à vue d’œil. Il la ramasse sur toute la surface de son corps et 
après quinze minutes d’explications gestuelles, l’interprète (déroutant comme il se doit) nous traduit : 




Typification, as Alfred Schutz and Natanson point out in their phenomenological 
descriptions of everyday life, is a central epistemological element of human 
experience in the everyday social world. Through typification human consciousness 
apprehend objects, events, persons, activities, attitudes, motives, ends, and organize 
their experience of the world concerning their familiarity or strangeness. Schutz 
writes:  
Objects are experienced as trees, animals, and the like, and more specifically 
as oaks, firs, maples, or rattlesnakes, sparrows, dogs. This table I am now 
perceiving is characterized as something recognized, as something 
foreknown and, nevertheless, novel. (Schutz, 1962: 281) 
 
The new table is a token, which, devoid of its particularities and by association 
with other similarly and previously perceived tokens, is understood as an instance of 
a type. Typification enables to situate what is not yet experienced or perceived within 
a horizon of familiarity.  For Schutz, typification does not enable to directly 
understand the subjective meaning that a fellow human ascribe to their actions, but 
though it one can “comprehend the subjective meaning intended by the Other in the 
sense of what is typically intended.” (Natanson, 1986: 13) Yet, for Schutz’s concerns, 
intersubjectivity does not depend on one’s knowledge of the subjective meaning of 
the Other “in their uniqueness; it is enough to grasp them in their exemplification.” 
(Natanson, 1986: 29) Typification points to what he identifies as one of the central 
features of everyday life, anonymity. Natanson argues that anonymity “is part of the 
structure of the social world (…) an invariant feature of an existence lived in the 
taken-for-granted terms of ordinary life.” (1986: 24) Anonymity, he adds, is 
reciprocal, I am anonymous to most others and most others are anonymous to me. For 
Schutz, typification entails an epistemological limitation and, thereby, encompasses 
the existence of difference. Both in typification and anonymity imply that there are 




that they are different. As Gordon argues, typification does not entail essentialism, if 
essence is understood as the substance, that is, the feature without which a thing 
would not be what it is. Phenomenological essence “is an appeal to a thing-itself (a 
type), but not a thing-in-itself (a type of being).” (Gordon, 1995: 56) 
As stated above, the doctor faces the paradox between the uniqueness of the 
patient and the professional obligation of generalization. For Natanson this requires 
approaches to seeing and listening that enable simultaneously comprehension 
(Verstehen) and therapy. We will return to listening in Fanon in Chapter 6.  
Back to Fanon’s consultation room, the suffering patient is actually asking for 
help, but the doctor cannot see or listen the patients’ demand since the pain does not 
adjust to the objective reality that the examination reveals. There is first a problem in 
the medical model. Fanon argues that the Neo-Hippocratic medicine taught at the 
faculties prioritizes a diagnostic of functions over organs, but this is hardly applied in 
the consulting room with North Africans. In the examination prevails the 
understanding that every symptom corresponds to a localized lesion. Thus damages 
are sought in the brain and in the organic systems of the patient, conceived as a 
clinical object, a corporeal structure. When no lesion is found, then there is no 
pathology and the scientific procedure is not what is put into question, instead it is 
“the patient [who is] at fault–an indocile, undisciplined patient, who ignores the rules 
of the game: (…) each symptom entails a lesion.” (Fanon, 1964: 16; my 
translation
143
; italics in the original).  
The view of the patient as a generic set of symptoms is, however aggravated by the 
“a priori” attitude of the medical personal in their engagement with the North African 
(Fanon, 1964: 15). The construction of problem people emerges here out of the 
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 « le malade en défaut, — un malade indocile, indiscipliné, qui ignore la règle du jeu. (…) Tout 




conjunction of the aforementioned reductive conception of the human in medicine 
with the racism of the society, to which the clinic presents itself as an extraneous 
element. In other words, the patient is the North African patient.  
In front of this pain without lesion, this disease spread in and over the whole 
body, this continuous suffering, the easiest attitude, which one adopts more 
or less rapidly, is the negation of any morbidity.  The North African is a 
simulator, a liar, a good-for-nothing, a bum, an idler, a thief. (Fanon, 1964: 
15; my translation144) 
 
Fanon and Gordon have explored phenomenologically the consequences of racism 
and colonialism in the everyday social life, the latter in conversation with Fanon, 
Schutz and Natanson. The patient here is not a type (being-itself), but a type of being 
(being-in-itself).  The North African does not go into the doctor’s room as a patient 
and then can go to a café as a customer, or sits in a vehicle as a driver. He is a North 
African patient, driver or customer. As Gordon puts it, the denial of the human 
element in the North African leads to the closure of the other possibilities. The North 
African is overdetermined and turned into a thing: “Overdetermination transforms 
consciousness in the flesh into a thing, a form of being-in-itself.” (1997: 73) To turn 
the black or the Arab into a thing demands the elimination of the perspective of the 
subject. He notes that racism produces a “perverted” form of anonymity, through 
which the black or the Arab becomes all blacks and Arabs.  
This perversion of anonymity results in the invisibility of the black or the Arab, 
since “to be seen in a racist way is an ironic way of not being seen through being 
seen.” (Gordon, 1995:58; italics in the original) In other words, racism does not stem 
from the fear of the Other, the unknown, the unfamiliar or the stranger. Instead, in its 
epistemic dimension racism actually renders the black and the Arab too familiar, 
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 Devant cette douleur sans lésion, cette maladie répartie dans et sur tout le corps, cette souffrance 
continue, l’attitude la plus facile et à laquelle on est plus ou moins rapidement conduit, est la négation de 
toute morbidité. À l’extrême, le Nord-Africain est un simulateur, un menteur, un tire-au-flanc, un 




everything is known and there is nothing else to know. In “Racism and Culture”, 
Fanon observes that during the liberation struggles colonial nations try to reinforce 
racist discourse, but it ceased to have an effect: “The occupier does not understand 
anymore. The end of racism starts by a sudden incomprehension.” (1964: 52; my 
translation
145
; own italics) That is, epistemically, the end of racism starts by a 
disruption of meanings that leads to a shocking and humbling moment and to a 
movement of openness to difference.   
In the perverse form of anonymity there is not the epistemological limitation 
which Schutz and Natanson exposed because there is no possibility of anonymity, 
everything is known, and as such the black is invisible by being too visible (Gordon, 
1997). Fanon writes: “I aspire to anonymity, to oblivion. Look, I accept everything, 
as long as no one notices me!”  (Fanon, 1952: 113; my translation
146
) Gordon 
observes that for Fanon the transformative task is to build institutions attuned to the 
plight of oppressed people. These institutions “must afford a level of typicality that 
affords anonymity in the ordinary sense of human limitability.” That is, the North 
African could be a typical patient, a typical driver and a typical North African. As 
such, this would not be based on the notion of an essential North African, and as a 
typical North African “one could live life amid the hubbub of everyday existence.” 
(Gordon, 1995: 66) 
4.2.2 The clinical and the political 
The clinic presents itself as an element extraneous to the society. For Fanon, the 
consultation room is a space where meanings, temporalities, experiences of the world, 
and histories meet and clash. The “pre-existing framework” built by Europeans into 
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 « L’occupant ne comprends plus. La fin du racisme commence avec une soudaine 
incompréhension. » 
146




which the North African enters (Fanon, 1964: 15; my translation
147
) poses not merely 
a problem of cultural attunement. It points both to the bodies and beyond them, to the 
meanings and roles ascribed onto specific bodies, and the lack of attention to the 
sociogenic dimensions of illness: 
Today the North African who attends the doctor bears the dead weight of all 
his compatriots. All those who had only symptoms, all those about whom the 
doctors said: ‘Nothing you can get your teeth into.’(Meaning: no lesion). But 
the patient who is there in front of me, this body that I am forced to assume 
to be swept by a consciousness, this body that is no longer a body or at least 
that is doubly a body because it is terrified – this body that asks me to listen 
to it, without, however, dwelling on it- provokes a revolt in me. (Fanon, 
1964: 17; my translation
148
; own italics) 
 
The question of embodiment, central in Fanon, acquires in the consultation room a 
vital importance. The terrified body that asks for help “without dwelling on it” is a 
body embedded in a larger mesh of practices, institutions, structures and forces that 
hold sway over it. It is also a body not dissociated from consciousness, hence it is 
through the body that the North African relates to the self and to the social world. It is 
thus a body constituted in relation to the aforementioned regulative attitudes, 
practices, institutions, forces and structures. In short, what doctors fail to consider is 
the existential situation, the lived experience of what it is to live in a colonial society 
carrying the weight of the roles and definitions assigned, that being, perceiving, 
acting and experiencing the world as a North African cannot be delinked from a 
social milieu that rejects him. As Nigel Gibson and Roberto Beneduce point out, 
Fanon anticipates the concept of body politic by identifying that the experience of 
pain, self-perception of the body, and the anguish and fear of the North African “are 
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 « cadre préexistant » 
148
 Aujourd’hui, le Nord-Africain qui se présente à une consultation supporte le poids mort de 
tous ses compatriotes. Tous ceux qui n’avaient que des symptômes, tous ceux à propos de qui 
l’on disait : « Rien à se mettre sous la dent. » (Entendez : pas de lésion.) Mais le malade qui est 
là, en face de moi, ce corps que je suis forcé de supposer balayé par une conscience, ce corps 
qui n’est plus tout à fait corps ou du moins qui est doublement corps puisque ahuri 
d’épouvante, — ce corps qui me demande de l’écouter sans toutefois m’y attarder, — 





always politically and racially situated” (Gibson and Beneduce, 2017: 124). As Fanon 
shows, disregarding these aspects may serve instead to reify the symptoms. That is, 
considering the symptoms at the expense of social and political considerations risks 
locating the origin and the cause of pathologies in the very patient.  
The North African begins an odyssey from doctor to doctor. There are multiple 
variations of this. The patient goes back to the same doctor or drags his pain 
elsewhere seeking help. Further explorations, new tests, nothing is found. The doctor 
hesitates. He is referred to a specialist. He is sent to surgery. He comes back happily 
without surgery. Or, right after being discharged from hospitalization, the patient 
comes back with different symptoms. The doctor suspects. He feels mocked. 
Laziness, lies, obstinacy, indiscipline are the explanations found for such behaviors. 
Mistrust and indifference extend and a diagnosis circulates among the medical 
personal for the “pseudo-pathology” of this “pseudo-sick person” (Fanon, 1964:17; 
my translation
149
), the North African syndrome:  
The medical staff discovers the existence of a North African syndrome. Not 
through experimentation, but according to an oral tradition. The North 
African takes his place in this asymptomatic syndrome and situates himself 
automatically as undisciplined (cf. medical discipline), inconsequential (with 
reference to the law according to which every symptom implies a lesion), 
and insincere (he says he is suffering whereas we know there are no reasons 




Fanon notes that there are also good-willed doctors and medical approaches which 
attempt to overcome the anatomical reductionism. He follows Dr. E. Stern 
recommendation’s in “Médecine psycho-somatique” to carry out a situational 
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  « pseudo-pathologie (…) un pseudo-malade. » 
150 Le personnel médical découvre l’existence d’un syndrome nord-africain. Non pas 
expérimentalement, mais selon une tradition orale. Le Nord-Africain prend place dans ce 
syndrome asymptomatique et se situe automatiquement sur un plan d’indiscipline (cf. 
discipline médicale), d’inconséquence (par rapport à la loi : tout symptôme suppose une 





diagnostic, namely, taking into account the biography of the patient, the relations with 
his associates, his sexuality, his preoccupations and occupations, his feelings of 
security and insecurity, and the dangers that threaten him. In his dissertation, Fanon 
briefly but positively considered the synthetic approach of psychosomatic medicine in 
“its resolute bearing on the very core of the human conflict”, and its possibilities to 
offer a “medicine of the person.” (Fanon, 2018: 270) 
However, the attempt to follow the situational diagnostic turns into a caricature 
when tested against the experiential reality of the North African. As Gordon observes, 
Fanon exposes the failure of theoretical models premised on a universal and 
disembodied human being to account for and establish a diagnosis of the pathologies 
of the North African, a concrete embodied consciousness taken apart by exploitation 
and oppression: “What each of Stern’s recommendations misses is the meaning, 
content, and impact of the abstract patient in the face of a flesh-and-blood being 
whose humanity is questioned.” (Gordon, 2015: 91) Such model, by staying at the 
surface level, may serve to nourish the racist imaginary and engulf the North African 
patient with colonial knowledge, reinforcing his position as anthropos, the subhuman 
object of knowledge. 
Fanon proceeds with the situational diagnostic: With regard to the relations with 
his associates, he points out, the North African migrant to French eyes is a ghostly 
figure: “one does not see them, one perceives them, one glimpses them. (…) There 
are no contacts there are only clashes.” (Fanon, 1964: 19; italics in the original
151
; 
italics in the original). Concerning his occupations and preoccupations, looking for a 
job is both a preoccupation and an occupation. Not considering the structural 
exploitation and marginalization misses the mark of the situation. Concerning the 
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sexuality of the North African, Fanon underscores that the recurrent link between 
immigration and sexuality is anxiety and fear. He quotes a doctoral thesis in medicine 
wherein the author wonders whether the incontinent sexual needs of North African 
men, expressed through rape and prostitution, could be tamed with family 
reunification policies. However, bringing North African women to France, warns the 
author, would pose a threat to the demographic structure, and hence to French notions 
of, morality, family, citizenship and civilization. As far as his feeling of security or 
insecurity are concerned, Fanon writes that the first term is absent from the 
experience of the North African, since he lives in a constant and multidimensional 
insecurity. ‘But they have rights, they just don’t know them’, Fanon ventriloquizes.  
Not keen on abstraction notions, he writes:  
Rights, Duties, Citizenship, Equality, much beautiful things! The North 
African on the verge of the French Nation–which is, we are told, also his 
own–experiences in the political and civil domains an imbroglio which no 
one is willing to face. How is this connected with the North African in the 





Thereby he puts the political at the heart of the clinical, and the clinical as 
embedded in wider societal dynamics. What takes place in the daily life, at the tram, 
in the cinema, at work, in his relations with women, is what leads him to the doctor. 
The medical setting, in turn, is not exempt from this pathological circuit in which the 
North African is confined. Fanon has a broader perspective of what constitutes the 
North African syndrome. His caustic and subversive use of the term puts under 
examination the medical institution in its intricacy with the society.  It does not refer 
to the diagnosis of a possible pathology suffered by North Africans, it also 
encompasses the attitudes of the doctor, the ontologization of symptoms, the 
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 Droits, Devoirs, Citoyenneté, Egalité, que de belles choses ! Le Nord-Africain au seuil de la 
Nation française — qui est, nous dit-on, la sienne — vit dans le domaine politique, sur le plan 
civique, un imbroglio que personne ne veut voir en face. Quel rapport avec le Nord-Africain en 




normative sway to define the normal from the ill, and how “the politics of migration 
and debates about citizenship overlap with the politics of diagnosis” (Gibson and 
Beneduce, 2017: 127). In short, the North African syndrome puts under the 
examination the society as the origin of pathologies and the role of the clinical in 
creating, reinforcing or legitimizing the pathological or abnormal subjects.  
As Fanon posits, the North African is threatened in his affective life and his social 
relations, and in the sense of belonging to the community. Therefore a biographical 
analysis of the North African should not start by an account of his life, but by his 
relationship with life itself, for he lives an ongoing death: 
(…) the North African meets all the conditions that make a sick man. 
Without a family, without love, without human relations, without 
communion with the collectivity, the first encounter with himself will occur 
in a neurotic mode, in a pathological mode; he will feel himself emptied, 
lifeless, in a body-to-body struggle with death, a death short of death, a death 
in life (1964: 21; my translation153). 
 
In his view, the North African is a sick person, yet in a different understanding of 
illness and health than that of the previous doctors. As we have seen, Fanon 
understood that health cannot merely be reduced to the psycho-physiological, thereby 
displacing the origin, the causes and the weight attributed to the pathological to the 
society that generates sick people. He conceives the pathology of the North African 
as a consequence of the overall condition of the migrant. Thereby, he urges to 
reconsider what is the North African patient asking for when he visits the doctor, 
what are the needs, demands and expectations of a patient “starving for humanity” 
(1964: 12; my translation
154
), what is the role of the medical institution in relation to 
oppression, the spatial structures of the hospital that take a toll on the very patient, the 
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 (…) le Nord-Africain réunit toutes les conditions qui font un homme malade. Sans famille, 
sans amour, sans relations humaines, sans communion avec la collectivité, la première 
rencontre avec lui-même se fera sur un mode névrotique, sur un mode pathologique, il se 
sentira vidé, sans vie, en corps à corps avec la mort, une mort en deçà de la mort, une mort 
dans la vie (…). 
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epistemological basis, the attitudes and the character of the relationship that a doctor 
establishes with a patient.  “Your solution, sir?”, he is asked. He answers: 
Do not push me until the end. Do not force me to tell you what you should 
know, sir. If you do not reclaim the man who is in front of you, how can I 
suppose that you reclaim the man that is in you? 
If you do not want the man who is in front of you, how should I believe the 
man that is perhaps in you? 
If you do not demand, if you do not sacrifice the man that is in you so that 
the man on this land can be more than a body, more than a Mohammed, by 
which magic trick will I acquire the certainty that, you too, are worthy of my 




Fanon closes the article by appealing to a fundamental first step, the commitment, 
through a radical demand to take responsibility for dehumanization. This is not only 
an ethical demand, it points to the formation of the self through the expression of 
what Maldonado-Torres calls a “loving subjectivity” (2008: 153). This is not a 
closed, atomistic subject, but an open understanding of the self as in relation, in a 
relation of generosity, to the other. It entails to put one’s humanity at the service of 
humanizing the suffering other, to the extent of failing to one’s humanity by not 
doing such work. In other words, the humanity of the doctor and the patient, the self 
and the other, are mutually constituted through this “act of giving” (Maldonado-
Torres, 2008: 153).  
Fanon’s subsequent move to the psychiatric hospital of Saint-Alban under the 
mentorship of Francesc Tosquelles would be a continuation and a confirmation of his 
search for a medicine for the human. 
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 « Votre solution, monsieur ? 
Ne me poussez pas à bout. Ne m’obligez pas à vous dire ce que vous devriez savoir, monsieur. Si 
tu ne réclames pas l’homme qui est en fa-ce de toi, comment veux-tu que je suppose que tu réclames 
l’homme qui est en toi ? 
Si tu ne veux pas l’homme qui est en face de toi, comment croirai-je à l’homme qui est peut-être en 
toi ? 
Si tu n’exiges pas l’homme, si tu ne sacrifies pas l’homme qui est en toi pour que l’homme qui est 
sur cette terre soit plus qu’un corps, plus qu’un Mohammed, par quel tour de passepasse faudra-t-il que 




4.3 Fanon and Tosquelles 
Frantz Fanon arrived at the psychiatric hospital of Saint-Alban at the beginning of 
1952 and left for Algeria at the end of 1953. Francesc Tosquelles, the pioneer of 
institutional psychotherapy and the director of the institution at the time, recalls that 
in their first encounter Fanon explained that what had led him to Saint-Alban was 
their shared interest in “a psychiatric practice fundamentally attentive to the 
complexity of differences –maintained and sometimes tragically reinforced– that 
bound humans to each other” (Tosquelles, 2001: 168; my translation
156
). Saint-Alban 
was at the time the site of what would be labelled institutional psychotherapy, a 
pioneering approach to mental illness that questioned and recasted psychiatry at the 
conceptual and the practical levels.  
Institutional psychotherapy explored the “morbidity, and also the possible 
fecundity, of collective structures” (Murat, 2014:16; my translation
157
). Concretely, 
the therapeutic process entailed the transformation of the asylum from a site of 
confinement and segregation that generates or exacerbates mental illness into a 
human institution of disalienation. The reconfiguration of hierarchies, modes of 
organization, spaces, diagnostic policies, classifications, roles, functions and relations 
within the asylum aimed at creating a collective daily life that parallels that of society 
outside of the hospital and at promoting exchanges with the immediate community 
outside of the hospital, as intrinsic elements of the therapy. As Jean Oury, another 
decisive figure in the elaboration of institutional psychotherapy, puts it, 
 we need to treat the hospital in order to treat the patients. The hospital is ill. 
There is an accumulation of regulation that needs to be treated – the hospital 
requires treatment in order to treat. It is a double movement. (Oury, 2007: 6).  
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 « une pratique psychiatrique attentive surtout à la complexité des différences – entretenues et 
parfois renforcées tragiquement – qui liaient entre eux les hommes » 
157




 If institutional psychotherapy analyzes mental illness necessarily in relation to the 
social and institutional setting, the analysis of the hospital as ill and the possibility of 
turning it into a therapeutic tool, also entails to consider the institution not in isolation 
but embedded within thecultural, social, historical and economic immediate context, 
and in relation to broader administrative and political structures.  
Francesc Tosquelles remarks that the previous and the subsequent work of Fanon 
cannot be understood without considering both his stay in Saint-Alban and, perhaps 
more importantly, his decision to go to Saint-Alban, a place that Tosquelles 
described, removing from it all the accompanying idealism, as “the place of a 
hypothesis, not the place of a wager or the place of an adventure” (Tosquelles, 2007: 
11; my translation
158
). The innovations being undertaken in Saint-Alban resonated 
with Fanon’s concerns against narrow conceptions of the clinical and against his own 
psychiatric training, as he had set out in his thesis and taken further in Black Skin 
White Masks in the matter of the psychopathological, social, cultural and political 
dimensions of mental illness. It also matches certain elements of the critiques already 
advanced in “The North African Syndrome” of a dehumanizing medicine based on a 
priori diagnostics, fixing nosographic categories, degrading medical facilities, a 
vitiated subject-object relationship between doctor and patient, and the obstacles that 
impeded fecund encounters in the consultation room. Similarly, both Tosquelles and 
Oury emphasized that institutional psychotherapy understands, and demands, the 
view of the psychiatric practice and the institution as living and open, as a movement 
or a process in constant refashion rather than a model, a static organization or a set of 
tenets (Appril, 2014).  
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This echoes the importance of temporality and the idea of motion that permeates 
Fanon’s view of the human, culture, alienation or freedom. So does the concern for 
circulation and the centrality of empowering and promoting the responsibility of the 
patients in Saint-Alban, themes that undergird Fanon’s political and psychiatric 
thought. In this light his stay and his decision to go to Saint-Alban can be considered 
both a significant formative experience and a confirmation. A confirmation not so 
much in the sense of reinforcing a previous held position or a set of principles, but in 
the sense of a step in a path that Fanon had already set forth. A path, Tosquelles 
recalls, that for Fanon involves constant questioning, learning and alertness against 
reverie, dogmatism, obfuscation and obliviousness (Tosquelles, 2007: 12): the path of 
working on the political, psychological and historical conditions for human beings to 
be free. This is not dissimilar to one of the ways in which Tosquelles posits the 
hypothesis of Saint-Alban:  
The hypothesis proposed in Saint-Alban gathered human beings, mads or 
not, so that they are able to get hold of the mobile, articulable and re-
articulable matter of which they are constituted, and unfortunately, 




4.3.1  Francesc Tosquelles and the origin of institutional psychotherapy 
 
Pierre Delion locates the changes introduced by Francesc Tosquelles, Jean Oury 
and the circle of Saint-Alban as the third moment of rupture in the history of Western 
psychiatry, after Pinel and Freud (Delion, 2014). In a similar vein argues historian 
Laure Murat. To explain the lack of recognition or the marginal position of 
institutional psychotherapy in the history of European psychiatry she uses the term 
“symbolic revolution”, drawing from Bourdieu, to refer to “a revolution that has 
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 « L’hypothèse posée à Saint-Alban rassemblait des êtres humains, fous ou pas fous, pour qu’ils 
puissent puiser dans leurs propres possibilités la matière mobile articulable et réarticulable dont ils sont 




become invisible because it has changed our categories of perception” (Murat, 2014: 
15; my translation
160
). Like Delion, she identifies the first decisive moment at the end 
of 18
th
 century with Philippe Pinel and the emergence of European modern psychiatry 
through moral therapy, a human approach that comprised the liberation of psychiatric 
patients from the chains with the aim of reintegrating them in society. The second 
turning point dates back to the invention of psychoanalysis by Sigmund Freud and his 
associates in Vienna in the late 19
th
 century.  As stated, the last major shift is the 
creation of what has been known as institutional psychotherapy
161
 (Murat, 2014).  
This third moment revolved around the vibrant groups gathered in the psychiatric 
hospital of Saint-Alban during the stay and the direction of Tosquelles between 1940 
and 1962. In this period the institution hosted psychiatrists like Jean Oury, Lucien 
Bonnafé, Félix Guattari, Phillipe Paumelle, Maurice Despinoy, or Frantz Fanon, 
among others. Michel Foucault was distantly yet also related to the network since 
Tosquelles, together with Henry Ey, co-supervised his training in psychotherapy 
(Oury, 2007). Their contributions were to nourish and enlarge the scope of what 
started in Saint-Alban by taking it elsewhere and endowing it with new theoretical 
perspectives and practical experiences. The clinic La Borde, founded in 1953 by Jean 
Oury after a stay in Saint-Alban from 1947 to 1949, became the other main 
conceptual and practical reference point for this new orientation to mental health 
(Delion, 2014; Murat, 2014). The ramifications that emerged from Saint-Alban and a 
detailed account of the development of institutional psychotherapy, including their 
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 « une révolution devenue invisible car elle a changé nos catégories de perception. » 
161
 The term was coined by Georges Daumézon in 1952. Initially it was referred to “sector 
psychiatry” or “psychiatry of extension”, and it has also been called “anthropo-psychiatry” and 
“psychoanalytic psychiatry” (Oury, 2007). As Jean Khalfa notes Fanon usually employs the term 
“social therapy”, which Tosquelles also did, and sometimes refers to it as “sociotherapy” (2018). 
Murat considers the term institutional psychotherapy as unfortunate because it fail to capture the 
complexity of the movement and the diversity of its practices (2014: 17). Jean Oury emphasizes the 
dimension of motion when he says that institutional psychotherapy does not exist and has never existed 




influence on Franco Basaglia and the ideas elaborated in the Gorizia hospital in Italy 
in 1960’s, their relation with Anglo-Saxon approaches, or their relation with the 
subsequent emergence of the  antipsychiatric movement fall beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. Instead I have decided to briefly focus on the figure of Francesc 
Tosquelles, “the catalyst of the Saint-Alban group, the fire of the ʻgeneration of 
gestationʼ” (Oury, 2007: 34), and also Fanon’s mentor.  
The roots of the movement that blossomed in Saint-Alban date back to the World 
War II, the Spanish Civil War, and to the dynamic social and political tissue of 
Catalonia in the first third of the 20
th
 century, and its organized working class 
movement against fascism. Francesc Tosquelles, born in 1912, was a precocious 
psychiatrist, Marxist militant and a committed antifascist both in France and in Spain. 
Since he was ten years old he frequented the Institut Pere Mata in Reus, a leading 
psychiatric hospital directed by Professor Emili Mira i López, who played a key role 
in Tosquelles’ training. The hospital, located in a modernist building, had running 
water and electricity available, which was not necessarily usual, and provided group 
therapies based on ergotherapy, hydrotherapy, dance, theater and games (Tosquelles, 
1993). Another important element in his training was the community of Eastern and 
Central European neurologists, psychiatrists, gestalt psychologists and psychoanalysts 
that sought refuge between 1931 and 1936 in Barcelona, which was known at the 
time as the “little Vienna”. He underwent psychoanalysis by the Hungarian 
psychoanalyst Szador Reminger. After obtaining his degree in medicine in 1933, he 
worked at the Institut Pere Mata until the beginning of 1937 (Tosquelles, 1993).  
During this period Tosquelles began to interrogate aspects of the institution and its 
relation to the treatment of mental health problems. He noticed that the Freudian 




patients. Pierre Delion underscores the importance of the transference, or the 
projection of feelings or early fantasies of the client on to the therapist, in order to 
understand the therapeutic relationship. However, Freud was reluctant to analyze 
psychotic persons and his students did not consider the whole psychiatric framework 
in their analysis. Tosquelles noticed that the application of typical treatments to 
hospitalized psychotic patients neither matched their specific condition nor their 
“being-in-the-world”. He thus developed the concept of multireferential transferences 
to observe how the “transference of these patients on to their environment was 
fragmented”. These patients required human institutions that house them in, and try to 
produce “for them and with them forms of collective counter-excitation so that they 




Besides the psychiatric circles, Tosquelles was actively involved in the social and 
political movements of Barcelona,  which had also an impact on the development of 
his psychiatry. He first became a member of BOC and then of POUM
163
, and 
participated in political debates, meetings, reading clubs and working class 
associations. Tosquelles explains that Catalan collective forms organization of the 
means of production and the traditional cooperative associations, of which the 
psychiatric hospital in Reus was an example, would be a source of inspiration for the 
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 « avec et pour eux une sorte de pare-excitations collectif de nature à les protéger des effets de 
ces multi-clivages. » 
163
 POUM (Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista) was a Spanish communist party deeply 
ingrained in Catalonia, Valencia and the Balearic Islands. It was founded in Barcelona in 1935 out of 
the alliance of BOC (Bloque Obrero y Campesino )  and ICE (Izquierda Comunista). It built a strong 
peasant organization and introduced Marxism in the working class movement, until then mostly 
dominated by anarchosyndicalism, and quickly became the main working class party in Catalonia.  It 
advocated for a single working class front, trade union unity and the unity of revolutionary Marxists in 
light of the upcoming struggle against fascism. Opposed to the bureaucratization of the Russian 
Revolution and the International Communist, it held an autonomous position towards Moscow and a 
strong anti-Stalinist stance, which resulted in the constant persecution and the repression of POUM 




organization of the asylum, the role of the patients, and the relation to the French 
administration in Saint-Alban: 
We created a society of mental hygiene (…) upon which depended the 
activities of the hospital (clubs, etc...) and all the external activities, although 
the central office was inside the asylum. The society was administrated by a 
cooperative of patients as a preparation for an open psychotherapy. The 
supporting members of the society were all people external to the hospital 
who contributed economically in order to sustain and promote activities 
independent from the central administration and to carry out activtities that 





By transposing the cooperative and trade union models into the asylum Tosquelles 
sought to weave a social and economic tissue in order to cultivate the autonomy of 
the patients and the institution. It also enabled him to exceed the rigid demarcations 
outside/inside of the psychiatric hospital and favored the generation of encounters 
with therapeutic significance. Thereby, Tosquelles poses a threefold challenge to the 
physical, social and administrative structures that sustain asylums. 
The social dimension, the notions of encounter, interaction and exchange are at the 
core of Tosquelles understanding of the institution and by extension of his psychiatric 
work.  Being aware of the dangers of relying on a priori and fixist definitions of a 
healing institution, he emphasizes the functionalist dimension when he defines 
institutions as “échangeurs”(1986
165
), or what generates exchanges. An institution is 
“a place where people meet with an expected regularity. (…) It is a site of assemblage 
where different groups articulate themselves and are articulated” (1993: 209; my 
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 « nous avions créé une société d'hygiène mentale, devenue ensuite la "Société de la Croix 
Marine", de laquelle dépendaient toutes les activités de l'hôpital (clubs, etc...), ainsi que des activités 
extérieures, bien que le siège se trouvait à l'intérieur de Saint Alban. L'administration de cette société 
était assurée par une coopérative de malades, en vue d'une psychothérapie ouverte. Les membres de 
soutien de cette société étaient des personnes extérieures à l'hôpital, qui payaient une cotisation pour 
promouvoir et financer des activités indépendantes de l'administration hospitalière, et pour avoir la 
liberté de prendre des initiatives qui ressortaient des pratiques courantes. » 
165






) Through the term échangeur, Tosquelles also draws a parallelism with 
the interchange or the motorway junction: a helical site where different paths intersect 
and set off in different directions. It is is built and enables to build and organize lives. 
The échangeur changes ways and directions, it makes circulation more fluid, but it is 
not always possible to drastically start a new life, he notes (Pain, 2015). 
This double intellectual and vital formative experience, the psychiatric and the  
political is resumed by Tosquelles through the image of the two legs upon which 
institutional therapy advances, the Freudian and Marxian one, the psychic and the 
political (Delion, 2014). The step of one leg must be accompanied by the other for 
movement to be produced. Namely, in the analysis of madness the 
psychopathological dimension of alienation must be accompanied by the social 
dimension of alienation, for without taking action towards social disalienation there is 
no mental disalienation (Tosquelles, 1987). Pierre Delion summarizes this double 
dimension: 
Institutional psychotherapy results from this extraordinary pioneering 
work which consisted in using Freudian conceptualizations by rethinking 
them with regard to psychoses, that is, by reconstructing a 
metapsychology that can illuminate the mechanisms and the specificities 
of the transferences. Yet at the same time it enables to enlarge the scope 
of the necessary revolutions by including the political dimension, the only 
capable of thinking social alienation and its effects on patients. Thereby, 
Tosquelles, helped by Bonnafé, invents not only institutional 
psychotherapy as a method to navigate through the ocean of madness, but 
also sector psychiatry as the condition of possibility of its application to a 
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 “ un sitio donde hay gente que se encuentran con una regularidad prevista; (…)Es un sitio de 
"manojo" donde se articulan grupos diferentes y se les articulan” 
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 La psychothérapie institutionnelle résulte de ce travail de pionnier extraordinaire qui consistait à 
utiliser les conceptualisations freudiennes en les repensant à l’aune de la psychose, c’est-à-dire en 
reconstruisant une métapsychologie de nature à en éclairer les mécanismes et les spécificités 
transférentielles, mais dans le même temps à élargir le champ des révolutions nécessaires en y incluant 
la dimension politique, seule capable de penser l’aliénation sociale et ses effets sur les patients. C’est 
ainsi que Tosquelles, aidé de Bonnafé, inventa non seulement la psychothérapie institutionnelle comme 
méthode de navigation sur l’océan de la folie, mais la psychiatrie de secteur comme condition de 






During the Spanish Civil War Tosquelles joined the P.O.U.M. militias at the 
Aragón front. There, he decided to apply a proximity therapeutic service and treat the 
patients in the battlefront instead of sending them back to a distant healing post. 
Tosquelles argued that by treating them in the immediate context where the neurosis 
arises, their familiarity to the context would prevent the chronification of the 
pathology. He emphasizes, however, that most of his efforts were directed to make a 
preventive therapeutic work with the doctors, who, for Tosquelles, were the most 
scared during wartime. He argues that the roots of their fear and anguish lie in their 
resistance to change derived from their bourgeois mentality, that is their search for 
stability, erudition, economic status and individualism, which he considered at odds 
with the practice of psychiatry. After being named medical chief of the psychiatric 
services of the republican army Tosquelles is relocated to the southern front where he 
organized therapeutic communities and recruited medical teams to create sector 
psychiatry structures. Arguing that psychiatrists were afraid of madness, he avoided 
to enroll them and instead created teams composed by volunteer non-specialist 
laypersons who had never had a direct contact with mental illness, namely local 
priests and nuns, lawyers, sexual workers, peasants or painters (Tosquelles, 1991). He 
prioritized persons “endowed with natural capacities to stay [rester] with others 
because it takes a long time to transform a person into someone who can stay with 
others”, that is, persons who possessed the quality of “knowing how to live, to 
exchange, how to connect with others”. In a short time of training, he remarks, 
laypersons who were sensitive to the twists and turns of the human souls could 
achieve extraordinary therapeutic results (Tosquelles, 1987 my translation
168
).  
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 « dotés de capacités naturelles à rester avec les autres, car on perd beaucoup de temps à 
transformer une personne en quelqu'un qui sait rester avec les autres (…) de savoir vivre, échanger, 




After the defeat of the Spanish Republic, Tosquelles arrived at the detention camp 
of Septfonds in Southern France where circa 500.000 Spanish refugees were confined 
in concentrationary conditions. Tosquelles remarks that from the outside the camp 
looked a psychiatric hospital: a yard of mud, hunger, epidemics and suicides enclosed 
by barbed wire. There, Tosquelles initiated a psychiatric work which he describes as 
one of his best therapeutic experiences (Tosquelles, 1991). Enrolling again refugees, 
laypersons, from the camp as assistants, he treated the patients in a wooden shack 
placed at the border of the camp. In this way many patients entered the psychiatric 
area through one door and escaped from the camp through the back door. Tosquelles 
describes the psychiatric service in the camp as “just one of the transit points.” 
(Tosquelles, 1987; my translation
169
) Different elements present in this experience 
such as the importance of spatiality, movement and circulation, of heterogeneity, and 
the centrality of the question of freedom, would subsequently take a more complex 
form in the psychiatric hospital. 
 In Saint-Alban, Tosquelles favored the exit of patients from the hospital, the 
exchanges and the encounters with people coming from outside, but he deemed as 
utopic the possibility of a fully open therapeutic service that leaves freely the patients 
in society–he would later be very critic of approaches that advocate for the total 
elimination of asylums arisen with the anti-psychiatric movement in the late 1960’s 
(1987). This is related to his view of the asylum as a refuge, a protected space from 
the outside, from the prejudices of society and the fear of madness, which is at the 
roots of the exclusion of so-called mads. Yet, he emphasizes that the asylum does aim 
at protecting the patients, but the freedom of the patients, and “[t]he protection of the 
freedom of those who work, who are engaged in building new relationships with their 
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fellows inside the asylum, and with the world.” (Tosquelles, 1987; my translation
170
)  
Tosquelles defines freedom as a condition that has to be built, learnt and taught 
collectively, hence his notion of the asylum as “a school of freedom”. 
The school of freedom requires a double transformation within the hospital and 
from the inside towards the outside through what he calls the creation of areas of 
freedom, namely the club, the bar, the psychodrama, the cinema, the printing room, 
among other spaces–some of them were dispersed and located 10 kilometers away. 
Tosquelles advocates for a multidisciplinary analysis of space that combines the 
geographical, administrative, bureaucratic and the therapeutic. He calls for a 
phenomenology that takes into account the politics and the poetics of space, that is, 
how spaces are lived, which emotions arise, which sense does it stimulate, which 
encounters do they foster, which conflicts do they enable to appear and which do they 
hide and block (Tosquelles, 1987). Both Oury and Tosquelles underscored the 
importance of the atmosphere and the ambiance in institutional psychotherapy, which 
is neglected and denied by “pseudo neurosciences” (Oury, 2007: 35). Yet atmosphere 
and space is to be accompanied by heterogeneity to generate a living space, which in 
their view is the condition for it to be effectively therapeutic. Oury points out that the 
different spaces that form hospital and education settings tend to offer the same the 
conditions, atmosphere and status.  Homogeneity is associated with inert, lifeless and 
motionless spaces, relations, characters and functions:  
What I call the architectonic – the totality of relations, roles, functions and 
people that defines the site where something happens – is based upon 
heterogeneity rather than homogeneity!. (…) It is a fundamental word for 
many, but especially for François Tosquelles. He often said that the milieu 
needed to be heterogeneous, even the educational milieu of children. He 
made clear that in order for things to be alive, for there to be exchanges, 
groups, inter-groups, initiatives, chance and encounters, there must be 
heterogeneity. (Oury, 2007: 34; emphasis in the original) 
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 « La protection de la liberté de ceux qui travaillent, qui s'occupent de construire des nouveaux 





Heterogeneity, and the ideas of life and motion that it entails, connects the spatial 
with the temporal.  He makes reference to certain approaches to Gestalt that rather 
than form and fixicity put the focus on the process and the movement that creates the 
form, that is, “the action that gives shape” (Tosquelles, 1987; my translation
171
). In 
this light the creation of areas of freedom does not mean that freedom lies in these or 
in any specific space, neither that patients are free or learn freedom there. Freedom is 
ensured by the multiplicity of spaces and their heterogeneity, the different 
characteristics, ambiances, rules and different ways functioning. The common 
construction of spaces, of the notion of the limit, the creation of the limits, the 
collective establishment of a law and the tracing of the perimeters is what enables the 
freedom of creation. Considering this, freedom lies in the capacity of passing from 
one space to the other. The creation of areas of freedom is oriented towards producing 
structures inside and outside that facilitate passing from one structure to the other, 
and the role of the psychotherapist is to build bridges (Tosquelles, 1987). Jean Oury 
expresses the importance of movement in the therapeutic process in La Borde:  
We must find the means through which people can express themselves. This 
is what we call, here at La Borde, the liberty of circulation. The liberty of 
circulation produces the possibility of the encounter, of real encounters – 
what Maldiney calls ʻpossibilizationʼ, the ʻpossibilization of the encounter. 
The encounter is not foreseen. If it is, it is not an encounter! A real encounter 
touches the Real, not the Symbolic or the Imaginary. It marks the point 
where things are no longer the same as before. (…) ‘Yes, it is true, we 
organize encounters, we programme chance’. (Oury, 2007: 44) 
 
As stated, the notion of encounter is a key element to Tosquelles’ transformation 
of the institution. This obeys to his understanding that in the case of isolated 
treatment there can be no effective psychotherapy because there is no need of self-
identification, the subject becomes evasive. It is through the encounters, the different 
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itineraries that they offer, the bifurcations that they open up, the conflicts that they 
unveil and the options that they foster, that patients take responsibility for their 
choices and ultimately find the subject at and as the origin of their own movement: 
“the different encounters that can take place in the different spaces enable us to say 
afterwards: ‘this is me’” (Tosquelles, 1987; my translation
172
). In other words, the 
subject discovers his or herself, and at the same time discovers his or herself as a 
responsible subject. Thus for Tosquelles freedom is not only inseparable from 
responsibility but to be free means that “‘I take responsibility for my freedom’. Being 
free means becoming responsible.” (Tosquelles, 1987; my translation
173
) 
4.3.2 Resistance and healing in Saint-Alban 
The work of Tosquelles in Septfonds came to Paul Balvet’s notice, at the time the 
director of the psychiatric hospital of Saint-Alban, who had the intention to introduce 
changes into the hospital. In 1942 Balvet was replaced by Bonnafé and more marked 
changes started to take place. Tosquelles arrived at Saint Alban in January 1940 
officially as an assistant nurse; his Spanish degree did not enable him to work as a 
psychiatrist in France and he had to complete again his studies in psychiatry under the 
French system (Tosquelles, 1993). 
 The hospital was located in a remote countryside area surrounded by peasant and 
shepherd communities and cut off from urban centers, in the départment of Lozère, a 
region that had historically been neglected by the central administration. At his 
arrival, Tosquelles found a ruinous and overcrowded building (1993). His first 
initiative was to ask Balvet to let him dwell with the villagers for a time, to attend the 
fairs, the markets, the festivals and the bars, for “the hospital has to be modified in 
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 « Les différentes rencontres que nous pouvons faire dans des lieux divers avec des personnes 
diverses nous permettent de dire après : "ça, c'est moi". » 
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relation with the real life in the fairs. (…) In psychiatry one must desist from 
performing as a doctor and one must go out to the street to see as a doctor.” 
(Tosquelles, 1993: 2007; my translation
174
) One of the things that Tosquelles saw was 
that, as a response to the situation of relative abandonment of the region, communities 
around Saint-Alban were organized following cooperative models similar to those of 
Catalonia (1987). This would be an important factor to establish relationships 
between the hospital and the outside and also for the subsistence of the patients and 
the hospital staff during the years of the German Occupation under which the 
isolation of Saint-Alban and Lozère was exacerbated.  
The measures taken in Saint-Alban made of the asylum one of the few exceptions 
of what has been known as the “extermination douce”, the silent death of 40.000 
mental health patients of hunger and lack of attention in French during the Vichy 
regime (Lafont, 1987). The abandonment of the patients did not obey to a deliberate 
policy of extermination issued by a concrete authority, but it was the result of the 
conjunction of a series of “abominations” stemming from different sectors: the 
precarious economic situation, the general consideration of madness as a 
degeneration of the race and producing superfluous spending, the view among the 
Vichy elite of the mentally ill as useless, the eugenicist positions of eminent doctors 
of the regime such as Nobel laureates Alexis Carrel and René Leriche, and the work 
of French psychiatrists outside the metropolis on the mental structure of the 
colonized. In this sense, notably influential was the work that the psychiatrist Antoine 
Porot was undertaking in Algeria on the mental inferiority of the native (Doray, 
2006). The importance of Porot for colonial and French psychiatry, its influence on 
social policies and the response of Fanon will be addressed in the following section. 
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 “hay que modificar el hospital, en relación con la vida real de las ferias (…) En psiquiatría hay 




In this context, knocking down the walls and the bars of the asylum was a question 
of conviction as much as of necessity. Patients were taught how to collect vegetables 
and with the medical staff went to pick them up at neighboring fields. Shepherds 
crossed the hospital with their cattle where patients exhibited their craft and 
manufactured goods and were exchanged by small goods. Also an underground 
economy flourished around the capture of alleged escaped patients; guards and 
neighbors profited from the reward of the authorities and the patients could spent 
several days living with a family in the village. A service of tuberculous patients was 
simulated, since the diagnosis of tuberculosis enabled to obtain ration cards and food 
supplies (Tosquelles, 1991). 
Yet, the asylum was opened in both directions. This also meant becoming a site of 
contestation and resistance. Political refugees, Jewish refugees, fleeing peasants, 
injured Resistance fighters, military detachments were hosted, healed or hidden with 
the cognizance and the active support of the patients. The asylum became a site of 
encounter of science, philosophy, politics, and art through the convergence of the 
patients, psychoanalysts, neurologists, immunologists, gestalt psychologists, 
phenomenologists, religious people, communist intellectuals, playwrights, poets and 
surrealists. Among them, George Canguilhem, Tristan Tzara or Paul Éluard and their 
families took refuge in Saint-Alban.  The latter wrote a collection of poems there and 
founded a clandestine publishing house in Saint Alban, whereas his wife, the artist 
Nusch Éluard, worked with schizophrenics. Surrealists frequented the hospital, 
notably out of the arrival of Bonnafé, and had a remarkable impact on Tosquelles’ 
thought and in the practices developed in the asylum (Tosquelles, 1987). This 
constellation of people from different perspectives and disciplines that Bonnafé called 




creation: resistance against Nazi occupation, against the murder of the mentally ill, 
against psychiatry as the organized practice of segregation, and against “all forms of 
inhumanities” (Bonnafé, 1991: 169; my translation
175
). The creative purpose aims at 
building “a new clinic” that bases its research on quotidian practices, that exposes the 
“reification, fetishization, thingification” at the level of thought and practices, that 
departs from dominant clinical models that “erase the subject behind the symptom”, 
that builds a new institution that generates disalienating relations rather than 
alienation and that brings to an end the enclave condition of therapeutic practices 
(Bonnafé, 1991: 212; my translation
176
). 
By 1947 there were no agitated patients in Saint-Alban. This was achieved without 
the use of specific medicines, inexistent at the time, and without applying 
containment measures.  At the time, Phillipe Paumelle, an intern of Tosquelles, wrote 
his dissertation on agitation. The phenomenon of agitation was commonly thought to 
be concomitant with madness and an intrinsic part of it, but as Paumelle puts it, such 
a view is false. The agitated insane person cannot be considered as simply an agitated 
individual in isolation, but he or she is agitated in relation to the aforementioned total 
architecture of the asylum, the spatial structure, the hierarchies, his or role and  
position in the hospital and the meaning of madness and agitation for nurses and 
doctors (Paumelle, 1953). As Tosquelles (1987) adds, agitation, although  does not 
obey to a univocal cause, is often a psychosis derived from the prison-like condition 
of the hospital, Thus healing the patient requires treating the hospital, the doctors and 
the nurses. Jean Khalfa summarizes one of the central tentes of institutional 
psychotherapy: 
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 « contre les inhumanites en tout genre » 
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 « nouvelle clinique (…) l’effacement du sujet derrière le symptôm (…) le processus de 




institutional therapy rests on the idea that the institution itself requires 
treatment if it is to treat its patients. In many cases, the hospital remained a 
simple place of internment, and patients whose problems were often minor at 
the start, would react to this environment, generating (Khalfa, 2018:186) 
 
The approach undertaken in Saint-Alban did not reject a priori the use of 
medicines. For that matter, the articles that Fanon wrote at the time deal with the use 
of biochemical and shock treatments. The article co-authored with Maurice Despinoy 
and Walter Zenner explores the monitoring of sleeping therapy techniques as an 
alternative to sleeping medicines and in order to pave the way for a different therapy. 
The three articles co-authored with Tosquelles assess the ethic and therapeutic limits 
and possibilities of electroconvulsive therapies and insulin therapies within the 
context of institutional psychotherapy in patients suffering from serious neuroses, 
chronic psychoses, with no re-adaptation to the life outside of the hospital. Tosquelles 
and Fanon observe the hasty use, and the abuse, of annihilation methods, and their 
application in cases that could be treated otherwise more effectively, such as 
agitation, without the danger of permanent harm. The response to this 
“simultaneously scientific and human problem” that demands a high level of “vigilant 
prudence and self-criticism”, they argue, has to put efficacy at the center of the 
research and the therapeutic approach (Fanon, 2018:291). They point out that 
although there was theoretical criticism of electroshocks in the literature, the existing 
discrepancies on whether, when and in which cases should be used have their origin 
in the key theoretical mistake that conceives personality and “so-called constitutions” 
as fixed. This omits the “dynamism of personality” and impedes to apply these 
techniques in a hospital designed to reconstruct personality (Fanon, 2018: 293).  
Moreover, predating the negative public perception and the regulation of shock 
treatments, Tosquelles and Fanon assert that such techniques have no therapeutic use 




electroconvulsive therapy,  when used, are not the central element but a resource or a 
complement, a part of a wider process of dissolution and reconstruction of 
personality. The central elements, they add, are the human relations and the activities 
that take place in the hospital “during the process of rediscovery of the ego and the 
world” (Fanon, 2018: 294). The reconstruction of the ego and the world is partly 
directed through organizing and preparing the activities, the group and the milieu in 
which the patient is placed, but it also takes place in the spontaneous and collective 
life of the hospital in which the group is embedded.  
Treating patients using this approach, we insist, necessitates granting the 
greatest importance to hospital arrangements, to the classification and 
grouping of patients, as well as to the concomitant establishment of group 
therapies. The co-existence of the workshop, the wards and the social life of 
the entire hospital is just as essential as the stage of active, interventionist 
analysis preceding the treatment. Outside the possibility of such therapeutic 
linkages, the Bini cure appears to us a complete nonsense. (Fanon, 2018: 
295) 
 
It is this interplay between organization and spontaneity, the connection between 
specific activities to the daily life, the simultaneous presence and absence of the 
therapist that distinguishes institutional psychotherapy from Anglo-Saxon group 
therapies such as ergotherapies, psychodramas or activities carried out through 
sessions. The latter attempt to have an impact on the patient’s life “through artificial 
and short-lived conditions”, whereas institutional psychotherapy takes the patient’s 
everyday lived experience as the starting point and integrates different activities, 
sessions and therapies in the daily life of the collective (Fanon, 2018: 296).   
Tosquelles observes that the creative and innovative decay of institutional 
psychotherapy obeyed to a growing corporatism, the distinction of the role of the 
psychiatrist through the new status of civil servants that rigidified the patient-doctor 
relations, and the tension with the administrative and bureaucratic apparatus. From 




hospitals and sector psychiatry. The technocratic orientation towards the management 
of mental health institutions and diagnostics was accompanied by bureaucratic 
requirements, homogenization and standardization measures, and a managerial 
economy as if a  company orientedincrease productivity, contrasted with the diversity 
and the lack of a single model to reorganize the institution that was intrinsic to 
institutional psychotherapy (Tosquelles, 1987). Likewise, Tosquelles thinks of the 
current developments in psychiatry, such as the DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders) a U.S. promoted system of classification of mental 
illness and nosographic categories, or the prevalence of cognitive- behavioral 
methods, as a step back of 200 years. 
Today the hospital of Saint-Alban, renamed after Tosquelles, bears little trace of 
the stay of the Catalan psychiatrist. The place has been described as cold and orderly, 
tidy and inhospitable; an open warehouse forming a “quilted universe” that 
sugarcoats aggressiveness and comfortably masks relations of authority.  Isolation is 
back, certain patients are labelled as incurable and out of place in the hospital, and 
security and control through camera systems have replaced the demolished walls of 
the hospital (Favereau and Artières, 2016). 
In light of the current developments in psychiatry and its dominant tendencies 
Laure Murat wonders whether this this third symbolic revolution has failed as such, 
that is, in changing the categories of perception. However, she points out that in 
contrast to the moral treatment of Pinel and the psychoanalysis of Freud, which, as 
critics have shown, contained conservative components through the reinforcement of 
the normative position of the psychiatrist or by readdressing traditional societal 
elements respectively, the explorations of disalienation, human freedom and 




conservative closure to the crisis in psychiatry. For Murat this suggests its failure as a 
symbolic revolution, but it also turns it into a “true revolution”, which she describes 
as “a movement in perpetual becoming, in eternal resumption, whose subversive 
dimension society is not capable to absorb.” (Murat, 2014: 18; italics in the original; 
my translation
177
) For Fanon and others this would not be exactly so. In the next 
chapters we will see how institutional psychotherapy focuses excessively on the 
inside of the asylum and neglects its wider role in society. However, the lack of 
closure that Murat points out, makes the work of Tosquelles and the circle of Saint-
Alban significant beyond its concrete context or historical time, for it also 
interpellates the present and can help to interrogate current events that exceed the 
hospital and the psychiatric. 
Conclusion 
 Fanon would move to Algeria with these concerns in mind and determined to 
implement Tosquelles approach in his psychiatric work in Algeria. The next chapter 
attempts to contextualize Fanon’s psychiatric work in Algeria and the obstacles he 
found to facilitate interaction and cure. As we have seen, the origin and the 
elaboration of institutional psychotherapy were closely related to contexts of war. 
However, Fanon, arriving before the outbreak of the colonial work found a society 
structured around the impossibility of interaction and the encounter between humans. 
In other words, Algerian society itself was premised upon the conditions of the 
psychiatric hospital which he attempted to transform.  
In this setting, psychiatry as practiced in the colonies was instrumental to maintain 
and legitimize the setting of oppression, through the construction of the Muslim, the 
pathologization of political manifestations and their role in shaping social policies, 
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 « une vraie révolution, c’est-à-dire un mouvement en perpétuel devenir, dans l’éternelle reprise, 




while at the same time conceived itself as an element of modernization and 
civilization. This elicited an ambivalent relation of the Algerian towards medicine. 
On one side, the technical superiority was acknowledged, and on the other it was 






















Chapter 5. Madness and Colonialism 
Introduction 
As stated in the previous chapter. the stay of Fanon in Saint-Alban was a formative 
experience that he attempted to translate to the Blida-Joinville hospital in Algeria. 
However, at his arrival in Algeria, more than a year before the outbreak of the war, 
Fanon found a qualitatively different situation than the contexts of war in which 
Tosquelles had worked. Colonialism was not a form of domination but an ubiquitous 
form of oppression and exploitation that permeated everyday life, denied the 
possibility of humanity to colonized subjects and produced specific forms of mental 
disease.  Moreover, the intricate relation between medicine and colonialism elicited 
highly ambivalent responses in the Algerian populations. Concretely, colonial 
psychiatry in North Africa and in the rest of the continent was dominated by a racist 
understanding of the African and the Arab subjects, and was instrumental to 
dehumanization and repression. This chapter covers Fanon’s critical deconstruction 
of colonial alienation and colonial psychiatry before engaging in his reconstructive 
work in the next chapter.  To provide an account of all these aspects I have structured 
this chapter in the following way: 
The first section situates Fanon’s psychiatric practice in colonial Algeria by 
focusing on the key distinction he establishes between conquest and colonization. The 
birth of institutional psychotherapy was closely linked to the condition of war, 
concretely World War II and the Nazi occupation of France. Fanon arrived in Algeria 
before the outbreak of the independence war and found a qualitatively different 
situation. The interactions and encounters that Tosquelles and Oury attempted to 
favor inside the hospital as the central therapeutic element in contrast to the 




Colonialism creates a society of rigid spatial separations and also a fundamental 
distinction between the human and the subhuman that produces a different set of 
problems regarding the mental problems that it generates, and also in relation to the 
role of psychiatry, the function of the asylum and the meaning of health in a society 
that produces mental disease. 
The second section delves into the relation between medicine and colonialism both 
as exemplifying the double logic of colonialism: medicine rationalizes the 
humanitarian logic and is at the same time instrumental in conquest and oppression. 
In “Medicine and colonialism” Fanon describes how for the intricacy of the Western 
medicine with the rest of the colonial apparatus, whether its military, economic, or 
administrative aspects, produces an ambivalent response in the colonized. On the one 
side it is rejected, not because of its foreign origin but because of it active intricacy 
with colonial power. On the other side, the colonized acknowledge the technological 
advances and healing possibilities of colonial medicine. This ambivalence, which 
epitomizes the difficulty of the encounter and the relationship, provokes a crisis in the 
colonized in the sense that they are forced to make a choice. Through these dramatic 
choices, which often militate against the colonized themselves, and by developing 
ethnography of the consultation room, Fanon offers a piercing analysis of colonial 
alienation in relation to medicine.  
The third section draws on the previous account of alienation to explore the 
relation between power, oppression, subjectivity, the psyche and embodiment in 
Fanon’s work and also in relation to Judith’s Butler’s meditation of the psychic life of 
power, and Lewis Gordon’s Fanonian phenomenology of power as empowerment. 
The notion of power as empowerment is one of the connecting elements of Fanon’s 




The fourth section analyzes another of the problems that Fanon encountered in his 
psychiatric practice in Algeria, the racist and colonial psychiatry. To that effect, I will 
resort to the primary sources and to the work of historians of psychiatry.  Psychiatry 
in North Africa was dominated by the Algiers School at the epistemic, institutional 
and organizational levels, and in the British colonial Africa by John Colin Carothers, 
an expert of the WHO. Their theoretical work on the North African Muslim and the 
black African respectively was instrumental to the dehumanization, the construction 
of the Arab and the African stereotype and the legitimization of repression, punitive 
measures and shaping policies in the colony. Relying on biology and culture, the 
Arab and the African were similarly denied subjectivity and represented as having 
low mental activity, emotional, pathological liars, aggressive and violent.  
The fifth section addresses the critiques of colonial psychiatry. In France they took 
place in the beginning of the 1990’s, on the basis of their biological essentialism and 
lack of scientificity. However, Fanon’s critiques of Carothers’ and Porot in Les 
damnés de la terre and his psychiatric writings point, interestingly, in other direction. 
He does not denounce the essentialism, the bias or their poor scientific basis. Neither 
does he directly reject the stereotypes of the Arab and the African. Instead, he 
subverts them by considering the political and historical context and interpreting the 
behavior of the colonized as different symptoms of alienation. 
5.1 Algeria is a large hospital 
At the end of 1953 Fanon was appointed Chef de Service of the Blida-Joinville 
psychiatric hospital in Algeria. If the experience of war, both the Spanish Civil War 
and the German Occupation, had decisively informed the emergence and the 
development of institutional psychotherapy, the situation that Fanon found at his 




terms of the structures that colonialism imposes and its effects on Algerian people at 
the level of everyday life. Such difference could be explained through his distinction 
between conquest and the oppression that colonialism entails:   
Under the German occupation, the French remained human beings; under the 
French occupation, the German remained human beings. In Algeria, there is 
not only domination but the decision to the letter to occupy the sum total of 
the territory. Algerian men, women wearing ‘haik’, the palm groves and the 
camels form the landscape, the natural background for the French human 
presence. (…) Colonization has succeeded when all this indocile nature has 





Besides a form of domination, colonialism requires a systematic redesign and the 
imposition of structures that aim at reducing the colonized to a state of animality. 
Again, Fanon’s emphasis on temporality helps to shed light on the character of 
colonialism and the effects of oppression:   
Because it is the systematic negation of the other, a fervent decision to deny 
the other all the attributes of humanity, colonialism forces the dominated 
people to constantly ask themselves the question: ‘In reality, who am I? 




As Gordon points out, oppression pushes the colonized into the aforementioned 
zone of nonbeing, outside self-other relations. Thus, the derived question “Who am 
I?” could be posed as “What am I?” (Gordon, 2015: 128). This anthropological and 
existential question addresses not so much the cultural identity of being French, 
Algerian, black, Muslim, African, a combination of them or all of them, as the 
challenged belonging to the realm of humanity.   
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 « Sous l'occupation allemande les Français étaient demeurés des hommes. Sous l'occupation 
française, les Allemands sont demeurés des hommes. En Algérie, il n'y a pas seulement domination, 
mais à la lettre décision de n'occuper somme toute qu'un terrain. Les Algériens, les femmes en «haïk», 
les palmeraies et les chameaux forment le panorama, la toile de fond naturelle de la présence humaine 
française. (…)(…)La colonisation est réussie quand toute cette nature indocile est enfin matée. » 
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 « Parce qu'il est une négation systématisée de l'autre, une décision forcenée de refuser à l'autre tout 
attribut d'humanité, le colonialisme accule le peuple dominé à se poser constamment la question: « Qui 




 In the effort to tame what is considered a hostile nature and denying the attributes 
of humanity, to produce culture, meaning, to establish relations with the environment 
and with fellow humans, colonialism, Fanon notes, seeps into the bodies and the 
minds of the colonized. Fanon observes that before colonialism was contested, the 
constant and accumulated “noxious stimulants” of everyday life produced the 
collapse of the defenses of the colonized, which leads a great number of them to 
psychiatric hospitals. As he states, “During this calm period of successful 
colonization there is a regular and important mental pathology directly produced by 
oppression.” (Fanon, 1961:240; my translation
180
)  In a similar vein, colonial Algeria 
was described by the Algerian novelist Kateb Yacine as a large hospital (Keller, 
2007). Yacine’s statement is not metaphorical, the barriers that Fanon attempted to 
break inside the hospital through the application of institutional psychotherapy were 
the defining elements of social life outside of the hospital. As we will see in further 
detail, this produces not only different types of mental troubles to be treated inside the 
asylum, but, it also complicates the relation between the framework of psychiatry and 
society, and what it means to heal in a pathogenic and sick society. 
5.2 Alienating medicine 
Another decisive element that conditioned Fanon’s psychiatric work in Algeria 
stemmed from the relation that had been historically established between medicine 
and colonialism, and particularly from the role that psychiatry played in fostering and 
maintaining oppression. Fanon faced the paradox of trying to cure in a space that was 
embedded in a political, administrative, and military apparatus that produced 
suffering. Historian Richard Keller observes that medicine “constitutes a site of 
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colonial surveillance and the clinic a means of amassing useful data in the assistance 
of domination.” (Keller, 2011: 211)  Hubert Lyautey, the military and colonial 
administrator who led the French conquest of Morocco, asserted that medicine “is the 
only excuse for colonialism.” Yet he later added that the physician, ‘‘if he 
understands his role, is the primary and most effective of our agents of pacification 
and penetration.’’ (quoted in Keller, 2011: 216). In these two sentences Lyautey 
captures the inseparable doubleness of the colonial logic and the role that medicine 
plays in it. Medicine provided a rationalization for the humanitarianism of 
colonialism as the carrier of civilization, education, and health, while concurrently it 
assisted to and legitimized the alienation, torture, and war against local populations.   
Fanon’s clinical work in Algeria had to navigate between these two poles, which 
were not always easily distinguishable. In the chapter “Medicine and Colonialism” 
from L’an V de la revolution Algérienne, Fanon exposes the aforementioned intricacy 
of medicine with the colonial project: the relation between doctors and the army, the 
experimentation on Algerian patients, the humiliating behavior of certain physicians, 
their use of truth serums and electroshocks disregarding their effects, their active 
participation in tortures, and their complicity of doctors with the police and the 
tribunals in the elaboration of false medical reports. Keller asserts that Fanon 
“presents medicine and psychiatry as ideological instruments of colonial power.” 
(Keller, 2011: 199). Yet this is a fragmentary view of the shaded landscape that 
Fanon faced in his clinical practice and also captured in that chapter.  
 Following the trail of “The North African Syndrome”, in “Medicine and 
Colonialism” Fanon also offers an ethnographic account of the problems of disease 
and health in the colony by looking at how the structures of meaning, attitudes and 




treatment are tragically informed by colonial structures. The double function of 
colonial medicine that blurs the distinction between health and oppression manifests a 
crisis. Crisis is etymologically related to to decide or requiring a decision in front of a 
problem. In this situation the colonized faces an “abiding need for vacillation” about 
their resort to colonial medicine; a decision that would place them in one of the two 
sides of the poisoned colonial logic (Beneduce, 2016: 17; my translation
181
). As 
Roberto Beneduce points out, through the hesitations and indecisions of the colonized 
Fanon elaborates a portrait of different angles of colonial alienation that enable him to 
shed light on the “grey areas of colonialism”. Besides the frontal opposition to 
colonial psychiatry, Fanon trudged through this double facet of medicine and, had to 
develop forms of transborder thinking that reached into these grey areas as a way to 
reconstruct the practice of psychiatry and envisage medical treatment.   
Fanon notices that ambivalence is one of the structural features of the colonial 
world. Like other technologies, values, practices and ways of being, colonial 
medicine is perceived with a profound ambivalence.  The colonized is aware of the 
technical superiority of colonial doctors and the potential benefits that Western 
medicine could offer. However, in a situation that impedes nuanced responses, where 
“[t]he truth objectively expressed is constantly vitiated by the lie of the colonial 
situation” (Fanon, 1959: 116; my translation
182
), the avowal of this contribution 
would be interpreted by colonizers as an invitation to reinforce their presence.  
 The reason for the ambivalent relation towards medicine does not lie in the 
adamant attachment to local forms of healing, in the clash of modernity against 
tradition, in the expectations or disappointments regarding the different pace and 
intensity of healing of biomedicine versus local techniques, or an intrinsic fatalism, as 
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sociologists and anthropologist would argue, but in the direct association of Western 
medicine, doctors and hospitals to colonial occupation and the concomitant 
dispossession, exploitation, and humiliation.  “The colonized perceives the doctor, the 
engineer, the schoolteacher, the policeman and the countryside ranger through an 
almost organic confusion.” (Fanon, 1959: 109; my translation
183
) Accepting colonial 
medicine would thus reinforce and legitimize the whole colonial system, and it would 
also imply taking an active part in it (Fanon, 1959). 
The dilemma that is tragically posed is that the desire and the need to save the life 
of a fellow Algerian entail resorting to a space of healing and life and conjointly of 
oppression and death. This ambivalence “tears the choices and consciousness of 
Algerians” (Beneduce, 2016: 17; my translation
184
) to the extent of taking self-
damaging decisions, of adopting, as Butler puts it, an “attachment to subjection” as 
the product of operation of power (Butler, 1997: 6). Fanon offers instances of the 
exacerbated ambivalences, doubts and indecisions of Algerians in life or death cases: 
the “apparent rejection of the father (…) to owe the life of his child to the intervention 
of the colonizer” (1959: 116; my translation
185
), the refusal to hospitalization despite 
the warnings of the doctors that hesitating and postponing the treatment would 
compromise the life of the patient, or the doubts of the group about the hospitalization 
of a seriously ill Algerian. The last minute decision to hospitalize the fellow, taken 
unilaterally and against the will of the group, usually arrives too late. The often 
demise of the patient would raise feelings of guilt and betrayal, which are followed by 
reaffirming the position against colonial medicine (Fanon, 1959).   
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 « Le colonisé perçoit dans une confusion presque organique le médecin, l’ingenieur, 
l’instituteur, le policier, le garde-champêtre .» 
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 « déchire les choix et la conscience des Algériens »  
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The ambivalence persists when the doctor is Algerian. On the one side the 
colonized are proud of one of them having mastered the technique of the colonizer; 
on the other side, the colonized doctor is suspicious of belonging to the side of the 
oppressor. Fanon observes that the colonized doctor, like other members of the elite, 
is economically interested in the maintenance of colonialism and often takes sides 
with the colonizer by directing militias and raids. Likewise, the local doctor looks 
down to local forms of medicine with special contempt since he feels obliged to 




Like other colonized intellectuals, the doctor “often finds himself in an unstable 
position” product of concrete although unsteady circumstances (Fanon, 1959: 121; 
my translation
187
). In “Racism and Culture” Fanon provides instances of another side 
of this instability, now during the anticolonial struggle and the intellectuals’ 
revalorization of the tradition –“another example of ‘withdrawal’, another type of 
indecision” (Beneduce, 2016; 18; my translation
188
): “the Arab doctors sleep on the 
ground, spitting anywhere”, “the black intellectuals consulting a sorcerer before 
taking a decision” (Fanon, 1964: 51; my translation
189
). 
As Harry G. West and Todd Sanders collect in the volume Ethnographies of 
Suspicion (2003), the inherent difficulty to identify the location and the direction of 
the working of power, its ambiguity, opacity and contradictory quality elicits 
disquieting psychological and social experiences and responses of suspicion. In the 
visit of the Algerian to the doctor as described by Fanon the consultation room is a 
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«  sa nouvelle appartenance à un univers rationnel » 
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 « se trouve fréquemment  en porte-à-faux. » 
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 « autre exemple de « repli », autre genre de vacillement » 
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 « Les médecines Arabes dorment par terre, crachent n’importe où » « Les intellectuels noirs 




space of suspicion and conflict, the continuation of the imposed splits that order the 
“infernal labyrinth” that is the colonial society (Fanon, 1959:114; my translation
190
).  
The doctor-patient encounter is not the meeting of two individualities, Fanon 
asserts, their characteristics and relations are standardized by the colonial framework. 
The Algerian is tense and rigid in front of “at the same time a technician and a 
colonizer.” (Fanon, 1959: 115; my translation
191
) Like in the “North African 
Syndrome”, the body, the symptoms and the suffering of the patient are opaque to the 
doctor. The pain is general, diffused and exceeds the tact of the doctor. An objective 
approach to illness, the etiology, symptomatology, or nosology do not enable to 
recognize the conflict, grasp the tensions that traverse the body of the patient, and the 
historicity that shapes symptoms, behaviors and the medical encounter itself (Gibson 
and Beneduce, 2017). If the body of the colonized is incomprehensible to the doctor, 
the words of the doctor are filtered through the doubts of the Algerian.  In this 
atmosphere of mutual mistrust, muddied perception and hampered communication for 
the colonized the slightest remark is offensive, and will cast doubt on the diagnosis of 
the doctor.  
Fanon adds that for the colonized, to leave the consultation room with the body 
intact and a few pills as a treatment is felt like a victory. Despite the prescription, the 
patient does not follow the treatment and only comes back much later when the 
disease is more acute. If the patient follows the treatment, which implies admitting 
the colonizer’s approach, in many cases it is compensated and superimposed with 
local forms of medicine. The patient feels like the embodiment of the clash of 
mutually excluding values; “the fear of being the battleground of different and 
opposed forces” gives rise to tensions and stresses that alter the initial clinical picture 
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 « labyrinthe infernal »  
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(Fanon, 1959: 119; my translation
192
). As Roberto Beneduce summarizes, “[e]very 
ambivalence between imaginaries and epistemologies, every hesitation between 
values reflect a universe of conflict and lie.” (Beneduce, 2016: 18; my translation
193
) 
The ambivalence, doubts, paradoxical positions, and fatalistic choices in relation 
to the problems of disease and health respond to a situation saturated with violence, 
hunger, unemployment, cultural contempt, inferiority complex and the lack of future 
perspectives.  For “the disinherited of all the regions of the world” life is not 
understood in terms of blossoming and fulfillment, but “as constant struggle against 
an atmospheric death.” Thus, Fanon writes, “[t]he attitudes of refusal or the rejection 
of medical treatment are not a rejection of life but a larger passivity in front of that 
close and contagious death." (Fanon, 1959: 116; own italics; my translation
194
) 
5.3 Power, psyche and body 
Colonial medicine may not only be alienating and an instrument of oppression, 
but, as Fanon emphasizes, it is embedded in broader and concrete processes and 
relations of power that shape meanings, expectations, desires, attitudes, symptoms 
and behaviors. This illustrates in its colonial and racial dimensions what Butler 
accounts in The Psychic Life of Power and is present throughout Fanon’s work in 
different instances: the infiltration of power into the constitution of the self to the 
extent of hiding the moment and the process of constitution, and the origin of power. 
“[P]ower that at first appears as external, pressed upon the subject, pressing the 
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 « la crainte d’être le lieu de rencontre de forces différentes et opposées. » 
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 « Chaque ambivalence entre imaginaires et épistémologies, chaque hésitation entre des valeurs 
renvoie à des positions définies par un univers de conflit et de mensonge. » 
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 «déshérités de toutes les régions du monde » «comme lutte permanente contre une mort 
atmosphérique. » « Les conduites de refus ou de rejet de l’intervention médicale ne sont pas refus de la 




subject into subordination, assumes a psychic form that constitutes the subject's self-
identity.” (Butler 1997: 3)  
Were this Fanon’s only view of power the prognostic of the situation would be a 
dead-end one. Fanon believed in human liberation and did not understood power just 
as a force of control and constriction, neither of resistance and opposition to 
subjection, but as related to creativity and empowerment, as we saw in the previous 
chapters. The creative aspect is contained in Fanon’s notion of sociogeny, as already 
stated. Sociogeny addresses the interrelation between the subjective and the objective 
levels and underlines human agency and creativity in the constitution of the social 
world. The human establishes relations and generates and gives meaning to 
structures, institutions, practices, rules and ways of living while in turn it is also 
constituted by them. Sociogeny analyses the interaction of the subject to the structure, 
not only for its subjection but how it can participate in changing the structure. At the 
core of sociogeny lies thus the possibility of the transformation of social structures, 
institutions and the very human being. This is what Fanon in Black Skin White Masks 
calls being “actional” (Fanon, 1952) in opposition to the “larger passivity”, reactivity, 
or defensive and contracting positions. Being actional is to participate in the 
collective construction of the social world, or as Lewis Gordon puts it, to have an 
effect on the world. 
Gordon’s phenomenological description of the relation between individual and 
structures (Gordon, 2006a: 102-105) can help to illuminate Fanon’s understanding of 
empowerment and oppression, and is pertinent to explain the crisis, the decision of 
the colonized in relation to medicine. For Gordon, the individual relates to the social 
structure through a relationship between choices and options. Choices or human 




Oppression results from the reduction of the options available. Under this situation 
the ability to choose is unaffected but the choices are now redirected towards how to 
respond and relate to the absence of or the limited options. In other words, choices 
revolve around the chooser; oppression restricts the domain of reach and influence on 
the world and produces a movement of contraction. The reiteration and intensification 
of this inward orientation produces what Gordon calls implosion, when the scope of 
reach and interaction are limited to one’s body and “the choices become entirely 
about the constitution of the self” (Gordon, 2006a: 104). Hence, Gordon adds, the 
question “In reality, who am I?”, that as Fanon declares, “colonialism forces the 
dominated people to constantly ask themselves” (Fanon, 1961: 240; own italics; my 
translation
195
). Oppression leads the efforts of groups to self-deprecation, self-
questioning, and compulsive self-repair.  
The “human world”, Gordon notices, “is not only infused with power but also the 
expression of it” (Gordon, 2018: 20). Oppression and the concomitant inward turn are 
an expression of power. And also an expression of power is the transformation and 
the increase of options that would facilitate outward choices and the expansive 
movement of relationships and interactions that would have an effect on the world. In 
this situation inward choices, when taken, would not be imposed by a limiting 
externality. Far from intricate definitions of power Gordon succinctly defines it as 
“the ability to make things happen with access to the means of doing so.” (2018: 20).  
Power is the ability to live outwardly, to make choices that would initiate a 
chain of effects in the social world that would constitute a set of norms and 
institutions that would affirm one’s belonging in the world instead of 
simulating a flight from it to an infinitesimal, inwardly directed path of 
madness and despair. (Gordon, 2006a: 105) 
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 As Gordon notes, crisis have a component of bad faith, of self-delusion. They inhibit 
choice by “through the presentation of ossified values” (1995: 22). That is, the 
problem appears as given and reified instead of having a human origin and human 
solutions. The way the colonized chose to respond to the imposed limited options, 
whether through indecisions, passivity, defensive positions, reactivity or withdrawal 
conceals the origin of the problem and their agency in the formation and the solution 
of the problem.  
However, that the psychiatric is deeply embedded in the wider social and political 
situation does not imply that they are to be convoluted. Fanon did not see mental 
illness as uniquely derived from the political situation, nor did he address political 
issues uniquely through psychiatry. He envisaged his psychiatric work in Algeria as 
part of the expansion of options and an opening to the world by transforming an 
institution of oppression into a human and humanizing one that would foster 
disalienation and the agency of the patients, that is, that brings to the front their role 
as subjects of disalienation.  
 
5.4 The Algiers School and colonial  psychiatry 
The psychiatry that Fanon found at his arrival revolved around the figure of the 
psychiatrist Antoine Porot at the level of teaching, research, clinical practice and the 
organization of the mental care system in Algeria, although his influence extended to 
other regions of the Maghreb, Indochina, Madagascar, and the metropolitan France. 
Porot and his students set the doctrinal and structural foundations of psychiatry in the 
colony, yet also the scientific basis for the rationalization of the domination of 
colonized populations. If medicine in the colonies, as we saw, had this ambivalent 
character of cure and conquest, healing and killing, psychiatry, although also integral 




the level of sub-humanity. The understanding of the Muslim as inherently aggressive, 
impulsive, incapable of truth, reflection and moral discernment, and for whom there 
was no possible rehabilitation, rationalized the maintenance of the social order 
through confinement, punishment and force (Keller, 2007a).  
Porot taught neuropsychiatry since 1917 and since 1925 hosted the only chair in 
psychiatry at the faculty of medicine of the University of Algiers, thereby training 
practically all Algerian psychiatrists and subsequently forming the Algiers School of 
psychiatry. Besides research and teaching, Porot played a decisive role in the 
establishment of the mental health system in North Africa following the report of the 
1912 Tunis Congress. Therein was set the plan for the provision of mental health care 
to all members of the population in French North Africa according to the French law 
of 1838 (Collignon, 2006). In 1929, Porot submits the project for the first hospital 
exclusively dedicated to mental health assistance, the Blida Joinville Hospital. 
Following the military model, Porot organized a network of mental care institutions 
structured on three levels: the university hospital for acute cases, the psychiatric 
hospital for chronic patients, and the psychiatric hospice for cases of dementia 
(Kacha, 2009). As Keller’s archival work reveals, the project faced numerous 
economic, political and administrative constraints; the project required negotiating 
with the French metropolitan government, local authorities and neighboring farmers 
who showed no interest in investing in the construction of hospitals. The enterprise 
took shape due to Porot’s intense personal involvement, influence and lobbying 
activity. In light of the obstacles the construction of the Blida hospital acquired a 




1938 “in the spirit of exaltation of the French civilizing mission” (Collignon, 2006: 
533; my translation
196
).   
Porot and the French psychiatrists in the Maghreb conceived themselves as new 
versions of Pinel, entrusted with the humanitarian mission of freeing the natives from 
the chains and the imprisonment of the theretofore pitiful conditions of mental health 
treatment. Moreover, the implementation of a psychiatric system following the 
French model was part of a strategy of implementing innovations with the aim of 
enhancing and revalorizing lands, resources and the productivity in French territories. 
Thus the psychiatric system in North Africa functioned also as a form of deepening 
the social and territorial control (Keller, 2007a). Until then, mental health patients 
were treated in the metropolis, mostly in Marseille and Aix-en-Provence. The new 
hospital entailed a shift in the treatment of mental illness through the incorporation of 
modern techniques and a focus on mental care instead of confinement  (Collignon, 
2006; Keller, 2007a).  
The psychiatric hospitals, separated by gender and race, enabled the Algiers 
School to delve into their ongoing theorization on the psychic life and the mental 
structure of the colonized. Porot retook the pre-colonial orientalist descriptions of the 
Muslim offered by ethnologists, travelers, merchants, passing doctors and military. In 
1843, alienist Jacques Moureau, inquiring on the relation between civilization and 
madness, had described the Arabs as fatalistic, passive and alien to moral life, on 
climatic, cultural, religious grounds. Likewise, he argued that climate and Islam are 
also the reasons for the few rate of mental illness that he found among Arab 
populations (Collignon, 2006). In 1896, Abel-Joseph Meilhon, a doctor in Aix-en-
Provence, publishes his first works on comparative description and classification of 
                                                 
196




illnesses. Meilhon emphasizes the difference between the mental structure of the 
Arabs and the Kabyles. This distinction would be a constant in colonial psychiatry 
and anthropology. The latter are described as more complex beings whereas the Arab 
is depicted as fatalistic, impulsive, vindictive, and with a tendency to violence. 
Meilhon explains that in terms of “a state of cerebral inferiority congenital within the 
race,” (quoted in Gibson and Beneduce, 2017). Meilhon also denounces the 
conditions of the Algerians patients of mental health, the inhumanity of the 
transportations and the inadequacy of the treatments provided in France. He 
emphasized that the lack of access to mosques, the inadequate French diets and the 
language barriers were obstacles for the improvement of the patients. He proposed the 
humane treatment of the patients in their lands of origin (Gibson and Beneduce, 
2017).  
During colonization psychiatry and its knowledge on the colonized became 
instrumental for the maintenance of the social order and the repression of dissidence. 
Since its origin, colonial medicine and psychiatry were intrinsically linked to the 
army. A case in point is the 1908 « Étude psychologique sur l’Islam » of   Maurice 
Boigey, a military doctor in North Africa. He argues that whereas European culture is 
dynamic, creative, active and governed by the “Idea”. Muslim nations are halted in 
their evolution, and fundamentally passive and paralytic in their psychological 
typology. His answer to his question “What is a Muslim?” is straightforward: a 
Muslim is someone incapable of thought, of art and beauty, of science, of sailing, of 
building. A Muslim is frozen, static, and in the same stage of evolution since the 
times of the prophet Mohammed:  
[The Muslim] has the same passions, the same manias, the same vices, the 




horizons as those coreligionists who were contemporary of Mohammed. 




The whole clinical and military framework that Boigey creates revolves around 
the idea that Islam is a vital and nervous center that invisibly connects all Muslims. 
On that basis, he argues that “the koranic mental structure” (Boigey, 1908: 12; my 
translation
198
) is inherently pathological. It induces the Muslim brain into a 
“neuropathic state” characterized by the lack of intellectual aptitudes,  “perversions of 
sexual instinct goes hand in hand with perversion of feelings and the aberration of the  
moral sense” (Boigey, 1908: 9;autor’s translation
199
), withdrawal, choleric outbursts, 
hallucinations that result in sudden crimes and other types of deliria and follies.  
This psychological portrait elicits practical suggestions for the military defeat of 
Muslims troops. One key element is to remove Muslims from their only vital force: 
“When a deft hand, foreign to Islam, cuts the threads of the central organ, Muslims, 
thereby isolated, become paralyzed.” (Boigey, 1908: 10; my translation
200
) Islam is 
basically the actor and the person is the puppet. Bereft of Islam Muslims have no 
sense of individuality and initiative and are in a state of constant suggestion. Another 
practical suggestion is to attack Muslim troops must be attacked according to their 
cerebral lacunae, that is, not frontally but from different sides at the same time for his 
brain cannot respond to these simultaneous stimuli.  
Informed by these early accounts, the relation between colonial domination, and 
by the positivist approach to criminology and legal medicine of Cesare Lombroso, 
Porot and the Algiers School attempted to set the scientific foundations for the study 
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of the mentality of the Algerian. In their work, culture, religion or customs as 
explanative elements of Algerian behavior were not discarded but faded into the 
background in favor of systematic and scientific approach to the Muslim mental 
structure. In “Notes de psychiatrie Musulmane” (1918), Porot gathers his 
observations on the young Algerians recruited for the war, a “shapeless mass of 
primitives deeply ignorant and credulous in their most” (Porot, 1918: 377).  By 
contrasting with European mental structures, he constructs the North African 
personality, on the basis of the theory of constitution, as inherently pathological.  The 
“native” is characterized by  “the vigorous force of certain primitive instincts”, 
“religious and fatalist metaphysics” “suggestibility”, “affective life reduced to the 
minimum”, “passivity”, “mental debility”, “pathological stagnation”, “savage 
hysteria, brutal and violent crisis”, “mental puerility”, or “lack of scientific appetite”  
(Porot, 1918; my translation
201
).  
The writing of the Algiers school range from addressing hysteria, epilepsy and 
mental disorders in relation to biological difference, legal psychiatry, sexuality, 
alcoholism, primitivism and mental disease, to what would be a recurrent thesis in the 
construction of the North African, “the criminal impulsivity of the North African 
indigenous” (Porot and Arrii, 1932: 588: my translation
202
).  
The question of the violent character of the North African was a central element in 
the construction of the North African stereotype and a constant concern for defining 
colonial security policies and social control measures, for the repression of 
manifestations of anticolonial character, and also affected the metropolis through the 
increasing migration from the Maghreb. The first scientific account on Algerian 
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criminality dates back to Kocher’s study in 1883. Sextius Arène dedicated to first 
study on criminality in Tunisia in 1913 as a dissertation on legal medicine. In what is 
a recurrent pattern in colonial studies, the author detaches the violence and crime of 
the North African from the framework of colonial violence and of domination. He 
observes that major crimes have statistically decreased due to the civilizing action of 
France. However, this has been insufficient to diminish petty criminality. Petty 
criminality is explained on the basis of the lack of assimilation to French moral and 
laws, intoxication, or the “strong genital temperament of the Arab” (Arène, 1913: 
171-172; my translation
203
) resulting not only in sexual crimes but mostly in 
vengeful, sudden crimes. Petty crimes are fundamentally violence among Tunisian 
whereas major crimes such as riots and revolts target French interests and citizens.  
Noteworthy is the conclusion he draws of the, at the time, recent riots and protests, 
from which Arène removes any political content:  “Recent riots have to be considered 
as mob crimes and not as signs of a xenophobic hatred, which tends on the contrary to 
disappear.” (Arène, 1913: 171; my translation
204
) In this particular case the author 
dismisses xenophobia as the reason behind revolts in favor of a mass outburst of rage, 
although he still considers the framework of xenophobia as explaining the crimes of 
Tunisian against colonizers.  
In colonial psychiatry, xenophobia was used as a “psychiatric label” (Gibson and 
Beneduce, 2017: 101). Porot writes that “the observation of all the xenophobic 
movements shows the role of crystallization almost constant of a mystic, a fanatic or 
the unrealistic.” (Porot and Arii, 1932: 596; my translation
205
) Although they 
categorize xenophobia as a political crime, they treat the phenomenon as the sudden 
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explosions of isolated individuals whose crime is cooked up silently until it suddenly 
explodes. The authors illustrate it with the case of the case of a 37 years old Algerian 
man sitting in a café who suddenly jumped against a group of European men and 
stabbed one of them.  During the interrogation  
he declared not knowing the victim, but he had wanted to sacrifice a ‘roumi’ 
despite knowing that he would be guillotined: ‘This double human sacrifice  
can save the world from the forthcoming five years of misery.’ This 
indigenous had left his village at the age of 17, living an errant life and 





In “L’impulsivité criminelle chez l’indigéne algerien. Ses facteurs” Porot and Arii  
argue that although there are coincident morbid factors with European criminality 
such as alcoholism, deliria or dementia, the impulsive tendencies of the Algerian are 
mostly based on their defective psychological constitution and on their mores, social 
habits and behaviors. Algerian criminality is explained by their lack of value for 
human life, including their family members’, and a lack of affective and moral life. 
Their obstinacy, immoderation, tendency to resentment, revenge, and their 
susceptibility provoke that the slightest vexation or futile dispute unleash dramatic 
event.  Likewise their attachment to ancestral customs, religious life and an acute 
instinct of possession and conservation elicit defensive attitudes such as delirious, 
anxious and passionel forms of jalousie. In this light, the “genital instinct” and the 
sense of property over women exacerbate blood crimes of passion. The authors link 
the manifestations of violence of the Algerian with epileptic episodes: an unforeseen 
aggressive outburst provokes a choleric and relentless violence which is followed by 
amnesia. The authors conclude that the virulence of the impulsivity of the Algerian is 
unseen in Europe. In contrast to the European cases, where impulsive criminality 
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results from some sort of impairment or pathological factor, in Algeria this 
phenomenon is not pathological but obeys to constitutional, social and cultural 
factors, it is fundamentally normal.  
Porot explains hysteric manifestations, which he had previously defined as part of 
Algerian psychology, as “the liberation of superior activities in favor of more 
primitive activities” (Porot, 1935; 264; my translation
207
). This obeys to 
morphological and anatomical reasons that situate the Algerian, as Fanon points out, 
at in the group of inferior vertebrates (Fanon, 1961: 290). In Porot’s words: 
The North African indigenous, with an important mental debility and whose 
higher and cortical activities are little evolved, is a primitive being whose 
essentially vegetative and instinctive life is mostly regulated by the 




If in his earlier texts Porot envisaged the rehabilitation of the North African 
through education or military service (1918), his subsequent combination of the 
theory of biological constitution, the racial degeneration theory, which focuses on the 
hereditary disposition, and the primitivism of Levy-Bruhl, condemns the Algerian to 
a fixed position closer to animals: 
Primitivism is not a lack of maturity, a pronounced cessation in the 
development of the individual psyche, it is a social condition that has 
reached the end of its evolution; it is adapted in a logical fashion to a life that 
is different from ours. It is not only a way of being resulting from a special 
education: it has far deeper foundations and we even think that it must have 
its substratum in a particular disposition of the architectonics, of at least of 
the dynamic hierarchizing of the nervous centers. (Porot and Sutter, quoted 
in Fanon, 2018: 407) 
 
The Algerian is not considered an infant who can be educated and developed, but 
has achieved the highest possible degree of maturation that their culture and biology 
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allow them. The destiny of the Algerian is thus linked to a race that ties them to an 
inescapable primitivism. This generates new problems:   
The multiple factors determining criminality, fatalism, impulsivity, brutal 
instincts, the tendency to lie, and so on, were viewed as intrinsic to all North 
Africans— embedded in their bodies and their traditions. Thus, learning new 
customs, and importantly the engaging with the civilizing mission itself, 
only produces new forms of madness (Gibson and Beneduce, 2017: 102). 
 
André Donnadieu called “civilizational psychosis” (1932; my translation
209
) to the 
mental disorders of the so-called evolués, the colonized who have pursued French 
formal education and have been in close contact with French law, morality, history, 
litterature and social life. The author established such diagnostic after the clinical 
framework of severe anxiety and attempted suicide of a Moroccan student. He argues 
that the pathology derived from the shock of being in close contact with French 
culture and passing without transition from a world dominated by religion, 
superstition and ancestral believes to the splendor of the French world. Donnadieu 
advised the patient to abandon his studies and go back to his customs and traditions in 
the countryside, after which, he reports, the patient did not relapse. Donnadieu 
concluded by recommending French authorities that only those rare Muslims with an 
extreme intelligence and higher aptitudes for assimilation and adaptation were 
prepared to combine these radically different civilizations. 
Primitivism, the civilizational psychosis, the ipathology of the Muslim, these 
understandings complicate education and discipline as means of developing the 
maturation that the humanitarian mission attempts and paves the way for 
segregationist measures and drastic forms action which place the North African in a 
concrete position within the psychiatric institutions and the social order. As Keller 
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notes “the essential structure for civilizing North Africans was therefore penal rather 
than educational, medical rather than cultural” (2007a: 144).  In Porot’s words, 
It is above all through (…) sanctions that we teach these simple and 
instinctive beings that human life must be respected, that collective interest 
prevails over individual interest; a thankless but necessary task  in the 




 Within this framework, conscious political manifestations, non-political 
behaviors that signal a lack of docility, mental disorders product of the oppressive 
conditions or expressions of violence are interpreted as symptoms. An example is the 
medical report, elaborated by Porot and Guttman (1918) on a Swiss woman 
imprisoned in Algeria for trying to influence Algerians against the French 
government, and particularly against inciting the desertion of Algerian soldiers 
recruited for the wars against Germany and Morocco, for which she had to face a 
military court. The authors diagnosed her with “Don Quixotism”, “that is, an ardent 
and altruistic passion, often reformative and socially committed, always in the search 
of a generous and fair cause to be defended” (Porot and Guttman, 1918: 108; my 
translation
211
).  Among the symptoms of the more concrete diagnosis of “senile 
Arabophilia” (Porot and Guttman,  1908: 119; my translation
212
) the authors count her 
insistence to learn Arabic, having conversations with North Africans, visiting  
Muslim injured soldiers, her conversion to Islam and her marriage to a Muslim man. 
As Gibson and Beneduce point out,it was the woman not being able to see the evident 
reality, the inferiority of the Muslim, what triggered the whole pathological apparatus 
on her (2017: 101). 
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As Collignon notes, the dehumanization and denial of subjectivity of the 
colonized in the colonial context favored the consideration of the North African as a 
tabula rasa upon which chemical and physical experimentations and innovations 
could be practiced. The reduced ethical, political and administrative limits of the 
colony in comparison to the metropolis endowed the self-declared ground-breaking 
psychiatrists with a limitless power which led to led to an abusive use of experimental 
techniques and to deepen the gulf between the physicians and the colonized 
(Collignon, 2006). The field of action of the Algiers School extended beyond their 
usual physical reach of the clinic and the prisons. The school actively participated in 
the program of “action psychologique” during the colonial war, in which 
psychological warfare played a central role in the colonial strategy.  Such program, 
framed within the civilizing mission, designed social policies, methods of 
interrogation, the pacification of populations from the schools to the hospitals in order 
to”modify unfavorable attitudes, (…) to reshape the Algerian mind by destroying its 
capacity for resistance” (Keller 2007a: 156, 159). 
Keller argues the Algiers school and their practices were “far from marginal”, 
rather, their “contributions to psychiatric research shifted the direction of the French 
psychiatry discipline between the First World War and the Algerian struggle for 
independence.” (2007: 3). However, after the independence of the colonies and their 
return to France, the members if the Algiers School got a second wind and extended 
their influence until the end of the 1980’s. The position of the members of the school 
hosting chairs of psychiatry in universities and important institutions enabled them to 
continue researching and spreading their theses. The emphasis moved from the native 
to the migrant, the most controversial aspects of Porot’s theories were toned down, 




discarding socio-economic considerations, the pathologies of migration were 
fundamentally explained on the basis of the pre-existing, psychological elements in 
the migrant, either latent or manifest. This psychological fragility explained the 
decision to migrate in the first place and then accounted for the migrant’s lack of 
adaption to the new context. The focus was put on the weak psychological substratum 
of the migrant, leaving unquestioned psychiatric institutions and knowledge, and the 
pathogenic role of the hosting society. Their research on migration was not translated 
into actual practices and devices to address the mental problems of migration (Doray, 
2006, Rechtman, 2012). Yet, as Richard Rechtman (2012) notes, this was not limited 
to the case of the Algiers School. Although different psychiatric approaches and 
independent initiatives to study and treat the pathologies of migration emerged in 
contestation to such views, there has been no political will at the state level, in France 
as in most Europen countries, to address the health problems of migrant and refugee 
populations beyond the common health structures and legal framework. No public 
health plan of data gathering, prevention and treatment of mental health issues of 
these social groups have been developed despite the prioritization of mental health 
questions since the 2000 in France. The situation of the Arab migrant in France that 
Fanon defined in 1952 as “an imbroglio” of which nobody wants to take care of, 
persists at different levels. The socioeconomic, the legal, the medical, questions of 
citizenship, the symbolic and the political intersect with the existential situation of the 
migrant. Rechtman writes  
At the level of the state, the health care of migrant populations, besides being 
a strictly medical question, is first and foremost a political issue in which the 
principles of the French universalism are regularly reaffirmed. (Rechtman, 
2012:  108-109; my translation
213
) 
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5.5 Psychiatry in Africa 
In the English colonial Africa the equivalent of Porot and the Algiers School 
would be the South African psychiatrist John Colin Carothers, who is considered one 
of the initiators of cultural psychiatry (Giordano, 2011). Supported by important 
publishing and institutional platforms, Carothers had been medical officer of the 
British colonial in Kenya, director of the Mathari Mental Hospital and the HM Prison 
in Nairobi from 1938 to 1950, and psychiatrist at St. James in Portsmouth, England. 
He was considered an international expert and was consultant for the World Health 
Organization, who published his 1953 report, The African Mind in Health and 
Disease; A Study in Ethnopsychiatry. In this work, which attempted to study the 
African psyche, particularly contrasting it with the European, he gathered cases, “that 
do not fit the European categories”, from different authors, disciplines and different 
African regions. He observed a coincidence in the psychiatric literature on the study 
of the African mind across their geographical, cultural, religious and ethnic 
variations. “Their essential similarity is therefore quite remarkable”, he concludes 
(Carothers, 1953: 158). Carothers drew on anthropological work, anatomy, psychiatry 
and electrophysiology. Although Carothers struggles to distance himself from the 
stereotypical African constructed by other colonial psychiatrists in favor of an 
objective approach (Gibson and Beneduce, 2017), his conclusions do not differ 
significantly and his text is rich in methodological and conceptual contradictions, and 
a convoluted attempt to define race in cultural rather than biological terms. 
Carothers refers to studies that affirm the relation between skin and cortex 
stemming from the embryo, thereby implying that if there are physical differences 
such as the skin, there are also mental differences (Carothers, 1953: 73). However, 




anatomical difference between the African and the European mind.  Therefore, there 
would not be a direct correlation between intelligence, aptitudes, behavior, mental 
structure or temperament and the physical constitution of the body. Instead, “most of 
the significant differences he found might be attributable to the greater complexity of 
the European’s social, intellectual and cultural background” (Carothers, 1953: 84).    
He then points out that the African psyche cannot be studied in isolation, but has 
to be considered alongside of what he thinks is the African experience. Thus, he 
brings cultural and historical factors to the forefront, including environmental, 
nutritional and educational and experiential elements. He argues that in contrast to 
European cultures which function in a dynamic way, this quality is absent in the 
African cases: “unlike modern Western cultures, all preliterates are relatively static” 
(Carothers, 1953: 54). This would be one of the decisive factors behind African 
psychology, which he characterizes by immaturity, impulsivity, uniformity and statis, 
not able to appreciate subtleties, having an infantile affective life and low level of 
brain activity. There are similarities “between the mentality of the normal primitive 
African and a certain type of aberrant European mentality commonly included under 
the title psychopathic” (Carothers, 1953: 138). 
Carothers concluded that the main characteristic of the African is his lack of 
mental activity: “the resemblance of the leucotomized European patient to the 
primitive African is, in many cases, complete.” (Carothers, 1953: 157) He sustains 
this argument by pointing out the reduced activity in the frontal lobes, which are 
responsible for integrating stimuli coming from other parts of the brain. The result of 
this frontal passivity is the absence of mental synthesis: “The African, with his lack of 
total synthesis, must therefore use his frontal lobes but little, and all the peculiarities 




1953: 157) Carothers distances himself from Porot’s biological determinism of North 
African mentality in favor of an approach that gives preeminence to cultural factors to 
explain the African psyche. However, Carothers treats African culture as isomorphic 
to race. Carothers’ graceless oscillation between biological and cultural racism and 
his equation of culture with race illustrates the continuity between biological racism 
and cultural racism that Fanon advances in “Racism and Culture”. 
In The Psychology of Mau Mau (1954), a report for the British government, 
Carothers brings together psychiatry with social policies at the service of the British 
counter-insurgence tactics against the Kikuyu anticolonial rebellion. Carothers delved 
into the static quality of African culture, which for him explained the anticolonial 
revolt of the so-called Mau Mau.  The South African psychiatrist insisted that the 
need in African cultures of a slow, gradual “transition” to cultural changes is 
disrupted by the contact with European culture. Kikuyu’s lack of adaptative aptitudes 
and their culturally determined obstinacy towards the new foreign element resulted in 
a “psychologically chaotic situation” (Carothers, 1954: 7).  Kikuyu are described as 
having no interest in the benefits of education, as ungrateful and possessing an 
egotistic sense of the world that puts the blame on external factors, in this case 
colonial administration, but does not question the self. But they are also described as 
potentially the closest to European psychology among all Kenyan ethnic groups. This 
favored the envy towards the position of Europeans and their power. Neither 
education nor their economic activities enabled them to achieve their aspirations, 
which exacerbated the envy and turned into frustration and resentment. In sum, he 
framed the origin of the conflict in the shock derived from the stubborn attachment to 
tradition versus modernization and the resulting psychopathology which is manifested 




anxious conflictual situation in people who, from contact with the alien 
culture, had lost the supportive and constraining influences of their own 
culture, yet had not lost their ‘magic’ modes of thinking. (Carothers, 1954: 
15) 
 
This anxiety, which could not be mitigated through magic and rituals, unleashes 
“the highest degree of unconstraint and violence— a common experience in 
psychiatric practice in Africa” (Carothers, 1954: 6). Carothers denied the historical 
subjectivity of the colonized and the political character of their manifestations. He 
instead incorporated the political manifestations as symptoms of the psychopathology 
of the Kikuyu. He described the anticolonial movement as “recalcitrant” and 
“psychopathic”, and its leader Jomo Kenyatta as the equivalent of the devil 
(Carothers, 1954: 19).  
Like that of the Algiers School, Carothers’ work also legitimated violent social 
policies outside of the clinical framework. His final recommendation on “the 
rehabilitation” of the Kikuyu did not seek to address the consequences of the 
“emergency”, nor its causes. By “rehabilitation” he meant the return to an improved 
and more efficient version of the pre-war social order, and the elimination of the 
traces of “contamination” left by the “Mau Mau” movement on Kikuyu people (1954: 
20). To that effect he proposed the “villagization” or relocation of the Kikuyu 
population from the forest to specifically created and separated settlements. This 
would ensure the safety of the rest of the populations and, in his view, enhance the 
level of sociality and integrity of the Kikuyu, which were conceived as inherently 
fragmented. In practice, this was translated in the confinement of 400.000 Kikuyu on 
concentration camps, which, according to British officials were “distressingly 




5.5 Difference, alterity and pathology 
Some historians point out that colonial psychiatry was less interested in 
constructing a mad African than in the reinforcement of human difference by 
portraying the African as a radical form of alterity in relation to the European (Keller, 
2007a; Collignon, 2006). This argument does not accurately capture the relation of 
psychiatry to racism and what racism does, for it frames the argument in terms of 
alterity, analogy and difference. Whereas racism, as Fanon puts it, and Gordon (1995, 
2015) and Maldonado-Torres (2008), among others, have developed, is not a problem 
of otherness. The other is a human being, and therefore, carrier of values and with 
whom ethical relations can be established. In the zone of non-being, however, rather 
than otherness the colonized subject is placed in a position of non-otherness or “sub-
alterity”, that is, not as radical difference, but a perversion of difference that places 
them below the human. The colonized is not-self and not-other. It is denied of 
subjectivity and of the possibility of ethical relationships, hence its disposability and 
the violence that psychiatry exerts and contributes to rationalize. In this framework, 
Fanon points out, race indicates not only the absence but the negation of values. As 
Maldonado Torres observes, the creation of sub-alterity is instrumental to the 
formation of “a world to the measure of a community of masters” (Maldonado-
Torres, 2008: 239-240). Thus, the normative framework emerges through the 
relations of domination that  shape notions of value, normality, health, pathology, 
symptom, nosographic and diagnostic categories. As Gordon observes, in the chapter 
on the black and psychopathology of Black Skin White Masks Fanon exposes the 
predicament in which the black is trapped in the colonial and racist normative order. 
In this order where the standard is the white person the black is a phobogenic object, 




common in every society, but the introduction of the pathological element in it, its 
normativity. Thus the abnormality of the black is the norm. And to be a normal black 
human is abnormal. As Gordon puts it, in either case the black fails as a human being 
in a racist setting. In the first case, failure is the norm; and in the second case, the 
black fails at failing (Gordon, 2015, 2004). Colonial psychiatry follows the same 
logic and is instrumental in its creation. Carothers seems to confirms this argument: 
The failures were of the usual kinds met in Africa; (…) although such 
failures occur from time to time in experience of European employees (…) 
they would only occur frequently in Western civilization in persons who 
would be considered thoroughly irresponsible, whereas Africans who do not 
default in ways  like these are  rather exceptional people. (Carothers, 1953: 
93) 
 
In the racist normative framework, the healthy Algerian is the docile and 
compliant whose psychological and social development fails in relation to the 
European. The manifestations of suffering derived from the colonial conditions or the 
open questioning, critique and protest against the colonial regime is interpreted as 
symptoms of a psychopathological, criminal behavior. Hence, as Gibson and 
Beneduce note, by isolating the manifestations of social suffering and discomfort 
from the historical, social and political conditions, fragmenting its causes and 
reasons, taking biology or a folkloric understanding of culture as explanative 
elements, “the pathological and barbaric seem to be the only avenues for subaltern 
protest” (2017: 101).  Thus, colonial psychiatry functioned as a means to rationalize 
the specific and different forms of ruling over the populations, whether, civilizing, 
educating, punishing, confining, relocating, repressing, or eliminating.  
5.6 Critique of colonial psychiatry 
In France the first critiques of colonial psychiatry appeared at the beginning of the 




basis of the work of the Algiers School. However, such critiques focused uniquely on 
the ideas of colonial psychiatrists, their biologicism and the scientific foundations of 
their work, at the expense of the context, the purpose, the function and the effects of 
such ideas inside and outside the clinic (Collignon, 2006). In Algeria slight 
divergences appeared in the bosom of the Algiers School. Suzanne Taïeb, a Tunisian 
student of Porot, submitted under his supervision a dissertation in 1939 which 
contained discrepant views on the role of Algerian culture and its importance to 
understand the mechanisms behind mental illness. Concretely, she looked at how 
belief systems, meanings and the symbolic organization of Algerian social, cultural 
and religious life shaped local conceptions of madness, its origin, and treatments 
(Faranda, 2012). Taïeb explored how madness was not attributable to individuals but 
involved the participation of djenoun or spirits, as in other aspects of everyday life.  
The response to this conception of madness activated social and familiar networks of 
healing. Although she framed these cultural elements within the primitivism, fatalism, 
mental debility and the lack of rational and scientific thought of the Algerian, having 
them into account could enable to rethink attitudes and behaviors of the patient 
dismissed as psychopathologic and to reconsider diagnostic categories theretofore 
attributed to the deficits of the race such as delirium or paranoid psychosis. Likewise, 
her ethnographic work with women patients in Blida sheds light on the social and 
cultural content of their delusions and hallucinations. Exceeding her initial intention, 
the stories of women also revealed their experience with the colonial psychiatric 
system, their expectations, frustrations and misunderstandings derived from 





Gibson and Beneduce note that certain of these accounts exposed the connection 
between concrete symptoms and the experience of domination and persecution inside 
and outside the clinic. Taïeb’s work “hesitantly revealed the link between symptoms 
and social- historical context”, but she did not value nor develop forms of diagnosis 
that could account for such links. Admirer of Porot and endorsing the doctrine of the 
primitivism of the North African herself, Taïeb’s job timidly and implicitly 
questioned different aspects of colonial psychiatry, while also subscribing to it. Thus 
rather than a critical perspective it, her innovative work represented an isolated 
breach within the Algiers School (Gibson and Beneduce, 2017: 151). 
The Algiers School met criticism from different intellectual circles. Openly 
critical of North African psychiatry were an important group of Tunisian doctors who 
emphasized the prestige and the richness of the Muslim medical tradition. Political 
figures like Ferhat Abbas denounced the effects of the action psychologique.  The 
relation between colonial oppression, madness and violence is a central element in 
Kateb Yacine’s work. Yacine’s  mother died in the Blida-Joinville hospital victim of 
electroshock treatments. She had been hospitalized for years after a crisis derived 
from the rumors about the execution of his son following the bloody repression of the 
Sétif demonstrations (Keller, 2007b).  
The Nigerian psychiatrist Thomas Adeoye Lambo, addressed Carothers’ work in 
his own explorations on the relation between the mental factors and mental disease 
among Yoruba. Lambo questions the methodological decisions and the scientific 
status of Carother’s works. For Lambo, his work departs from false premises which 
he attempts to confirm by endowing them a layer of scientific objectivity at the 
expense of truth. His work abounds in falsehoods, inconsistencies, gaps and 




valid observations of scientific merit” (Lambo: 1955: 241). For Lambo, Carothers is 
ill-informed concerning both psychiatric language and the groups of people he was 
studying; this is not a problem of ignorance, he notes, but of false knowledge. In front 
of the “the baffling problems of the incomprehensible”, Carothers adopts the 
“common procedure of making sweeping generalizations behind a veritable 
smokescreen of technical terms, involved abstractions and semantic confusion” 
(1955: 245).  
Fanon addressed the work of colonial psychiatrists directly in several instances. In 
Black Skin White Masks he had assessed the work of Octave Mannoni. He covered 
the work of Carothers and Porot directly in the unsigned, short article, 
“Ethnopsychiatric Considerations”, published in an issue of the journal Consciences 
Maghrebines  in 1955. He also addressed them in the last chapter of Les damnés de la 
terre, and in his lectures at the University of Tunis. Indirectly, he referred to them in 
several other articles written during his stay Algeria such as the aforementioned 
“Racism and Culture” or “Conducts of Confession in North Africa”. Likewise he also 
drew from and held a critical dialogue Suzanne Taïeb’s work in “Daily Life in the 
Douars” and “Introduction to Sexuality disorders among North Africans”. 
René Collignon points out that in comparison to other critiques, the force of 
Fanon’s lies in its “flamboyant and radical tone” and in the “vehement character of 
his denunciation” of the Algiers School (2006: 539-540; my translation
214
). Similarly, 
Keller argues that Fanon’s indictment of colonial medicine is “hyperbolic, a 
testament to his personal experience rather than an unvarnished reflection of 
historical truth” (2007b: 840). Keller here reproduces the aforementioned question of 
theory and experience in its racial dimensions. Cheikh Anta Diop put it bluntly in his 
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message to the Nigerien youth, “for truth be valid and objective, is has to sound 
white” (Diop, 2013: 215; my translation
215
). Whereas Foucault, who permeates 
Keller’s historical analysis of colonial psychiatry, offers theory and “historical truth”, 
Fanon, unable to exceed his own experience through reflection, provides a biased 
account of personal resentment. The relation between Foucault and Fanon, which 
adds an ironic twist to the matter, will be briefly covered in the next chapter.  
These views reveal themselves as stereotypical in light of the writing of Fanon. 
Actually, his tone is cold; he summarizes and exposes the ideas of the Algiers School 
in a way that give the impression of a state of the art of the literature of colonial 
psychiatry. In my view, the relevance of Fanon’s critique lies precisely in that he does 
not go into a hand to hand combat with colonial psychiatrists.  In “Ehtnopsychiatric 
Considerations”, it is rather through irony and sarcasm that he valorizes their work.  
Fanon describes as “important monographs” those of Porot and Carothers, and 
sarcastically notes that “current achievements seem to be sufficiently solid to permit 
an attempt at systemization.” (Fanon, 2018: 406)  He caustically concludes that “This 
is how the hypothesis of the Algiers School came to be verified: on the 
psychophysiological level, the Black African greatly resembles the North African – 
the African is a unity.” (Fanon, 2018: 407).  
It is the content rather than the form what differentiates Fanon’s from other 
critiques. From the content I want to emphasize two main points that will be 
developed in what follows: first, he does not question the scientificity of colonial 
psychiatry; and second, as Gibson and Beneduce (2017) remark, Fanon does not 
counter the claims of colonial psychiatrists about the violent impulsivity, tendency to 
lie or the passivity of the Africans. Instead, he subverts their logic by placing their 
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conclusions within a political frame, and while he carries out a genealogical work on 
the symptoms of colonial alienation, ascribing them a political value, he also connects 
them with the signs, fragments and traces for liberation. 
Antonio Gramsci issued a similar critique of criminologist and legal psychiatrist 
Cesare Lombroso, Porot’s methodological and scientific model. For Gramsci, 
Lombroso’s reductionist approach resulted in the criminalization and the 
pathologization of political movements and peasant populations of Southern Italy: 
Instead of studying the origins of a collective event and the reasons for its 
diffusion, of its collective being, the protagonist was isolated and reduced to 
a biographical pathology. Too often this was based on unfounded causes, or 
on motives that could be interpreted differently: for a social elite, the 
elements of the subaltern groups always contain something barbarian and 




And as Gibson and Beneduce (2017) note, Fanon’s critique and subversion of 
colonial psychiatry, and his clinical and political work, echoes Gramsci’s observation 
that  
“the history of subaltern social groups is necessarily fragmented and 
episodic. (…) Therefore, every trace of autonomous initiative of the 
subaltern groups should be of inestimable value for the integral historian” 




In other words, it is by identifying, collecting, and connecting the fragments and 
episodes of the colonized in their responses to colonialism, to colonial and Muslim 
medicine, to labor, to European values and technologies, the relation to truth, the 
social relations, the relations of gender and within the family among the colonized, 
among other aspects, that Fanon identifies the traces of history and the political in 
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 “en vez de estudiar los orígenes de un acontecimiento colectivo, y las  razones de su difusión, de 
su ser colectivo, se aislaba al protago; nista y se limitaban a bater su biografía patológica, demasiado a 
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élite social, los elementos de los grupos subalternos tienen siempre algo de bárbaro y patológico.” 
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 “La  historia de los grupos sociales subalternos es necesariamente disgregada y episódica. (…) 
Todo rastro de iniciativa autónoma de parte de los grupos subalternos debería por consiguiente ser de 




their manifestations, both in terms of symptoms of alienation but also as signs of the 
latent possibility of liberation. 
Fanon acknowledges the influence and authority after decades of being taught at 
the University of the theories that describe the Algerian as a born-criminal, liar, idler 
and thief. A colleague said to him: “It is a bitter pill to swallow, but it is scientifically 
established.” (Fanon, 1961: 287; my translation
218
) However, unlike Lambo and 
contemporary French psychiatrists, Fanon does not question the scientific validity of 
these racist theories neither labels them as bad science: 
If we have exposed at length the theories proposed by colonial scientists, it 
was less with the aim of showing their poverty and absurdity than of 





Addressing racism in science or philosophy as bad science, bad philosophy, or 
directly as unscientific leaves science unquestioned and replicates the theodicean 
logic identified by Gordon: Science would be a complete system whose errors, 
contradictions and impurities are located outside of it, in the realm of bad science or 
the unscientific. For Fanon the problem is not the scientific status, but scientific 
practices and theories that militate against the human and are instrumental to 
oppressive societies through the pathologization of populations and skewed notions 
of normality, which exacerbate madness: 
The important theoretical problem is that it is necessary at all times and in all 
places to make explicit, to demystify and to hunt down the insult to 
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 « C'est dur à avaler mais c'est scientifiquement établi. » 
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 « Si nous avons longuement repris les théories proposées par les hommes de science 
colonialistes, ce fut moins pour montrer leur pauvreté et leur absurdité que pour aborder un problème 
théorique et pratique extrêmement important. » 
220
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Fanon rejects the theories of the Algiers School but does not oppose their 
arguments; he instead attempts to show that the violence, the laziness or the lies of 
the Algerian have their origin in the colonial society that the Algiers School portrays 
as normal. In the colony, alienation is the norm. He also connects the school with 
metropolitan and Anglophone psychiatrists. The dependency complex of the 
Malagasy, the laziness of the Hindu, the savage obedience of the Senegalese soldier, 
the jalousie of the Kikuyu, the mental debility of the Algerian, are interconnected to 
forms of domination and exploitation throughout the Third World and to the 
conditions of  blacks in Europe and in the United States.  
In his lectures at the University of Tunis Fanon argues that the typical laziness of 
the colonized is a mechanism of self-defense against the exploiting conditions of 
labor in the colonies. Labor is understood as “forced labour in the colonies, and even 
if there is no whipping, the colonial situation itself is a whipping” (Fanon, 2018: 530). 
Idleness is fundamentally non-collaboration; it is the response of the colonized to the 
rapacity of the colonizer, he affirms. He argues that the temporal horizon of the 
colonial enterprise is the short-term extraction and materialization of benefits. It does 
not set the conditions for the future profits of the following generations of colonizers. 
Instead, it aspires to “amass the biggest possible profit in the shortest possible time.” 
(Fanon, 2017: 529) In this understanding, the colonized is seen as a replaceable mass 
of laborers. The unemployed colonized, he points out, is not unemployed, instead 
“they are natives whose energy has not yet been claimed by the colonial society. They 
form a reserve in case the other workers fail to appear”. For Fanon, Porot’s theory of 
the premature senility, around 35-40 years of age, is instrumental to the conception of 
the colonized as a disposable and replaceable mass of labor. In this framework, 




replacing cases of early senility” (2017: 530). The laziness of the colonized is both a 
mechanism of self-defense and non-collaboration, a form of protecting one’s life and 
of hindering the unbridled accumulation of the settler. 
 In Les Damnés de la terre he insisted on the political character of the behavior 
and attitudes of the colonized and how laziness for the colonized subverts colonial 
logics: “in the colonial regime a zealous working fellah, a nègre who refuses to rest 
would simply be pathological individuals.” (Fanon, 1961: 284; my translation
221
). 
Although he understood these attitudes as forms of refusal rather than consciously 
political resistance, he added  that “[t]he duty of the colonized who have not yet 
matured their political consciousness and decided to reject of oppression is to have 




Fanon remarks that the relationship of the colonized to labor is extended to the 
legal system, taxes, the bureaucratic apparatus, the collective values and the ethical 
universe of the colonial society, in which “gratitude, sincerity, honor are empty 
words.” (Fanon, 1961: 284; my translation
223
) In the article “Conducts of Confession 
in North Africa” (1955), co-presented with his colleague Raymond Lacaton at the 
Congrès des médecins aliénistes et neurologues de France et des pays de langue 
française, the authors show that the depiction of the Algerian as a pathological liar 
demands a more complex explanation. The authors examine this phenomenon from 
their position as legal doctors who, before the trial, have to evaluate the mental state 
of the Algerian accused of having committed a crime.  
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 «en régime colonial un fellah ardent au travail, un nègre qui refuserait le repos seraient tout 
simplement des individualités pathologiques. » 
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l'oppression est de se faire littéralement arracher le moindre geste. » 
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The authors observe that in eight out of ten cases the detained denies the 
accusation. Yet also in the cases where there has been an initial confession, after a 
lapse of time the accused retracts his testimony and denies his participation in the 
crime. “He does not try to prove his innocence. He claims his innocence. If the court 
decides it, then let it kill him. He accepts everything.” (Fanon, 2018: 416) In spite of 
the evidence, the witnesses (who also frequently retract, Fanon adds), and the initial 
confession, the lack of appropriation of the act by the detained puzzles the legal 
doctor, who, however, faces a “lucid, coherent man, whose judgement is unimpaired” 
(2018: 416).  Without the truth of the perpetrator, the case is reduced to a file devoid 
of a proper criminological understanding. 
 The dominant explanation provided by colonial doctors, the court and the 
police is that the North African is a pathological and compulsive liar, incapable to 
distinguish true from false and to take responsibility. Fanon and Lacaton’s argument, 
however, follows a different logic, and leads them to propose a phenomenology of the 
penal process with a marked political character. Although they point out that this is a 
preliminary inquiry that demands further study, they argue that in order to assess the 
sanity of the accused and the question of criminal responsibility it is necessary to 
explore “the lived experience of the act (…), otherwise said, the facts as seen by the 
accused.” (2017: 413) By that he does not refer to the motives of the crime or to a 
purely psychological understanding of it. He rather affirms that in order to understand 
the subjective act it is necessary to resort to the intersubjective world and the meaning 
of the act in social terms.  As he puts it, it implies to explore the values, the ideas, and 
mental attitudes, how the act is experienced and appears to consciousness, what is the 




Fanon and Lacaton make reference to Sartre’s play Dirty Hands where the main 
character takes responsibility for his crime and thereby gives coherence to the act and 
endows meaning to his life. The denial of the act and not taking responsibility for it 
would be alienating for the accused and a condemnation to absurdity. Through 
Bergson, Fanon adds that a crime entails a sense of guilt, self-condemnation and the 
segregation of the individual from the group. The confession and assumption of 
responsibility before a judge is a form of acknowledging and opposing the 
wrongdoing, which entails the acceptance of the sanction and the reintegration into 
the group. In these circumstances, “subjective assent founds and gives the sanction a 
meaning.” (2017: 414) Fanon observes that this “denouement” presupposes and 
requires the prior and reciprocal recognition between the wrongdoer and the society. 
For social contract philosophers, confession (aveu) has a moral dimension, sincerity, 
and relatedly, has a civic dimension, consent, which is the avowal and endorsement 
of the social contract. Confession and assuming responsibility for one’s wrongdoing 
imply consenting with the attitudes and the principles that link the individual to the 
collective values and the ethical world of the social ensemble. According to the 
European understandings, confession would be associated with the moral, legal and 
civic dimensions of belonging to a society.  
However, Fanon notices that the accounts of Sartre, Bergson, Rousseau or Hobbes 
are inadequate to explain the zone of non-being of the colonial situation. Colonial 
society is characterized by disproportional power relations, which inform not so much 
the absence of shared values between European and Algerians, as the very absence of 
values and ethical treatment in the relation between both groups.  
In the particular case of the Algerian Arab, does no such duplicity exist? Has 
the native contracted a commitment? Does he feel bound? Does he feel 
excluded by the misdemeanour? What is the lived meaning of the crime? Of 





The denial of the crime and confession of the Algerian is not a matter of 
insincerity or the unwillingness to integrate to society, since there is no prior and 
reciprocal recognition and integration to the colonial society, but of refusal. 
Confessing the crime would be consenting with the legal process; the lack of 
ownership of the crime, the refusal to take responsibility for it is a form of rejecting 
the investigation, the trial and the sanction, that is, the legal and juridical system of an 
oppressive and alien regime. As Fanon would repeat in Les Damnés de la terre, being 
dominated and oppressed does not necessarily entail the acceptance of such 
domination and oppression. The disallowance of the colonial system  
through the refusal to authenticate (…) the social contract proposed to him, 
means that his often profound submission to the powers-that-be (…) cannot 
be confounded with an acceptance of this power. (Fanon, 2018: 412) 
  
As in the case of their relationship with medicine addressed above, for the colonized, 
accepting the penal procedure implies legitimizing and complying with the whole 
colonial system. In that article he pointed out that “[t]he truth objectively expressed is 
constantly vitiated by the lie of the colonial situation.” (Fanon, 1959: 116; my 
translation
224
) As we will see in chapter seven, in Les Damnés de la terre Fanon 
asserts that “the problem of truth” in the conflicting political landscape of the colonial 
world deserves careful consideration: “To the lie of the colonial situation the 
colonized responds with an equal falsehood.” (Fanon, 1961: 52; my translation
225
) As 
Gibson and Beneduce observe, there is an element of truth in the silence or the 
retraction of the accused, for it lays bare the actual absence of reciprocal recognition, 
of collective values, of a shared ethical universe in the colonial society, and the lack 
of consent with the social contract. Truth and falsehood have not only different 
                                                 
224
« La vérité objectivement exprimée est constamment viciée par le mensonge de la situation 
coloniale.»  
225




meanings for the different groups, but also the criteria and the authority that 
determine what is true and what is false are antithetical. If truth is what will kill the 
colonized, the Algerian will respond with a falsehood. Thus, “the colonized is not 
lying but simply refusing to authenticate the proposed social contract and drafting 
another script.” (Gibson and Beneduce, 2017: 249)  
In the last chapter of Les Damnés de la Terre he dedicates a section to the 
question of the criminal impulsivity of the Algerian as framed by Porot and 
Carothers. He observes that the idea of the criminality of the Algerian does not only 
have influence over settler populations and policies but also over the colonized 
themselves. It is both a social and an individual problem, a constitutive element of 
“the kernel of despair crystallized in the body of the colonized” from which the 
colonized has to be liberated at the individual and the social levels (1961: 283; my 
translation
226
). He notes that the image created by European lawyers, psychiatrists, 
anthropologists, journalists, policemen and legal doctors was acknowledged and 
ingrained in the psyche of the Algerian to the extent of generating narcissistic and 
ambivalent forms of self-identification “as manifestation of an authentic virility” 
(1961: 293; my translation
227
).  
Like, laziness, the criminality and the tendency to violence of the Algerian is a 
manifestation of the conflict. Fanon notes that the criminality of the Algerian in 
France is less frequent and of a different character, and in other Maghreb countries 
criminality has drastically decreased after their independence. The violence of the 
Algerian, he argues, is a direct product of the conditions of colonial society, and is 
mostly directed against a fellow Algerian.. Fanon relates the behavior of the 
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Algerians to the ones he witnessed in concentration of camps during War World II, 
where the struggle to survive turns the fellow into enemy. He writes:  
The French are down on the plain with the police, the army and the tanks. In 
the mountains there are only Algerians. Up above there is Heaven and its 
promises of an afterlife; down below are the French with their concrete 
promises of prison, beatings and executions. Inevitably you strike against 
yourself. Here lies the core of the self-hatred that characterizes racial conflict 




As we will see in further detail in Chapter seven, the violence between Algerians is 
an important concern in Fanon’s thought on the Algerian situation. Fanon explains 
how this intra-community violence, is related to the symbolic, labor exploitation, the 
spatial structures of confinement and segregation, the technologies of 
dehumanization, which constitute what Fanon calls the atmospheric violence of the 
colony. 
Conclusion 
Taking this chapter as the historical and theoretical context in which Fanon 
developed his psychiatric work, the next chapter delves into the reconstruction of 
psychiatry in North Africa in its epistemic and practical dimensions. Fanon attempted 
heal the clinic and humanize psychiatric practices by implementing institutional 
psychotherapy in the Blida-Joinville hospital, but the initial idea encountered 
different obstacles and varying results, mostly related to the issues presented in this 
chapter. This led Fanon to delve into the understanding and treatment of mental 
disease in Algerian society, its relation to colonial society, to economics, the 
gendered aspects of mental health, and to question the therapeutic process in relation 
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to wider cultural social and political dynamics. Fanon also questioned the complicity 
of psychiatry, the psychiatric hospital and the role of the psychiatrists regarding 
oppression and also its emancipatory possibilities.  
Fanon resigned and joined the Algerian liberation movement, but his militant side 
is not incompatible and did not entail the abandonment of psychiatry. In Tunis, Fanon 
initiated a pioneering work through the creation of an open psychiatric hospital. 
Fanon goes beyond institutional psychotherapy and the recreation of a society in the 
hospital towards an approach that involves society in the healing process and a more 







Chapter 6.  Healing the clinic, healing with the clinic 
Introduction 
Many readers of Fanon have interpreted his transfer to Algeria as a move to join a 
revolution. In these teleological understandings of Fanon’s life psychiatry was 
contingent and secondary. However, Fanon arrived in Algeria more than a year before 
the outbreak of the war with the intention to apply the avant-garde techniques learnt 
in Saint-Alban and continued to practice psychiatry well into the war in Algeria and 
Tunis (Gibson and Beneduce, 2017).The previous chapters situated Fanon’s 
psychiatric work at the crossroads of three stories, French psychiatry, institutional 
psychotherapy, and colonial psychiatry, concretely the Algiers school (Murard, 
2008). This chapter covers his effort to reconstruct the theoretical and practical basis 
of the psychiatry practiced in North Africa.  
During his stay in North Africa, Fanon published a series of articles that reflected 
the process of humanizing psychiatry, turning the asylum from a site of 
dehumanization and generation of mental illness into a space of disalienation, and 
attuning the healing process to the cultural, social and political context of Algeria and 
Tunis. The relevance of such writings lies first in their psychiatric significance 
extending beyond the colonial context. Second they also help to see the intricacy 
between his political and psychiatric thought. Third, as Gibson and Beneduce  (2017) 
note, the psychiatric writings, despite being open and incomplete studies, enable to 
shed light in the process itself of rebuilding  a cultural and political psychiatry. This 
was not a linear process; during this time Fanon faced different challenges and 
experienced diverse setbacks that demanded rethinking and questioning at the 




of the role of culture in relation to healing, the functioning of the clinic within 
society, and the limits of psychiatry in contexts of oppression. 
Fanon’s trajectory as a psychiatrist in the matter of the psychiatric hospital moves 
from healing the institution by recreating a society within it, to healing with the 
institution by including society within the therapeutic process through the open 
psychiatric hospital.  In order to explore these elements, I have organized this chapter 
accordingly:  
The first section briefly presents the social context, the conditions and the 
deficiencies of the Blida-Joinville Hospital, in which Fanon was one of the chefs de 
service. The hospital was poorly equipped and insufficient to host the clinical 
boarders and their activities. Furthermore, the equipment was conceived for a 
punitive and coercive treatment of the patients, who were in separated pavilions by 
gender and race. This required not only the reconfiguration of space but also the 
relations between medical staff and the patient, the training of the former, new modes 
of interaction, and the questioning of the assigned roles. 
The second section covers Fanon’s attempt to introduce institutional 
psychotherapy in the asylum. But what functioned in the ward of European women, 
failed in the ward of Muslim men. This initiates a process of reflection and self-
critique, which leads to the study of the social, political, cultural and religious 
organization of the Kabyle and the implementation of changes in the asylum 
accordingly.  
The third section explores Fanon’s understanding of the intricacy between politics, 
culture and history. Although there were problems of language and cultural difference 
which had an influence in the aforementioned initial failure, for Fanon the problem 




One has to take into account how colonialism has an impact on the relation of the 
Algerians to their own culture. Institutional psychotherapy, he argues, is not a 
technique or a method but it is itself political and inseparable from conflict. In this 
line, his article on the study with Algerian women on the Thematic Apperception Test 
(T.A.T) explores how perception and imagination are imbricated with concrete the 
political and historical conditions. 
 The fourth section addresses Fanon’s exploration of Algerian approaches to 
mental health, the understanding of madness, the institutions of mental health, their 
relation with the social organization, gender dimensions, and the efficiency of the 
practices related with religion, magic and dances of possession.  
The fifth section addresses the efforts to modify the asylum through the writings of 
Fanon on the internal journal of the hospital. The editorials of Fanon enable to see the 
inner life of the hospital and expose Fanon’s main concerns and doubts on the 
communication with the boarders, the engagement of the nursing staff, the need to 
create a specific nursing training, and to change what he called sadistic attitudes. The 
subsection 6.5.1 addresses this aspect from a theoretical perspective by focusing on 
an important article that Fanon wrote on the phenomenon of agitation and the asylum. 
In the article Fanon distances himself from Tosquelles understanding of agitation and 
hints the limits of institutional psychotherapy.  
The sixth section covers Fanon’s letter of resignation. In it, he issues a critique of 
the social role of the psychiatrist and the psychiatric hospital, its complicity with the 
dominant regime and its functioning as separating non-normative populations. The 
letter is treated as a manifesto on the intersection between psychiatry and politics, on 




contradictions of a political psychiatry. It is by delving into these contradictions that 
Fanon links his position as a doctor, intellectual and a militant.  
The seventh section is dedicated to the lectures at the University of Tunis in 1959-
1960, after being expelled from Algeria. In those lectures Fanon delved into the 
relation between psychiatry and society, and analyzed different forms of colonial 
alienation but also alienation in Europe in relation to labor derived from mechanisms 
of discipline and surveillance. 
 The eighth section covers his psychiatric work in Tunis, where he changed his 
approach to healing and the psychiatric hospital by opening an open mental health 
clinic. This pioneering experience entailed a shift in the therapeutic approach which 
focused on the connection between the clinic and society, and increased the distance 
with institutional psychotherapy without breaking definitely with it.  
The ninth section covers Fanon’s influence on the critical approaches to psychiatry 
emerged internationally in the following decades, and also on the relevance of his 
approach in relation to current, hegemonic psychiatric theories and practices.  
6.1 The Blida-Joinville Psychiatric Hospital 
Fanon arrived in Algeria in November 1953 as Chef de Service or section director, 
a task he shared with other four doctors, Jean Dequeker, Raymond Lacaton, M. 
Micucci, F. Ramée. The arrival of Fanon enabled to slightly relieve the overload of 
work and a better distribution of the boarders in an oversaturated and ancient hospital, 
untouched since its inauguration, and facing serious problems of space, infrastructure, 
personnel, and funding. Despite their different backgrounds and sometimes 
conflicting views of psychiatry, political positions and understanding of the 
psychology of the Algerian and the colonial situation, the five co-directors agreed on 




Algeria. In an article co-written soon after Fanon’s arrival, “Current aspects of mental 
care in Algeria” (1955), the five authors exposed the poor conditions of the hospital – 
which was “moving slowly but surely toward total paralysis” (Fanon, 2018: 401) – 
made of it an ineffective space for the therapeutic praxis.  
Initially designed for 1200 patients, the hospital hosted 2500, and 850 were 
pending for admission. The authors pointed out that to face the overcrowding every 
possible space, including corridors or bathrooms, was set up as dormitories, thereby 
reducing the possibilities of leisure, workshops, labor or meetings. When not in the 
dormitories the boarders had to spend their time in the yards. The question of space, 
and its heterogeneity, as we saw in the previous chapter, is one of the central concerns 
for the transformation of the asylum and the development of institutional 
psychotherapy. The authors asked, “What hope can there be to perform therapeutic 
activity in a ward of one hundred and seventy beds?” (Fanon, 2018: 399) The 
problem of overcrowding was exacerbated by the lack of funding, which manifested 
itself in an insufficient staff, lack of space and therapeutic facilities, and shortages of 
electricity and water. 
The authors noted that, in contrast to the metropolis, the acceptance of admissions 
in psychiatric hospitals was not obligatory in the colonies; admissions depended on 
the space available and the eventual vacancies. The resulting delay causes that by the 
time of the hospitalization the condition of the patients is aggravated. In some cases 
this manifests itself in the aggressive behavior of the patient or of the family towards 
the patient. Some patients are left at the gates of the hospital until his or her 
admission.  In other cases the aggressive behavior of the patient follows a judiciary 
process rather than medical and waits in prison rather than in a hospital. Likewise, 




hosted patients from remote areas and encompassed a larger region than what was 
initially conceived for. The contact with distant families of the boarders is difficult 
and has to be done by the administration in the absence of medical facilities in all 
areas. The absence of an extended network of mental care facilities that reaches far 
away areas impedes to follow up the progress of the discharged patients, to guide 
their re-adaptation into society and to provide aftercare services. The authors also 
observe a gender element that hinders the discharge of Muslim women: 
The Muslim wife’s status, which allows the husband instant remarriage, is an 
insurmountable source of difficulties. After repudiation, cured women 
remain in hospital for several months before being able to reintegrate into a 
family household, which, in the absence of any precise information, it is 
necessary to find without any available help from a medico-social service. 
(Fanon, 2018: 402) 
 
The Blida-Joinville hospital had some annexed buildings in hospitals located more 
than one hundred kilometers away. These buildings were run by underqualified staff 
and did not count on the presence of doctors or intern but depended on the monthly 
visits from the doctors of Blida. In response to the persistent administrative, 
organizational and economic constraints the authors proposed to release the tension 
upon the larger psychiatric hospitals, being Blida-Joinville the largest of them by 
developing a proper network of mental care that reaches all levels of the therapeutic 
process, that enables an expanded provision of services, and is aware to the 
sociocultural elements of Algerian life. Starting from the qualified training of nursing 
staff, creating local mental care facilities, aftercare organizations and increase the 
number of social worker.  
6.2 Success and failures of institutional psychotherapy 
Fanon was responsible of a ward comprised by 165 European women and another 
ward of 220 Muslim men. The policies of mental care separated boarders by gender 




reticence or distrust of his fellow section- directors, Fanon enjoyed enough autonomy 
to apply the knowledge and experience acquired in Saint-Alban in the two wards he 
was in charge of.  As we saw in the previous chapter, institutional psychotherapy 
explores the different dimensions of alienation and seeks to reform and humanize the 
institution, to turn the asylum into a place of disalienation and therapy, to create a 
collective life reducing the hierarchies, roles and barriers between boarders, orderlies, 
nursing and doctors, to restore the freedom of the mentally ill and turn them into 
agents of the whole social and therapeutic process so that they can be reintegrated 
into society (Cherki, 2011; Gibson and Beneduce, 2017).  
In Blida-Joinville, such efforts initially yielded unequal results. Whereas in the 
ward of European women the application of institutional psychotherapy quickly 
succeeded, it failed in the ward of Muslim men. In a self-reflective article, “Social 
therapy in a ward of Muslim men: Methodological difficulties”, published in 1954 in 
L’Information psychiatrique , Fanon and his intern Jacques Azoulay describe in detail 
the process of applying institutional psychotherapy, the responses of the patients, 
analyze the reasons behind their failure, which paved the way for a new direction in 
their psychiatric work. This failed experienced was not the end of the project, it 
instead brought about a self-reflection and critical evaluation which 
enabled us to orient our research in a wholly other direction. We have 
adopted greater modesty faced with the culture presented to us. We took 
some steps towards it, fearful and attentive. And the extraordinary thing is 
that the few indistinct notes that, at the start, awoke our interest, little by 
little came to form a coherent whole. (Fanon, 2018: 354) 
 
The authors introduced ward meetings, newspaper meetings, regular celebrations 
and festivities, created committees for the recreational evenings, the printing and 
editing of a newspaper, the film club or the record collection, introduced workshops 




European women the boarders actively engaged in the adequate decoration of the 
space, its adaptation and transformation for each activity. The patients and all the 
staff participated in the celebrations; the boarders assumed the responsibility for the 
organization of the activities and took the initiative in the creation of their own 
regular events, where the medical staff attended as spectators. The authors point out 
that these activities only constitute “the framework of an increasingly enriched social 
life”. The patient is not alien to what surrounds her; the new environment elicits 
responses and modifies the relation of the patient with the asylum and also the way 
that her madness is lived. One of the first consequences was the disappearance of the 
so-called agitation:  
the very atmosphere of the ward had changed, and we were able to return all 
the restraint equipment without needing to fear any major difficulties. Not 
only had asylum life become less distressing for many, but the rhythm of 
discharges had already markedly increased (Fanon, 2018: 357). 
 
In contrast, the application “of the same methods” in the ward of Muslim men was 
qualified as a “total failure” (2018: 357). Fanon and Azoulay had previously carried 
out seminars and preparatory meetings with the nurses. They “carefully prepared” the 
first meeting with the doctors, nurses, the staff. and some patients. They arranged the 
scene, selected a skilled interpreter. and prepared every detail. During the meeting,  
“we tried to take an interest in each of the patients, to transform that abstract and 
impersonal multitude into a coherent group driven by collective preoccupations.” The 
response of the patients was silence and lack of interest. The following meetings 
would gradually become shorter, they became “only a ceremonial devoid of meaning, 
absurd and, after some hesitation, we decided to break them off.” (Fanon, 2018: 358)  
Alternatively, Fanon and Azoulay attempted to promote evening discussions, games 
and songs guided only by nurses. But interest soon decreased and patients 




yielded equal results. Indifference was also the response of the patients to oriental 
music on the radio, domino games, and ward parties with music and theatre. The 
authors reasoned that since they could not lead the patients to participate they would 
instead try to entertain them by attending the activities of European women and the 
film club. But patients would not attend unless being directly invited to the events or 
they would leave during the projection of a film. Fanon and Azoulay kept providing 
options for the Algerian men but the latter refused any engagement on the basis of 
being tired or feeling pain. Their participation in the newspaper also failed. Their 
involvement in working activities in the yard was irregular and was not considered as 
having a proper therapeutic value since it was taken as a distraction, or a temporary 
form of escaping the wards and avoiding other therapies. Neither the creation of 
ergotherapy workshops elicited the attention of the patients, who refused “to enter 
into dialogue”. Fanon and Azoulay observed that  
not only were we unable, after three months, and despite much effort, to get 
the Muslim patients interested in the beginnings of collective life that was 
being organized in the European sector, but the ward atmosphere remained 
oppressive, stifling. (Fanon, 2018: 361) 
 
The environment in the ward of Muslim men was loaded with mistrust and fear. 
The frequent arguments, quarrels and screams of the patients raised the fear of the 
nurses who had to mediate between them and sometimes were aggressed, and the 
alarm of the staff in the ward. Nurses demanded the adoption of confinement and 
punitive measures, patients were isolated or tied up not only after an incident but also 
as a preventive measure. Fanon and Azoulay point out that the “vicious circle – 
agitation, restraint, agitation – always kept up a veritably concentration-camp 
mindset”, but their attempts to minimize the punitive structures met the “inertia”, 
irony, or the frontal opposition of the nurses (Fanon, 2018: 361). The authors 




wards after three months; the climate of the European women’s ward was therapeutic 
whereas that of the Muslim men remained constricting and punitive.  
  In the subsequent analysis, Fanon and Azoulay acknowledged their responsibility 
for this failed experience and turn their critical gaze toward themselves. They 
recognize the limitations of their understanding of the condition of the Algerian 
patient, question their methodological decisions, their assumptions on Algerian 
society, and outline the importance of the sociocultural dimension. The authors assert 
that one of their main errors was to take the part for the whole, that is, to conceive the 
process of institutional psychotherapy on Algerian patients on the basis of the 
outcomes with European patients.  
We had wanted to create institutions and we had forgotten that all such 
approaches must be preceded with a tenacious, real and concrete 
interrogation into the organic bases of the indigenous society. 
By virtue of what impairment of judgement had we believed it possible to 
undertake a western-inspired social therapy in a ward of mentally ill Muslim 
men? How was a structural analysis possible if the geographical, historical, 
cultural and social frames were bracketed? (Fanon, 2018: 362) 
 
 
Fanon and Azoulay notice that the need to have two interpreters altered the 
relation between the psychiatrist and the patient, in which language plays a 
fundamental role. To engage in a meaningful dialogue, to overcome the mistrust and 
the reserves of the patient while ignoring the multiple elements that go hand in hand 
with his language represented an additional obstacle. Fanon repeats what he had 
advanced in Black Skin White Masks, “to speak a language is to bear the weight of a 
culture” (Fanon, 2018: 368). That is a language cannot be separated, from its 
historical, contextual, social, affective and somatic elements. The figure of the 
interpreter was absent in the everyday life of the Algerian and was associated with the 
encounter with the colonial administration and the legal system. The presence of the 




which makes “all communication difficult”. In the rare cases where trust between 
doctors and patients had been built the patient expressed directly, in detail and with 
enthusiasm his situation. He omitted the presence of the interpreter and considered it 
incapable to convey what he had to express. Fanon and Azoulay add that “a study of 
this three-way dialogue would reveal a disruption of the phenomenon of the 
encounter.” (Fanon, 2018: 367). For the doctors, the need of an interpreter represents 
an obstacle for the doctor’s comprehension of the patient, for it breaks the synchrony 
between prosody, body language and the content of the language
229
. The doctor is 
deprived of the ten-minute statement of the patient, which is summarized in two 
minutes by the interpreter. Often, they add, the interpreter takes the liberty to translate 
the patient’s speech “according to some stereotyped formula, depriving it of all its 
richness: ‘He says that he hears djnoun’ – indeed, one no longer knows if the delusion 
is real or induced.” (Fanon, 2018: 368; translation modified).  
Nigel Gibson and Roberto Beneduce highlight that to delve into the meaning of 
different and foreign expressions of suffering in a setting of oppression requires a 
special attitude and sensitivity on the part of the doctors, and a unique alertness to 
both the traps of translation and diagnosis.  In their own words: 
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 Out of this experience Fanon started taking Arabic lessons. Fanon was also probably acquainted 
with Tosquelles particularly intuitive approach to language. Tosquelles argues that a proper 
psychiatrist has to be a foreigner to the patient or pretend to be one. However, the distance between 
French and Catalan and French and Arabic may complicate Tosquelles’ view. Although versed in 
French, Tosquelles held a marked Catalan accent until the end of his life and causally mixed both 
languages in conversation. Alice Cherki remarks that Fanon, who spoke a careful and proper French, 
was astonished by Tosquelles’ strong and tenacious accent after having spent more than ten years in 
France (Cherki, 2011). Tosquelles stated that “it is not a frivolity on my part to speak such a bad 
French”. For him, the fact of being foreign confused the patient and raised her curiosity since it broke 
with the assumptions of what is supposed to be the proper language of a doctor. More importantly, he 
adds, this strangeness facilitates the psychiatrist to enter into the world of the mentally ill since it 
required the effort of the patient, who in order to understand is obliged to translate and to take an active 
position. Tosquelles also declared that when listening to a patient he pays more attention to the music, 
the rhythm, the accents, the tone, the inflection, the articulation, the silence and the cuts than to the 




‘Real or induced’: in just three words, Fanon and Azoulay foreground the 
responsibilities and attitudes a clinician has to keep in mind when listening 
to unfamiliar experiences or ‘cultural’ idioms related to suffering. Above all, 
they argued, clinicians have to question the meaning of delusion in a context 
such as colonialism, where this can literally translate the experience of 
‘being acted on.’ By acknowledging their limited access to the nature of 
patients’ delusions, and admitting that the risks associated with translation 
might result in a stereotypical interpretation of their content, Fanon and 
Azoulay demonstrated the subtlety of their analysis, laying bare some of the 
dynamics of institutionalized medicine as well as the challenges posed in 
“intercultural” settings. (Gibson and Beneduce, 2017: 316) 
 
In hindsight Fanon and Azoulay qualified their initiatives in the ward of Muslim 
men as naïve. The ergotherapy workshops proposed activities which were usually 
carried out by Algerian women. Likewise, the failure to participate in the musical and 
dramatic activities was due to the fact that singing and performing were activities 
carried out by specific characters. In Algerian society the actor and the singer were a 
professional external to the group. Theater was at the time limited to the main cities 
whereas in the villages the figure of the itinerant storyteller had concrete functions 
such as spreading news or tales. The celebrations that were proposed in the ward of 
men did not have the family or religious component that informed Algerian 
festivities. Playing games may be part of the process of socialization, but Algerian 
children quitted the school at a young age to help with the cattle or carry out small 
jobs. Also, the entertainments proposed by doctors and nurses “were not for the 
Muslim patients a practically ‘vital’ need as they were for the Europeans” (Fanon, 
2018: 369). The movies shown, their plots and the characters were unfamiliar to their 
systems of reference. In the case of Les Noces de sable, based on the character of an 
Arab prince and set in North Africa, “the psychological framework remained 
western” and Muslim patients did not “participate fully in the action or identify with 
the personages.” (Fanon, 2018: 370). The elaboration of the newspaper did not 
consider the high illiteracy rate, the importance of the oral tradition, and omitted the 




Fanon and Azoulay observe that their initial approach was unreflectively framed 
within the politics of assimilation. This assumed that the Algerian must not be 
understood, and instead it is the Algerian who has to do the effort to understand and 
to adapt to the proposed framework. “Assimilation here does not presuppose a 
reciprocity of perspectives. It is up to one entire culture to disappear in favour of 
another.” (Fanon, 2018: 362). The failure of institutional psychotherapy can be 
interpreted as form of resistance of the Algieran patients and staff towards the 
disappearance of a culture (Cherki, 2011). Yet for Fanon’s psychiatric project the 
relation between the politics of assimilation and psychiatry exceeded the terrain of 
culture. The authors argue that “a revolutionary attitude was essential” at the level of 
theory and practice. The existing theories of the Algiers School offered a poor 
understanding of the psychiatry of the Algerian, mostly limited to physiological 
aspects. This situation demanded a renewal and a re-construction of the theoretical 
body. By referring to Marcel Mauss’ total social fact, Fanon affirms that such 
theoretical work needed to “grasp the North African social fact” in its “totality”, that 
is, to encompass the biological, psychological, institutional, cultural, aesthetic, 
cognitive, political, economic, religious, moral, affective,  aspects of Algerian life, its 
social constitution and the modes of sociability (Fanon, 2018: 363).  It is by grasping 
the total social fact and placing the asylum within it that Fanon shifted the orientation 
of his work.  This experience led Fanon and Azoulay to do anthropological and 
sociological research and to visit Arab and Kabylian villages. In parallel to the Arabic 
lessons and the anthropological and sociological approach to Algerian society and to 
his activities in the asylum Fanon attended ecstatic ceremonies and nights of dances 
of possessions, rituals conducted by marabout to expel the djinn or evil spirits, he got 




In this article the authors sketch the ethnic composition of the region, the 
distribution of land, the role of religion, the institutions that regulate social life and 
the patriarchal character of the family and social life. They fundamentally emphasized 
the changes that were taking place during colonialism, the disruption taking place in 
the Algerian economic modes, the problems of farming and the changes in the 
collective property of land, the regression of nomadism and the consequences of 
settling down in the renting of labor, the migrations to the city, the creation of a 
proletarian class without a proper industrialization, the traditional authorities and 
social and economic institutions, the formation of shanty towns. It is this changing 
setting and in this concrete time where they have to situate the asylum and reconsider 
their psychiatric orientation. In “Daily life in the douars”, an unpublished 
ethnography from 1954 co-written with Azoulay, the authors sought to capture the 
spaces, institutions, customs, and the worldview which inform social life in a 
Kabylian village. The douar is both a geographical and human community. It is 
strongly based on the intricacy of religious, social and cultural practices and beliefs 
that link individuals to a collectivity through strong relations of solidarity, a common 
notion of time and understanding of the present and the future as in the hands of god, 
a harmonious and free of disturbances view of life, a common approach to illness, 
adversities, or by clearly defined patriarchal and gerontocratic hierarchies. Although 
the author’s emphasize its traditional and relatively stable character, they do not 
portray the douar as a timeless and fixed cultural, social and human structure, but 
rather attempt to locate and describe the douar within the more marked changes 
taking place in cities and larger villages, or in nomadism and agricultural regions. The 
urban dweller is more strongly exposed to the economic, technological and cultural 




rural and the urban Algerian recognize each other “as belonging to one and the same 
cultural community.” (Fanon, 2018: 375). 
Following theses analysis Fanon set up different institutions and structures in the 
ward of Muslim men. Namely, the creation of a nursing school and a nursing degree 
in mental health care, a Moorish café as a meeting place for men, the reactivation of 
the mosque, the habilitation of a football stadium and the formation of football teams, 
the introduction of suitable ergotherapy workshops, and the creation of a small open 
section. Blida’s mufti reticently attended several of the first religious celebrations that 
were introduced in the hospital. But his presence gradually became more frequent and 
his dialogues with the boarders functioned like actual group psychotherapies. The 
hospital became another stop for the itinerant storytellers passing through the region, 
and for the performances of a musician, Abderrahmane Azziz who would eventually 
become part of the nursing staff. To the special performances of the Blida Orchestra 
also attended Algerian women; it was the first time that the ululations were heard in 
the hospital.  These changes increased the social tissue in the ward of men and the 
involvement of the Algerian staff in the process, and patients progressively started to 
take charge of the activities (Murard, 2008; Cherki, 2011). 
6.3 “Psychiatry has to be political” 
The story of the initial failure and the successful redirection of the situation may 
be understood as such if cultural difference was the crux of the issue and Fanon’s 
dilemma lied in how to translate the experience of Saint-Alban to the setting of 
Algeria through a form of intercultural dialogue. But the matter was more complex 
(Murard, 2008). Just like in his critique of Mannoni’s psychology of the Malagasy in 
Black Skin White Masks Fanon asserted that the Malagasy does not exist anymore, his 




solution, but he puts the focus on the “new fact, born of the colonial situation”. That 
is, in the concrete changes taking place and the fragmentation and exhaustion derived 
from the impact of colonialism in the Algeria of 1954. Fanon and Azoulay concluded 
that “[t]his society, which is said to be rigid, is fermenting from the base.” (2018: 
367). As he put it later, “[c]olonialism disrupts all the references of the local society”, 
it “impairs the relations that the colonized have with their own culture. In many cases 




Later, in a conversation with his intern Charles Géronimi on the failure of 
implementing institutional psychotherapy Fanon provides an angle of the problem 
that was not addressed in the article with Azoulay. Géronimi was surprised 
concerning the “impairment of judgement” of the one who had written Black Skin 
White Masks or “The North African Syndrome”, to which Fanon answered: 
It was not simply a matter of imposing external methods more or less 
adapted to the ‘indigenous mentality’. I had to demonstrate several things: 
that the values of Algerian culture are different than those of colonial 
culture, that these structuring values must be embraced without any 
complexes by the carriers of such values–the Algerian medical personnel 
and the Algerian patients. In order to have the support of the Algerian 
medical staff I had to incite them a sentiment of revolt of the sort: we are as 





Institutional psychotherapy is not a technique or a method to be applied or 
adapted, “but rather about owning a process that is implicitly political” (Gibson and 
Beneduce, 2017: 157). This passage illustrates Fanon’s understanding of culture as 
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 «  d’un fait nouveau, né de la situation coloniale» « le colonialisme bouleverse toutes les 
données de la société autochtone» « dénature jusqu’aux relations qu’entretient le colonisé avec sa 
propre culture. Dans un grand nombre de cas, la pratique de la tradition est une pratique troublée » 
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 « Il n’était pas question pour moi d’imposer de l’extérieur des méthodes plus ou moins adaptées 
à la ‘mentalité indigene’. Il me fallait démontrer plusiers choses : que la culture algérienne était 
porteuse de valeurs autres que la culture coloniale ; que ces valeurs structurantes devaient être 
assumées sans complexe par ceux qui en sont porteurs –les Algériens soignants ou soignés. Il me 
fallait pour avoir l’adhésion du personnel algérien susciter chez eux un sentiment de révolte sur le 




embedded in conflicts, history and politics. It also exemplifies his dialectical view of  
conflict as intrinsic to human interaction and to some extent a necessary element to 
forge human relations. Conflict makes explicit the political process, lies bare inertias 
and self-concealed positions by posing a challenge and compelling a response in the 
form of the affirmation of the dignity and self-respect of the challenged. In this view, 
conflict activates critical reflection, action, and the building of alliances to change the 
conditions.  
This intricacy of culture, history, politics and the psyche is patent in another self-
critical article, “TAT in Muslim women: Sociology of perception and imagination” 
presented at the Congrès des médecins aliénistes et neurologues de France et des 
Pays de Langue Française in 1956. The article, co-authored by Fanon and Géronimi, 
is a preliminary study of the larger project of using the Thematic Apperception Test 
(TAT) with Algerian patients. In this case, the subjects were a group of Algerian 
women who were part of the small open service and did not present serious disorders. 
As in the case of introducing institutional psychotherapy the authors describe their 
attempts to apply the test as a “systematized failure” (Fanon, 2018: 432). The failure 
in therapeutic terms again served to initiate a process of self-critique and interrogation 
of the methodological assumptions and the epistemological basis of psychiatry as part 
of  the redirection towards a critical and sensitive psychiatry attuned to the experience 
of the patients. 
 The TAT is a projective personality test consisting in a series ambiguous images 
and pictures. The patient or the customer is asked to freely interpret them and to 
elaborate a story out of them, to construct the characters, develop a plot and present 
an ending to the story. Among the objectives of the test, it enables the doctor the 




sheds light on problem solving skills, and also stimulates the imagination and 
creativity of the patient or customer. Fanon and Géronimi briefly mentioned a study 
on the adaptation of the TAT to the Congo, and a study that calls to take into account 
the different social, cultural and temporal variations within Europe in using the test. 
In their experience with Algerian women Fanon and his coauthor follow these lines of 
thought while at the same time deviate from them. 
The authors noticed that Algerian women tenaciously strived to describe the 
pictures, but did not establish a connection between them. Their responses were 
basically enumerations and descriptions. They tried to enumerate all the things they 
knew, or meticulously described the image providing excessive and unrequested 
details. The responses were fragmentary, unorganized, and devoid of coherence, 
structure or a narrative thread.  “There is no stage, no drama. (…) Despite our precise 
instructions, the Muslim patients did not tell us about what was happening in the 
cards but instead what was in them.” (Fanon, 2018: 429). Fanon and Géronimi 
describe in detail the reactions of the patients, their perplexity before the unfamiliar 
images, the silences, hesitations, the perceptual mistakes, and the efforts to discern 
and the problems to identify the objects. The authors point out that  
by asking them to describe, to live a scene elaborated by westerners and for 
westerners, we immerse them in a different, foreign, heterogeneous and non-
appropriable world.(…) The lines of force organizing perception are 
missing: the patients ‘spell out’ the card without ever living it. (2018: 430; 
translation modified)  
 
In regard to the imagination and creativity of the patients, the authors encountered 
similar difficulties. The patients refused to provide a background or to anticipate the 
ending of the story by simply saying that they could not know it, that lying is 
forbidden, or by appealing to religious prohibitions, since anticipating the future 




Fanon and Géronimi noted that the test required an adjustment. But the failure of the 
test could not simply be attributed to the cultural difference of the Algerian in regard 
to the western origin of the test, or to the credulity and the deficiencies associated 
with primitivism as the Algiers School would rationalize. The authors affirmed that 
the responses provided were “devoid of psychoanalytical value”, that is they did not 
enable the psychiatrists to elucidate the personality and the psychic life of the 
Algerian women, but in such responses there “is an attitude that demands we seek 
what lies beyond it” (Fanon, 2018: 431). In other words, as the title of their article 
suggests, the responses of the patients were more indicative of the sociological forces 
shaping perception and imagination, of the concrete social, cultural and historical 
world in which they lived than about the patients themselves. As the authors put it, 
The incoherent, inappropriate, vague and disjointed replies; the apparently 
caricatural perceptions – all indicate that our method has something wrong 
with it. The dynamisms flowing within Maghrebin society, the lived 
experience of the surrounding European world, the Muslim’s marginalized 
existence, which leads to a scotomization, a disinterest, the cultural truth, 
ought to have been thematized. Our patient’s inadaptation is the correlate of 
the method’s inadequacy. (Fanon, 2018: 430) 
 
In hindsight, it was not surprising for the authors that the Algerian women could 
not live the images of the test. The methodological inadequacy consisted in detaching 
perception from the social conditions, the existential dimensions, the experience of 
marginalization of the subjects, and from their “precise, demanding, and in a sense, 
spasmed, cultural world”, (Fanon, 2018: 430), namely the impact of colliding forces 
on symbolic forms and on arresting the very production of symbols. In his psychiatric 
praxis, Fanon attempts “to set the psychical suffering of many of the patients within 
the flux of historical events and the net of symbols that contained their existence.” 




Similarly, the absence of creativity and imagination was not addressed as an issue 
of cultural or religious difference. Fanon and Géronimi assert that the absence of 
imagination and the attitudes of the patients towards fictional activities require 
examining the concrete and real world, where the imaginary life is nourished from 
and draws its foundations. Rather than an isolated phenomenon, imagination, like 
thought or reason, is connected to the apprehension of the real and the active 
engagement with the concrete world. Imagination is intrinsic to participating, 
bringing meaning, and constituting the world.  The authors affirm that “[t]he 
imagination, the imaginary, are only possible to the extent that the real belongs to 
us
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.” (Fanon, 2018: 431) Thus, what was at stake for Fanon and Géronimi was the 
condition of these women as free agents to participate in the constitution of the world.  
Faced with unusual objects, with unidentifiable situations, rejected by hostile 
because heterogeneous viewpoints, the Muslim woman is unable to elaborate 
any imaginary existence. The rare stories gathered did not restore us a world. 
(2018: 431-432).  
 
As Gibson and Beneduce add, the proposed images did not trigger the imagination 
of the patients not simply because their content and connotations were culturally 
different to the patients, but because they mirrored their condition of dispossession: 
“The women were humiliated by images that reflected the full extent of their 
extraneity; they had no means of recognizing themselves in the test.” (Gibson and 
Beneduce, 2017: 431) In contrast, Fanon and Géronimi note, when these patients 
were presented a blank card the foreign and constraining element disappeared, the 
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 Fanon and Géronimi’s thought echoes Sartre’s phenomenology of the imaginary world. Sartre 
posited that the condition of possibility for consciousness to imagine is “being-in-the world” or “to be 
situated in the world”. That is, although it seems as a flight from the real, imagination is motivated and 
conditioned by the concrete and particular apprehension of the real by a free consciousness 
(2004:185). Sartre argues that there is a reciprocal relation between the apprehension of the real and 
surpassing it “towards the imaginary”. Imagination “appears on the ground of the world”, but the 
world is apprehended as world by surpassing it through imagination. Thus, imagination is not 
secondary and contingent but an “essential and transcendental condition of consciousness.” There is no 





absence of images unleashed the imagination of the patient:  “Not running up against 
a world that excluded them, our patients formed rich and varied stories.” Fanon and 
Géronimi concluded that after this experience, in order to capture the different 
dimensions of the patients’ lives, to seize the instability of a human made world, their 
following trials would be situated within “a spatio-temporal framework, animated by 
cultural dynamisms that are homogeneous to the psycho-affective forces under 
examination.” (Fanon, 2018: 432) 
As Gibson and Beneduce note, the failed experiences in sociotherapy or with the 
TAT did not led Fanon to adopt a cultural relativism or a condescending approach 
towards local culture, but to develop a political phenomenology of these failed 
attempts, supported by a notion of culture “immersed in history, in which relations of 
sense are always bound up with relations of force, power, and resistance. (Gibson and 
Beneduce, 2017: 156). Yet, this view of culture did not prevent Fanon to explore and 
take seriously the local imaginaries, the expressions of suffering in the local systems 
of reference, the meaning of madness in Algerian society, the understanding of the 
mentally ill, her position within with the family circle and within the broader and 
changing social setting, the traditional approaches and treatments of mental illness, 
and the central role of religion, in which the cultural and symbolic elements of 
madness and health were ingrained.  
6.4 Local approaches to mental health  
Fanon’s explorations of the local understandings of mental health and disease did 
not run parallel to his work in the asylum but intersected with it in the overall task of 
reconstructing a psychiatric practice attuned to the singularities of the patient. In the 
above commented “Daily life in the douars” Fanon and Azoulay described how the 




is also the case when it comes to the understanding of disease and cure.  Social life in 
the douar revolves around the Moorish café, the djemaa or assembly, the public 
square, the markets, the family celebrations, and the religious feasts. Yet, the authors 
observe that social life is spatially separated by gender. “Women live in a closed 
society that remains in the shadows of the men’s society.” Woman lived “a largely 
cloistered existence” (Fanon, 2018: 376), fundamentally reduced to the domestic 
ambit, whereas man’s social life is public, “open to the world” and bereft of 
constrictions (Fanon, 2018: 377). Women have their own social life, consisting in 
meeting with other women, receiving visits from relatives or they play a specific role 
in religious feasts. Inside the household the roles and spaces of husband and wife are 
clearly defined, the authors equate their relation to that of master and servant. The 
wife is usually hosted in the house of the husband and represents the foreign and 
unknown element in the household. Yet, they also noticed that this situation is not 
exempt of ambiguity,  
on the one hand, her position is a subjugated one and, on the other, it stymies 
the power of the man. The wife participates in the occult, she stands in 
relation to a world that throws the man, she knows a lot of secrets; she must 
therefore be taken good care of. The man fears his servant; the wife thus gets 
her revenge. (2018: 378)  
 
Women have access to a world knowledge that escapes the sphere of influence of 
men. Among other things, women are the first instance in the treatment of disease. 
They have access to the world of the djinn, “and know the power of the word and of 
desire.” They are acquainted with curing recipes, which the authors describe as 
effective (2018: 383). Besides women, there are two superior instances to which the 
sick person can resort to, the iqqachs and the saints. The iqqachs mediate with the 
spirits through their knowledge of the mystical character of words and recitations. 




which he can animate transcendental forces (Desparmet 1993: 73). The saints stand 
next to God and their healing power needs to be invoked by a marabout. The ill 
person can also resort to other sorcerers, but this is seldom done since they are not 
physically part of the community and live in distant places, and they are also foreign 
to the beliefs of the douars. They possess a specific and personal science considered 
obscure and dangerous, which is not based on Koranic wisdom and can be at the very 
root of the disease or bring new disease. 
The authors note that the harmonious existence in the douar and the order of things 
that stems from the divine can be altered by external adversities such as natural 
catastrophes, economic crises or cataclysms. These events do not entail a breach 
between the individual and the collective, the personal history is still linked to the 
history of the community. This does not apply in case of disease, since illness alters 
the fundamental adherence of the individual and the community. Putting the emphasis 
on the temporal and spatial consequences of illness, the authors observe that the sick 
person is isolated, cut off from the community; there is a split between the personal 
history and the history of the collective. The sick person becomes an individual, 
“powerless, alone with an evil that is strictly his” (2018: 382).. In a long passage that 
I will not quote at lenght, Fanon and Azoulay switch to the first person in order to 
narrate in detail the inner dialogue of the sick person who has been disconnected from 
the community:  
Whether God is testing me through illness, whether he favours me (..) all this 
escapes me, the ways of God being foreign to me. (…)So I will consult those 
privileged beings able to help me. and this with all the more hope as I know 
man is able to affect me in my health, Thus  the illness that man may have 
contributed to inflicting upon me, he can also take part in removing. In the 
society that surrounds me, several categories of individuals may come 





The turn to the perspective of the sick person reflects the beginning of a personal 
history, of becoming and individual once the ties with the community have been 
altered. Here the authors do not simply describe a behavior or an event but put the 
focus on the lived experience of disease and cure, that is, on how they appear for 
consciousness, as an object of thought. By approaching objects of thought that are 
“phenomenologically real” Fanon and Azoulay attempt to grasp how the self and the 
world are mutually constituted and thereby to understand how values are lived and 
focus the production of meaning of disease and cure in social terms. In this movement 
there is an implicit bifurcation from the rationalizations of the Algiers School which 
would treat the behavior of the Muslim in terms of fatalism or credulity.  At the outset 
Fanon and his co-author observed that considering the “thrilling and generous reality 
of genies” (2018: 373) in North Africa the psychiatrist is tempted to order and 
classify what is complex and does not follow a linear progression. The concern of 
comprehending the meanings instead of capturing or seizing reality  is a constant in 
Fanon’s thought since his dissertation. As he put it in Black Skin White Masks, “[t]he 
essential for us is not to accumulate facts or behaviors but to draw their meaning.” 
(1952: 164; my translation
234
) 
This initial study had an impact on the changes introduced in the hospital, and also 
paved the way for further and more specific research on madness in Algeria “from the 
inside” (Fanon, 2018: 421), as Fanon and his intern François Sanchez  put it in 
“Maghrebi Muslims and their Attitude to Madness”. In this article, published in 1956,  
the authors emphasize that mental care practices in the Maghreb are deeply rooted in 
culture and endowed with a humanistic character, which itself requires special 
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attention, and that is absent in Europe despite its roots date back to Muslim 
approaches to mental care in the Middle Ages.   
The authors compare Maghrebian to Western representations of madness. In the 
West, they notice, there is an ambivalent and contradictory attitude towards the 
patient. On the one hand the mentally ill is considered as an ill person whose behavior 
is associated to the pathology at hand. On the other hand, it is common to consider 
the mentally ill as responsible for her actions and her illness. They point out that it is 
recurrent among relatives or medical and nursing staff the suspicion that the mentally 
ill indulges or takes advantage from her condition to coerce, exploit, or commit 
aggressive behaviors.  Alternatively, in the Maghreb mental illness is determined by 
the external action of genies or djnoun. The responsibility for the pathology lies in the 
genie and not in the patient, who is “absolutely alienated”, an “innocent victim of the 
genie or genies that possess him” (2018: 422).  The authors emphasize that the 
attitude to the mentally ill is “guided by a concern to respect the human in the 
person.” (2018: 424) The patient is never dehumanized and the group never loses 
sight of the human side and the dignity in the patient, who “preserves intact the image 
of a person’s normality despite the existence of the illness.” (2018: 424) Hence the 
respect and veneration are not directed towards madness itself, neither towards the 
mentally ill, but towards the human in the mentally ill.  Likewise, the social 
dimension of the patient is also kept intact.  Mental disorders do not elicit 
embarrassment and do not provoke the isolation or aggressive behavior towards the 
patient. It is strongly determined by the temporary intervention of the djinn, once is 
over and the patient is cured, she can resume her activities and reincorporate into the 
group without raising mistrust or ambivalence. The authors outline that mental 




intervention of the djinn and are considered curable, do not affect the basic structure 
of the personality, and there is no notion of a chronic disorder.  
Fanon and Sanchez observe “a harmonious articulation of beliefs in the Maghreb, 
enabling the creation and implementation of ‘mental care’.” (2018: 424) Namely, 
there is a dynamic balance between the cultural, the symbolic, the ethical, the 
religious, the view of the human, the social values and structures and the therapeutic 
of psychotherapeutic practices. Although in quantitative terms these practices do not 
effectively address the problems of mental illness, the authors see in the “profoundly 
holistic spirit” of such practices the explanation for the humanistic character of 
Maghrebian mental care, which, “at the human level it possesses a great value that 
cannot be limited to the mere efficacy of Maghrebi therapy.” (2018: 424) 
If in the article on the Muslim attitude to madness the authors attempt to 
“reconstitute the historicity of suffering”, in “Introduction to Sexuality Disorders 
among North Africans” Fanon insists on the perspective from the inside in order to 
explore the “local idioms of suffering” (Gibson and Beneduce, 2017: 151). This 
article, co-written by Fanon, Azoulay and Sanchez in 1955 following their 
ethnographic research in Kabylian villages, responds to the need to account for the 
influence of the djnoun or genies in the expression of mental disorders, and how they 
inform and structure different aspects of everyday life. To that effect the authors 
relied on a “well-reputed” taleb specialized in treating impotence –although the 
authors point out that “his explanations seemed somewhat confused to us” (Fanon, 
2018: 386).  The authors also drew from the primary sources of the taleb and 
marabouts such as the Book of Clemency on Medicine and Wisdom, a Middle Ages 





Fanon and his co-authors noticed that there was a recurrent and frequent 
association between mental disorders and sexuality, mostly impotence and 
vaginismus. The article explore how that the significance of the troubles of sexuality 
required addressing their origin in “normal consciousness, the nodes of belief” (2018: 
385), that is, to look at the cultural, social, religious aspects imbued in the 
understanding of sexual disorders. The authors point out that sexual disorders are 
understood in relation to magical practices “and have to be treated as such.” (2018: 
386) The origin of sexual impotence may lie in the punishing responses of the 
djnnoun after having been offended or annoyed. In these cases the impotent man must 
resort to a taleb in order to mitigate the djnnoun through invocations or amulets with 
magic formulae. Another source of sexual impotence lies in acts of sorcery and magic 
which are used to bind a man. Some of these magic practices are licit and fall within 
the moral domain of the community such as the cases of selective impotence where 
the wife who has been cheated binds the husband to herself and turn him impotent to 
other women. However, there are other cases that society rejects and equates to black 
magic such as the spells coming from the revenge of a jealous or repudiated woman 
that produce the total impotence of the man.  The cure of the impotent man may take 
place either when the woman renounces to the binding, or through the intervention of 
the taleb who counterbalances the spell with another form of magic.  
Fanon and the co-authors emphasize the “essential value of speech” in the magic 
and healing practices; Incantations, invocations, recitations, verbal prescriptions, 
formulae, utterances instructions or Koranic verses have a capacity to bind and a 
power to affect the body (2018: 389). As it was stated, throughout Fanon’s work there 




relation between language and embodiment, on the power of words to move the 
sensory and the affective corners of the human being beyond their semantic meaning. 
The binding and the magic practices do not only target men, they can also be 
directed at women. Families may want to protect the virginity of the daughter before 
marriage, or to maintain the celibacy of a repudiated woman. Husbands who doubt on 
the fidelity of the wife may also bind her by turning impotent other men or by 
annihilating the desire of the wife. The cases when a woman binds another woman in 
revenge of being abandoned are rejected by society. The spells and magic practices 
that society prohibits and that considers licit are indicative of gender relations and 
power dynamics in Algerian society. As Fanon had referred in “Daily Life in the 
Douars”, there is a marked gender demarcation in Algerian rural societies which also 
informed the social, religious, and cultural imaginaries of health and disease. 
Women’s lives were described as “cloistered”, and “subjugated” in relation to the 
husband’s open social horizon. Yet, the active participation of women in healing and 
magic practices enlarged their sphere of influences and conferred them power through 
their access into the world of the unknown, the occult and the invisible, which was 
restricted and unsettling to most men. In this case, the recurrent cases of sexual 
impotence linked to mental disorders among Muslim men were a “preoccupying 
problem, since Muslim society is founded on the authority of men.” (Fanon, 2018: 
385) There are traces of conflict and politics in the suffering body of the Algerian 
men which are to be explored; the troubles of masculinity in a patriarchal society 
were indicative of a broader social trouble affecting the roles, reference systems and 
symbolic and power structures of a society fractured by colonialism. This external 
disruption reached all aspects and spaces of social life – relations between neighbors, 




(Gibson and Beneduce, 2017: 151) Thus, beyond the efficacy of the spells and 
psychotherapeutic treatments, what Fanon, Sanchez and Azoulay describe is a society 
filled with fear, suspicion, envy, anxieties, feelings of humiliation and of being 
constantly threatened and persecuted, where the closest other is posited as a threat and 
there is no clear distinction between the enemy, the relative, the neighbor or the wife. 
This situation raises a sense of vulnerability that gives give rise to “delirium of 
persecution” and what would later be called “cultural paranoia”, something which, 
Fanon, Sanchez and Azoulay hinted, yet did not completely elaborate. (Gibson and 
Beneduce, 2017: 145). 
As Alice Cherki affirms, Fanon’s concern in the articles on institutional 
psychotherapy for Muslim men or on the TAT for Muslim women, among others, 
was to “enable authentic speech by reestablishing an environment that allows each 
subject to take up again the traces of real or psychical events.” (Cherki, 2017: xi). 
Simultaneously, in the latter examined articles on Algerian representations of 
madness his main concern was rather to listen to the expressions of suffering and pain 
and to trace back their historicity. As it was stated, Nigel Gibson and Roberto 
Beneduce (2017) notice that this required a special medical sensitivity, and also 
towards politics and culture: Fanon did not approach the expressions of suffering 
through cultural relativism, romanticism, paternalism, or taking culture as a sign of 
pathology.  Instead, his listening entails a form of bracketing so that he can traverse 
the complexity of experience, culture, politics embedded in suffering, find their traces 
and expressions in the body of the patient, and to delve into the meaning of the 
symptoms, to discern what the patient is saying, what he is asking for, and also what 
the patient does not and cannot express. He maintained a critical distance towards 




discourses, and categories of European medicine. Although he did not treat both 
approaches to health symmetrically, he was alert to the alienating potential in both.  
Besides the therapeutic role of traditional practices, in his writing on the Algerian 
war Fanon is concerned in how the culture of the colonized contains elements that 
can contribute to resistance and liberation, but also alienating practices and values 
that impede action, lock the colonized into defensive and reactive positions, and 
impede the openness and motion characteristic of a living culture. In L’an V de la 
revolution algérienne, accounting on the individual, social and cultural changes 
taking place during  and because of the decolonization struggle, Fanon optimistically 
writes that the “old superstitions begin to collapse” referring to marabouts, sorcery 
and the belief in the djinn informing all aspects of life (Fanon,1959: 132; my 
translation
235
). This view is modified in his scathing critique in Les Damnés de la terre 
of the persistence of the “harmful genies” and the “magical superstructure” “that 
create around the colonized a world of prohibitions, barriers and inhibitions far more 
terrifying than the world of the settler.” (Fanon, 1961: 56; my translation
236
) Fanon’s 
critique is not so much based on pitting tradition against modernity as in terms of 
liberation against alienation. The world of genies and sorcery bind the colonized to a 
tradition, a history, a group, and to an immutable world by creating a parallel reality 
of fear and phantasms where the colonizer becomes insignificant, he posits. And 
although in this work Fanon paid less attention to gender relations and the specific 
situation of women, he clearly stated that the emancipation and empowerment of 
women could not rely on their access to the invisible and occult world of genies: 
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 « les vieilles superstitions commencent à s’écrouler » 
236 « génies malfaisants » « superstructure magique » « dispose autour du colonisé un monde de 




The underdeveloped country must refrain from perpetuating the feudal 
traditions that prioritize men over women. Women will have exactly the 
same place as men, not only in the articles of the constitution, but in daily 





As we will see in further detail in the next chapter, Fanon’s treatment of magic and 
sorcery differs from how he approached the ecstatic dances of possession.  Although 
in the context of the revolution he did not see political and emancipatory value in 
these practices, which functioned as forms of evasion from the conflict, he conceived 
them as psychologically significant, and not intrinsically alienating, but as a way of 
releasing aggressiveness and channeling the accumulated violence in the body. 
6.5 Healing and care  
The editorials that Fanon wrote for Notre Journal, the internal weekly newspaper 
of the wards, enable to see from within his attempt to reform the institution, the 
obstacles encountered, the doubts concerning institutional psychotherapy, the 
decisions taken, the setbacks, the accomplishments, and the elements that inform life 
inside of the hospital that escaped to the control of the doctors.  In these editorials, 
addressed to the patients and the personnel, he expresses in layman’s terms and with a 
didactic intention his understanding of building a healing institution and the efforts to 
put it into practice in the daily life. Fanon’s entries also show how elements that are 
implicit and undergird his social and political work and his overall philosophy appear 
explicitly in the journal and in plainer language. 
In his editorials Fanon brings to the forefront the importance of care in mental 
health care, in its different meanings. He insists that healing entails a work of care in 
the sense of nurturing the other through cultivating different attitudes which produce 
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 « Le pays sous-développé doit se garder de perpétuer les traditions féodales qui consacrent la 
priorité de l'élément masculin sur l'élément féminin. Les femmes recevront une place identique aux 
hommes non dans les articles de la Constitution mais dans la vie quotidienne, à l'usine, à l'école, dans 




different human relations. Care is also present in the sense of being cautious and alert, 
that is, to be attentive to what the boarders express. And care also takes the meaning 
of the concern or the anguish that the encounter with the other elicits. 
In one of the first editorials, upon an observation of a patient, Fanon addresses the 
relation between the institution and society exemplified by the peripheral location of 
the hospital, far away from everyday social life : 
Future generations will ask themselves with interest why we were persuaded 
to build psychiatric hospitals remote from any centre. Several patients have 
already asked me: ‘Doctor, will we hear the Easter bells ring? – I don’t 
know’. I didn’t want to answer the question, because, though I was only new 
in this hospital, I felt responsible for the fact that we are unable to hear the 
bells from here. (Fanon, 2018: 318; own italics) 
 
 The peripheral of the asylum is not only a geographical location but also a social 
condition. The appeal to the sensory reflects how the patient in internment is 
separated from time, from the cyclical festivities that mark the calendar, from the 
sounds of human interaction, the rhythm of a city and the social life. Fanon’s initial 
evasive response to the patient reflects the tension between the asylum’s therapeutic 
function of curing and its broader social function of separating and containing groups 
of people. In “The North African Syndrome”, where he addressed the relation 
between medicine and politics concerning North African migrants in France, Fanon 
emphasized the relation of medicine with political dynamics and appealed to the 
responsibility of the doctor: 
Actually it is our fault. As it happens the fault is YOUR fault. Men come and 
go along a corridor that you have built for them, where you have arranged no 
bench on which they can rest, where you have crystallized a bunch of 
scarecrows that furiously smack them in the face, and they hurt their head, 
their chest, their heart.  
Where they find no room 
where you leave them no  room 
where there is absolutely no room for them  








In both passages, despite their differences in tone and in the addressee, Fanon uses 
at the start the first person plural to directly involve himself in the complicity of 
medicine with alienation. In the latter he was a recently graduate doctor and in the 
former a newly arrived doctor. This was the only time Fanon explicitly addressed the 
relation between politics and the psychiatric hospital in the newspaper, although 
succinctly dealt, it is latent in other editorials. The rest of the editorials sought to 
explain the boarders and the orderlies the meaning of the therapeutic project and the 
activities that aimed at turning a place destined to accumulate and exclude 
depersonalized patients, “all piled on top of one another” (Fanon, 2018: 317), into a 
therapeutic establishment “whose self-declared goal is the organization of a social life 
for its boarders” (Fanon, 2018: 323), as he explains in another entry. This goal 
contains two basic, interrelated elements, elevate the patients into humanity and foster 
their agency. In the successive editorials he insists that is necessary to eliminate the 
sense of imprisonment of the patients, to mitigate their mistrust towards the 
institution, and to contribute to maintain their social ties and their place in society of 
those who have been recently interned through their contact with the outside world. 
He explains the importance of participating in the journal and the value of writing 
against self-abandonment and solitude. Against the inertia and the indifference 
derived from the internment he dedicates an editorial on the importance of time, 
schedule and the organization of activities, not for the sake of keeping patients busy, 
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 « Justement, la faute vient de nous. Justement, la faute est TA faute. 
Comment, des hommes vont et viennent le long d’un couloir que tu as construit pour eux, où tu 
n’as ménagé aucun banc où ils puissent se reposer, où tu as cristallisé un tas d’épouvantails qui leur 
giflent rageusement le visage, où ils se blessent la face, la poitrine, le coeur.  
Où ils ne trouvent pas de place 
où tu ne leur fais pas de place 
où il n’y a absolument pas place pour eux 
et tu oses me dire que cela ne t’intéresse pas ! 




but to create a rhythm of life through the meaningful participation of all the personnel 
of the hospital. He announces the opening of the Moorish café, the oriental salon for 
Muslim women, the guingette, an open-air café and dance hall, and the celebration of 
Christian and Muslim feasts. In the editorials he also takes charge of the critiques of 
the patients and their different complaints about the quality of the food, or the lack of 
communal activities involving all the boarders. An article in the newspaper of a 
visiting doctor, Doctor Albert Gambs, seemed to confirm the accomplishments of the 
therapeutic environment: 
in your establishment that atmosphere struck me. No sterile restlessness, no 
throng of people around the doctor as he passed through a ward: each person 
is busy with his or her work and interested in it. Your nurses do not monitor 
you, but really ‘live’ among you, side by side, participating in the same 
activities as you. (Fanon, 2018: 331) 
 
In his response to Gambs, Fanon exposes his understanding of the institution,  
which echoes institutional psychotherapy, yet it also contains important philosophical 
elements that which would undergird his political thought, his understanding of 
culture and the political and administrative organization of the postcolonial state and 
their risks of solification and reification. For these reasons the following passage 
warrants a lengthy quotation: 
The ‘institution’ was the central issue of the previous editorial; and the great 
merit of the definition put forward of it was the importance granted to 
movement. The equilibrium between the team game, regular training, and 
ordered and creative work confers on the institution both its solidity and its 
plasticity. From there, the following question must be asked and is asked: is 
every institution not in constant danger of vitiation? Or again: does not every 
attempt to give body to an institution risk taking directions that are 
fundamentally opposed to the open, fecund, global and nevertheless 
qualified character of the institution? You have to place yourself at the heart 
of the institution and interrogate it. If it is a generous source, it must enable 
multiple personalities to be manifest in it. It has to make possible 
interminable and fruitful encounters. It has to be multiplied constantly. It has 
to be at the disposal of its members, at their service. If it does not radiate, if 
it fails to achieve its essential duty, which is constant dialogue between its 
members, if it permits ‘collective monologue’, and if, lastly, it does not 





A living institution, the one that enables human flourishing, is characterized by 
motion, plasticity, interaction, and is attuned to the fact of it being constituted and 
composed by human beings, who “have the extraordinary quality of being in constant 
renewal.” (Fanon, 2018: 339) A persistent inquisitive eye is essential to maintain the 
delicate equilibrium between the openness of the institution and the forces, attitudes, 
inertias that take life away from it and lead to stagnation and closure. One of the 
forces that militate against the dynamic character of the asylum from within are 
automatisms, the mechanic repetition of gestures, and “doubtless habits” (Fanon, 
2018: 338). Fanon insists on the necessity of “infusing life into each committee” 
(2018: 341), rather than a formalistic accumulation of organization structures, 
hierarchies and roles that tend to rigidify and lose their meaning.  
This was also a matter of everyday attitudes. Fanon emphasizes the importance of 
creativity, imagination and everyday care and alertness.  The hero, he explains, is not 
the one who performs epics deeds and then lies down to rest, but the one who 
tenaciously and daily “gets through his or her task with conscientiousness and love.” 
(Fanon, 2018: 336) Fanon addressed several editorials to the nursing staff. Initially 
nurses at Blida had no specific training until a program was organized, and they also 
were sent to France for workshops. The relationship between doctors, nurses and 
boarders is essential for the functioning of the asylum yet always complicated. Fanon 
notices how the recommendations of the doctors to the patients are turned into orders 
and prohibitions through the intervention of the nurses; part of the role of the nurse is 
to understand the patient and to help the patient to understand, to avoid their rejection 
of the institution and to contribute to their engagement in the social life.  
Fanon dedicated several editorials to the question of the sanctions and rules of the 




formation of teams, the training, and the implications of the sports activities for the 
overall life of the asylum (Cherki, 2011). Yet, the issue of the punishments and 
punitive measures, the role and the attitude of referees raised certain questions about 
the overall functioning and the understanding of the institution. Fanon seemed 
initially sympathetic to the Sport committee’s elaboration of rules and a disciplinary 
code with sanctions and penalties for the sport activities.  Aggressions, insults, 
offense, provocation or any non-sporting conduct should be penalized on the grounds 
of accountability and the patient’s assumption of responsibility for their actions, as it 
occurs in the outside world. “These sanctions prepare the boarder for life on the 
outside”, he affirms (2018: 342). But he enigmatically concludes that this does not 
reach the core of the issue and the question of sanctioning is more complex: “where 
does the desire to penalize come from?” (2018: 343) In the following editorial Fanon 
briefly looks at the role and the functioning of authority and punishment at the family 
and the broader community levels. But for Fanon the question of sanctions lays bare 
two problems. First, regarding the conception that the asylum should mimic or 
recreate the society outside of the hospital, which is not necessarily a therapeutic 
environment. And second, sanctioning does reproduce paternalistic and authoritarian 
attitudes of the hospital staff towards the patient instead of caring ones. The 
disciplinary code risks creating the conditions for the re-appearance of the attitudes in 
the patients that the therapeutic structure seeks to eliminate. Fanon concludes in his 
last editorial that introducing sanctions, punishments and a disciplinary code is “a 
therapeutic absurdity” (2018: 348) and what is at stake is care and understanding.  
Otherwise said, if care is not taken, the hospital establishment, which is 
above all a curative establishment, a therapeutic establishment, is gradually 
transformed into a barracks in which children-boarders tremble before 
parent-orderlies. (…) Here, at hospital, all this changes. (…) We do not 
punish our patients; we are obliged to understand each one of their attitudes. 




attitude of understanding and adopt an attitude of punishment, we are 
mistaken. (Fanon, 2018: 346)  
 
6.6  Violence in and of the asylum 
Fanon’s aforementioned concern for enabling speech of the boarders through the 
environmental conditions becomes patent in “The Phenomenon of Agitation in the 
Psychiatric Milieu: General Considerations, Psychopathological Meaning”, a technical 
article co-written with his intern Slimane Asselah and published in 1957. In this essay 
the authors tackle one of the central arguments of institutional psychotherapy, that is, 
the violence that the psychiatric institution engenders and is manifested in the so-called 
agitation. The authors express their divergences with Tosquelles’  article  “Introduction 
à une sémiologie de l’agitation”. The Catalan psychiatrist distinguished between 
expressive and perceptive-reactive agitation, proposed several steps to observe 
agitation, and advocated for a semiology of agitation that would enable to understand 
and treat agitation. Although Tosquelles did not view agitation, in contrast to dominant 
psychiatry, as a symptom or pathology, but, exceeding the psychological and related to 
institutionalization and the attitudes of the staff, contradictorily his semiotic approach to 
observe it and understand it, did not exceed the medical framework. Tosquelles 
compared agitation to a wound turned into gangrene produced by the action and 
attitudes of the hospital staff (Gibson and Beneduce, 2017). Fanon and Asselah argue 
that agitations present multiple and different manifestations yet they are both expressive 
and perceptive-reactive at the same time.  
Agitation is not merely an excrescence, a ‘psycho-motor’ cancer. It is also 
and above all a modality of existence, a type of actualization, an expressive 
style. Agitation disarms, since it is what reunites the structures. (Fanon, 
2018: 447)  
 
Like Tosquelles, they deny treating agitation as a disease, but rather than a state, as 




concrete environmental conditions. Beyond a problem of cruel attitudes and 
repressive practices what the authors call into question is the asylum, which “itself is 
sadistic, repressive, rigid, non-socialized, and has castrative aspects.” (Fanon, 2018: 
440). Thereby they put the focus on the structural character of agitation, which is 
fundamentally the reflection and the return of the violence of the asylum.  
The notions of ‘façade psychosis’, of ‘morbid mental persistence’ 
(persistence mentale morbide4), as well as spectacular reactions of posture, 
provocations with a strongly aggressive charge such as those encountered in 
concentration-camp environments, the sadomasochistic nodes so easily 
brought about in the asylum framework – all these things demand veritable 
vigilance. (Fanon, 2018: 439) 
 
In other words, the persistence and transmutations of mental disorders,  aggressive 
behaviors, furious outbursts, or what is interpreted as the “willful malice” of the 
patient, which are a response “to a type of concentration-camp structure of an 
essentially repressive character”, indicate that the observation has to be shifted 
towards the therapeutic setting. (Fanon, 2018: 439)  
The authors point out that the coercive, immobilization and isolation measures are 
“a second internment” once the patient “has already been expelled by the social 
milieu, which has requested its sectioning under the 1838 law.” (Fanon, 2018: 440) 
The first internment entails a “dis-adaptation”. The second internment, with its 
concomitant motor restraint and the disruption of the body schema, that is the 
dialectical relation between the body and the world, brings about a set of different and 
complex manifestations, choleric outbreaks, delusions, furious reactions, further 
agitation, and notably, hallucinations, to which the authors pay special attention, and 
which is not a claim to reality, but “an abrupt annihilation of perceived reality” 




explained in neurological terms, but are the organisms’ response to the conditions of 
rejection and exclusion: 
In practical terms, then, isolation, immobilization, and the use of coercive 
methods through the sadistic instruments brought into play, provoke, or at 
least precipitate, and deepen the regression. Thought in flight is caught in the 
flow of images without any possibility for it to escape through the 
benevolent and realistic (actualisant) help of another (autrui). Shutting the 
patient in a cell, isolating him, fixing him to the bed – this amounts to 
printing the conditions of existence for hallucinatory activity. Starting with 
anxiety, solitude and the psychobiological feeling of catastrophe that 
features in nearly all mental illness, and is here fuelled by the aggression 
typical of rejection, of reclusion, an evident ‘complication’ of the clinical 
treatment of hallucinations arises. (Fanon, 2018: 442-443; translation 
modified) 
 
Fanon and Asselah do not understand agitation as a substantial clinical entity, 
neither is a chronic condition. But in contrast to Tosquelles’ semiology and his 
proposal to observe agitation, they point out that agitation cannot be explained 
mechanically, but dialectically, that is, in the interaction and the “reciprocal 
foundation” between the institution and the patient. The boarders transform and give 
back what they receive from the clinic. Thus, agitation is a product of human 
relationships, a reciprocal response to the violence of the hospital setting. They 
outline that agitation “appears within a human framework – the clinical service itself. 
(…) A fitting expression is agitation as asylum putrefaction.” (Fanon, 2018: 444)  By 
bringing the human element to the forefront–a central element in Fanon’s philosophy 
since his dissertation and the earliest pages of Black Skin White Masks up to his 
vision of the postcolonial world–the authors recall that the hospital is not a thing 
neither an abstraction, but a product of human actions and of human relationships. 
Besides the evasion of responsibility, treating the hospital as inert and ossified 
impedes responding to the concrete challenges that it poses, and hinders the 




activities and practices, which in turn will constitute new types of boarders and 
hospital staff.  
If the hospital setting forms a knot of social relations, of ambiguous 
encounters, then agitation loses its resonance as an entity, as irresponsible 
behaviour, as something incomprehensible. From a dialectical viewpoint, 
agitation then enters into the primordial cycle of the reflecting-reflected 
mirror: you give to me, I receive, I assimilate, I transform, I render to you. It 
is certainly not the case that all catastrophic reactions, of which agitation is 
only a modality, will disappear. But these attempts of organisms at 
explanation are restored to their value as significations. The second 
internment that isolation represents is dispensed with once and for all. 
(…)This notion of rigorous skill, of armed suppleness, of fully articulated 
institutions, breaks with the vicious circle in which the patient tends to settle. 
(Fanon, 2018: 445) 
 
 
The human element is not to be confused with a mere ethical approach. Fanon and 
Asselah are suspicious of reformist attempts of the institution which, out of humanity, 
focus uniquely on the attitudes of the staff, or on the mere suppression of the 
straightjackets, coercive and punitive tools and practices or isolation units. The 
authors portray an asylum where, besides the meals and the sleeping times, the days 
of the “not bed-ridden” boarders are spent in the courtyard roaming in “Brownian 
motion” (2018:440).  They point out that the quick setback after the elimination of 
coercive measures leads to the demands of the staff to reincorporate them, thereby re-
initiating the aforementioned vicious circle of agitation-restraint-agitation. The chain 
of reactions affects all levels of the hospital: the claims of the staff are perceived by 
the doctors as fueled by the sadistic behavior of the nurses, which vitiates doctor-
nurse relations and elicits the distrust within the hospital personnel.  
Consequently, the issue is less to advocate or command the suppression of 
straightjackets or isolation units, than to foster in the milieu the circulation of 
productive, de-alienating, and functional lines of force with a strong 
potential for differentiated demands. (Fanon, 2018: 440) 
 
 
Likewise, the authors are highly critical of therapeutic understandings of the 




(…) notions such as ‘the village-hospital’, ‘the hospital, a reflection of the 
outside world’, inside the hospital is like outside’, ‘the patient should feel at 
home’, and so on. Such expressions, you will surmise, are an attempt to 
mask the reality beneath falsely psychotherapeutic humanitarian concerns. 
(2018: 446) 
 
The authors point out how mere humanitarian arguments veil the violence of the 
institution, whose problems are of a deeper character. In order to understand agitation 
one has to consider the concreteness of the institution. That is, first, the relation 
between the hospital and society; and second, the relationships established within the 
asylum. Fanon does not delve into the first element in this article but he does during 
his lectures in the University of Tunis. With reference to the second point, the 
organization of the institution as a therapeutic environment, the rebuilding of a social 
life within and “establishing a general framework for de-alienating encounters”, 
requires a “plasticity” in the institution so that that would absorb the manifestations of 
the patient without crumbling down, and that enables the “reconciliation between the 
existing being and his manifestations. It ought not to refuse anything from the 
patient.” (2018: 445) Fanon insists that agitation is not to be calmed down though 
medication nor repressed, neither can the problem be solved through a telephone 
consultation and looking up in a medical textbook. Instead, it requires to understand 
the patient in the concrete setting, which is at odds with isolation, exclusion and 
coercion. In turn, a proper therapeutic organization leads to it “being lived by the 
patient as that which ‘understands at last’, and not as that which amputates” (2018: 
439). It is in setting the conditions that lead to this reciprocal understanding where the 
transformation of the institution shall be oriented towards. This idea of the institution 
in motion is at odds with a mechanistic and endogenous view of agitation. As a mode 
of existence, agitation is not a senseless form of stasis but is involved in the building 




In actual fact, the agitated individual at once does and does not know what 
he is doing. Or if you will, he does not know what he is doing but he is 
trying to find out. These are the attempts that clarify here and there the 
scene, leaving the observer with the disagreeable impression of being fooled. 
Thus, even at the bottom of these disordered, anarchic behaviours, which are 
stamped with the seal of nonsense, the fundamental ambiguity of existence is 
integrally assumed. (2018: 447) 
 
Alice Cherki notes that this article “is a jewel of modernity for our time, when 
isolation cells and restraints are once again being prescribed in France.” (Cherki, 
2017: ix). Yet, the relevance of this article also has implications outside the walls of 
the asylum. Fanon’s understanding of the “lines of force” that define and order the 
asylum as a pathogenic site and are at the root of the violence that originates in it, 
informed and helped him to think what he called the Manicheism of the colonial 
situation in his analysis of the “physical and metaphysical segregation” (Sekyi-Otu, 
1996: 81) derived from the particular spatial disposition of the colonial city, and to 
his treatment of racism and colonialism as everyday spatial and historical relations 
(Kipfer, 2007). In the chapter on violence of Les Damnés de la terre, Fanon insists 
how colonialism and racism are also forms of spatial organization that “obey to the 
principle of reciprocal exclusion” (Fanon 1961: 42): 
The colonial world is a compartmentalized world. It is surely unnecessary to 
recall the existence of native quarters and European quarters, of schools for 
natives and schools for Europeans, in the same that way it is unnecessary to 
recall the apartheid in South Africa. However, if we delve into the intimacy 
of this compartmentalization we will be able to reveal the lines of force that 
it implies. This approach to the colonial world, its ordering and its 
geographical disposition will allow us to define the threads out of which a 
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 « Le monde colonial est un monde compartimenté. Sans doute est-il superflu, sur le plan de la 
description, de rappeler l'existence de villes indigènes et de villes européennes, d'écoles pour indigènes 
et d'écoles pour Européens, comme il est superflu de rappeler l’ apartheid en Afrique du Sud. Pourtant, 
si nous pénétrons dans l'intimité de cette compartimentation, nous aurons au moins le bénéfice de 
mettre en évidence quelques-unes des lignes de force qu'elle comporte. Cette approche du monde 
colonial, de son arrangement, de sa disposition géographique va nous permettre de délimiter les arêtes 




As we will see in the next chapter, Fanon carefully describes the rigid Manichean 
logic that orders and separates the native and the colonized town.  This form of 
domination through radical separation is as coercive as directly repressive and is both 
physical and metaphysical (Sekyi-Otu, 1996). It restricts, isolates, excludes, and is 
also is linked to the less visible “perspective of eternity” in which colonialism “has 
installed itself” (Fanon, 1959:35; my translation
240
). Through stasis and repetition, 
colonial space and time “produces forms of homogeneity that are embedded in daily 
spatial practices” with an impact on the bodily, affective and imaginative experience 
of the colonized (Kipfer, 2007: 711). Fanon describes the effects of everyday life 
colonial space and times as follows: 
The native is a confined being. The apartheid is just a modality of 
compartmentalization of the colonial world. The first thing that the native 
learns is to stay in his place, not to go beyond certain limits. This is why the 
dreams of the native are muscular dreams, dreams of action, aggressive 
dreams. I dream that I jump, that I swim, that I run, that I climb.  I dream 
that I burst into laughter, that I jump over the river in one leap, that I am 
chased by a group of cars that never catch me. During colonization, the 
colonized never stop liberating themselves between nine o’clock in the 
evening and six o’clock in the morning. This aggressiveness, sedimented in 
the muscles, will be initially manifested against his fellows. (…) Faced with 
the colonial ordering, the colonized are in a state of permanent tension. 





Architect Massimo Paolini affirms that the asylum, the abattoir and the 
concentration camp are the three paradigmatic spaces to understand the violence of 
the modern world for their opacity, inaccessibility and falling outside of the realm of 
rights (Paolini, 2019). Fanon more than once associated the responses to the structure 
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 « (…) colonialisme qui s’est installé dans une perspective d’éternité. » 
241
« L'indigène est un être parqué, Y apartheid n'est qu'une modalité de la compartimentation du 
monde colonial. La première chose que l'indigène apprend, c'est à rester à sa place, à ne pas dépasser 
les limites. C'est pourquoi les rêves de l'indigène sont des rêves musculaires, des rêves d'action, des 
rêves agressifs. Je rêve que je saute, que je nage, que je cours, que je grimpe. Je rêve que j'éclate de 
rire, que je franchis le fleuve d'une enjambée, que je suis poursuivi par des meutes de voitures qui ne 
me rattrapent jamais. Pendant la colonisation, le colonisé n'arrête pas de se libérer entre neuf heures du 
soir et six heures du matin. Cette agressivité sédimentée dans ses muscles, le colonisé va la manifester 






of the asylum to those found in concentration camps settings. The correlation between 
the concentration camp and the psychiatric hospital would be a recurrent argument of 
the anti-psychiatry and anti-institution movements in the following decades (Foot, 
2015). In several instances, Fanon also compared the concentration camp to colonial 
societies, but rather than the exceptionality that Paolini implies in his argument, 
Fanon’s account of everyday life under colonial forms of domination reflects, as it 
was argued in previous chapters, how in the colony the extraordinary is imposed as 
the ordinary condition of everyday existence. The forms of contention and separation 
in the asylum and in colonial society can also be read as descriptions of security 
politics viewed from the underside, of those who suffer them. Besides the political 
character of Fanon’s psychiatry, this essay is another example of how his medical and 
political thought rather than running parallel or superimposing one over the other, 
they nourish each other.  Their mutual imbrication, in this concrete case, also enables 




Although in the article on agitation Fanon’s view of the psychiatric hospital is still 
within the framework of institutional psychotherapy, he exposes certain theoretical 
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 There is an overall agreement that Fanon anticipated a “spatial turn” in the analysis of 
oppression. But the role and the importance of Fanon’s focus on space is approached differently.  
Postcolonial thinkers and cultural theorists have mostly emphasized the spatial dimension in Fanon’s 
work at the expense of the historical, dialectical, existential phenomenological and Marxian elements 
of his work. In their textualist, and in some cases psychologizing readings, space in Fanon enabled to 
overcome what they perceive as binaries and essentialist positions, and to explore “the spatialization of 
cultural politics”, third spaces and non-representability.  On the other hand, Ato Sekyi-Otu understands 
space as a moment in Fanon’s dialectical narrative (Kipfer, 2007). Leaving aside their marked 
ideological considerations, and although my reading is in general closer to the latter, both approaches 
miss Fanon’s point. Fanon’s thought, as stated in Chapter two is clearly rooted in time and temporality, 
as he explicitly puts it. Besides, connecting his thought on the asylum and agitation with his 
phenomenology of violence, although considering their different contexts, problems and 
developments, shows that for Fanon space is not necessarily non-dialectical but neither a relative 
moment to be overcome. Instead space and time overlap and intersect in the constitution of social 




and practical divergences, contradictions and breaches in relation to the thought of the 
group of Saint-Alban that would eventually grow deeper. 
6.7 Fanon’s letter of resignation: dealing with the contradiction 
The anticolonial war started in November 1954, and around mid-1955 Fanon, who 
was known for his psychiatric work and his anticolonial positions, was contacted by 
the National Liberation Front (FLN) to provide mental care treatment to combatants. 
The assistance was arranged through the open service that Fanon co-directed with 
Lacaton, who did not oppose. The initial psychiatric care extended to surgical care, 
the provision of medicines, which were severely controlled by the colonial regime, 
the elaboration of reports of torture and the logistic support of the local and regional 
cells such as the storage and of weapons and sheltering combatants in the hospital and 
his private house (Cherki, 2011). The undercover activities of Fanon with the FLN 
went unnoticed to the intelligence services. Only his support to a strike whose highest 
rate of support in the hospital was reported in the wards under his direction and his 
protest against the imprisonment of a trade union leader appear in the archival records 
of the police (Gibson and Beneduce, 2017: 175). As we saw in the previous chapters, 
Saint-Alban during the World War II became a site of resistance and insurrection 
against fascism. In the case of the Blida-Joinville hospital, the involvement of Fanon 
and other members of the staff, Algerian and French, with the anticolonial revolution 
was secret and private. The intensification of the war, episodes such as the Battle of 
Algiers, the repression of protests, and the ordinary character of the colonial 
oppression had a growing impact on the daily life of what was envisaged as a space 
of disalienation and humanization. Fanon started treating both torturers and the 
tortured (Gibson and Beneduce, 2017). In one of the case studies on the disorders of 




inside the hospital of a policeman who was being treated privately with an Algerian 
patient who had been tortured by him. The policemen who suffered from depression 
derived from his activities in the police had an anxiety attack and eventually resigned 
and left Algeria; the tortured Algerian patient ran away, hid inside a toilet and 
attempted to commit suicide. The situation acquired tragic dimensions with the 
increasing pressure of the police over the hospital, which was considered a “nest of 
fellaghas” (Cherki, 2011:161). The nurses strike in July 1956 was severely repressed. 
Fanon’s colleague, Raymond Lacaton was arrested and tortured. Lacaton warned that 
new and mass arrests were to follow. Alice Cherki notes that Fanon’s resignation in 
December 1956 and his subsequent expulsion from Algeria probably saved his life. 
Around that time, other nursing and hospital staff were also detained. Doctors with 
whom Fanon had co-written articles in Algeria, François Sanchez and Slimane 
Asselah would be also detained and tortured in the beginning of 1957. The latter was 
at the time working in Algiers, and to this day his body is still missing (Gibson and 
Beneduce, 2017: 175).  
Fanon’s resignation letter to Robert Lacoste, the governor-general of Algeria, 
condenses in a poetic and resolute tone his views on madness, psychiatry, and the 
dilemmas that arise from the entanglement of psychiatry and politics. Fanon starts the 
letter by acknowledging his attempt to reform the asylum and the dominant 
psychiatric approach: 
Although the objective conditions of psychiatric practice in Algeria were 
already a challenge to common sense, it seemed to me that efforts should be 
undertaken to render less vicious a system whose doctrinal bases stood 
opposed daily to an authentic human perspective. (…) There is not an ounce 
of my activity that has not demanded as its horizon the unanimously desired 





However, Fanon notices that what was to be questioned was more than the 
functioning of a therapeutic approach, but the broader social framework in which the 
doctor, the institution and the psychiatric practices take place. This required 
questioning what a successful therapeutic act means in an oppressive society. Fanon’s 
early self-critique of the assimilationist policy that he had been following by applying 
institutional psychotherapy to a different cultural setting takes a new and broader turn 
when he considers the political dimensions of the clinic: 
Madness is one of the ways that humans have of losing their freedom. And I 
can say that, placed at this junction, I have measured with terror the extent of 
the alienation of this country’s inhabitants. If psychiatry is the medical 
technique that sets out to enable individuals no longer to be foreign to their 
environment, I owe it to myself to state that the Arab, permanently alienated 
in his own country, lives in a state of absolute depersonalization. What is the 
status of Algeria? A systematic dehumanization. Now, the absurd wager was 
to want at whatever price to ensure the existence of some values whereas 
lawlessness, inequality, and multiple daily murder of humanness were 
erected as legislative principles. The extant social structure in Algeria stood 
opposed to any attempt to put the individual back in his or her place. (2018: 
434) 
 
Dehumanization and madness is the red thread that connects the asylum to the 
colony. By bringing social oppression to the forefront Fanon not only questions a 
particular therapy, but problematizes the medical framework and its relationship to 
oppression. Since his medical dissertation Fanon adamantly associates madness to the 
loss of freedom and conceives psychiatry as one of the means to restore it. Yet, what 
health, healing and a successful therapy means cannot be thought in isolation 
following a medical model, but have to be understood in the relationship of the clinic 
with social structures, power dynamics, social interests and mechanisms and 
institutions of regulation. Hence, for Fanon in Algeria to cure means to adjust the 
person to a system that he defines as a “systematic dehumanization”. As Filippo 
Menozzi puts it, Fanon grasped the kernel of any political psychiatry: “in a society 




discipline, to comply with oppression.” (2017: 370) In line with the sociogenic 
approach, improving the conditions of the patients and the innovations brought to the 
reform of the asylum are insufficient and a form of compliance, instead it is necessary 
to intervene in the social structure in which psychiatry is embedded so that to cure 
and to free can be reconciled:   
The function of a social structure is to set up institutions that are traversed by  
a concern for humankind. A society that forces its members into desperate 
solutions is a non-viable society, a society that needs replacing. (Fanon, 
2018: 435) 
 
In the letter Fanon does not only examine medical and social realities, but there is 
also an intimate reflection and an exercise in self-questioning that emerges from the 
interrogation of the duty of the psychiatrist when confronted with the limits of his 
praxis, and of the social commitment of the psychiatrists as an intellectual.  Fanon 
concludes the letter: 
There comes a time when silence becomes a lie. (…) For long months, my 
conscience has been the seat of unpardonable debates. And their conclusion 
is the will not to lose hope in man, that is to say in myself. My decision is 
not to bear a responsibility, at whatever cost, on the false pretext that nothing 
else is to be done. (2018: 435) 
 
Many readings interpreted his rupture with French administration and his 
departure from Algeria as the abandonment of psychiatry in favor of politics and 
thereby becoming the anticolonial and Pan-African revolutionary. Henri Ey told 
Fanon in 1957 “to stop doing politics and to concentrate on psychiatry, we need him” 
(Cherki, 2011: 137).  Franco Basaglia, the leading Italian psychiatrist of the anti-
institutional movement acknowledges in L’Institutizione Negata the influence of 
Fanon in his work
243
. Basaglia, who quotes Fanon’s letter almost at length, outlines 
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 Basaglia, who undertook a revolutionary experience in the Gorizia hospital between 1961 and 
1968, was, like Tosquelles and Fanon, an antifascist militant in his youth. His imprisonment under 
Italian fascism informed his views of the asylum. Besides Fanon, his thought was also influenced by 
Foucault and, like Fanon, by Sartre, Merleau-Ponty. He defined himself as a phenomenologist (Foot, 




that the political character of Fanon’s psychiatry starts from the realization that the 
doctor-patient relation, like that of white and black and those with power and the 
powerless is an institutional relation, which in turn is defined by the social system. 
For Basaglia, Fanon understood that the reform of the institution or the therapeutic 
act within the framework of a system that militates against freedom entails the silent 
acceptance of the system and the acquiescence with oppression. In this framework, to 
cure meant to reinsert the patient into a society without freedom and to comply with 
the systematic dehumanization. Basaglia argued that the problem of madness required 
broader and deeper social changes than the mere intervention in the asylum. But, he 
concludes, that whereas Fanon could choose joining the Algerian revolution in order 
to take action, he and the Gorizia team, sharing similar views and facing similar 
problems, had to remain within the institution that they negate, and whose violence 
they mask and perpetuate through their therapeutic acts.
244
 (Basaglia, 2010)   
For Françoise Vergès, Fanon conceived psychiatry as “a means among other 
means of political and social emancipation” (1996, 94). However, Vergès observes in 
Fanon’s work an irreconcilable contradiction between the “committed activist” and 
the “professional psychiatrist”: “This tension between two practices, whose goals 
seemed similar, resulted in Fanon’s voluntaristic rhetoric, a form of rhetoric that was 
contradicted by his professional practice”. (Vergès, 1996: 95) Vergès raises an 
                                                                                                                                           
culminated in the 1978 law, known as the Basaglia law, which put an end to the proliferation of 
psychiatric hospitals in Italy and its progressive dismantlement.  
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 There are different biographical inaccuracies in Basaglia’s account and also important 
theoretical divergences. Fanon’s political understanding of medicine was being formed before Algeria, 
as Basaglia contends, and is explicit in his first published article, “The North African Syndrome”. 
Basaglia seems to be unfamiliar with Fanon’s medical work and his more radical forms of intervention 
in the asylum in Tunis, which would ironically bring both thinkers and psychiatrists closer in regards 
to what Basaglia called the negation of the asylum. There are, however, important differences in their 
conception of the mental disease and psychiatry in general, which we will briefly expose in the 
following section. On other matters, Basaglia carefully unveiled how the psychiatric framework, in 
connection with other institutions, operated in Italian society in relation to the division of labor, 
exclusions, and the distribution of power. However, he did not consider how psychiatry doubled its 
function and intensity in colonial societies, and unlike Fanon, Basaglia did not think colonial societies 




interesting point, that of the contradiction between the doctor’s duty to cure and the 
oppressive social framework in which it takes place. However, the tension to which 
Vergès alludes is explicitly addressed in Black Skin White Masks, “The North African 
Syndrome”, “Medicine and Colonialism”, in his resignation letter and in his initial 
engagement with the FLN as a doctor.  
Rather than voluntarism, a chasm, and an unsolvable contradiction between the 
doctor and the militant, it is by taking responsibility for the contradiction and by 
“making the contradiction the site of a real social change”, rather than avoiding it, 
that the professional doctor becomes a committed intellectual (Menozzi, 2018: 376).  
Filippo Menozzi explains through Sartre’s conception of the intellectual how 
Basaglia and Fanon similarly approached the contradictions and tensions between 
psychiatry and politics. For Sartre, the committed intellectual is the one who is aware 
of the contradiction that emerges between possessing a technical and practical 
knowledge, which in principle is to be put at the service of all, and the actual and 
limited use of that knowledge by the ruling and dominant class. In other words, the 
committed intellectual is characterized by the awareness of the contradiction between 
the universality of the work and the particular interests to which it serves. This entails 
not only a critique of society but also a critique of the epistemic and institutional 
foundations of their knowledge, and a self-questioning of their role, status, identity 
and position as intellectuals. The intellectual positions herself within these 
contradictions and tensions, assumes responsibility for them and responds to the false 
universality through her engagement with the concrete needs and demands of the 
society. For Menozzi, both Fanon and Basaglia “inhabit the borderline between the 
clinical and the critical, medicine and militancy, the necessity of cure and the 




they were caught to interrogate the role of the psychiatrist in society, the ideological 
functioning of the asylum, to expose the dominant and disguised ideology of the 
society, to reveal its contradictions, and to rebuild their knowledge and practices 
accordingly (Menozzi, 2015).  
Thus, the dilemma is not about medicine or anticolonial militancy, psychiatry or 
revolution. Fanon does not think in terms of inside or outside of medicine, as he 
shows its limits and how medicine can simultaneously be in both sides of the 
oppressor/oppressed divide. The issue is rather about reflection, responsibility and 
commitment. In “Letter à un Français”, probably addressed to his colleague Dr. 
Raymond Lacaton who left Algeria for France after being arrested and tortured, 
Fanon takes his colleague to task for turning a blind eye and appeals to the 
responsibility of the doctor: 
When your brothers ask you: ‘What happened in Algeria?’ What will you 
answer them? More precisely, when people will want to understand why you 
left this country, what will you do to extinguish the shame that already 
afflicts you? The shame of not having understood, of not having wanted to 
understand what has happened around you every day. For eight years you 
were in this country. And no part of this enormous wound has prevented 




In “Medicine and Colonialism” Fanon reflects how, in a war where medicine and  
access to medicaments played a central role, the theretofore suspicious figure of the 
Algerian doctor and the relation between Algerians and Western medicine were 
reshaped by the political engagement of doctors, nurses and pharmacists, and their 
attunement to the new reality: 
Sleeping on the ground with the men and women of the mechtas, living the 
drama of the people, the Algerian doctor becomes a part of the Algerian 
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 « Quand tes frères te demanderont : qu’est-il arrivé en Algérie ? Que leur répondras-tu ? Plus 
précisément quand on voudra comprendre pourquoi tu as quitté ce pays, comment feras-tu pour 
éteindre cette honte que déjà tu traînes ? Cette honte (de n’avoir pas compris, de n’avoir pas voulu 
compren-dre ce qui autour de toi s’est passé tous les jours. Huit ans durant tu fus dans ce pays. Et pas 




body. There is no longer the constant reticence that characterized the period 
of uncontested oppression. It is no longer ‘the’ doctor, but ‘our’ doctor, ‘our’ 




6.8 The Tunis lectures 
Fanon did not abandon psychiatry after resigning from his post in the French 
administration. During his exile in Tunisia, where he arrived in March 1957, he 
combined his militancy in the FLN first as editor/journalist of the journal El 
Moudjahid and later also as ambassador in West African countries with his writing, 
his teaching for the FLN cadres and at the University in Tunis, and his psychiatric 
work at the Charles-Nicolle Hospital and in refugee camps. 
In 1959 and 1960 he offered a series of lectures at the University of Tunis for 
students of sociology and psychology entitled “The Meeting between Society and 
Psychiatry”. The notes taken by a student were first published by the University of 
Oran in 1984. In these lectures Fanon briefly covers disparate topics and also 
establishes connections between them.  Some themes were dealt in previous works, 
such us the sociocultural elements that intervene in racism, the problems derived from 
black people seeking white recognition, the psychopathology derived from racism, 
black music, the critique of colonial psychiatry and the possibilities and limitations of 
institutional psychotherapy. He talked about racial segregation and black and white 
relations in the United States, specific mental problems derived from new 
mechanisms of surveillance and control in the workplace in metropolitan, 
industrialized societies and the difference with colonial forms of labor, ego formation 
and socialization of the child, or the attitude of the colonized towards Nazism. As the 
                                                 
246 « Couchant sur la terre avec les hommes et les femmes des mechtas, vivant le drame du peuple, 
le médecin algérien devient un morceau de la chair algérienne. Il n’y a plus cette réticence, constante 
dans la période d’oppression incontestée. Ce n’est plus « le » médecin, mais « notre » médecin, « 





title of the lectures suggests, in all these cases he links psychiatry with social theory 
and different forms of alienation with social diagnostics. The question of psychiatry 
and its role in monitoring the social order is also explicit in these lectures: 
The mad person is one who is ‘foreign’ to society. And society decides to rid 
itself of this anarchic element. Internment is the rejection, the side-lining of 
the patient. Society asks the psychiatrist to render the patient able again to 
reintegrate into society. The psychiatrist is the auxiliary of the police, the 
protector of society. (Fanon, 2018: 517) 
 
 
The psychiatrist is endowed with the task of securing society and in turn “society 
strives to control the psychiatrist’s work practice.” This leaves the doctor in a position 
of intermediary between society and the patient, he points out.  Fanon sees psychiatric 
treatment as aiming at the socialization or re-socialization process of the patient. Yet, 
this raises the question of what is understood as normalcy and deviance: “Is the aim 
of a human being never to present a group with problems?” Fanon rejects criteria of 
normality based on adaptation to a group, the capacity to work, or the conflict-less 
functioning of a society (Fanon, 2018: 518). Here he puts the emphasis on the 
conundrum of the psychiatrist who is caught again between the demands and the 
control by society and his own work with the mentally ill. 
In hospitalization settings, he observes, “the essential instrument was the key.” 
(2018: 518) The key compartmentalizes, separates units, wards, cells, spaces within 
the asylum and sets a frontier with the outside world. By way of sociotherapy, he 
argues, one can reach to a different understanding of madness: 
Madness is prohibited at the hospital. Up to now, when a patient began 
to cry out, it was said that he was fulfilling his function as a mad person. 
Every pathological manifestation must be tackled; reason must be set 
against the unreason of the patient. This is an extremely rich experience 
for the person engaged in this practice. One cannot be sick with a healthy 
brain, with clear neuronal connections; through the connections, there is 
a sort of open pathway through which the doctor has to introduce himself 






Fanon distinguishes between physical brain damage and madness. The mad is not 
a sick person, but he does not deny the existence of madness despite the ideological 
considerations and the social function of psychiatry. For him, the role of the 
psychiatrist is to access into what seems an unintelligible sphere. This new 
psychiatric treatment that Fanon was envisaging at the time bore resemblances with 
that of Basaglia (Gibson and Beneduce, 2017). Fanon also pointed out some 
shortcomings of sociotherapy, such as the incorporation of police officer in the 
Anglo-Saxon world and the problems of creating a new society. In other articles 
written in Tunis he would extend in these and other limitations. 
Fanon dedicates a section to the mental disorders produced by capitalist working 
conditions and concretely by the mechanisms of control and surveillance in different 
workplaces. In capitalist societies, the subject is formed through the gathering of data, 
records, and the elaboration of reports and files. “Modern times, it has been said, are 
characterized by the individual’s being put on file.” (2018: 522) Fanon examines how 
in factories and contexts of industrial production control through time management   
binds the worker to the time clock machine and gives rise to a series of 
psychopathologies. There is a constant fear of reprimand and the feeling of guilt in 
the worker, there is no possibility to apologize or justify a delay to the machine, he 
points out. 
Being a good worker means you have had no trouble with the time clock. 
The workers’ relations with the apparatus are strict, timed. For the worker, to 
be on time means being at peace with the time clock. (2018: 522) 
 
The subjection to time through the relation with the machine provokes anxiety, 
outbursts of anger, tensions, nightmares: a train that departs, a door that cannot be 




522) Alienation is manifested in absenteeism, obsessive attitudes around time, 
boredom, feeling of estrangement, loss of reflexes and accidents. Following the work 
of psychiatrist Louis Le Guillant, Fanon looks at the mental troubles of telephone 
service workers. The mechanical character, the intense rhythm of phone calls, the 
constant use of headsets, and the fact of being listened and monitored by a supervisor 
produce insomnia, somatic problems, difficulties to concentrate, frequent pain and 
illness that can end up in suicide.  
the employee feels as though she is constantly being spied upon, she must 
control herself constantly; the body insofar as it is manifest is persecuted 
with hallucinations by auditory perception (Fanon, 2018: 523). 
  
He adds the in telephone operators of public services, where the conversations are 
not controlled or listened, certain symptoms vary. Fanon posits that the installation of 
cameras and closed circuit television in large department stores in the United States 
are not only focused on thieves but also on monitoring the activity of workers. The 
employees are not notified but they are aware of being followed, which results in 
similar neuroses to those of telephone operators. The time sheets, the records of 
working hours and productive hours, the devices of surveillance, as he puts it, are 
forms control through quantification by employers which have different effects on the 
bodies and the psyche of the laborers and provoke distinct disorders at the individual 
and family levels. Fanon observes that the relation between the worker and the 
machine is not “the only thing that has reified, the employee has, too (…)[w]ithin the 
technological milieu, the tendency is to reduce communications and transform the 
human being into an automaton” (Fanon, 2018: 522-524). His analysis of labor in the 
colonies provides a very different landscape. The colony is the state of nature until 
the arrival and the intervention of the colonizer. “Work, insofar as it fecundates man, 




or as he treats malaria, as an obstacle to be conquered and to be tamed through 
violence (2018:528). As stated before, the inherent laziness and apathy that are 
attributed to the colonized are for Fanon forms of protection and non-collaboration 
with the plunder of lives and land that is labor in the colony. “The colonized who 
resists is right”, he adds.  Fanon concludes that labor can serve and can be recovered 
for the “humanization of man”, which implies fostering “relations of generosity” 
where the modification of nature is necessarily accompanied by the modification of 
the human (2018: 530). 
During the lectures Fanon also spoke about “the color bar” that defines black and 
white relations in the United States. The division is firm and constant, it is a spatial 
demarcation and it is lived in the flesh. Divided societies generate certain forms of 
behaviors characterized by “nervous tension leading quite quickly to exhaustion, (…) 
control of the self is permanent and at all levels, emotional affective…”  Police 
repression and the different value ascribed to black lives are intrinsic elements of the 
social compartmentalization: “When a Black kills a Black, nothing happens; when a 
Black kills a White, the entire police force is mobilized.” (2018: 525) From the 
novels of Chester Himes Fanon outlines the aggressiveness that permeates black lives 
and social relations. One of its manifestations is, “by a sort of introjection, the Black 
man’s aggression turns back upon the Black man.” (2018: 524) The aggressiveness is 
also manifested in the desire of escaping and of being white. The themes of flight and 
evasion and of aggression and suicide, he adds, are recurrent in Black American 
music.  In this setting, Fanon asks, “to what extent can a Black encounter a White?”  
(2018: 525) As he expressed in relation to the colonial situation, in the United States 
the relations between blacks and whites are mediated by a lie. The black cannot be 




voice, as well as particular demeanour and style.” (2018: 526) The meeting with the 
other is obstructed by the stereotype, by conflict, by different codes and values. The 
difference is not ontological, but marked by the lie which is the situation itself: “there 
is a lie which is the lie of the situation.” (Fanon, 2018: 525) In the vitiated relations of 
a context of domination the black “cannot be required to engage in human 
behaviour.” (2018:526).  
The common thread of these different topics are the varied forms of regulations, 
disciplining and control that seize minds and bodies: the social control on the work of 
the psychiatrists to discipline the mentally ill, the “anarchic element” and “the 
strangers to society”, the different technologies of control and surveillance of 
workers, the time clock, the audio and the video surveillance, the self-control derived 
from the color line.  Nicholas Mirzoeff argues that Fanon’s work on the asylum and 
his concerns on the forms of control and discipline anticipated the writings of 
Foucault on these topics.  Foucault taught at the same university in Tunis between 
1966 and 1968 a course on “Madness and Civilization”. Mirzoeff wonders how could 
Foucault not be acquainted with Fanon’s work, writing and teaching in Tunis 
(Mirzoeff, 2012). Moreover, Fanon’s and Foucault’s trajectories intersect in other 
points. Different aspects raised by Fanon on the debate between organogenesis and 
psychogenesis of his dissertation were also followed by Foucault several years later 
(Khalfa, 2018), and Foucault must have been familiar with institutional 
psychotherapy group of Tosquelles in Saint-Alban and of Guattari and Oury in La 
Borde. The Working group for Institutional Psychotherapy and Sociotherapy was 
created in 1960 around these figures (Gibson, 2015). Julian Bourg argues that, “Much 
postwar French intellectual interest in madness, normality, and pathology had its 




previous chapter, in the growing field of history of colonial medicine Foucault 
occupies a central role in the theoretical framework. Fanon is approached as an 
anticolonial theorist or militant and a doctor whose experience is given sense through 
the French thinker, despite the latter’s active omission of the former in his own work, 
and of the colonial context in which he theorized. The lack of acknowledgement is, 
however, not limited to Fanon. Thinkers of the Black Panther Party like George 
Jackson or Angela Davis were also unacknowledged influences on Foucault’s 
conceptualization of power/knowledge, genealogy or biopolitics (Heiner, 2007). 
Foucault led the “Groupe d’Information sur les Prisons” which translated some of 
their works and wrote on Jackson’s assassination (Weheliye, 2014). It has to be 
noticed that Fanon was recognized by the Black Panther Party as one of their 
reference thinkers. The implications of these omissions go beyond ethical issues in 
regard to citations or intellectual honesty. The silence of Foucault on Global South 
thinkers accentuates “the active elision and active disavowal of racism, colonization, 
and ethnic racism” in his lectures in the mid 1970’s (Weheliye, 2014: 62). For Brady 
Heiner, these denied influences in Foucault’s work raises political and epistemic 
questions about their different reception, their distinct value and legitimacy as 
knowledge, and, therefore, about the disciplines and organizations and structures of 
knowledge in which these thinkers are erased:  
Given the formative role that black power plays in Foucault’s elaboration of 
the concepts of power-knowledge, genealogy and biopower, why is it that 
the enunciative force of black power is met with social, civil and biological 
death while that of power-knowledge is subject to canonization in a host of 
academic disciplines? Why is Foucault’s brand of genealogical discourse 
incorporated by the ‘will to truth’ of contemporary knowledge regimes, 
while the insurgent knowledges of black power movements remain largely 





6.9 Healing with the clinic  
The Charles-Nicolle Hospital was the largest general hospital in Tunis. There 
Fanon continued to question the asylum and attempted to attune his work to his 
critical psychiatry through the creation of a day psychiatric service. The ordinary 
psychiatric establishment that formed part of the general hospital was turned into the 
Neuropsychiatric Day Center (hereafter, CNPJ). At the time this became the second 
open psychiatric hospital in Africa and a rarely explored structure in Europe except 
for certain variations of it in the Anglo-Saxon world (Cherki, 2011). Currently, day 
hospitalization has lost its innovative character and it has become an administrative 
device that “it is often seen alongside incarceration, as part of the neoliberal 
alternative to the old model of psychiatric internment.” (Gibson and Beneduce, 2017: 
206). Fanon approached it differently, as his last psychiatric article attests. Published 
at the end of 1959 in La Tunisie médicale, “Day hospitalization in psychiatry: Value 
and limits”, it has a second part subtitled “Doctrinal considerations” co-written with 
Géronimi.   
In the first part Fanon contextualizes the CNPJ within other open doors and day 
hospitalization experiences in Canada, Denmark or Britain. Concerning the 
methodology of the day care hospital the Fanon poses two basic questions. First, with 
the gaze upon the postcolonial world he asks whether such approaches could be 
carried out in an unindustrialized country, which, in light of the positive experience in 
Tunis he responds affirmatively. Second, whether this initiative is suitable for all kind 
of psychiatric disorders. For Fanon the value of day hospitalization lies in that it 
addresses two basic needs: it facilitates the early diagnosis and treatment of disorders, 
and it maintains the patient in contact with the outside world “to a maximum” (2018: 




attitude, of the conflictual situation” that occurs in the security settings of 
hospitalization (2018: 475). By abstracting the patient from her milieu, the original 
site of conflict, the asylum disguises and transforms the symptoms. Hospitalization 
apparently relaxes certain pathological manifestations and offers an atmosphere of 
security, a “protective coat” to the patient, but this is a false protection since it numbs 
the patient into a “sort of wakeful sleep in which the patient led a vegetative life.” 
(Fanon, 2018: 474). For Fanon the goal of the day hospital is not only to avoid the 
separation of the patient from the social milieu, but also to integrate and to embed 
therapy within social life. 
Fanon thoroughly analyzes the almost two year experience of organizing the 
hospital, its functioning, the composition of the patients, their  age, occupation, 
family status, economic situation, their length of stay and the results obtained. The 
authors observe that the hospital was set for 80 patients. During the analyzed period 
more than 1000 patients were admitted with a gradual decreasing length of staying. 
For Fanon, the predominance of unemployed patients or with unstable jobs and 
difficult material conditions exposes a fundamental “problematic” of mental illness, 
“namely that tomorrow’s uncertainty and material negligence foster the hatching of 
disruptions to an individual’s equilibrium, and thus problems with harmonious group 
insertion.” (2018: 482-484). The question of instability and misery of the patient was 
corroborated with the increasing admissions of Algerian refugees to the hospital.  One 
of the main obstacles in the everyday of the hospital was the pervasive repressive 
attitudes and the perception among the personnel that the patients were “the enemies 
of the staff’s tranquillity.” (2018: 476) As in the article on agitation Fanon observes 
that this is not exceptional but a common attitude in psychiatric structures based on a 




undertake spatial modifications to undo the structures of what up to then was a classic 
psychiatric hospital. An important part of the work of the nurses was the reception of 
the patients in the morning. For Fanon that first conversation of the day was a crucial 
element around which the rest of the day would be organized. Inquiring about their 
previous evening, about the family and their social life ¡ demanded special care: “The 
orderlies are asked to take a benevolent attitude, especially when the oneiric material 
provided is spectacularly anguishing”, and should also avoid asking the family in 
front of the patients” Fanon, (2018: 477). 
The daily routine consists in psychotherapeutic work in the mornings, mostly 
psychoanalytically inspired. However, biological treatments such as insulin therapy, 
sleep therapy and seismotherapy were not discarded. Yet Fanon points out that  
The main guideline of our therapeutic interventions is that consciousness is 
to be affected as little as possible. Whence the rarity of narcoanalysis or 
amphetamine shocks. We do not believe in the curative value of dissolutions 
of consciousness. The service is oriented toward awareness, verbalization, 
explanation and strengthening the ego. (2018: 493) 
 
The day hospital also provided neurologic services, which were absent in the 
general hospital. After the meal time, the afternoon was dedicated to collective 
psychotherapies such as dramatization or workshops. The dramatic activities were not 
based on representations of a fictional scene. Since one of the aims of the day hospital 
was to impede the concealment of symptoms and to keep the conflictual aspects in all 
living environments, therapy was oriented towards the open treatment of the conflicts 
(Cherki, 211: 210). Thus dramatization consists in the patient’s presentation of a 
biographical situation, which was ensued by a collective and open discussion: 
This presentation during which the patient shows, comments upon and takes 
up his or her responses to conflicts, provokes the listeners to take a stance, 
make criticisms and express reservations. Correlatively, the patient tries to 
justify him- or herself through his or her behaviour, which reintroduces the 





In the second part, “Doctrinal considerations”, Fanon and Géronimi critically 
situate the day hospital in relation to the open service, the internment and institutional 
psychotherapy, from “the plane of the patient’s lived experience” (2018: 498).  The 
authors describe how in hospitalization settings therapy and the administration of 
medicines usually ends around 18h. At that time the doctors, nurses and hospital staff 
change their clothes and get ready to resume to their lives outside the hospital.  For 
the boarders, this sense of abandonment is a distressing experience:  
Outside life filters into the hospitals along with the staff’s plans (…) Outside 
life assumes an increased density in the patient’s eyes, who remains confined 
in the silence and the boredom of large rooms. This experience is already 
painful enough for a patient immobilized by a fracture, typhoid or asystole. 
For the mental patient, who literally only feels immobilized by the coercion 
of the establishment, protest, an attitude of revolt against hospitalization, 
arises several times a day. (Fanon, 2018: 498) 
 
For the authors, institutional psychotherapy attempts to mitigate these tensions and 
maintain the social dimension of the patient through the creation of a “neo-society” 
within the hospital, and the establishment of different roles, relationships, duties and 
hierarchies. This led to a shift in the understanding of madness. Within this 
framework, there was a change in the classical symptoms and manifestations of 
mental illness as they appear in the internment settings.  The patient needs “to 
verbalize, to explain, to explain himself, to take a position. (…)Social therapy wrests 
patients from their fantasies and obliges them to confront reality on a new register.” 
(Fanon, 2018: 498-499) This new relation to reality that institutional psychotherapy 
fosters is still pathological, it still takes places at the level of the imaginary, they 
argue, but it facilitates the doctor’s understanding and follow up the mechanisms and 
the process of mental disease through the efforts of the patient who now strives to 
maintain the unity and coherence of the ego. However, for Fanon and Géronimi 




the emphasis on motion and sociality, cannot avoid the ossification and stagnation of 
the institution: 
It is necessary, however, to acknowledge that with institutional-therapy, we 
create fixed institutions, strict and rigid settings, and schemas that are rapidly 
stereotyped. In the neo-society, there are no inventions; there is no creative, 
innovative dynamic. There is no veritable shake-up, no crises. The institution 
remains that ‘corpse-like cement’ of which Mauss speaks. (Fanon, 2018: 
499) 
 
The society that this approach attempts to recreate within the walls of the asylum 
is abstracted from other institutions, spaces, social mechanisms, principles and laws, 
and it is still lived as a form of imprisonment. Overall, this produces a pseudo-
society, a petrified society with limited disalienating possibilities. Although they set a 
clear distance from the postulates of Tosquelles, the authors do not reject institutional 
psychotherapy per se. Referring to their experience in Blida, they add that this 
approach favors the social dimension of the patients and is “indispensable” against 
“chronicization, asylum putrefaction and patient decline” that arise in large 
institutions of internment. It also helps the doctor to understand what takes place 
outside.  “But it rarely cures. (…) This is why we think today that the veritable social-
therapeutic milieu is and remains concrete society itself.” (Fanon, 2018:499-500)  
In day hospitalization there is no cut between the patient and society, no form of 
internment. The patient leaves the hospital as an employee leaves work and can go 
home, to the café, or to the cinema. The patient takes public transportation, shares 
spaces with other workers returning home, and meets other people in the route. The 
expanded options that interaction fosters and the choices and negotiations of his place 
in the world inform the personality of the patient, his affective responses, and the 
social dynamics. These encounters, the authors note, become now fruitful in 




ties with the social life are severed, but a person who is active in the world and in the 
ongoing process of negotiating its insertion in it. The social world, the professional or 
the family spheres, other people, are not perceived as a threat, or an obstacle against 
freedom, but the site where freedom is exerted and expanded. This goes hand in hand 
with Fanon’s notion of madness as a pathology of freedom that he maintains since his 
dissertation. As Fanon and Géronimi put it: 
In any phenomenology in which the major alterations of consciousness are 
left aside, mental illness is presented as a veritable pathology of freedom. 
Illness situates the patient in a world in which his or her freedom, will and 
desires are constantly broken by obsessions, inhibitions, countermands, 
anxieties. (2018: 497) 
 
 
In the coercive conditions of internment, with its strong restrictions on movement, 
interaction and sphere of action, the freedom of the boarder is limited to the realm of 
fantasy. Thus, the patient “feels free only in his opposition to the doctor who has 
withheld him.” (2018: 497) For the authors, the open services bestow a certain 
freedom to the patient by allowing them to leave the hospital. But this freedom is 
limited and formal. In many cases the possibility of leaving the hospital is rejected by 
the doctor despite the evident negative effects of hospitalizations in the patient. 
Freedom and the rupture with forms of coercion is one of the central elements of day 
hospitalization. In this setting, there is no blackmail, the patient does not depend on 
the “doctor’s benevolence”, rather, the attendance to the hospital is felt as a temporal 
visit to the therapist, and the existing hierarchies are more malleable: 
The a minima master/slave, prisoner/gaoler dialectic created in internment, 
or in the threat thereof, is radically broken. In the setting of the day hospital, 
the doctor-patient encounter forever remains an encounter between two 
freedoms. That condition is necessary for all therapy, but especially in 
psychiatry. (2018: 497; own italics) 
 
In contrast to internment, in the context of day hospitalization the doctor is not the 




patient, a personality in crisis within a present environment. This makes for a 
concrete, dynamic, in vivo examination of the illness.” (Fanon, 2018: 501) By having 
access to the illness as lived by the patient, the doctor can think dialectically rather 
than focusing on semiology, and approach it in existential rather than in nosological 
terms. That is, through the dynamic and immediate approach to illness, it is 
understood and treated as a whole, as a multiplicity of relations, not as a set of 
symptoms manifested in and reified by the internment setting. In classical 
hospitalization, they argue, forms of being were put into question, now, with the day 
hospital what is put into question are forms of existence: “There is no pointillist 
approach to different symptoms, but a global tackling of a form of existence, a 
structure, a personality engaged in current conflicts.” (Fanon, 2018: 502)  
The displacement from ontology to an existential ontology was an important move 
in Black Skin White Masks, as we saw. Internment and hospitalization equate the 
conflict with the patient, and locate the pathology in and as the patient. This view 
reifies the patient and the illness, the authors observe. The detachment of the family 
and the rupture with society concomitant to internment is experienced by the patient 
as “an authentic condemnation of his essence, of his truth” (Fanon, 2018: 503). The 
rejection of the mentally ill elicits the question that, as stated above, is also a question 
constantly posed by those whose humanity is challenged: “Who am I, ultimately? Is 
that not the nagging question that the mental patient repeats to us at multiple levels 
and on different registers?” (Fanon, 2018: 503) Rather than restraining their field of 
action and possibilities, and locking them onto themselves, the day hospital fosters 
the continuity with the world and enables the patient to “be ever a bearer of 




milieu (Fanon, 2018: 504). Therapy can then take into account all these elements and 
the multiple relations that form and inform the reality of the patient: 
An ill brain cannot return to health by denying reality. Internment diminishes 
the violence of the conflict, the toxicity of reality. But the cure – the ordered 
calling into question of the established pathological structures – must 
proceed precisely at the core of the syncopated dialogue established between 
the overall personality and its environment. Action upon reality – and the 
patient is one of the elements of reality – is unifying. (2018:504) 
 
Fanon and Géronimi clearly distinguish the day hospital from private psychiatric 
practice and therapy. The day hospital functions as mediator between the social 
milieu and the patient. It limits the exposure to the source of the conflict while it 
reconstructs and reinforces the personality of the patient towards his intervention in 
the everyday life. The authors also point out the limits of the day hospital. To the 
problems of distance, transportation and the economic costs that these imply for the 
patient, the fundamental problem lies in that it is not a suitable setting for all kind of 
disorders. The authors observe that the day hospital is not adequate in cases where the 
organic damage is significant, in cases of acute delusion, dementia, or certain types of 
psychosis, patients with aggressive reactions, and patients who are subjected to legal 
measures. The authors note that there is still a considerable sector of the population 
who requires psychiatric care that are excluded from the day hospital, but also that 
many of such cases can be treated once the most acute phase has receded.  
Fanon and Géronimi conclude their reflection on their two year experience by 
posing questions that turn their reflection towards matters of public health. Fanon was 
already thinking in terms building the psychiatric care services, structures and 
policies of the new independent nations. The articles affirmed that this setting could 
be implemented and function efficaciously in poor countries, and presented the limits 




its underlying philosophy requires establishing relations between different and 
complementary structures, policies and forms of healing, to combine them and 
multiply them, but taking the day hospital as point of departure. They posit that this 
demands a “strict legislation” that connects psychiatric care to other medical centers, 
regulates the duration of hospitalization, avoids turning day hospitals into open 
services, impedes the “creation of those monsters that are traditional psychiatric 
hospitals” and endows “the patient a maximum of freedom by removing all the 
carceral and coercive aspects” of psychiatric care (Fanon, 2018: 508-509).  
6.10 Psyhicatry, antipsychiatry, critical psychiatry 
 People asked me: ‘What do you want to 
change? It’s not possible.’ But, day by day, 
things changed. Then they asked me. ‘Where 
are you going with this?’ and I said, ‘I don’t 
know’. And it was true. I didn’t know. (Franco 
Basaglia; quoted in Foot, 2015). 
 
These was Fanon’s last article on the asylum and madness and his last words on 
psychiatry, besides the chapter of Les damnés de la terre on the mental disorders of 
colonial war and his work on Algerian refugees that appeared elsewhere, which will 
be covered in the next chapter. Fanon was an influence and anticipated many themes  
in anti-psychiatry, radical psychiatry and critical ethnopsychiatry of the following 
decades (Cherki, 20011; Yousseff and Fadl, 1996; Gibson and Beneduce, 2017). 
Giovanni Pirelli argued that Fanon was not aware of the influence that he would have 
on European psychiatry (Menozzi, 2015).  His colleague Alice Cherki points out that 
Fanon would not have endorsed anti-psychiatry because he believed in the existence 
and the universality of madness and in the healing possibilities of psychiatry despite 
its manifold forms of violence. Fanon did not conceive mental illness as uniquely a 




of his life at a young age places us in the prickly terrain of speculation, but to ask how 
Fanon would have oriented his psychiatric work rather than providing firm answers 
requires to take into account that psychiatric practice was a daily open question for 
him and for other radical psychiatrists. And there probably lies their radicality. On 
one side, anti-psychiatry was not simply the denial of madness and psychiatry
247
. On 
the other side, from his writings in Algeria and Tunis one can discern that the 
adamant attachment to a fixed methodology, to a specific therapeutic model, or to a 
fixed institutional setting were not the guides of his work. Instead, his commitment 
was rather to an ongoing critical and self-critical questioning process that enabled 
him to be suspicious without discarding any element and to challenge and look 
beyond the existing theoretical and practical frameworks.   
What can be asserted without speculation is that Fanon’s questioning of the 
asylum and of the political, social, legal and administrative entanglements of 
psychiatry was crudest than that of the circles of Saint-Alban and La Borde, without 
radically breaking with them. Yet his approach to mental illness was not based on 
systematically negating it and attributing it directly to the political, but in attempting 
to understand it. In this sense, Fanon skipped and overcame the polemics during the 
1960’s between Gorizia and Saint-Alban. Basaglia criticized the obstinacy of 
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 The term anti-psychiatry is today derogatorily associated with a radical psychiatric movement of 
the 1960’s and 1970’s that was based on the denial of the existence of mental illness. Yet this is a 
distorted and ahistorical portray of a heterogeneous current in terms of the ideas, positions, 
experiences, practices and figures from different geographical origins. In light of this simplification 
many of the proponents of anti-psychiatry, such as Basaglia and the Gorizia group, ended up 
distancing themselves from the term. Although some of its proponents argued that mental illness was 
itself a product of psychiatry, the different positions within the movement were more nuanced and 
varied, which makes difficult to establish a narrow definition of it. Such diversity was both its strength 
and its weakness. First coined by David Cooper in 1967, anti-psychiatry encompassed a wide array of 
critical and self-critical approaches to psychiatry that located mental illness within broader social and 
political structures. Overall, anti-psychiatry questioned the asylum, the biological theories of mental 
illness, the inhumanity of psychiatric treatments, or the social consequences of ascribing the label mad. 
Questions were shared but the answers varied. Some proposed the abolition of psychiatry, others 
issued critiques within psychiatry, others advocated for a scientific revolution within the field, whereas 




institutional psychotherapy on the treatment of the mentally ill in and through the 
institution by abstracting the therapeutic act and the asylum from the socio-political 
contexts and functions. The reform and modernization of the asylum was illusory 
since they did not call into question many of psychiatry’s assumptions and 
definitions. Whereas institutional psychotherapists such as Félix Guattari argued that 
anti-psychiatrists’ a priori prevalence of the political could trigger new forms of 
repression. It was necessary to address mental alienation without immediately 
referring to the political and the social. Understanding madness is a much slower and 
difficult process than negating the institution (Tosquelles, 1987).  
Besides the matter of Fanon’s legacy and influence on different medical 
movements, there are also aspects in which the world of psychiatry has not yet caught 
up with the work of Fanon, Tosquelles or Basaglia. The Basaglia law issued in 1978 
that put an end to the construction of asylums in Italy and enforced their progressive 
dismantlement is considered a partial success (Menozzi, 2015). In France, as noted 
above, the repressive conditions of the asylum persist, to which new technological 
elements of surveillance and control have been added that bestow such conditions 
with a colder and more hygienic outlook. Yet their thinking and their work on the 
asylum can help to think other institutional settings and the forms of alienation and 
violence that they produce. Basaglia extended his analysis of the asylum to the 
university, another “total institution” (Foot, 2015).  Detention and internment centers, 
refugee camps, the spatial structures to host refugees and migrants in Europe, United 
States or Australia follow a colonial logic and use colonial language.  
Current dominant psychiatric orientations are based on the conception of the 
discipline as a techno-science. The definition and classification of mental illness and 




Association through the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders was 
described by Tosquelles as a step back of 200 years (1993). The reliance on the 
biomedical and pharmacological psychiatry, the dominance of cognitivism and 
behavior practices take away the anthropological and psychopathological elements to 
address suffering (Cherki, 2017). In this framework of medicalization and 
decontextualization, deviancy is individualized and treated biomedically, and “with 
genetic accounts of racial and ethnic differences providing a scientific rationale for 
racially targeted medical care” (Gibson and Beneduce, 2017: 14). The links between 
racism and medicine, and between racism and mental illness have not been broken. 
The ties between race and pathology continues to travel from medical schools to the 
consultation room. “The Puerto-Rican syndrome” or other “culture-bound 
syndromes” that do not consider the historical and social dimensions of suffering, that 
put threatening populations of color under suspicion are translated into 
overdiagnoses, underdiagnoses and the mistrust of the patient (Suite et al. 2007). The 
association of black protests with schizophrenia (Metzl, 2009) exemplifies the 
continuing role that psychiatry has played in “pathologizing revolt” (Lazreg, 2008; 
Giboson and Beneduce, 2017). This also takes place by individualizing “the effects of 
political violence (for both perpetrators and victims) so that revolt and agitation are 
seen as symptoms” of pathological individuals rather than the behavior of oppressed 
groups (Gibson and Beneduce, 2017: 15). The language of colonial psychiatry haunts 
the present, notably after 9/11, in the construction of Muslims as new groups 
“problem people” in terms of madness and irrationality. The figure of the “mad 
muslim terrorist” is also explained pathologically and psychoanalytically in a 
reductive way without considering the pathogenic relations, spatial and historical, in 




Simona Taliani finds striking resemblances in the accounts, the language and the 
manifestations of the colonized with the postcolonial refugee, the migrant, the victim 
of human trafficking, those whose humanity and identity is questioned and self-
questioned, who are overdetermined and deprived of otherness. As we will see in the 
next chapter when talking about colonial trauma, the history of colonialism, even if it 
is not personally lived, and the experience of migration intersect in the postcolonial 
world in these figures. For Taliani, they suffer from a “double alienation” (2012: 
290), coming from the remnants of their colonial history and from the postcolonial 
European societies (Taliani, 2012). The role, status and the place of culture, and its 
concrete elements and subjects, in healing and in psychic suffering upon which Fanon 
reflected helps to question culturalist and interculturalist approaches in the treatment 
of mental disease in refugee and migrant populations in Europe that treat their system 
of reference as self-contained and static.  This does not take into account that the 
situation of the migrant in the homeland, the causes of migration, the migratory 
process, and the arrival to the new country have disrupted and dislocated the home 
culture itself, and it omits the colonial traces expressed in the language of the patient, 
and in the hosting institutions and societies. This folklorization of culture also risks 
falling into the linear logic and a univocal cause to explain the symptom of the 
medical model. Fanon shows that a thoughtless use of medical diagnostic categories 
can be as alienating as the discourse of sorcery (Taliani, 2012, Beneduce, 2017).  
 Conclusion 
The next chapter turns to Fanon’s treatment of violence in the opening chapter of 
Les damnés de la terre, one of the most addressed and controversial aspects of his 
work. But as we have seen throughout this dissertation, Fanon’s questioning, 




cannot be reduced to that chapter, since it is a constant in his work. As this chapter 
has shown, Fanon analyzes the different forms of violence, covert and overt, taking 
place in the healing process. From method, diagnostics, staff attitudes, hierarchies and 
structures that militate against humanity of the patient and against the possibility of 
their active participation the social world and human interaction, to the identification 
of the covert traces of violence, politics and history in the speech and the body of the 
patient, or the by interrogating the healing process within wider societal dynamics. 
At the same time,  Fanon’s thought on violence and his theorization of violence in 
Les damnés de la terre cannot be understood without other elements –already covered 
in this dissertation – that are both present in the chapter and are also constant in his 
work: the poetic and dramatic dimension of the text, the sociogenic analysis, the 
interrogation of the violence of the asylum and the psychological dimension, his 
existential phenomenology of embodiment, temporality, spatiality and oppression, the 
meanings and values attributed to the colonized, the zone of non-being and  the 
absence of ethics in racist societies that compromises the relation beween ethics and 
politics, and the question of the universal and the particular. It is not only a reflection 
on revolutionary violence, as it has been usually read, but he brings up a connected 
set of themes and problems related to violence, including questions of nonviolence 
and the aftermaths of violence. In any case, I treat Fanon’s work on violence in Les 
damnés de la terre, not at the core of his thought, but nevertheless as helping to think 





Chapter 7. Concerning Violence 
We must analyze, patiently and lucidly, each one of the reactions of the 
colonized, and every time we do not understand, we must tell ourselves that 
we are at the heart of the drama, that of the impossible encounter in any 




The opening chapter of Les damnés de la terre, “Concerning Violence”, has 
elicited widespread discussion to the extent of eclipsing the rest of his work. On the 
basis of the 71 pages of the opening chapter Fanon is reduced to a thinker of violence 
and revolution or considered an “apostle of violence” in other cases. There is also 
many debates on whether he conceived violence as a means or as an end in itself, or 
whether the violence of the colonized is the same as the violence of the colonizer, 
(Roberts, 2004), whether  violence was part of a dialectical process, or violence is 
understood for Fanon in purely psycho-affective terms. Any reductionist position 
risks missing the point.  
At a personal level, his colleague Alice Cherki observes, Fanon was not a violent 
person (Cherki, 2011: 304). For that matter, Simone de Beauvoir evokes in her 
autobiography that Fanon was “horrified” by both colonial violence and the counter-
violence of the liberation struggles in Africa. “’Above all, I would not like to be a 
professional revolutionary”, she recalls him saying (Beauvoir, 1963: 424; my 
translation
248
). By the time he was writing “Concerning Violence” he was well 
acquainted with and experienced in dealing with the psychological damages and the 
consequences of the war. Fanon most probably wrote “Concerning Violence” in 
Tunis while treating the Algerian refugees and the orphan children running away 
from the war (Gibson and Beneduce, 2017). In his writing, Fanon did not valorize 
violence, neither positively or negatively. He did not justify violence, nor was he 
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apologetic about it. Instead he issued a series of warnings and sheds light on the 
different problems related to violence. His personal position on violence was, for him, 
secondary. This does not amount to a position of detachment or as ambiguous 
observer. His position was clear since he joined the anticolonial revolution. Instead, 
the suspension of his personal position and the absence of value judgements on 
violence are more related to his commitment to the decolonization project, that is, a 
cause larger than himself. But it is clear throughout “Concerning Violence” and 
“Colonial War and Mental Disorders” that violence unavoidably produces pain and 
suffering, as Gordon (1995) puts it, for Fanon, violence has a tragic character. 
 “Concerning Violence” is, as its title indicates, a chapter on violence, but it is not 
a digression on violence as an abstract concept, mainly because for Fanon violence is 
not abstract and is not conceived as a thing, but as a relational phenomenon. Neither it 
is a handbook of revolution and does not uniquely address revolutionary violence. 
Fanon analyzes the many dimensions of violence and its manifold manifestations in 
the colonial context that constitute what he called “the atmosphere of violence”.  
At the same time, it is not a chapter only on violence. Fanon explicitly affirms that 
violence is a “problématique”, that is, violence is linked to a complexity of issues.  
Thus, violence cannot be conceived in isolation and, as he usually does, he juxtaposes 
themes and connects a set of concerns while talking about violence.  While discussing 
violence, Fanon elaborates on the relation of ethics to politics (Gordon, 2015),  on 
questions of maturity and maturation, on problems of agency and corporality, the 
problem of the universal and the particular, he also makes an existential 
phenomenological description of the spatial dimensions of oppression, of life under 
segregation, of how it is lived by the colonized, what kind of subjectivity, 




live under violent conditions, what kind of liberation does it foster, what does it 
occlude, and what limits does it impose. He brings up the conundrum of nonviolence, 
and he also assesses that the history of colonial violence does not end with counter-
violence, independence and liberation. 
The aim of this chapter is to unpack these issues, which he implicitly and explicitly 
addresses especially in “Concerning Violence” and in “Colonial War and Mental 
Disorders”. Besides the anticolonial thought and the context of anticolonial revolts of 
the time, Fanon’s account of violence cannot be understood without considering the 
different elements that appear throughout his work, and the different dimensions of 
Fanon’s thought, the aesthetic, the humanist, the phenomenological, the existential, 
the psychiatric, his dialogues with Hegel, Sartre, Marx or Césaire, his understanding 
of the asylum, of the violence that it produces, and his attempts to transform it.  
I have structured this chapter as follows. The first section focuses on the aesthetic 
dimension of “Concerning Violence”.  As Lewis Gordon (1995) points out, violence 
in Fanon has a tragic character. Such tragic element does not take place at the level of 
content but also of form. As stated in chapter 4, the poetic element in Fanon is 
connected with methodological, political and pedagogic concerns. In theatrical terms, 
Fanon presents an initial scene of two figures, the colonized and the colonizer in a 
world that he describes as Manichean, divided in two. Yet this initial scene hides a 
complexity that will unfold throughout the chapter and the book. As Ato Sekyi-Otu 
points out, it is important to take into account the dramatic dynamics of the text and 
the narrative that he builds and develops throughout the rest of book, and also to 
distinguish Fanon’s voice as the author, his exercises of ventriloquism, and the 
unfolding complexity of the plot. The second section explores how the Manichean 




black and anticolonial struggles disrupts the universals and the particulars. This is not 
tantamount to a rejection of the universal, but to its suspension as the starting point of 
the struggle. The third section addresses Fanon’s description of oppression in relation 
to the spatial organization of the colonial town and the violence that it produces. The 
Manichean structure that colonialism attempts to impose is lived in the flesh and the 
affectivity of the colonized and is manifested in the aggressiveness, and violence 
between the colonized.  Fanon’s first concern is what to do with this violence and 
reorient it in a political form. The fourth section briefly unpacks Fanon’s more 
controversial position on violence, referring to the psychological benefits of violence, 
and relates his view to similar accounts such as that of Frederick Douglass and Jean 
Améry. The fifth section addresses the core of Fanon’s argument on the subject of 
violence. Namely, as Lewis Gordon points out, Fanon considers violence as intrinsic 
to the “appearance” of the colonized. This is related to symbolic violence, racist 
structures of meaning and normative life which make the political emergence of the 
colonized violence to the system. This understanding of violence which, has not been 
properly grasped by commentators such as Sartre, Hannah Arendt or Judith Butler 
moves away from the paradigms of violence as a means or violence as an end in 
itself. The sixth section addresses Fanon’s critique of a particular approach to 
nonviolence and pacifism based on the avoidance of violence and linked to class 
interests. The seventh section examines how the aforementioned understanding 
violence as the intrinsic appearance of the colonized also moves away from the 
dichotomy of violence versus nonviolence. I illustrate the point with the cases of the 
Civil Rights or the anti-Apartheid struggles which have been addressed in terms of 
such dichotomy. The eighth section explores Fanon’s last chapter of Les damnés de la 




section explores Fanon’s anticipation of postcolonial violence and mental disorders as 
the legacy of colonialism and the problems of current psychiatric approaches to 
address them. The tenth section examinesss his concluding call for decolonization 
and a new humanism 
7.1 At the heart of the drama 
Many readings of Les Damnés de la terre, notably of its opening chapter, 
“Concerning Violence”, fail to take into consideration the aforementioned aesthetic 
dimension and the poetics of Fanon, which as stated, does not play an ornamental role 
but is imbricated with methodological, political, anthropological and pedagogical 
considerations. In Les damnés de la terre, the dramatic elements through which 
Fanon builds his argument (Sekyi-Otu, 1996; De Oto, 2003) is accompanied by the 
tragic character that for Fanon has colonialism and violence (Gordon, 1995). Such 
chapter may probably be the most commented and controversial of Fanon’s work and 
has made him known as an “apologist of violence”, “glorifying violence” by his 
detractors, or associated and reduced him to a thinker of revolutionary violence. In 
Black Skin White Masks he qualified as “absurd drama” the relation between blacks 
and whites in racist societies, and in L’an V de la revolution algérienne he had 
explicitly affirmed the dramatic character of the colonial situation and linked it to its 
epistemic and ethico-political dimensions:  
We must analyze, patiently and lucidly, each one of the reactions of the 
colonized, and every time we do not understand, we must tell ourselves that 
we are at the heart of the drama, that of the impossible encounter in any 




His demand to understand not only emphasizes the complexity of the colonial 
order, it also issues a firm appeal to humility in approaching its study. This entails to 
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 « Il faut, patiemment mais lucidement, analyser chacune des réactions du colonisé et chaque fois 
que l’on ne comprend pas, il faut se dire qu’on est au cœur d’un drame, celui de la rencontre 




consider the perspective of the colonized, to look at the drama from different angles, 
it involves a sustained effort at posing questions, revising the questions themselves 
and the whole framework of inquiry. 
As  Sekyi-Otu notes, without considering, among others, the aesthetic dimension 
of Les Damnés de la terre, its interpreter can extract isolated sentences, paragraphs or 
whole pages of the text, confer them a conclusive and prescriptive character and 
mistakenly presume Fanon’s authorial voice and a conclusive position (Sekyi-Otu, 
1996). Illustrative of this is the criticism that philosopher and literary critic Tzvetan 
Todorov (1995) issues of anticolonialism in the works of Aimé Césaire, Wole 
Soyinka or the Black is Beautiful movement for what he sees as cultural relativism 
and hostility to universalism, but it is in Fanon, he points out, where the “similarity 
between colonialist and anticolonialist discourse reaches its extreme” (Todorov, 
1995: 56).  Todorov affirms that in Fanon’s thought “only the actors change in the 
move from colonialism to anticolonialism: their attributes, like their actions, remain 
the same.” (Todorov, 1995: 56)  He takes Fanon’s statements such as “We are 
nothing like you”, "To the saying 'All natives are the same' the colonized person 
responds: 'All settlers are the same'”, or "The violence of the colonial regime and the 
counterviolence of the native balance each other and respond to each other in an 
extraordinary reciprocal homogeneity" (Fanon quoted in Todorov 1995: 56) to mean 
that anticolonialism, like colonialism, is premised upon the refusal of truth, a 
regressive particularism, weaponizing difference, and hence, racism, and 
totalitarianism. When the literary critic reads in Fanon “by an ironic turning of the 
tables it is the native who now affirms that the colonialist understands nothing but 
force" (Fanon as quoted in Todorov; 1995: 56), Todorov sees “no irony”, but 




defined according to Todorov’s reading, for Fanon “all the good people are on one 
side, and all the bad on the other” (Todorov: 1995, 56).  He writes: 
Fanon's response to all these questions is that no absolute values exist. 
Something is good when it serves my ends, and bad when it opposes them. 
This is why violence is good when it is in the hands of the oppressed and 
serves their struggle, while the colonizers remain forever detestable. Here 
again (ironically?), Fanon imitates the theoreticians of racism and 
imperialism.  (Fanon, 1995: 57-58) 
 
Hence Todorov’s bewilderment about Fanon’s defense of decolonization and 
condemnation of colonialism while presenting what for him is a symmetrical and 
bloody landscape: if for Fanon colonialism is "violence in its natural state" and it "can 
only be called into question by absolute violence" (Fanon; quoted in Todorov, 1995: 
57), Todorov wonders why “would one be preferable to the other” considering their 
resemblance and “Fanon’s fascination with violence” (1995: 57). The outcome, he 
tells off to the postcolonial world, “was predictable since the start” (1995: 56), for 
“one reaps what one has sown”, something that Fanon seems to ignore or assumes 
with “incomprehensible joy” (1995: 57). The moral relativism, pure irrationality and 
reactivity that Todorov sees in Fanon makes him squirm in his armchair, to the extent 
that he likens Fanon’s statement, “[w]hen the native hears a speech about Western 
culture, he pulls out his knife " (quoted in Todorov; 1995: 58) to “Goebbels’s 
revolver” (1995: 58).   
 Ironically, Todorov’s equating of Fanon with the Nazis and his caricature-like 
portrayal of anticolonial thought as reactive, resentful and hostile to truth is not 
distant from the colonial tropes –as examined before concerning colonial psychiatry 
that Fanon had to deal with in Algeria– that were used to rationalize domination, war 
and the preservation of the colonial regime. “Challenge to colonial rule was defined 




personality built on negative values and emotions, principally ‘hatred’.” (Lazreg, 
2008: 66)  Fanon, as Du Bois, was cognizant of the risks of collapsing people into 
problems rather than exposing and addressing the problems that they suffer. His call 
to “to analyze, patiently and lucidly, each one of the reactions of the colonized” 
echoes Du Bois’ warning, which fell on deaf ears in Todorov’s analysis. Fanon was 
very explicit on this point: “It is necessary to reflect on the problématique of 
violence.” (1961: 72; my translation
251
) In French he uses the term problematic not as 
an adjective but as a noun, thereby referring to a whole set of problems related to 
violence. 
Instead of pathologizing anticolonial thinkers, a more searching point of departure 
might be to question, as Sekyi-Otu sensitively puts it, what history or form of 
domination, and what relation to that history and form of domination, would elicit 
Fanon’s account and the virulent response to colonialism. In his own words: 
What must the experience of human bondage be like in order to give rise to 
this manifestly unbridled voluntarism in the rhetoric of revolutionary 
agency? What manner of apprehending history would yield this radical 
catastrophism in the representation of social transformation? (Sekyi-Otu, 
1996: 48; own italics) 
 
As we will see, this is one among the different aspects that Fanon explores in the 
statements that Todorov emphasizes and in the chapter on violence. Leaving aside the 
ad hominem, the false equivalence and the oversimplification through which Todorov 
builds his argument, his analysis does not reach “the heart of the drama”, which as 
Fanon put it, is the impossibility of a human encounter, of a meeting ground in the 
colony. Todorov presupposes that the colonial world is formed by symmetrical 
human relations between already formed universal and abstract subjects, and 
sustained by an ethical background, that although being disrespected its restoration 
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would enable to deal with a political problem. Yet, as we saw, it is precisely the 
absence of values and the expulsion of the colonized from self-other relations and, 
therefore, from the realm of ethics what Fanon exposes as characterizing the colonial 
and racist world. As we saw it, in Black Skin White Masks he called it “the zone of 
nonbeing”. For Lewis Gordon Fanon poses a challenge to liberal political theory: 
This critique of presuming the presence of a Self–Other dialectic leads, 
however, to a critique of normative political theory. For such theory, most 
represented by modern liberalism, the claim is that it is about theorizing 
what should be, but the thought in fact presupposes the very political reality 
it needs to construct for its condition of possibility. To put it differently: For 
those who rule, they prefer ethics to precede politics since they presuppose 
an already just and humane, although often hidden, environment as the de 
facto context of their inquiry into what ought to be. (Gordon, 2007b: 6) 
 
The tragedy of the colonial situation is that in a world without values responsibility 
falls by the wayside and everything can be done to the human. When the colonized, 
the subhuman, claims his or her entrance into the domain of ethics and human 
relations their appearance, which as noted is etymologically related to existence, is 
conceived as violence, that is, the violation of a theodicean system that premises its 
justice and legitimacy in the dehumanization of the colonized. The conundrum that 
for Fanon colonization and racism poses is how to address a political issue, without 
the ethical conditions that sustain politics, so that through political intervention 
ethical relationships can be created and cultivated (Gordon, 2015). 
We will explore these considerations throughout the present chapter. But now, if 
we focus on the dramatic form, it has to be asked what is Fanon saying, doing and 
meaning in the statements that Todorov extracts and singles out if they are considered 
as part of “the moving body of verbal and representational acts” (Sekyi-Otu, 1996: 34; 
italics in the original) through which Fanon builds his narrative? In this light, Fanon’s 
statements lose its closed, univocal, exhortative tone. When treated as part of a 




in the role of a passionate participant and interlocutor” (Sekyi-Otu, 1996: 5), such 
utterances reveal themselves as open, ambiguous and equivocal.  An instance of 
many could be when Fanon says that colonial violence can only crushed by a greater 
violence (Fanon, 1961: 61) and ten pages later, in apparently a blatant contradiction, 
he issues the following statement:  
We see that everybody is aware of this violence and that the question is not 
always to respond to it with a greater violence, but rather to see how to ease 





The aforementioned question on “the manner of apprehending history” (Sekyi-
Otu, 1996: 47) may shed light on what Fanon assesses in parts of the text through 
these intertextual playes. In the opening page of the book Fanon states that 
“[d]ecolonization, which intends to change the order of the world, (… ) cannot be the 
result of a magic wand stroke, a natural tremor, or an amicable agreement.” Instead, 
he adds, 
 Decolonization, as we know, is an historical process: That is, it can only be 
understood, it can only find its intelligibility or become transparent to itself 
insofar as we discern the historicizing movement which gives its shape and 




Fanon conceives decolonization as an historical process, which appears opaque as 
an object of thought, which is to be disclosed and understood as such in the very 
process –a process bound by its historicity. Yet, this statement plays an intra-textual 
role when considered within the dynamics of the text. As Sekyi-Otu (1996: 53) notes, 
such quote can be grasped as initiating an internal dialogue taking place within the 
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 « On voit donc que tout le monde est conscient de cette violence et que la question n'est pas 
toujours d'y répondre par une plus grande violence mais plutôt de voir comment désamorcer la crise. 
Qu'est-ce donc en réalité que cette violence? » 
253
« La décolonisation, qui se propose de changer l'ordre du monde, (…) elle ne peut être le résultat 
d'une opération magique, d'une secousse naturelle ou d'une entente à l'amiable. La décolonisation, on 
le sait, est un processus historique: c'est-à-dire qu'elle ne peut être comprise, qu'elle ne trouve son 
intelligibilité, ne devient translucide à elle-même que dans l'exacte mesure où l'on discerne le 




text, and functioning as the basis according to which the pages that follow it are going 
to be  analyzed, questioned and revised. In the ensuing pages Fanon does not provide 
an account of an historical process but starts his narrative in media res and brings the 
reader without preliminary into the “heart of the drama” (Aching, 2013). He presents 
a scene of two paradigmatic figures, the colonizer and the colonized, two “different 
species” (Fanon, 1961: 43; my translation
254
), mutually and asymmetrically 
constituted, “the colonizer has made and continues to make the colonized. He draws 
his truth, namely his wealth from the colonial system.” Within this system the 
colonized is a “‘thing’”, “spectators crushed by inessentiality”, who achieves their 
humanity “in the very process of liberation” (Fanon, 1961: 40; italics in the original; 
my translation
255
). The setting of the initial scene is the “Manichean” world of 
colonial Algeria, “a world divided in two” (Fanon, 1961: 43; my translation
256
), not 
only spatially, also at the level of human worth, of ethics, and values: “the colonizers 
turns the colonized into the quintessence of evil”, “impermeable to ethics”, the 
“absence of values, but also the negation of values” (Fanon, 1961: 44; my 
translation
257
). The intermediary between both sides, the spokesperson of the colonial 
order is the soldier, who uses “the language of pure violence” and “carries the 
violence to the homes and the brains of the colonized” (Fanon, 1961: 42; my 
translation
258
). These two sides, he adds, “are not complementary”,  
The two zones oppose each other, but not at the service of a higher unity. 
Ruled by the Aristotelian logic of reciprocal exclusion, they obey to the 
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 « espèces différentes » 
255
« C'est le colon qui a fait et qui continue à faire le colonisé. Le colon tire sa vérité, c'est-àdire 
ses biens, du système colonial.(…) transforme des spectateurs écrasés d'inessentialité (…) la      « 
chose » colonisée devient homme dans le processus même par lequel elle se libère. » 
256
 « monde coupé en deux » 
257 « le colon fait du colonisé une sorte de quintessence du mal. (…) imperméable à l'éthique, 
absence de valeurs, mais aussi négation des valeurs. » 
258
 « utilise un langage de pure violence. (…) porte la violence dans les maisons et dans les 




principle of reciprocal exclusion: there is no possible conciliation, one of the 




Fanon points out that this is not a dialectical moment, but rather an antidialectical 
one, characterized by fixicity and lack of reciprocity.  Yet at the utmost manifestation 
of a rationale of opposites, segregation, and its concomitant compartmentalization 
and elimination of human relations, Fanon emphasizes the relational nature of the 
colonial system, for both the colonizer and colonized are ineluctable figures for 
defining and maintaining a broader system, colonialism. The disappearance of either 
of them entails the elimination of colonialism. And as we will see in further detail, the 
appearance of the colonized, that is, the affirmation of the colonized as human agent, 
is violence to the system.  
 Critics of Fanon have dismissed such analysis as binary or dualistic thinking and, 
therefore reductive (Gilroy, 2000). However, Fanon’s description of the colonial 
world as Manichean is not accidental, it obeys to a double reason: First, he argues that 
the structure that colonialism attempts to impose is a Manichean one based on a 
drastic antagonism between the colonizer and the colonized. Second, it is in relation 
with this unequal Manichean structure and power differentials whereby the colonized 
emerges politically, ceases to be a thing or a spectator, and initiates the process of 
decolonization. Before developing this aspect, a brief clarification on the recurrent 
critique of binaries might be pertinent. As Gordon (2008) notes, the a priori rejection 
of binaries as such, a repeated trope in postmodern and poststructuralist thought, is 
not short of irony for such thought is also grounded on anti-essentialism. It is, instead, 
the context at hand which should guide the mode analysis and depending on it one 
can decide whether a binary analysis is relevant and generative or wrong, reductive or 
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 « La zone habitée par les colonisés n'est pas complémentaire de la zone habitée par les colons. 
Ces deux zones s'opposent, mais non au service d'une unité supérieure. Régies par une logique 
purement  aristotélicienne, elles obéissent au principe d'exclusion réciproque: il n'y a pas de 




leading to absolutist forms of closure. Further, treating an analysis premised on black 
and white, colonizer and colonized, or oppressor and oppressed as binaries endows a 
normative symmetrical value to both terms that does not adjust to a reality where only 
one of the terms has a normative status. Besides, as Gordon adds, the distinction 
between being and being-not, an epistemic resource that enables human cognition to 
discern differences, is not a binary. In this light, the normative and the non-normative, 
the white and the non-white, cannot be considered a binary, for the possibilities of the 
formers are finite whereas those of the latter are infinite. 
  Fanon, as stated, uses the expression Manichean to describe the colonial world 
intentionally. He is not arguing that the reality under colonialism is a binary one, as 
the complexity will unfold throughout the same chapter and in the rest of the book. 
Alternatively, first, he is pointing out that the colonial and racist logic and structure 
that colonialism and racism attempt to enforce onto the relations in the colony is a 
binary one. As we will see below, Manicheism in Fanon is similar to what Gordon 
called the theodicy of racist systems, and what Fanon called in Black Skin White 
Masks called the “zone of non-being”. It is the expulsion from the realm of ethics, 
sociality and humanity of groups of people, and their total disposability, while such 
society considers itself peaceful and just precisely on the grounds of violence and 
injustice. Second, and importantly, it is within this Manichean framework in which 
the decolonization struggle takes place and the thing is turned into an actor. That is, 
the colonized achieves historical self-consciousness and becomes a political subject 
within this Manichean framework. This is one of the things that Fanon is doing in 
“Concerning Violence”, a phenomenology of historical consciousness (Sekyi-Otu, 
1996).   He states, “When the colonial context is apprehended in its immediacy, it is 




certain species.” (1961: 42; own italics; my translation
260
) By appealing to Hegel’s 
immediate knowledge Fanon approaches social life in the colony as directly lived, as 
it is sensuously grasped, as it appears to consciousness to the colonized. The approach 
of immediate knowledge is not comprehension but the apprehension of the object. 
This standpoint epistemology, inherently partial, but not any less legitimate and 
substantial, does not entail a conclusive and comprehensive claim on the social life 
under the colonial regime. It requires being further questioned and subjected to 
revision and completion (Sekyi-Otu, 1996: 51-52). Likewise, what has been 
understood as Fanon’s convinced demand for decolonization, that the last shall be the 
first (Aching, 2013: 26), when considered within the level of immediacy, is endowed 
with a static albeit fleeting character:  “[t]he colonized can perceive in an absolute 
immediacy whether decolonization has taken place or not: the minimum required is 
that the last shall be the first.”  (Fanon, 1961: 48; my translation
261
) It is within this 
framework of immediate knowledge that decolonization is conceived as “a program 
of absolute disorder” (Fanon, 1961: 39; my translation), through which the colonized 
“has already decided to replace the colonized, to take his place”. 
Therefore, in those statements Fanon is not so much talking about violence than 
describing and problematizing an initial stage of decolonization, and revealing how 
Manichean colonial discourses, practices and structures are inextricably linked to the 
colonial subject to the extent that they inform the process of becoming a subject, the 
desires, the imagination and the emancipatory responses of the colonized. As he 
explicitly puts it, the dichotomy that colonialism and racism impose upon the world 
continues during decolonization (1961: 52), and this stage of decolonization “unifies 
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 « Quand on aperçoit dans son immédiateté le contexte colonial, il est patent que ce qui morcelle 
le monde c'est d'abord le fait d'appartenir ou non à telle espèce, à telle race. » 
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 «Ce qui veut dire que le colonisé a la possibilité de percevoir dans une immédiateté absolue si la 




that world, by the radical decision to remove its heterogeneity and unifying it on the 
basis of nation, and sometimes, of race.” (Fanon, 1961: 48; my translation
262
) This 
transformative activity is what he means when he says that “for the colonized this 
violence represents the absolute praxis.” A praxis that he qualifies as “totalizing” 
(Fanon, 1961: 82, 90; my translation
263
) 
Were this Fanon’s prescription and his last word, decolonization would merely 
consist in inheriting colonial Manicheism, in a brutal reversal and the Africanization 
of the colony. Things are more complex, he writes: 
However, everything was simple. The good ones were on one side and the 
bad ones were on the other side. The idyllic and unreal clarity of the 
beginning is replaced by a penumbra that dislocates consciousness. (Fanon, 




He then proceeds to unfold the multiple contradictions and relations that the 
colonial framework occludes and cannot be grasped by the sensuous directedness of 
immediacy: the class relations, the role and the model of the trade unions, the 
different positionality and attitudes of the colonized intellectuals, the distinction 
between the rural and the urban, the rural exodus, the conflicting role of political 
parties, the relation of the metropolis with the European settlers, or the European who 
support the anticolonial struggle. Sekyi-Otu points out the text moves from the 
immediate knowledge and the apprehension of the colonial world to a form of 
“rational knowledge” that seeks the comprehension of the world (1996). The second 
act of decolonization is a move beyond the initial world of opposites as perceived at 
the level of immediate experience; it entails a process of psychological, political and 
social maturation of consciousness in which the complexity, the contradictions, the 
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 La décolonisation unifie ce monde en lui enlevant par une décision radicale son hétérogénéité, 
en l'unifiant sur la base de la nation, quelquefois de la race. » 
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 « Pour le colonisé, cette violence représente la praxis absolue. » 
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 « Tout était simple pourtant, d'un côté les mauvais, de l'autre les bons. À la clarté idyllique et 




shadows and the grey areas of the colonial and postcolonial situation are unveiled and 
addressed. Once the world of the colonizer and the colonized is dissolved an open 
dialectic is set in motion. 
7.2 The universal and the particular 
In Todorov’s own reading it might be justifiable that he understands Fanon as anti-
universalist relativist, but is Fanon actually saying so? Before addressing this aspect, 
it might be important to notice that Todorov extends his critique of relativism, racism, 
and a reactive particularism to anticolonial discourse in general, and concretely to the 
work of Soyinka, Césaire or the movement of Black is Beautiful. If we take the case 
of the latter, for Todorov it might be more virtuous and universal to claim Everybody 
is Beautiful. But, what the Black is Beautiful points out is the normative disparity in 
the standards of beauty and ugliness. To draw a contemporary parallelism, the Black 
Lives Matter movement against white supremacy and police violence against black 
people would also be a reactive particularism since the universal would be All Lives 
Matter. However, the latter is the argument employed by white supremacists, and 
maintains the actual disparity on the value of lives. Thus, what the movement of 
Black Lives Matter exposes, out of the concrete and the particular of black existence, 
is the contradictions of the abstract universal, reveals that it actually does not work as 
an universal under the concrete conditions of racism, and issues a more universal 
claim on the value of lives, for it encompasses the false universal and exceeds it. This 
“universalizing potential” can generally be discerned in black and anticolonial 
thought (Gordon, 2000:141).  
Étienne Balibar (2016) reminds that every universal in spite of its timeless self-
understanding is enunciated from somewhere, from concrete, historical, social, 




universals do not only clash with particulars but also with other universals. They are 
bound to notions of identity, community, belonging and inclusion, and concomitantly, 
exclusion. For this reason, Balibar points out, universals do not have a strictly 
ecumenical character; it is misleading to conceive them in terms of unity and 
harmony, instead of in terms of difference, conflict and division.  
Césaire and Fanon do not address these conflicting universals, but the oppressive 
and racist dimensions of European universalism, its constraining and narcissistic 
character which rejects human difference and exclude them from the possibility of 
belonging to the universal. In the preface to Fanon’s book, Sartre puts it by adopting 
the voice of the colonized:  “You are making monsters out of us; your humanism 
claims our universality and your racist practices locks us into the particular.” (Sartre, 
1961: 18: my translation
265
) In the same vein, Balibar observes that the exclusion 
from the universal is rationalized on the basis of the refusal of universalism by those 
who are excluded or in their incapacity to understand universalism. He adds that 
universalism is not intrinsically racist, but racism and universalism are neither 
opposite, instead they have been intrinsically connected in the Euromodern world. 
Balibar concludes that although it can rationalize discrimination and oppression, the 
discourse of universalism can also articulate resistance, revolts and insurgent 
struggles, as the case of feminists or black or anticolonial struggles for emancipation, 
which challenged dominant constructions of universalisms and their 
institutionalization (2016).   
The discourse of Césaire and Fanon was both situated in the universal and rooted 
in the particular struggles and conflicts derived from the condition of the black and 
the colonized. What they do is to expose the fakeness of the alleged universal, 
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 « vous faites de nous des monstres,  votre humanisme nous prétend universels et vos pratiques 




challenge it by showing its contradictions and its particularity, and dialectically, and 
paradoxically, construct a larger universal rooted in the concrete struggles. This is 
made explicit in Césaire’s letter of resignation from the French Communist Party. 
Besides his divergences with the party’s position towards Stalin, Césaire argues 
against reducing racism to the class struggle and against treating the colonial question 
“as a part of a more important whole” (Césaire, 2010: 147). He adds: 
I shall anticipate an objection. 
Provincialism? Not at all. I am not burying myself in a narrow particularism. 
But neither do I want to lose myself in an emaciated universalism. There are 
two ways to lose oneself: walled segregation in the particular or dilution in 
the “universal.” My conception of the universal is that of a universal 
enriched by all that is particular, a universal enriched by every particular: the 
deepening and coexistence of all particulars. (Césaire, 2010: 151) 
 
 When Fanon reiterates that the colonial world is a Manichean world, that they are  
not two different worlds, but a single world divided in two, he is pointing out that it is 
a consequence of the false universalism and the inapplicability of the universal to one 
side of that world. Decolonial and international relations theorists concur that the 
ascription of universal rights obeyed to such asymmetrical division of land, lives and 
humanity that Fanon described as Manichean and anti-dialectical (Suarez-Krabbe, 
2015; Aching, 2013). 
In Black Skin White Masks Fanon had anticipated the predicaments of human 
relations in colonial and racist societies by questioning the inapplicability of Hegel’s 
dialectics of lordship and bondage in colonial and racist settings. The metaphorical 
account of human interaction described by the German philosopher in 
Phenomenology of Spirit has elicited much discussion and is at the basis of 
contemporary debates of political philosophy, understandings of subjectivity and 
conflict, such as those revolving around the struggle for recognition. For Hegel, the 




of the other. The other is an external to the self who can negate me or exclude me, but 
in the awareness of my own negation lies also the possibility of a consciousness that 
is aware of itself. Thus, it is through the recognition of the other that one achieves 
self-consciousness. The desire for recognition triggers what Hegel called a life and 
death struggle. By risking one’s life one gets rid of superfluous elements and can 
unveil what one is. But such life and death struggle does not literally take place for 
the death of the other would deprive me from the possibility of being recognized. The 
one who abandons the struggle becomes the slave. The master is a consciousness that 
exists for-itself, he has control over the slave and over his work. He has power over 
everything. However, the master is not satisfied with obtaining recognition from a 
downfallen and a dependent self-consciousness. The consciousness of the slave is the 
form of a thing. The slave, out of fear, moves away from the master and focuses on 
the object of his work. Through the objectification and the production of his work he 
becomes aware of the things he creates, of the world and of the relationship with the 
master. Through his work he understands his existence in his own right and attains 
self-consciousness, as a being-for-itself. In the end it is the master who is dependent 
and obtains a flawed recognition whereas the slave is an independent being. For 
Hegel,this is not the end of the story, since this is to be overcome by the unfolding of 
the Spirit, but it is here where Fanon’s account of Hegel stops (Hegel: 1977: 111-
119).  
Fanon questions Hegel’s account of recognition from its point of departure. 
Instead of abstract subjects devoid of history and social conditions, he locates them in 
the colonial setting and takes into account the relations of subordination and the 
absence of reciprocity between the master and the slave. Here, the master is the 




Hegel’s account there is a reciprocity between master and slave, which is absent in 
the colonial world. The master despises the consciousness of the slave and does not 
seek his recognition, since the latter is not the other of the master. What the master 
demands from the black is not recognition but work. The black, instead, wants to be 
like the master. Instead of turning towards the object, the black turns toward the 
master and abandons the object. Therefore, the black is dependent from the master 
(Fanon, 1952, 213-214). In Fanon’s treatment of the colonial master and slave there is 
no reciprocity, no dialectical movement, no conflict, or at least there is a different 
type of conflict than in Hegel’s meeting of two equals. Or, as Gordon (2007, 2015) 
clarifies, in the zone of non-being, the conflict is not between self and other, but 
about trying to be the other. 
Maldonado-Torres argues that applying Hegel’s reasoning to the problems of the 
black “would entail getting lost in the particular and contingent when the idea is 
rather to focus on the truly universal.” Fanon had, instead, another approach: “The 
urgent thing is to rediscover what is important beneath what is contingent.” (Fanon, 
1964: my translation
266
) Thus, while Hegel seeks the eternal in the development of 
the Spirit, Fanon “takes the opposite road: situated in time he focuses on the ruptures 
with what presents itself as the universal or eternal.” (Maldonado-Torres, 2008: 103)  
“Concerning Violence” describes a rigid, anti-dialectic world that epitomizes the 
contradictions of the alleged universals. Fanon rejects abstracts universals and turns 
towards those excluded by the universal. This entails an “ethico-political movement 
from slave to slave” as the starting point of political action (Maldonado-Torres, 2008: 
153).  Ciccariello-Maher points out that by temporarily inhabiting the particular, the 
colonized assumes a defensive position which defers the universal; “subjective 
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autonomous action” and an “identitarian moment” are “necessary steps” in order to 
go beyond such rigid Manichean world and to set in motion an open-ended dialectics 
(Ciccariello-Maher, 2014: 32). In Les damnés de la terre the dialectical movement 
takes the form of the social consciousness of the independent nation, beyond narrow 
conceptions of identity and nationalism: 
The people realize then that national independence puts at stake multiple 
realities which, sometimes, are divergent and antagonists. Clarification, at 
this concrete moment of the struggle, is crucial since it helps the people to 
move from a global and undifferentiated nationalism to a social and 
economic consciousness. The people, who at the beginning of the struggle 
had adopted the primitive Manicheism of the colonizer–the black against the 
white, the Arab against the Infidel– realize en route that a black can be 
whiter than the whites and that the eventuality of the national flag and the 
possibility of an independent nation do not imply that certain layers of the 





In short, the universal is not the starting point of the struggle, neither is something 
fixed, but is what animates and where the struggles are directed to. Yet, the 
“identitarian moment” in Fanon is not so much the defense of a concrete identity, the 
content of a culture or claiming the value of a specific tradition. Alternatively, as 
Maldonado-Torres points out, Fanon seeks to create the material conditions of 
possibility for self-expression, cultural production and reproduction, and the 
formation of human communities. Blackness and the colonized are understood by 
Fanon in relational rather than in substantive terms. In their exclusion from 
universality they are turned into “the locus of dehumanization and inhumanity” 
(Maldonado-Torres, 2008: 153). This means that being excluded from the realm of 
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 « Le peuple comprend alors que l'indépendance nationale met au jour des réalités multiples qui, 
quelquefois, sont divergentes et antagonistes. L'explication, à ce moment précis de la lutte, est décisive 
car elle fait passer le peuple du nationalisme global et indifférencié à une conscience sociale et 
économique. Le peuple, qui au début de la lutte avait adopté le manichéisme primitif du colon: les 
Blancs et les Noirs, les Arabes et les Roumis, s'aperçoit en cours de route qu'il arrive à des Noirs d'être 
plus blancs que les Blancs et que l'éventualité d'un drapeau national, la possibilité d'une nation 
indépendante n'entraînent pas automatiquement certaines couches de la population à renoncer à leurs 




the universal and the human does not amount to a position of complete exteriority, 
but instead they are in a relationship with it.  
In the journal of Saint-Alban Fanon wrote: “If you want to go deeper into the 
structure of a particular country, you have to visit its psychiatric hospitals.” (Fanon, 
2018: 279) And in Les damnés de la terre he expressed a similar point in a more 
polemic way, “the fellah, the unemployed and the hungry do not lay claim to truth. 
They do not say that they represent truth, because they are the truth in their very 
being.” (Fanon, 1961: 51; my translation
268
) This is not a relativistic position or a 
claim to the intrinsic righteousness of the colonized. It is a shift of the locus of 
enunciation that enables to critically assess the values and the ideals of the society 
from below.  In other words, what he called the damné embody and lay bare the 
contradictions and the lies of the society which are presented as truth: the double 
standards, the violence and the very absence of truth in the colonial context as the 
defining elements of colonial society, which the colonized is bound to and shape their 
response: “To the lie of the colonial situation the colonized responds with an equal 
lie.” (1961: 52; my translation
269
) 
7.3 Atmospheric violence and the social contracture   
 It is not because the Indo-Chinese have discovered a culture of their own 
that they revolted. They revolted simply because, for many reasons, they 




To understand the aforementioned processes of the construction of subjectivity and 
the colonized as a historical agent within such Manichean framework Fanon delves 
into “the intimacy of the compartmentalization” (1961: 41; my translation
271
).  As 
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 « le fellah, le chômeur, l'affamé, ne prétend pas à la vérité. Il ne dit pas qu'il est la vérité, car il 
l'est dans son être même. » 
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 « Au mensonge de la situation coloniale, le colonisé répond par un mensonge égal. » 
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« Ce n'est pas parce que l'Indochinois a découvert une culture propre qu'il s'est révolté. C'est 
parce que tout simplement  il lui devenait, a plus d'un titre, impossible de respirer. » 
271




stated in the previous chapter, his description of the spatial arrangement of a divided 
world and its effects on the body and the mind of the colonized, and the violence that 
it produces in return, reflects his understanding of the borders, the relations, the 
layout and the spatial disposition of the psychiatric hospital that organize its 
repressive character. In both cases he uses the expression “lines of force” to refer to 
the physical and figurative or invisible threads and references which order and define 
a field of phenomena.  
Fanon illustrates such world of rigid separations in his careful description of the 
colonial city. The European town is well-lit, paved, and lavish, whose rubbish bins 
are filled with objects that are unknown for the colonized. The native town is a 
starving town, where people live on top of each other and looks with envy the 
European town. He observes that the European town is an area of robust shoes. “The 
feet of the colonizer are never seen, except, perhaps by the sea, but one is never close 
to them.” (Fanon, 1961: 42; my translation
272
) The European town is a zone in 
motion, mostly a movement of exploitation, he notes, whereas the native town, is a 
“solidified zone”, an exhausted town, a town on its knees. (Fanon, 1961: 52; my 
translation
273
)  The division between the two areas is defined by the police station and 
the checkpoints. As he puts it, the policeman is the spokesperson of the colonial 
regime in the sector of the colonized.  
As stated, this spatial organization according to race is as coercive as it is 
repressive, and its effects are both physical and metaphysical (Sekyi-Otu, 1996). 
Fanon’s focus shifts from the spatial organization to the political traces that it leaves 
on the body of the colonized. This “narrow world, infested with prohibitions” (Fanon, 
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 « Les pieds du colon ne sont jamais aperçus, sauf peut-être dans la mer, mais on n'est jamais 
assez proche d'eux.» 
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1961: 41; my translation
274
) is suffered in the flesh, the psyche and the imagination by 
the colonized. He observes that within such framework of segregation and 
constriction the colonized lives in a state of “permanent tension”, the muscles are 
tetanized and they are only untightened in their sleep: “the native dreams are 
muscular dreams, dreams of action, aggressive dreams.”  (Fanon, 1961: 53; my 
translation
275
) Throughout his work Fanon makes constant references to breathing, in 
certain cases as a metaphor of expansion and connection, as in his conception of the 
“rehabilitated nègre, (,,,) ‘porous to all the breaths of the world’” (Fanon, 1952: 124; 
my translation
276
). But breath, as the most vital element for life, is one of the 
intersecting points of his medical and political concerns. Under colonial and racist 
conditions the most fundamental physiological activity, and thus life, is regulated and 
threatened: “the breath of the individual is an observed, occupied breathing. It is a 
combat breathing.” (1959: 48; my translation
277
)   
 Rigidity, shortness of breathing, lack of movement, fear, envy and desperation; 
the colonial order is incarnated in the muscular contraction of the damné.  Roberto 
Beneduce notices similar political signs in the bodies of oppressed people in the 
banlieues and the urban peripheries, taut facial expression, lost gazes and muscular 
tensions which objectively are devoid of meaning to the doctors. He adds, “the 
colonial contract is signed by a muscular contracture, a lie, or a smile showing the 
teeth, a grin” (2017: 104; emphasis in the original; my translation
278
). Fanon writes: 
In the colonial world, the affectivity of the colonized is kept on the edge like 
an open wound that escapes the caustic agent. The psyche retracts, 
obliterates itself and releases through muscular demonstrations which leads 
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 « monde rétréci, semé d'interdictions » 
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 « les rêves de l'indigène sont des rêves musculaires, des rêves d'action, des rêves agressifs. » 
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   «le nègre réhabilité (…) ‘poreux à tous les souffles du monde’ ». 
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 « la respiration de l’individu est une respiration observée, occupée. C’est une respiration de 
combat. » 
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 « le contrat colonial a été signé par une contracture musculaire, un mensonge, 









Fanon points out that the aggressiveness accumulated in the muscles will be 
unleashed firstly against their own fellows: violent explosions, fratricidal or “tribal” 
feuds, self-destructive expressions, suicidal behavior, vengefulness. As stated, what 
was rationalized as the inherent criminality of the North African and overwhelmed 
the police and the judges (Fanon, 1961: 53), is for Fanon both a sign of alienation and 
fragments that anticipate a latent insurgency (Gibson and Beneduce, 2017). Fanon’s 
attention to the violence taking place among the oppressed was also one of Malcolm 
X’s concerns with the non-violent approach of Martin Luther King. For Malcolm X, 
King’s non-violent approach addressed the relations between blacks and whites, and 
disregarded the relations between blacks. Thus, the first injunction to non-violence 
should address black relations for the sake of unity and solidarity (Dorlin, 2017).   
Fanon examines what to do with this aggressiveness and turns to the cultural and 
religious resources of the Algerian.  Through religion, he argues, the colonized puts 
the responsibility for the situation in the hands of God. Thereby, the colonized forgets 
the colonizer, and resigned, achieves “the serenity of a stone.” (Fanon, 1961: 56; my 
translation
280
) The world of magic, spirits and their “terrifying myths” also tames the 
aggressiveness of the colonized. Yet, he argues that the world populated by evil 
spirits, zombies, giants, and ruled by superstitions, creates a life filled with 
prohibitions and barriers, and produces a stronger fear than the colonial world itself, 
“in terrifying me, it behaves like an unquestionable reality.” (Fanon, 1961: 56; my 
translation
281
) This nightmarish reality, he notes, provides a sense of security and 
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 « Dans le monde colonial, l'affectivité du colonisé est maintenue à fleur de peau comme une 
plaie vive qui fuit l'agent caustique. Et le psychisme se rétracte, s'oblitère, se décharge dans des 
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hystérique. » 
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 « sérénité de pierre.” 
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belonging, and integrates the Algerian within a collectivity, a tradition, a history. 
Against the backdrop of the forces of magic and myth, colonialism appears 
extraneous and irrelevant: “everything is reduced to a constant confrontation at the 
level of fantasy.” (Fanon, 1961: 57; my translation
282
) The third possibility that Fanon 
explores in order to liberate the colonized from the aggressiveness and incorporated 
violence are the ecstatic dances. For Fanon, in contrast to the world of magic and 
spirits, the dances of possession are not based on fear and control but on permission 
and release. The dances of possession have for Fanon a positive impact on the 
affectivity and the personality of the colonized: 
The native’s relaxation is precisely this muscular orgy through which the 
most acute aggressiveness, the most immediate violence are channeled, 
transformed, and exorcized away. The circle of the dance is a permissive 
circle. It protects and authorizes (…) This disintegration, splitting and 
dissolutions of the personality play a crucial role in the stability of the 
colonized world.  When they set out, the men and women were impatient, 
suffocated, stamping their feet. On their way back peace, calm and stillness 




His description of the ecstatic rituals reflect what has been called energetic 
practices of peace, in which  harmony or  “the resonance of the divine breath” is the 
primordial element, and are based on a holistic understanding of the relation between 
the self, society, nature and the supernatural. In such understandings, breath is 
considered the primordial element of life and an expansive and connecting element 
between humans and with the world (Dietrich, 2012: 48). However, Dietrich does not 
consider what impedes breathing and how these practices may address such obstacles. 
After the dances of possession peace returns to the village, but Fanon bluntly affirms 
that during the war such rituals are less and less practiced: “The back to the wall, the 
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 « Tout se résout, on le voit, en affrontement permanent sur le plan phantasmatique. » 
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 « La relaxation du colonisé, c'est précisément cette orgie musculaire au cours de laquelle 
l'agressivité la plus aiguë, la violence la plus immédiate se trouvent canalisées, transformées, 
escamotées. Le cercle de la danse est un cercle permissif. Il protège et autorise. (…) Ces effritements 
de la personnalité, ces dédoublements, ces dissolutions remplissent une fonction économique 
primordiale dans la stabilité du monde colonisé. À l'aller, les hommes et les femmes étaient impatients, 




knife at his throat, or to be more precise, the electrodes on his genitals, the colonized 
is forced to stop telling stories.” (Fanon, 1961: 58; my translation
284
) As stated, Fanon 
does not reject the therapeutic potential of the dances of possession. In his exploration 
of the theory and practice of mental health in North African societies he noticed the 
success of therapies related to religion, magic and possession in contrast to the failure 
of Western psychiatric approaches. The reason behind this for him was that they were 
developed having into account the conception of the subject, the community, health, 
disease, the supernatural world, and human relations in everyday life, the social 
organization and including the gender dimension. However, in the context of the 
anticolonial struggle, meanings, practices, values, conceptions of the self and 
relations with others, hierarchies and technology were changing, including those of 
medicine and of what therapy means. 
 Hence for Fanon, in the context of the anticolonial struggle, he raises two main 
concerns against these practices. First, in spite of their possible psychological effect 
such practices have limited political use since what they do is to prevent the 
engagement with reality. Taming the aggressiveness and violence through religion, 
evading it through the world of spirits and magic or liberating it through the ecstatic 
rituals follows the same logic that the fratricidal violence of the colonized that such 
practices sought to address, namely to deny the origin of violence and to postpone the 
confrontation with oppression: 
the colonized try to persuade themselves that colonialism does not exist, that 
everything happens as before, that history continues. Here we clearly 
discern, at the collective level, the well-known behaviors of evasion. It is as 
if plunging into this fraternal blood enabled them to ignore the obstacle 
(Fanon, 1961: 55; my translation
285
). 
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 « Le dos au mur, le couteau sur la gorge ou, pour être plus précis, l'électrode sur les parties 
génitales, le colonisé va être sommé de ne plus se raconter d'histoires. » 
285
 « le colonisé tente de se persuader que le colonialisme n'existe pas, que tout se passe comme 





Second, and relatedly, these practices are not only a form of political retreat, but 
also of cultural retreat. In “Racism and Culture” he notes that colonialism and racism 
do not only petrify the bodies of the colonized but also the imagination and systems 
of references and meanings. It does not attempt to eliminate the preexisting culture, 
but to “mummify” it, to preserve it in a state of “permanent agony” while claiming 
respect and apparently honoring tradition and cultural specificity (Fanon, 1964: 42). 
“The culture of the dominated people is sclerotized, dying. Life no longer circulates 
in it. Or more precisely, the only existing life is dissimulated.”  Under such conditions 
culture becomes tantamount to tradition, and for the colonized culture becomes a site 
of retreat and closure instead of fertility and openness. (Fanon, 1964: 50; my 
translation
286
). In the context of the anticolonial struggle a living culture functions as 
“the awakener of the people (…) the voice of a new reality in action”; rather than a 
retreat, it expands by connecting people and disputing the public sphere (Fanon, 
1961: 211-212; my translation
287
). 
The problem, Fanon observes, is “to seize this violence that is being reoriented.” 
But this raises other problems. The change of orientation requires specific conditions, 
the maturity of the people, the organization, intellectuals and political parties, and the 
urgent decisions “about the means, the tactics and conduct of the organization. 
Without this there is only blind voluntarism with the subsequent risk of being terribly 
reactionary.” (Fanon, 1961: 59; my translation
288
) 
                                                                                                                                           
fameuses conduites d'évitement, comme si la plongée dans ce sang fraternel permettait de ne pas  voir 
l'obstacle» 
286
 « La culture du peuple asservi est sclérosée, agonisante. Aucune vie n’y circule. Plus 
précisément la seule vie existante est dissimulée. » 
287
 « réveilleur de peuple (…) le porte-parole d'une nouvelle réalité en actes. » 
288
 « de saisir cette violence en train de se réorienter. (…) à décider des moyens, de la tactique,  
c'est-à-dire de la conduite et de l'organisation. Hors cela, il n'y a plus que volontarisme aveugle avec 




7.4 Violence and detoxification 
Before exploring Fanon’s main point of violence, it has become almost 
compulsory to have one’s say on one of Fanon’s most quoted and polemic statement 
concerning violence: “At the individual level, violence is a cleansing force.” (Fanon, 
2004: 51) Indeed many commentators take this sentence as the central element of 
Fanon’s view of violence, which is missing the point (Gordon, 1995). To begin with, 
it is necessary to note that in the French original Fanon did not use the expression 
“cleansing force”, but the term detoxification: “At the individual level, violence 
detoxifies.” (Fanon, 1961: 90 my translation
289
) Detoxification is a medical term 
frequently used at the time (Gibson and Beneduce, 2017), and it was also a term 
employed by the French government in their strategy to divide Algerian population, 
that is, to purge the hearts and the brains of Algerian people from  the poisoning of 
the anticolonial movement (Klose, 2013). But the more important element of the 
mistranslation may be that in the original sentence Fanon refers to what violence does 
whereas the English version is turned into an ontological assertion that refers to what 
violence is.  
The issue of the psychological benefits of perpetrating violence in contexts of 
oppression and dehumanization has not only been raised by Fanon. In his 
autobiography, Frederick Douglass describes an episode in which, in his days as a  
slave, he fought back Edward Covey, a particularly cruel farmer. Douglass had taught 
himself to read and write and was sent to Covey by his owner, Thomas Auld, in order 
to discipline the slave. After six months of severe punishments, physical abuse and 
performing humiliating tasks under Covey, Douglass writes, “Mr. Covey succeeded 
in breaking me. I was broken in body, soul, and spirit.” (2009: 70) Douglass 
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complained to Auld and asked him for protection, but the protection was denied, he 
was threatened by his legal master, and was sent back to Covey. At this point, 
Douglass decided to fight back the abuses of the master. The long fight with his 
master, he writes,  
was the turning-point in my career as a slave. It rekindled the few expiring 
embers of freedom, and revived within me a sense of my own manhood. It 
recalled the departed self-confidence, and inspired me again with a 
determination to be free. The gratification afforded by the triumph was a full 
compensation for whatever else might follow, even death itself. He only can 
understand the deep satisfaction which I experienced, who has himself 
repelled by force the bloody arm of slavery. I felt as I never felt before. It 
was a glorious resurrection, from the tomb of slavery, to the heaven of 
freedom. My long-crushed spirit rose, cowardice departed, bold defiance 
took its place; and I now resolved that, however long I might remain a slave 
in form, the day had passed forever when I could be a slave in fact. I did not 
hesitate to let it be known of me, that the white man who expected to 
succeed in whipping, must also succeed in killing me. (Douglass, 2009: 78) 
 
Douglass was aware during and after the fight that confronting his master could 
have cost him his life, but more important than his life was his dignity, his sense of 
self-worth, and his humanity, that he won in that fight. Bernarnd Boxill notices in 
Douglass narrative a theme that is also present in Fanon’s account of liberation: 
Douglass, although aware of the risks, acted but did not anticipate the consequences 
of the fight. He did not engage in the fight in order to obtain psychological benefits, 
self-respect, to awake his determination to be free, or to end physical abuse. He put 
his life at risk without knowing in advance what would happen. He found himself in a 
desperate situation, but he did not act out of desperation. As Douglass explicitly put 
it, before the fight he had reflected and was determined to respond to the physical 
abuses of his owner (Boxill, 1997). As Gordon notes, enslavement and racist 
dehumanization entailed the construction of the black as a thing, an animal, it denies 
the possibility of interiority, of a point of view and the subjective life of the black. If 
Douglass was an animal, a thing or fully dehumanized, he would not have been able 




reflection, the decision to act, the exertion of one’s agency, and the assumption of 
responsibility to change the situation. (Gordon, 2000) 
The philosopher Jean Améry similarly describes an autobiographical episode of 
his confrontation with the prisoner overseer in Auschwitz. The single punch against 
that “professional criminal of horrifying vigor” (1980: 90) entailed the psychological 
and ethical restoration of a “disjointed personality” (1980: 91), despite the severe 
retaliation of the guard.  Améry affirms that what he later read in Les damnés de la 
terre mirrored his own assertion of dignity and humanity through his fight with the 
abusive prisoner foreman. Like Fanon, Améry also puts the emphasis on the 
embodied dimensions of oppression and liberation. His agency was limited to what he 
could do with his body:  “there are situations in life in which our body is our entire 
self and our entire fate. I was my body and nothing else” (1980: 90-91).  He points 
out that being a Jew in a concentration camp was a death sentence. One could deny 
and evade such situation by “withdrawing into one's self”, but its acceptance 
concomitantly entailed the “physical revolt” against the condition of the Jew: “I 
became a person not by subjectively appealing to my abstract humanity but by 
discovering myself within the given social reality as a rebelling Jew and by realizing 
myself as one.” (1980: 91)  
The statements of Douglass and Améry share several layers with Fanon’s position, 
not only about achieving self-respect and asserting their humanity through acts of 
physical violence but also on matters of agency, embodiment, responsibility, identity, 
or the indeterminacy of the act. A significant difference, however, lies in the fact that 
the former referred to individual acts of revolt whereas Fanon was in a context of 
armed struggle and of a collective struggle against a social structure.  One can 




political level (Gordon, 1995). Paying a closer look to Fanon’s statement may shed 
some light: 
At the individual level, violence detoxifies. It rids the colonized of his 
inferiority complex, of his contemplative and desperate attitudes. It 
emboldens him and restores him to his own eyes. Even if the armed struggle 
has been symbolic, and even if the colonized is demobilized by a rapid 
decolonization, the people have the time to realize that the liberation has 
been the matter of each one of them, that the leader deserves no special merit 




Considering the longer statement, Fanon does not restrict the restorative element 
of violence to armed insurrection–as we will see in the next section, he does not 
equate violence with armed struggle. The catharsis results from the revolting act of 
confronting colonialism. It turns the spectator into agents, independently of whether 
they are the perpetrators of a violent act or other individuals who, by extension, 
become agents of decolonization and assume their different responsibilities in 
transforming the social structure, this is one of the themes that he had developed in 
the previous book. However, as he shows throughout Les damnés de la terre and 
notably in the closing chapter on the trauma of war, the violent moment is a negative 
one, and is far from being the end of the story, also at the individual level; individuals 
will also have to take responsibility for the acts of violence and for building new 
social structures, institutions and relations that reconstruct the damaged humanity 
derived from colonial and anticolonial violence. 
7.5 Violence as violation.  
Fanon uses the concept of violence with different meanings and to refer to 
different types of violence throughout the text. However, besides the vicissitudes of 
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 « Au niveau des individus, la violence désintoxique. Elle débarrasse le colonisé de son 
complexe d'infériorité, de ses attitudes contemplatives ou désespérées. Elle le rend intrépide, le 
réhabilite à ses propres yeux. Même si la lutte armée a été symbolique et même s'il est démobilisé par 
une décolonisation rapide, le peuple a le temps de se convaincre que la libération a été l'affaire de tous 




the war and the armed struggle, the core of Fanon’s understanding of violence can be 
discerned in the opening statement of his chapter: 
National liberation national renaissance, restoration of the nation to the 
people, commonwealth, whatever the terms used or the new formulas 
introduced, decolonization is always a violent phenomenon. (…) 
decolonization is simply the replacement of a ‘species’ of men by another 
‘species’ of men (1961: 39; authors translation
291
; own italics).  
 
Fanon is not saying that decolonization is to be achieved through violence, but 
rather that decolonization is itself violent. Violence arises from the replacement of a 
species of humans by another. As we have pointed out, the replacement, and the 
notion of decolonization as replacement, as a mere inversion of the colonial logic, 
raises another set of problems that Fanon discusses throughout the book. Yet the 
threat of replacement, this change that is “willed, claimed, demanded” by the 
colonized, is lived by the colonizer “as a terrifying future” (Fanon, 1961: 39; my 
translation
292
). In the narrow and rigid Manicheism of the colonial project these two 
species are the colonizer, who is closer to god, and the colonized which is located at 
the level of subhumanity or animality. Every aspect of the colonized points to their 
“constitutional depravation” (Fanon, 1961: 45; my translation
293
), the colonizer turns 
the colonized into  
the quintessence of evil. Colonized society is not only described as a society 
without values (…) the native world is presented as impervious to ethics, the 
absence of values, but also the negation of values (…) the enemy of values. 
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 Libération nationale, renaissance nationale, restitution de la nation au peuple, Commonwealth, quelles 
que soient les rubriques utilisées ou les formules nouvelles introduites, la décolonisation est toujours un 
phénomène violent. À quelque niveau qu'on l'étudié: rencontres inter-individuelles, appellations 
nouvelles des clubs sportifs, composition humaine des cocktails-parties, de la police, de conseils 
d'administration des banques nationales ou privées, la décolonisation est très simplement le remplacement 
d'une « espèce » d'hommes par une autre  « espèce » d'hommes. 
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 « voulu, réclamé, exigé (…) sous la forme d'un avenir terrifiant » 
293
 « dépravation constitutionnelle » 
294
 « de quintessence du mal. La société colonisée n'est pas seulement décrite comme une société 
sans valeurs. (…) L'indigène est déclaré imperméable à l'éthique, absence de valeurs, mais aussi 





Fanon makes reference to the part on Black Skin White Masks where he detailed 
how the black is historically constructed through sociocultural, literary, scientific and 
philosophical elements as “a phobogenic, anxiogenic object”, that is, it induces fear, 
terror and anxiety (1952: 148 my translation
295
) Fanon describes that there is a system 
of meanings, symbolic forms, legal elements and cultural which do not have merely a 
symbolic function but have a material and existential impact. Pierre Bourdieu later 
labelled “symbolic violence” to the form of power “which manages to impose 
meanings and to impose them as legitimate by concealing the power relations which 
are the basis of its force,” (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990: xv). In Les damnés de la 
terre he does not stop to explain such process, but brings the reader straight to the 
present.  
As stated, the description of the colonial world that Fanon offers epitomizes what 
he had called “the zone of non-being”, a zone “neither of appearance or 
disappearance” (Gordon, 2007c: 10), where the colonized exists, but exists as 
subhuman. In this zone, the relations established are not between self and other, but in 
the absence of the ethical realm, the other is a non-other. The black, the colonized can 
establish self-other relations among themselves. As Lewis Gordon puts it, “Where 
ethics is derailed, all is permitted.” (2007: 11). In the Manichean logic of  racist and 
colonial systems, Gordon points out, the attempt to make both species meet, the 
claims of justice or appealing to the ethics of the system fail because the system 
presumes itself legitimate and just on the basis of the dehumanization, and the 
arbitrary death of the racialized. The attempt of the racialized to appear, is a violent 
act to the system that has produced such framework: “As neither self nor other, the 
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effort of blacks to appear in such a system becomes its violation. They thus suffer 
from illicit appearance” (2015: 114).  Fanon writes: 
Confronted with a world arranged by the colonizer, the colonized subjects 
are always presumed guilty. The colonized do not accept this guilt, but 
rather take it as a sort of curse, a sword of Damocles. Yet, deep down the 
colonized acknowledge no authority. They are dominated but not 
domesticated. They are made to feel inferior, but not convinced of their 
inferiority (Fanon, 1961: 54: my translation
297
; own italics) 
 
The guilt of the colonized is not a psychological complex, as Bhabha (2004) 
insists, and Fanon explicitly denies, but a structural condition of the damnation, that, 
as Gordon, notes, eliminates any possibility of innocence of the colonized:  
the blackened lives the disaster of appearance where there is no room to 
appear nonviolently. Acceptable being is nonexistence, nonappearance, or 
submergence (…)To change things is to appear, but to appear is to be violent 
since that group's appearance is illegitimate. Violence, in this sense, need not 
be a physical imposition. It need not be a consequence of guns and other 
weapons of destruction. It need simply be appearance. (Gordon, 2007: 11) 
 
 
There are two juxtaposed levels of violence here: the symbolic violence of the 
colonizer that imposes an ontological difference that separates the human from the 
non-human, and the existence of the colonized as violence to those very structures of 
violence. As George Ciccariello-Maher notes, in Fanon the symbolic violence of 
racialization has a deeper reach than the more indiscernible violence that Bourdieu 
describes; colonial and racist symbolic violence has an ontological impact, for it 
attempts to exclude the colonized from the realm of humanity. In spite of this, the 
“symbolic ontological violence” in Fanon is not an imposition on a powerless, 
passive subject. As stated the sociogenic analysis entails both the diagnostic and the 
active intervention of the human in the world, the possibility of change. Thus, in his 
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 « Face au monde arrangé par le colonialiste, le colonisé est toujours présumé coupable. La 
culpabilité du colonisé n'est pas une culpabilité assumée, c'est plutôt une sorte de malédiction, d'épée 
de Damoclès. Or, au plus profond de lui-même le colonisé ne reconnaît aucune instance. Il est dominé, 




methodological and anthropological perspective the “racialized-colonized subjects 
always find the symbolic violence which imprisons them to be within the reach of 
their fingertips, available for appropriation, to be wielded against its creators” 
(Ciccariello-Maher, 2010:7).  
In the Manicheist framework, the only way that the colonized can avoid being 
violent is not to move, to accept and remain in the place designated for him or her: 
“The first thing that the colonized learns is to stay in his place, not to go beyond the 
limits.” (Fanon, 1961: 53; my translation
298
) These limits are spatial, legal, political, 
economic, symbolic, sexual, and at the level of senses and imagination, they shrink 
the body and the mind, the land and the bread, the desires, the expectations and the 
imagination of the colonized. In the colony, the relation between colonizer and 
colonized, Fanon points out, is mediated by the police, checkpoints, physical 
segregation, prohibitions, exploitation, and torture. These are not considered violence, 
but legitimate force: 
The relationship between the colonizer and the colonized is a mass 
relationship. Against the greater number the colonizer opposes its force. The 
colonizer is an exhibitionist. His concern with security leads him to remind 




 Fanon implicitly brings up the distinction between violence and force. The 
violence exerted against the colonized is not considered violence, but the legitimate 
use of force, and any action of affirmation undertaken by the colonized is considered 
violence. In the colonial order violence is the legitimate use of force, and in turn, “the 
colonial regime draws its legitimacy from force” (Fanon, 1961: 8; my translation
300
). 
For Fanon the normative value of each group is not symmetrical and the normative 
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 « La première chose que l'indigène apprend, c'est à rester à sa place, à ne pas dépasser les limites. » 
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 « Les rapports colon-colonisé sont des rapports de masse. Au nombre, le colon oppose sa force. Le 
colon est un exhibitionniste. Son souci de sécurité l'amène à rappeler à haute voix au colonisé que « Le 
maître, ici, c'est moi ». »  
300




assessment of their actions cannot be endowed in abstract, but sociogenically. 
Enrique Dussel’s distinction between “compulsion” and “violence”, informed by 
Gramsci and Fanon, illuminates this aspect. He warns that such distinction is 
changeable and contextual. Compulsion refers to “all use of force that is grounded in 
the ‘government by law’.” (2008b: 104) That is, compulsion is the legal and 
legitimate use of force, based on consent. Violence, in turn, is defined by Dussel as 
the use of force exerted by individuals or groups “which does not rely on the 
consensual, collective, and critical support of the new system of legitimacy.” 
Violence can also be the coercive action over the rights of others. The appearance of 
social movements that struggle for new rights “creates a new legitimacy” that turns 
what was legitimate compulsion into illegitimate violence (2008b: 105). 
As Fanon observes, for the colonizer the alternative is not between an Algerian 
Algeria and a French Algeria, but between an independent Algeria and a colonial 
Algeria (Fanon, 1961: 86). He writes, 
The colonizer makes history. He is the absolute beginning: ‘We have made 
this land’. He is the ongoing cause: ‘If we leave, everything is lost, this land 
will return to the Middle Ages’. In front of him, the numbed beings 
possessed by fever and ‘ancestral customs’ constitute an almost mineral 
framework to the innovative dynamism of the colonial mercantilism. The 





In the colonial narrative, the colonizer is the alpha and omega of all human activity 
in the colony. The native is indistinguishable from the landscape, static, inert, 
unproductive, mineral at best, or a wild nature to be tamed at worst. The settler has 
endowed himself the right and to seize lands and lives. As we saw in the previous 
section, in this setting of repression and constricted agency, the colonized, who accept 
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 « Le colon fait l'histoire. Sa vie est une épopée, une odyssée. Il est le commencement absolu: 
«Cette terre, c'est nous qui l'avons faite. » Il est la cause continuée : « Si nous partons, tout est perdu, 
cette terre retournera au Moyen Âge. » En face de lui, des êtres engourdis, travaillés de l'intérieur par 
les fièvres et les « coutumes ancestrales », constituent un cadre quasi minéral au dynamisme novateur 




their own illegitimacy, direct their violence against themselves. As Jean Anna Gordon 
notes, in Fanon the anticolonial struggle started from the premise that the constant 
and open use of force of the colonizer is illegitimate and worthy of being labelled 
violence. This is the first disruption of the Manichean framework, and challenges  
who and what constitutes ‘collective support’, ‘legitimate representatives’ 
and ‘the people’ through forging an alternative hegemony (…)Redefining 
their foci of force or ceasing to commit collective suicide requires an 
outright challenge to the force of settlers as violence. (Gordon, 2014: 137-
138; italics in the original) 
 
Fanon points out that the discovery by the colonized that their lives, their breath, 
their heart beating are no different from the settlers’, that their skin is not of less value 
than that of the settler, produces “a fundamental  jolt in the world. All the new and 
revolutionary assurance of the colonized stems from it” (Fanon, 1961: 48; my 
translation
302
) The jolt in the world is the refusal to stay in their physical and 
metaphysical place, to accept the inferiority; the refusal to see oneself through the 
negative eyes of the colonizer entails the shattering of the “ontological walls of 
being” (Ciccariello-Maher, 2010: 9-10). The assertion of their humanity, the 
constitution of the colonized as a political subject and their capacity to question the 
existing legitimacy trigger a “conflicts of rights” between two competing and 
mutually exclusive legal and moral claims, in which the prevailing side would 
represent a violation:  
The criteria that would constitute suitable means for the settlers, for the 
colonial government, would be the absence of challenges to it. This is 
because such a system does not see itself as unjustified and unjust, which 
means its overturn would be, from its perspective, unjust, unwarranted, a 
violation of decency and order—in a word, violent. (Gordon, 2015: 118; 
italics in the original) 
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 « une secousse essentielle dans le monde. Toute l'assurance nouvelle et révolutionnaire du 




This situation, Gordon adds, “is no less than tragic: One side must lose.” The 
defeat of colonialism would be, to the colonial regime, “violence incarnate”; the 
defeat of the anticolonial movement would imply the persistence of violence. 
(Gordon, 2015: 118; own italics).  
7.6 Violence: Beyond means and ends 
Fanon’s account of violence is not conceived in terms of means and ends. 
Violence is not an end in itself and neither is instrumental to achieve independence, 
decolonization, psychic liberation, or to forge a new humanity, but is intrinsic to the 
colonial situation and to the colonized subject. Neil Roberts argues that Fanon is 
talking from a different paradigm that he defines as: “Intrinsic violence, in contrast to 
instrumental violence”, which Roberts defines as “a metaphysical concept in which 
the act of either random irrational or calculated rational violence itself contains 
inherent value.” (Roberts, 2004, 146) But there are two main limitations in Roberts 
account. First, Fanon did not endow any value to violence. Second, Roberts’ 
articulation draws more on Sartre’s preface than on Fanon’s text, and Sartre was 
talking about violence as a means. As Alice Cherki points out, Sartre was justifying 
violence whereas Fanon was analyzing it; Sartre was talking about killing whereas for 
Fanon violence was not only killing (Cherki, 2011). Roberts rightly affirms that most 
of the intellectual debates on this chapter from the 1960’s to current times have read 
Fanon as calling for the necessity of violence in the anti-colonial struggle.  Whether 
“they are supporting or rejecting Fanon, critics remain stuck in the conceptual 
paradigm of instrumentalism.” In this view Fanon’s alleged theory of violence is 
mostly explained along a “means-ends continuum” (Roberts, 2004: 145-146).   
One of the first and most prominent critics was Hannah Arendt, who posited that 




anti-political (1970: 65). Arendt’s criticism of Fanon is contradictory and mostly 
based on personal opinions than in an actual engagement with the text. Nevertheless, 
she raises issues that Fanon had already addressed.  Arendt links power to the 
political and locates violence as their opposite, as an illegitimate means to address 
conflicts. She argues that it is necessary to differentiate between power, force, 
authority and violence. A propos of the latter, she writes:  
Violence, finally, as I have said, is distinguished by its instrumental 
character. Phenomenologically, it is close to strength, since the implements 
of violence, like all other tools, are designed and used for the purpose of 
multiplying natural strength until, in the last stage of their development, they 
can substitute for it. (Arendt, 1970: 46) 
 
Arendt thinks violence as the rational means to exert a physical damage such as 
killing or injuring. She obliterates that Fanon had already addressed the 
instrumentalist view of violence in what he called the “puerile position that Engels 
adopted”. Engels conceived violence in reference to a confrontation of technical tools 
and the calculation strengths (Fanon, 1961: 63; my translation
303
). Sidestepping the 
problems of the instrumental definition, Vicent Martínez Guzmán emphasizes the 
relational element when he points out that violence entails the rupture of 
intersubjectivity (2001). Gordon posits that, along with its normative assessment, 
there is also a “relative intentional” element in violence. Reflecting on Fanon, he 
points out that, “where there is no subjectivity, there is no violence. There has to be 
consciousness of an imposition that is not, or has not been, requested. In violence, or 
violation, there is a crossing of a threshold” (Gordon, 1995b:77). Norman Ajari builds 
upon both Fanon and Gordon and also phenomenologically defines violence as “the 
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imposition by force of the passing from one state to another state onto a being who 
intended to persist in the previous state” (Ajari, 2015; my translation
304
) 
Roberts notes that Arendt’s definition of violence omits that violence, as Fanon 
shows, is not restricted to physical forms of damage but also to the impact of 
psychological violence
305
 (Roberts, 2004). Yet for Fanon there is more than the 
physical and the psychological. In a speech in Ghana he talks about the different 
layers of violence in terms of temporality and existence:  
Violence in the everyday behavior, violence with regard to the past, which is 
devoid of substance, violence with regard to the future, because the colonial 
regime presents itself as eternal. As we see, the colonized is trapped in a 
network of a tridimensional violence, a meeting point of multiple violences, 
diverse, repeated, accumulated (…) The violence of the colonial regime is 
not only lived at the level of the soul, but also at the level of the blood and 
the muscles (…) the violence of the colonized is simply a manifestation of 




Fanon talks of violence in terms of layers and dimensions. Colonial and racist 
violence have an impact at the level of being, of subjectivity, of the relation to time 
and space, to one’s body and to others. And as we have seen in this and previous 
chapters, besides the symbolic, the ontological, the psychological, Fanon also 
questions coercive and subtle forms of violence, that make the use of force 
unnecessary since violence itself is invisibilized and incorporated.   
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antérieur » 
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 On this issue, the other side of the coin would be Homi Bhabha’s position in the preface to the book. 
He reads the violence of the colonized as “part of a struggle for psycho-affective survival” (2004: xxxvi). 
Although Fanon addresses this psycho-affective dimension in the chapter, Bahbha’s reduction to the 
psychological revolves around how the colonized handled with the “guilt complex”, something that 
Fanon only mentioned in passing and in order to discard it (1961: 54). Indeed for Bhabha the whole book 
whether violence, national consciousness, decolonization or humanism, is rooted on an exploration of the 
“psycho-affective” (2004: xix). 
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 « Violence dans le comportement quotidien, violence à l’égard du passé qui est vidé de toute 
substance, violence vis-à-vis de l’avenir, car le régime colonial se donne comme devant être éternel. On 
voit donc que le peuple colonisé, pris dans le réseau de violences multiples, diverses, réitérées, 
cumulatives(…) Cette violence du régime colonial n’est pas seulement vécue sur le plan de l’âme, mais 
aussi sur celui des muscles, du sang (…) la violence du colonisé devienne tout simplement une 




Lastly, Arendt’s radical opposition between violence and politics is not only 
problematic because it discards the covert or overt political character of violent 
actions, whether  spontaneous or organized, rational and irrational, but also because 
she excludes the violence that is connected and emerge from politics, institutions, 
laws, or the different forms of violence that are exerted by the state
307
. The violence 
that arises from institutions, for Étienne Balibar, is as “extreme” as the one that arises 
against them. Balibar argues that “it is not possible to escape this circle by ‘absolute’ 
decisions such as choosing between a violent or a nonviolent politics, or between 
force and law.” Balibar’s way out is “to invent a politics of violence”, which is at the 
same time a “politics of civility”. This entails introducing the question of violence, 
“its forms and limits, its regulation and perverse effects on agents themselves, into the 
concept and practice of politics.” That is, introducing the question of violence and 
“anti-violence” in emancipatory politics (Balibar, 2002: xi-xii; italics in the original).  
Judith Butler offers a more nuanced reading of Fanon than Arendt, but her 
interpretation also shares the weaknesses of an instrumental understanding of 
violence. She affirms that violence in Fanon is “an instrumentality in the service of 
invention”. She notes that Fanon is not necessarily arguing for violence, “although he 
will also oppose both nonviolence and compromise as political options” (Butler, 
2008: 225). This is another deficit of not delving into the character of violence and 
resorting to the instrumentalist thesis: the false opposition between violence and 
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 The relationship between violence and law is one of the themes in Walter Benjamin’s   
“Critique of Violence”, a complex and open essay that Arendt excluded in her compilation of  
posthumous works of Benjamin (Goodman, 2017). Benjamin writes: “Among all the forms of 
violence permitted by both natural law and positive law there is not one that is free of the 
gravely problematic nature, already indicated, of all legal violence. Since, however, every 
conceivable solution to human problems, not to speak of deliverance from the confines of all 
the world historical conditions of existence obtaining hitherto, remains impossible if violence 
is totally excluded in principle, the question necessarily arises as to other kinds of violence 
than all those envisaged by legal theory.” (Benjamin, 1978: 293) To put it very succinctly, 
Benjamin distinguishes between a violence that preserves law, and another violence, that is not 





nonviolence, the latter considered as the ultimate means of political action. On the 
next section we will return to this aspect. Following other literary-critic feminists, 
Butler argues that in Fanon violence as a means of self-creation has a 
hypermasculinist character.  She affirms that this violence functions as a 
compensatory mechanism in his male normative understanding of colonial 
dehumanization as emasculation and decolonization as the restoration of masculine 
values, although she concedes that Fanon seems to be aware of this. Instead, Butler 
points out that there are elements in Black Skin White Masks which have a more 
universal scope, and that enable to go beyond the particularities and the constrictions 
of race and of masculinity and femininity (Butler, 2008). However, as stated, Fanon 
does not attribute an inventive value to violence in the chapter at hand, neither a 
revolutionary nor a positive value (Gordon, 2015; Marriott, 2018).  
The question of masculinism that Butler raises is justifiably posed considering that 
the gender dynamics within emancipatory movements have tended to reproduce the 
normative gender politics of the society which they question. Other feminists have 
noted that the possible masculinism in Fanon is not tantamount to male superiority, 
misogyny or anti-feminist positions but is instead compatible with his pro-feminist 
stances
308
 (Sharpley-Whiting, 1998; James, 1996; Elia, 1996). The absence of the 
gender dimension and the predominance of the masculine element are patent in Les 
damnés de la terre. This is not the case of his previous work, L’an V de la revolution 
algérienne, where he describes the social changes taking place in Algerian society 
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 Sharpley-Whiting (1998) has explored the almost conflicting readings of Fanon in different 
currents of feminism. She notices that whereas postmodern feminists, related to cultural studies and 
literary studies, have taken Fanon to task on the grounds of his gendered language that replaces the 
normativity of white Man by black men, and posited that Fanon reduced agency from women, 
Algerian feminists argued that Fanon exaggerated the agency of Algerian women. Black feminists 
have in their turn examined the influence Fanon in their theory and practices and exposed that the 
possible limitations in his treatment of gender are not incompatible with a pro-feminist reading of 
Fanon or with the use of Fanon for feminist concerns. Likewise, Marxists feminists such as Silvia 
Federici and Mariarosa Dalla Costa show “how his thought is foundational for a contemporary Marxist 




during the decolonization struggle at the level of agency, attitudes, values and social 
relations. In factual terms this is the work where Fanon failed most and where the 
ensuing developments did not accompany his analysis. But if instead of a sociological 
study, the book is taken as a “critical vision” of a society to come (Sekyi-Otu, 1996; 
Cherki, 2011), the question of gender would play a central role in a decolonized 
society, not by bypassing masculinity and femininity as Butler advocates, but through 
the reconfiguration of gender roles and by associating a decolonized society with the 
feminine elements. As covered in last chapter, in his psychiatric writings Fanon 
delved into the social and psychic troubles of Algerian men and women in relation to 
the disruption of Algerian patriarchal structures, and the consequent displacement of 
the status and authority of men, by an external force. In Parallel Hands, a theater play 
written in 1949, Fanon associated violent and destructive forms of addressing social 
conflict with masculine values. The play is set as a Greek drama with Oedipal and 
Hamletian overtones where a hyperbolic hero seeks self-creation and the 
transformation of the society from a millenary social order. Through the murder of 
the king, who is also his father, the hero aspires to unleash chaos and destruction, 
which would eventually lead to the renewal of the society. But there is no rebirth; 
neither self-affirmation nor social reconstruction end up taking place after murder and 
havoc. Although the rest of the characters are critic of the hero, their reasons obey to 
their particular interests.  It is Dhràna, the mother of the hero, who not only issues the 
strongest critiques of her son, but also of masculine’s narcissistic and ego driven 
ambitions that disregard the damaging effects of their violence, and put their 
aspirations and actions ahead of mutual needs and reason. She declares: 
To what summits will you lead me, dissatisfied men? 
(…) Excessively resounding men, for each one of your intoxications we are 
made to pay. So when, full of scorn for impossible glories, will you hang 




Vainglorious males, stop with the powerless edifice of your agitation. Your 
darkening acts hurt and the dreams animating you, hopelessly unachievable, 
flay our lips. 
I am tired. Tired of living for men. Tired of waiting, anxious, for the 
splendour of their feats. 
Men who barely listen, pity for your female companions! Pity! (Fanon, 
2018: 121-122) 
 
Alas Sire! Will we ever know from which unconveyed sources 
man brings back the tenacious fevers with which he annihilates 
cities? Strewn at the whim of the world’s hot breaths, women strive 
to defend a shred of root. We are the ones from whom the 
universe is organized, but the men, ridiculous creatures torn 
from ourselves, whip our faces with their homicidal hands. 
Yesterday, women, eternally powerless, tilted combustible eyes 
toward the noons in act. (Fanon, 2018: 124) 
 
The play concludes with the hero asking for forgiveness to the women, who have 
now taken the reins of the reorganization of the society. Robert Young emphasizes 
the influence of Simone de Beauvoir in one of the subthemes of the play, a feminist 
critique of masculinist values and forms of leadership. After the destruction and the 
defeat of the hero, what emerges is the unexpected reconstruction of society 
manifested in the change of its gender politics, whereby the women assume the new 
direction of the society (Young, 2018). In Les damnés de la terre Fanon does not 
bring up the feminist critique of violence, but he is also presenting a different 
understanding of violence than that of the heroic individual who aims at setting the 
world on fire in order to restart again. Instead he is describing ontologized humans 
whose appearance, which as noted before, is related to standing out and to exist, is 
violence incarnated. 
Butler also asks whether violence “as a pure instrument” can be kept as such or 
whether “it comes to define, haunt, and afflict” individuals, the community and the 
ensuing political project (Butler, 2008: 226). She adds that Fanon did not put this 
question, but this is precisely one of Fanon’s central elements in his understanding of 
violence: that there is no easy disentanglement from violence once one is embedded 




decolonization does not obey to a linear logic. He pointed out throughout the book, 
violence would haunt the postcolonial world both at the socio-political and the 
psychological levels. As David Marriott affirms, “Fanon’s concern is with how anti-
colonial revolution, far from producing emancipated subjects, can also produce 
subjects who are radically dispossessed.” (Marriott, 2018: 23)  And this violence is, 
again, not only physical, but he also warns how the new legitimacy that emerges from 
the anticolonial struggle, whether armed or not, is appropriated and sclerotized 
through symbols, flags, slogans, mummified understandings of culture, reification of 
ethnic divisions, the fetishization of the liberator and anticolonial leaderships, and 
rigid political and bureaucratic structures, which come into conflict with the role of 
the people and the required democratic process of what he called national and social 
consciousness.   In sum, the understanding of violence in Fanon as tragic in character, 
intrinsic to the colonized subject and a violation of the colonial order helps to sidestep 
the traps that adamantly populate the secondary literature on Fanon and violence. As 
Gibson and Beneduce poignantly put it: 
It is amazing to us that there has been such insistence on reading the first 
chapter of The Wretched of the Earth (titled “On Violence”) as an apology 
for violence, and that so much time has been dedicated to discussing Fanon’s 
supposed theory of violence. Meanwhile, what has been overlooked is his 
desperate analysis of the violence that the colonized are condemned to act 
out and repeat. (…) This horizon of destitution and ‘wretchedness’ is what 
Fanon described so viscerally. (Gibson and Beneduce, 2017: 254) 
 
7.7 Critique of nonviolence 
Contrary to what is commonly held Fanon did not oppose to nonviolence. He was 
acquainted with the philosophy of nonviolence, with Kwame Nkrumah and his work, 
and with the experience of the African countries that achieved independence without 




Ghana that gathered international advisors seeking to train African anticolonial 
movements in nonviolence. The nonviolent activists Bill Sutherland and Matt Meyer 
recall the strained atmosphere of the meeting and the heated presentations and 
debates. The conference took place right after the massacre of Sharpeville in South 
Africa and the French nuclear tests in Algeria. The proposals of the advisors were 
generally not well received; at the peak of extreme colonial violence, African 
delegates saw in the nonviolent international activists a naïve understanding of their 
situations and an attempt to coopt and interfere in the independence struggles. I quote 
at length:  
Fanon, who represented Algeria's National Liberation Front (FLN)-involved 
in the most intense armed conflict on the continent- spoke in a quiet and 
sober voice explaining his view of the regrettable necessity for armed 
struggle. Outside of the conference hall, Fanon described to the nonviolent 
advisors the attempts to attain Algerian independence by nonviolent means: 
'We tried this method, but the French came into the Casbah, broke down 
door after door and slaughtered the head of each household in the center of 
the street. When they did that about thirty five consecutive times, the people 
gave up on non-cooperation'. (Sutherland and Meyer, 2000: 40-41) 
 
As Lewis Gordon (1995) observes, at the strategic level Fanon stood at a half-way 
point between the idolization of armed struggle and the strict adherence to 
nonviolence as the only means to achieve independence. In the chapter on violence of 
Les damnés de la terre Fanon offers a critique of a specific form of nonviolence 
associated with the class interests of the nationalist elites and also with a certain 
function and purpose of nonviolence. At a certain moment, Fanon says, the colonial 
bourgeoisie introduces the notion of nonviolence as way to appeal to the shared 
interests of the intellectual and economic elites of the colonized. “Nonviolence is an 
attempt to settle the colonial problem around the negotiating table before any 




1961: 62; my translation
309
) The colonized elites demand a reform and their 
assimilation into the colonial system; they become the self-appointed interlocutors 
between the metropolis and the “terrorists”. In the negotiation the notion of 
compromise becomes the central argument in order to avoid the violence of the 
revolt. But for the colonized, colonialism “is not a thinking machine, not a body 
endowed with reason. It is violence in the state of nature.” (Fanon, 1961: 61; my 
translation
310
). Violence is the constitutive element of colonial relations, and, he adds, 
colonialism does not concede anything without exhausting all its possibilities. Based 
on their fear of violence, and through their privileged position, the colonized elites 
search for a compromise that for Fanon amounts to a “politics of immobilism” where 
the irreversible is to be avoided, while the bloodshed and the regrettable act are 
quotidian elements of colonial life (Fanon, 1961:63; my translation
312
). The colonized 
intellectual, in their compliance with the status quo, reproduce in such a way the 
unequal value of colored and white lives and their compliance with the status quo.  
Fanon’s critique of the understanding of pacifism and nonviolence as a clean 
hands approach that seeks to sidestep violence does not differ from what Gandhi 
called cowardice, the use of nonviolence in order to avoid violence. For Fanon, 
“proof of the native's humanity consisted not in the willingness to kill settlers, but in 
the willingness to risk his or her life.” (Mamdani, 2001: 34) This is not grounded on a 
blind heroism, exemplary martyrdom or an ethical superiority, but on the 
impossibility to disentangle oneself from violence when one opposes it. As stated 
above, the nonviolence of colonized intellectuals and economic elites is complicit 
with colonial violence and contributes to maintain it.  
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 « La non-violence est une tentative de régler le problème colonial, autour d'un tapis vert avant 
tout geste irréversible, toute effusion de sang, tout acte regrettable. » 
310
 « Le  colonialisme n'est pas une machine à penser, n'est pas un corps doué de raison. Il est la    
violence à l'état de nature. » 
          
312




7.7 The conundrum of nonviolence 
To the above deontological critique of nonviolence, Norman Ajari points out, 
Fanon adds an ontological critique: “non-violence does not exist.” (Ajari, 2014: 229; 
my translation
313
)  Ajari argues that non-violence always presupposes violence as the 
defining relation, and without it, its contestation by non-violence would have no 
object and no raison d’être. Yet, Ajari understands non-violence as the passive and 
willful reception of violence and locates the receiver of the violence as the victim, 
which is not how all proponents of non-violence, both as a moral principle or a 
political strategy, understand it. Besides, the fact that there is a deontological critique 
already implies there is such a thing as non-violence –a particular disposition or 
attitude towards violence– something which Ajari concedes. However, I concur with 
Ajari that in Fanon, besides the explicit critique of a concrete approach to non-
violence, there is also an implicit assessment of nonviolence through his conception 
of the existence of the racialized as violence or violation.  
As stated, his conception of violence as violation of the system and the intrinsic 
violence of the appearance of the colonized transcends the debates on means and ends 
and also simplistic divisions between violence and nonviolence. When he says that 
decolonization is always violent, independently of there being armed struggle or not, 
Fanon is questioning what is recognized as violence, against who an act is considered 
violence, what does nonviolence mean, whether is it possible to be nonviolent, and 
what is the point of declaring oneself nonviolent when one is already violence. To put 
it more bluntly, he points out that the self-assertion as nonviolent when the 
appearance of the black or the colonized is violence and their death is not considered 
violence is fruitless. The notion of violence as violation and the mere appearance and 
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existence of certain groups as violence sidesteps the antagonism between nonviolence 
and violence as used in the discourse on violence by the hegemonic power. There is a 
form of violence in such division through the imposition and the determination of the 
limits of what is possible. 
These considerations are not limited to Fanon’s immediate context. Instead, he 
helps us to think about other moments and movements that today are spoken in terms 
of nonviolence, such as the Civil Rights struggle in the United States (Gordon, 
2007c), in which the economy of violence was racially and asymmetrically 
distributed. The impossibility of nonviolent appearance was also the case of other 
movements which did not declare themselves non-violent but neither resorted to 
armed struggle nor offensive violence, such as the Black Panther Party,  hip-hop 
movements (Ciccariello-Maher, 2010) or the current global movement of Black Lives 
Matter (Gibson, 2016). It also sheds light on the problems of the different movements 
of the South African struggle against apartheid, or the current situation in Palestine 
(Alessandrini, 2014). In a 2010 study of Associated Press and Stanford University, 
20% of the respondents “openly” admitted to consider blacks as violent (Ciccariello-
Maher, 2010). A brief but closer look to such movements can shed light on how the 
opposition between violence and nonviolence and framing it in terms of choice does 
not reflect the situation, and is part of the imposed framework. 
 One of the most important advocates of nonviolence, Martin Luther King, who 
today is considered a national figure in the Unites States did not enjoy the same 
reception during his lifetime. A sanitized and depoliticized version of King has 
become the standard according to which black leaders and political movements are 
measured and considered deviant or violent. Yet during his lifetime the reception of 




side, his nonviolent strategy was praised, supported and demanded as the condition 
for black political action, while the white counterpart did not act accordingly. On the 
other side he was considered a threat when he addressed social and economic issues 
and the question of Vietnam (Jones, 1983). In mainstream media King’s image was 
represented as the radical opposite of Malcolm X in terms of personal identity, 
ideology and purposes. King was portrayed as a nonviolent and a honest leader, 
whereas Malcolm X was conceived as bitter, violent, fanatic, power thirsty and 
animated by dark motives, black supremacist and anti-Christian (Powell and 
Amundson, 2002). Malcolm X received less coverage and a less respectful treatment, 
thereby diminishing role of Malcolm X in the civil rights struggle. Despite their 
actual differences with respect to  nonviolence and other aspects, such antagonism 
could not be backed up by their thought and actions; Malcolm X argued for equality, 
not supremacy, and did not advocate nor committed violence. But this opposition was 
instrumental to secure the hegemonic racial order and power structures by shaping 
which claims, aspirations, practices and forms of protest are acceptable and  (Grimm, 
2015). As novelist James Baldwin put it, “The real reason that non-violence is 
considered to be a virtue in Negroes (…) is that white men do not want their lives, 
their self-image, or their property threatened.” (Baldwin, 1962: 68-69) Baldwin notes 
that the history of conquest and violence of the United States is turned as a history of 
heroism and innocence except in the case of black political action. Nonviolence 
serves to relieve the white liberal consciousness (Baldwin, 1962: 68) and offers the 
same virtuous and self-congratulatory image as that of the founding power that 





Besides, the treatment and the public perception of King changed as King’s and 
X’s ideas became closer throughout the years, and also as King related the black 
struggle to Vietnam and to the Third World, and expressed socialist and anti-militarist 
positions. William C. Sullivan, Head of the Division Five of the FBI called King in 
1963, “the most dangerous Negro in the future of this Nation from the standpoint of 
communism, the Negro, and national security” (Churchill and Wall, 1990: 96-97) 
After the murder of Malcolm X, the FBI counterintelligence reports that King was 
considered one of the contenders to the position of the black “messiah”, “should he 
abandon his supposed ‘obedience’ to ‘white, liberal doctrines’ (nonviolence) and 
embrace black nationalism.” (Churchill and Wall 1990: 131)  
There is this constant ambivalence in King’s reception; he is accepted as a valid 
and respectful leader insofar as he is limited to the nonviolent strategy and ethics. Yet 
the nonviolent movement appeared as violent and was responded as such.  Activists 
of the nonviolent movements recall that their advances “could not have been achieved 
without the complementary and still underappreciated practice of armed self-
defense.” (Cobb Jr, 2014: 1) Against the constant terrorism, African-American 
individuals and groups within and outside the movement organized patrols and guards 
to protect their leaders, the communities and the participants in the acts. After the 
bombings and the attacks suffered, King’s house was described as “an arsenal” (2014: 
7), and he made clear that the question of armed self-defense did not pose an ethical 
or strategic contradiction to nonviolence
314
. Survival was the basic condition for 
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 The question of organized self-defense and gun ownership cannot be dissociated from the particular 
history of the United States where they played a constitutive role. But this does not fully explain the 
dynamics of organized self- defense. Elsa Dorlin distinguishes self-defense from legitimate defense, 
noting that the latter is a right that functions like a privilege. Certain groups are legitimated to defend 
themselves, will be defended by the state and the state delegates on them for the defense of its 
interests, whereas others are not defended, they cannot resort to violence for their own defense and will 
be constrained in self-defense (Dorlin, 2017). Martin Luther King was denied the permit to carry 
weapons (Cobb Jr. 2014), and as we will see this would be one of the first issues that the Black Panther 




protests to be carried out.  Charlie Cobb Jr., former member of the Student 
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) points out: 
The dichotomy between violence and nonviolence so often imposed by 
historians and other analysts is not very helpful for understanding either the 
use of guns in local black communities or contemporaneous movement 
discussion and debate about self-defense. (2014: 10) 
 
Yet, in 1965, coinciding with the murder of Malcolm X and the revolts in Watts, 
the nonviolent strategy was considered in a stalemate, the debates regarding the 
nonviolent strategy were open, and pacifist views were questioned within the 
different Civil Rights movements (Dorlin, 2017). Stokely Charmichael, chairman of 
the SNCC and later an important member of the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense 
(BPP), raised the historical appeal to the Black Power after the murder of the civil 
rights activist James Meredith during a march in 1966, which changed the dynamics 
of the Civil Rights struggle. Carmichael did not see non-violence as a passive 
response. He later put it that King’s non-violence had taught them to face the enemy 
and enabled the political engagement of a larger number of African Americans, but 
“in order for nonviolence to work, your opponent must have a conscience – the 
United States has none.” (quoted in O’Donnell, 2017: 178)  
For Fanon resorting to nonviolence did not depend so much on the goodwill of 
those in power, but it was intrinsically linked to the relations of force: 
To raise the problem of a non-violent decolonization is less to postulate the 
sudden humanity of the colonizer than to believe in the sufficient pressure of 





 However, Charmichael’s words echo Fanon in two elements. First, he puts the 
question of how can you be nonviolent when you are intrinsically violent; it is 
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 « Poser le problème d’une décolonisation non-violente, c’est moins postuler une soudaine humanité 





fruitless to declare oneself nonviolent amidst the ongoing racist, innocent, violence. 
This does not amount to the rejection of non-violence per se, but it notes the sterility 
of the debate regarding the choice between violence and nonviolence. Second, and 
concomitantly, he points out the need to cease appealing to the master, and instead, in 
an affirmative move, to turn towards the black communities in order address their 
needs, promote their humanity and build different forms of organizing political life.  
This is clear when one examines how the BPP was not a non-violent movement 
but neither used violence as a means for political action. The BPP monitored police 
brutality against black communities and took the armed self-defense in a more 
ostensible way than the nonviolent movement, but also strictly rejected the display 
and the use of weapons for non-defensive purposes. In 1968 the group removed the 
term “self-defense” since that led them to be labelled as a paramilitary group (Nelson, 
2011), and, although rooted in the historical tradition of politicized African-American 
armed self-defense groups, their internationalist character and their ideological 
orientation and praxis, which included thinking and writing, exceeded such definition 
(Dorlin, 2017). They did not only provided immediate physical protection, but also 
different medical, food or education programs, anti-heroin campaigns, transportation, 
legal services, community organization, intellectual production and research,  and 
affective self-defense through celebrations, community meals and feasts. Despite 
their actions being entirely legal and complied with the constitutional right to carry 
arms
316
, the intelligence services considered them as “violence-prone and making 
efforts to perpetrate violence in the United States”. In 1968, the director of FBI 
J. Edgar Hoover declared that the BPP posed "the greatest [single] threat to the 
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 The Panthers claimed the right of black Americans to carry arms as any other citizen of the United 
States. One of the first campaigns of the movement was against the modification of the second 
amendment in California that sought to ban the carrying of weapons to African-Americans as a 
measure to contain self-defense groups. Weapons in public spaces were banned in the state of 




internal security of the country" and added that 1969 would be the last year of the 
BPP (Churchill and Wall, 1990: 123). The actual threat was the improvement of the 
material and spiritual conditions of black communities, the organizational autonomy 
of black ghettos, and the activation and politicization of what the BPP called the 
“lumpen”, the most oppressed and  alienated sectors of society, such as sexual 
workers, convicts, or street gangs (Churchill and Wall, 1990). The FBI 
COINTELPRO program of surveillance and neutralization of dissidents, which had 
previously targeted the Communist Party, Martin Luther King and Malcolm X, the 
SNCC or the Deacons for Defense and Justice, achieved unprecedented proportions 
in their task of discrediting, infiltrating, disorganizing and the selective killings of 
members of the BPP. Yet, as Elsa Dorlin points out, the program of the FBI has to be 
thought alongside the social imaginary and the symbolic framework  that represented 
the black man as violent, criminal, hyper-virile and a sexual predator, and  the black 
woman as a bad mother, an uncivilized matriarch and complicit and responsible for 
the crimes of their sons (Dorlin, 2017).  
The opposition against South African apartheid is also spoken in terms of 
nonviolence versus violence. But this simplifies the opposition against colonial 
violence and reduces it to the dichotomy of choosing between violence and 
nonviolence. Frank Chikane a religious leader of the United Democratic Front put it 
as follows:  
The question of violence is not important to the people of the townships. 
They are confronted every day by troops in the townships. There is not ‘a  
violent option.’ It is the necessity of the situation. You have to defend 
yourself. More people say that the ANC is not doing enough. It is a logical 
consequence of what the state is doing to people. (quoted in Williams, 2014: 
22) 
 
Chikane himself was imprisoned and after his release on bail in 1985 his house 




to protect Chikane’s house.  “I was obliged to admit that I was only able to continue 
preaching non-violence because others were prepared to use violence to create this 
space for me.” (quoted in Williams, 2014: 22) Nelson Mandela’s declaration at the 
Rivona Trial exposed the history of the struggle of his organization against the South 
African state. He posited that the African National Congress (ANC) had led a 
nonviolent strategy for the rights of Africans since its foundation in 1912 until the 
establishment of the apartheid regime in 1949. “But White Governments remained 
unmoved, and the rights of Africans became less instead of becoming greater.” 
(Mandela, 1965: 165) With the constitutional apartheid and the increasing repressive 
legislation and police violence, the persisting peaceful resistance through strikes and 
demonstrations of the ANC was responded with greater violence. A turning point in 
his account is the killing of 60 unarmed men in Sharpeville in 1960, the declaration of 
the emergency state and the illegalization of the organization. Mandela recalled the 
court that the creation of Umkhonto we Sizwe, a separate organization from the 
initially nonviolent ANC, was not based on love of violence, but on the failure of all 
the previous attempts. It was not an ethical nor strategic choice but it was rather 
predicated upon the realization that “there was simply no space of compromise in the 
colonies, no space of common feeling, no space, prepolitical or otherwise, that could 
serve as the basis for negotiation” (Williams, 2010: 14).  The violent resistance that 
Mandela advocated was very restricted,nuanced and measured, it ruled out attacks 
against civilians, but was also responded with state violence and the imprisonment or 
killing of its leaders and those of the ANC. Because of his statement in the trial 
Mandela was removed from Amnesty International’s list of prisoners of 
consciousness in 1964. For the NGO, subscribing to the “nonviolence clause” was a 




as worthy of human rights defense (Williams, 2014). There are different layers in this 
episode
317
. For the aims of this section chapter I want to outline how it illustrates not 
only the inadequacy of the antinomy between nonviolence and violence as abstract, 
ahistorical and absolute principles or strategies to oppose a violent order, but also the 
violence inherent in such division. Such division, presented as a choice, omits the 
conundrum of how to appear nonviolent when the affirmation of one’s existence 
transgresses the boundaries, that is, is violence to the system. Thus, the violence of 
the nonviolence/violence divide consists in that, through the imposition of moral 
conditions onto historical political practices, it enables the dominant power to 
categorize who is the violent and to criminalize their political appearance.  
7.8 Colonial war and mental disorders 
Fanon dedicates the final chapter of Les damnés de la terre, entitled “Colonial war 
and mental disorders” to the aftermath of the war on the bodies, the psyche, and the 
social world. Fanon introduces the chapter with a caveat. He points out that the 
clinical cases presented in the final chapter “may seem untimely and out of place”, in 
the context of a political work, but, he adds, “there is nothing I can do.” (Fanon, 
1961: 239; my translation
318
) In the previous chapters, combining both the utopian 
and the realistic, he analyzed the possibilities of the creative work of building a new 
society, and warned against the tremendous hindrances that the postcolonial nations 
would face. From the class relations and the formation of a parasitic elite to the 
fratricidal violence, the division between the rural and the urban, the relationship with 
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 For Randall Williams (2014), it illustrates both how human rights discourse becomes the 
“default ally” of the state, and the discrepancy between two different logics of postwar 
internationalism, human rights based on a new international consensus that goes beyond Westphalia 
and  the decolonization politics rooted in the history and practices of decolonization. The decision of 
Amnesty International takes the question of the political into an ahistorical and moral terrain. It denies 
recognition to the subject who advocates violence and effaces the historical context in which he is 
embedded. Like the South African court, it focuses on the innocence or not of the subject.  
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the metropolis, the role of culture and intellectuals, or the function of the political 
party in cultivating or precluding the political and social conscientization of the 
people and their participation in the decision making and the building of the 
institutions, Fanon delves throughout the book on the political and organizational 
aspects that can lead to a radical democracy or to the imitation and reproduction of 
colonial institutions under a different guise. 
Thus, the fact that Fanon thought that he had to justify, and finally included, the 
psychiatric notes, despite their apparent untimeliness and extraneity in a political 
work, indicates the relevance of the chapter. Fanon warns that the human substratum 
upon which the postcolonial world is to be built suffers from “multiple and 
sometimes indelible wounds” (Fanon, 1961 239; my translation
319
), produced by 
colonialism and the colonial war, and whose effects will remain for several 
generations. The psychic and mental suffering does not end with formal 
decolonization, but needs to be addressed as part of the decolonizing process. If the 
opening chapter is not an apology of violence, the closing one shows the atrocities 
derived by the use of violence to sustain or overcome the colonial order,  it is not a 
critique of violence, but a warning of the psychological, social and ethical work to be 
done.  
“These borderline cases bring up the question of responsibility in the context of the 
revolution.” (1961: 243; my translation
320
) He puts the focus on the wounds that the 
postcolonial societies will inherit. “Our acts never cease to haunt us. (…) Who dares 
to claim that vertigo does not haunt every life?”, he writes concerning the militant of 
a recently independent country who, each year towards the anniversary of the killing 
of ten people by the bomb that he placed in a colonialist café, suffers from insomnia, 
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anxiety and self-destructive ideas (Fanon, 1961: 243; my translation
321
). But the 
militant, although suffering for the possibility of having killed innocent people did 
not disown his action, Fanon adds, he assumed that the vertigo and the anxiety were 
the price that he personally had to pay for the independence. The chapter epitomizes 
what Gordon identifies as the tragedy of the colonial condition, its constant violence: 
in situations where there are no ethical relations what is in danger – whether 
oppressor or oppressed, victim or perpetrator – is “the possibility of a human being.” 
(Gordon, 1995: 80)  But, Gordon adds, “it is only human beings who are capable of 
tragedy”. That is, the human being is responsible for producing, maintaining or 
transforming the structures, practices, institutions and relationships that forestall 
humanity. Thus, the last chapter was a warning to the postcolonial nations that the 
pervasive suffering of the liberation struggle must be treated if societies do not want 
to become stagnant at the level of revenge and reactivity. This also entails taking 
responsibility for creating institutions, practices, and relationships that produce 
different human beings and lead to their growth (Gordon, 1995: 83)  
Fanon recalls that colonialism was already a significant source of psychiatric 
troubles which were difficult to heal within the colonial order, but the particularities 
of the colonial war would exacerbate and cause new forms of mental troubles with 
long-lasting and tragic consequences. Fanon writes that “an entire generation of 
Algerians immersed in gratuitous and collective homicide, with the psycho-affective 
consequences this entails, will be the human legacy of France in Algeria” (Fanon, 
1961: 241; my translation
322
), “and in France”, he added in private (Cherki, 2017: 
xiii). 
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322
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 In contrast to the literature on the trauma of war, he noticed that in the Algerian 
case there is no trace of the relative benign evolution of the disorders studied in other 
settings; the colonial war produces particular and hitherto unseen pathologies 
characterized by a notable malignancy. The trauma produces a persistent “fragility 
almost discernable to the naked eye. It is quite clear that the future of these patients is 
mortgaged.” (1961: 242; my translation
323
; own italics) Fanon posits that psychiatrists 
have tended to treat the psychic consequences of war under the category of psychotic 
reactions. In such view the pathology is triggered by a clearly defined event, although 
the subject and the context are minimally taken into account. For Fanon the origin of 
the disorders cannot be traced back to a single triggering event, but to the “bloody, 
pitiless atmosphere, the generalization of dehumanizing practices and the people’s 




The first series of disorders, which he calls mental disorders of a reactional type, 
brings to the forefront the question of responsibility and the ethical choices of 
Algerians and French. The first case is that of an Algerian militant who suffered from 
sexual impotence, depression, anorexia and insomnia. It took a while to uncover the 
origin of the symptoms: his wife had been raped while the colonial soldiers were 
looking for him. The wife told him to annul the marriage because she had been 
dishonored. The therapy is tangled up with the ethical question of taking 
responsibility for a situation that was not strictly individual but also involved social 
values and gendered dimensions which were changing during the revolution (Gibson 
and Beneduce, 2017). The patient resists to face the situation: “Was she obliged to 
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inform me about all this?” (Fanon, 1961: 248; my translation
325
) The marriage was 
arranged, the husband explains, there was no love between them and with the war 
they had distanced themselves further. Yet, after hearing multiple accounts of other 
raped women and the responses of their husband “his dignity of derided husband was 
pushed into the background”, writes Fanon. He saw how other men supported their 
wives and how other men offered themselves to marry single, pregnant women raped 
by French soldiers (Fanon, 1961: 245; my translation
326
). The husband felt guilty for 
his wife and acknowledged that she had been protecting him. He said that his wife 
was a “tenacious woman” who was raped because she did not confess where the 
husband and the cell of fighters hid. “It is because of me that she was dishonored.” 
(Fanon, 1961: 246; my translation
327
) But he asked Fanon: 
‘-What would you do if this had happened to you? 
-I do not know… 
-Would you take back your wife? 
-I think I would… 
-Ah, you see… you are not so sure.’  
He takes his head with his hands and after a while he leaves the room. After 
that day he gradually accepted to hear political discussions and the migraines 




The patient finally decided to continue with the relationship once the war would be 
over, but, as in other cases in the chapter, there is uncertainty about a future nourished 
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 « était-elle obligée de me mettre au courant de tout cela? » 
326
 « sa dignité de mari bafoué restent au second plan. » 
327
 « d'une femme têtue » « C'était à cause de moi qu'elle était déshonorée. » 
328
 « Qu'est-ce que tu ferais si cela t'arrivait? 
-Je ne sais pas... 
- Reprendrais-tu ta femme? 
-Je pense que oui... 
- Ah, tu vois... Tu n'es pas tout à fait sûr...’  
Se prend la tête dans les mains et après quelques instants quitte la chambre. À partir de ce jour, 





by the burden of the past: “I have decided to take her back, but I do not know how I 
will react when I see her.” (Fanon, 1961: 248; my translation
329
)  
The second case discusses an Algerian peasant who survived the massacre and the 
burning of his village. After the first aid services he asked for a gun, despite being a 
civilian and not involved in politics, and shot against Algerian soldiers. During 
hospitalization the patient attempted to kill other patients. He suffered from 
overexcitement, presented constant aggressiveness, hostility, violent outbursts and a 
fragmented speech. “There are French among us. They are disguised as Arabs. We 
have to kill them all. Give me a machine gun. All these so-called Algerians are 
French… and they do not leave me in peace” (Fanon, 1961: 250; my translation
330
) 
After several weeks the hostility decreased and the patient went into a phase of 
solitude and reticence that alerted the psychiatrists from possible acutest symptoms. 
In his psychiatric writings Fanon shows that in the colonial world suspicion is a 
recurrent element in colonial relations. In this case, for the patient everyone was an 
enemy, a possible traitor, he was unable to distinguish the foe from a friend or an ally. 
In this situation of pathological mistrust the only way to be safe was to be alone, that 
is, outside of the social world made of enemies. However, after a month the patient 
was willing to leave the hospital and learn a job. Guided by the social services the 
patient’s trouble receded significantly.  
The third case covers a young Algerian militant with insomnia, suicide attempts, 
depersonalization and hallucinations. “He begs us to stop the hemorrhage, and not to 
let them suck their blood even in the hospital” (Fanon, 1961: 251; my translation
331
). 
He talks of a woman that constantly appears and haunts him. He says that he knows 
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the woman, that he killed her himself. Fanon initially associates the symptoms to a 
Freudian guilt complex; his mother, to whom he was closely attached, was killed and 
his sisters disappeared during a French attack. But after several interviews the patient 
reveals an episode of an FLN operation. They went into the estate of an active settler 
who had killed several Algerians. The French man was absent, only his wife was at 
home, and the team decided to wait for him, but he killed the French woman.  He was 
interrogated by his superior, legal proceedings were initiated against him by the FLN. 
“I thought I was going to be executed, but I did not care.” (Fanon, 1961: 252: my 
translation
332
) Gibson and Beneduce notice that, as in other cases in this set, 
symptoms emerge from the ethical conflict derived from violent acts of a war where 
the distinction between the enemy and the friend, innocent and the guilty is blurred 
and rendered ambiguous to the extent of compromising the sense of the self, the 
community and the feeling of belonging.  In contrast to the article on confession 
where what was rejected was the external judge and a whole legal system, here the 
conflict revolves around an “internalized judge”: “What Fanon pointed to was that the 
internal (and infernal) judge continues to haunt (and question) our conscience, reason, 
and sense of personal responsibility.” (Gibson and Beneduce, 2017: 235)  
The legal process against the patient was abandoned on the basis of the medical 
examination. From then on, the woman appeared every night claiming for his blood. 
Other women also harassed him claiming for their blood, the floor was filled with 
blood until their wounds begin to close and he woke up agitated. After several weeks 
of therapy the nightmares disappeared, but “a great rift remains in his personality” 
(Fanon, 1961: 253; my translation
333
), as soon as he thinks of his mother the ghostly 
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woman reappears. Fanon’s prognostic is uncertain: “As unscientific as it may seem, I 
think only time may improve the dislocated personality of the young man.” (Fanon, 
1961: 253; my translation
334
) Fanon’s conclusion, vague and unscientific, precisely 
reveals that what is required exceeds the purely medical. Time is required for the 
reconstruction of the human at the individual and social levels. Simona Taliani points 
out that time also refers to the specters of the past informing present choices and the 
future orientation. As in the case above of the husband and the raped wife, time is 
what is needed for situating oneself and it is also what the other needs to be given in 
order to distinguish what is psychological, cultural and political in the relationship (in 
Beneduce, 2017).  
The two following cases deal with the troubles of two French police torturers. The 
first one is willing to return to France and to quit his job, which he did. The second 
one displays an aggressive behavior towards his wife and his children. He argued that 
he was not like this before, it all started after the “events”. Torture and obtaining 
information from the tortured had become a question of personal success and of 
competition among his colleagues. Fanon writes that “this man knew very well that 
all his troubles were directly caused by the type of activity developed in the 
interrogation rooms, even though he tried to put the blame on ‘the events’.” (Fanon, 
1961: 258; my translation
335
)  He did not consider quitting his job. Instead he asked 
Fanon to help him torture Algerians more effectively, with peace of mind, without 
guilt consciousness and behavioral disorders. The prognostic for both policemen was 
very different. Whereas the first policeman acknowledged the origin of the problem 
and acted accordingly, the cure was almost impossible in the case of the second one.  
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 « Aussi peu scientifique que cela puisse sembler, nous pensons que seul le temps pourra apporter 
quelque amélioration dans la personnalité disloquée du jeune homme. » 
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His reluctance to treatment, to reflect on the question, to recognize the origin of the 
problem and to abandon the practice of violence would lead to the failure of every 
treatment. There was no healing for the second policeman, instead he was trapped in 
an escalade of violence that went in every direction. Fanon points out that torture is 
“a coherent system that leaves nothing intact”. After a first stage where torture is 
compatible with a serene appreciation of beauty and of the little pleasures of everyday 
life, there is a stage where the whole existence of the torturer is imbued in “a radical 
and absolute sadism.”( Fanon, 1961: 258; my translation
336
)  
By linking responsibility to trauma, both of the victim and of the perpetrator, 
Fanon presents a more complex scenario than the one described by Karl Jaspers in 
The Question of German Guilt. In such work, Jaspers discussed how the 
acknowledgement of guilt and the individual and collective assumption of 
responsibility for the crimes committed by the Nazi regime was a necessary condition 
for the collective, moral and political restoration of Germany. He outlined four 
dimensions of guilt and their corresponding responsibilities: criminal, political, moral 
and metaphysical as means to individual and collective transformation. Criminal 
responsibility is held by individuals towards the law.  Political responsibility is the 
responsibility held by citizens for the actions of their governments. Ethical 
responsibility is held towards one’s own conscience. Metaphysical responsibility 
refers to the accountability of one’s actions before God. It points to the responsibility 
by action or omission of the violence exerted on any other human being (Jaspers, 
2001: 25-26). In Black Skin White Masks Fanon makes reference to the metaphysical 
responsibility of Jaspers, although he shows his reticence about its religious overtone. 
Yet, Jasper’s notion of responsibility is one of the influences on Fanon’s compelling 
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understanding of solidarity as co-responsibility for the other that exceeds oneself 
(Fanon, 1952: 87). But in the psychiatric case studies of Les damnés de la terre Fanon 
does not appeal to Jasper’s notions of responsibility and the reasons behind this may 
be interesting to briefly examine. 
 Although the colonial case is not analogous to Jasper’s object of thought, applying 
a cursory look to his model of responsibilities may reveal the different approach of 
both authors. First, Fanon puts the political responsibility of citizens, the metropolis, 
not in terms of aid, but in the due reparations of former colonial powers to the new 
independent nations. Second, Fanon’s point of departure is not the defeated or the 
victor of the war, but the “borderline cases”, the patient, either victim or perpetrator, 
who must take responsibility for his actions and his recovery. He does not treat the 
ethical as an individual question; the patient’s agency and responsibility exist in 
relation to the broader community, the changing social values and relations derived 
from the anticolonial struggle. The relation of the ethical and the political discussed 
above, returns here. Third, and most important for the scope of this section, Jaspers 
notably omits the question of trauma in his account of responsibility. The assumption 
of responsibility seems to transcend the action and relegate it to the past. However, by 
taking into account the position of the patient, and linking trauma to “responsibility in 
the framework of the revolution”, Fanon introduces a temporal dimension absent in 
Jaspers’ thought. The past is not only memory in the present, but with trauma the past 
haunts and embodies the present. Decolonization, and the path to create a new 
humanity, as Fanon concludes the book, is not a magical process, it is a more tortuous 
and not straightforward process. The possibility of failure and setbacks is not to be 
excluded and responsibility here means first taking responsibility for responsibility 




raped and he finally decided to rebuild the relationship ends, in an illustrative 
ambiguous way: “‘When independence comes, I’ll take my wife back. If it doesn’t 
work out, I’ll come to see you again in Algiers’” (1961: 248; my translation
337
)  
The second series of cases revolve around the atmosphere of war as the trigger of 
violent acts. The first case addresses two young Algerians, 13 and 14 years old, who 
killed their playmate, a French boy. Both had no problems in admitting their crime, 
they did not show repentance or discomfort. They argued that they had nothing 
against him, they used to play together.  
Why had he killed?  He did not answer the question, but he asked if I had 
ever seen a European in prison. Had there ever been a European arrested and 
sent to prison after killing an Algerian? I answer him that in fact I had never 




One of the adolescents explains that his relatives had been killed in the attack to 
the village of Rivet by French militias. Forty Algerian men were killed as retaliation 
of a FLN attack, and the village was burnt down. This was part of a strategy of civil 
militias involving thousands of French who sought to depopulate areas by burning 
down villages and settlement camps, terrorizing the population, and shooting 
whoever ran away (Gibson and Beneduce, 2017). In the poisonous atmosphere, 
notions of justice and fairness, legal and moral, are not only asymmetrically 
distributed, that is what the boys point out, but they become irrelevant. “And yes, I 
have killed him, now do what you want”, says one of the boys, defiant and 
unperturbed, to Fanon (Fanon, 1961: 261; my translation
339
).  
The Algerian patient of the second case was sent to the psychiatric hospital by the 
French legal authorities in a state of severe confusion, experiencing “paranoid 
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delusion” and with suicide attempts. Fanon notes that this was not an isolated case; 
patients with similar symptoms were recurrently seen during the early stages of the 
war. During the first weeks the patient does not communicate. Then the patient 
explains that he had been focused on his job, on developing his skills, and did not pay 
attention to the liberation struggle. One and a half years after the beginning of the 
war, the patient has the impression that his relatives treat him as a traitor. From then 
on, he spends as much time alone as possible, avoiding every contact. One day on the 
street he hears someone calling him a traitor but he does not see anyone. He locks 
himself in his room and hears voices: « Traitor… coward, all your brothers are dying, 
traitor… traitor…” (Fanon, 1961: 262; my translation
340
) He lost appetite, suffered 
from anxiety and spent his days in a prostrated position. At the fourth day he goes 
into the European town. Looking like a European, he is not controlled, but he sees 
other Algerians being stopped, insulted, frisked and arrested. He then leaps on a 
soldier and tries to grab his machine gun while screaming ‘I am an Algerian’. After 
interrogation he is sent to the psychiatric hospital.  
What I wanted, (…) was to die. Even at the police station, I thought and I 
hoped that after the tortures they would kill me. I was happy to be beaten up 
because that proved that they also thought of me as an enemy. (…) I am not 





Fanon asks in the first chapter how to move from the atmospheric violence, a 
violence that goes in every direction, to political violence (Fanon, 1961: 70). Many of 
the case studies that Fanon presents in the last chapter, particularly the two boys 
killing his friend, the young militant killing the French woman, or the latter one, are 
reactive forms of violence shaped by colonial relationships. They reveal that the 
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demarcation between the pathological and the political violence is blurry and 
equivocal. Fanon was not romanticizing when he wrote in the first chapter that this 
atmosphere of violence – “this violence which is under the skin” (Fanon, 1961: 70; 
my translation
342
)– enables to identify the enemy, or when he points out that violence 
in its totalizing character unifies the people (1961: 90).  “An atmosphere of drama 
reigns where everyone wants to prove that he is ready for anything.”( Fanon, 1961: 
70: my translation
343
) In this atmosphere of violence the individual is depersonalized, 
there is no possibility of everyday life, he points out, one cannot be an alcoholic, a 
fellah or a pimp as before (Fanon, 1961: 85), and there is also a collective 
depersonalization at the level of social structures, at the level of mutual trust and the 
sense of belonging (Fanon, 1961: 283).  
The third case discusses the symptoms of a young French girl after the death of her 
father in an ambush. Fanon emphasizes the coldness of her account of the death of 
her father, devoid of feelings and remarkably lucid. Her father was a high civil 
servant who was in charge of the centers of interrogation of the region. He was 
deeply involved in the repression of the anticolonial struggle to the extent that his 
own house had become a center for torture. Living in another village, she avoided 
going home and meeting her father, but he informed her enthusiastically of the new 
detentions. She knew all the Algerian families of the village, and their children had 
been her friends. She was trapped within the atmosphere of hatred and fear: “In the 
end I would not dare to walk on the street since I was completely sure to find hatred 
everywhere. Deep inside myself I agreed with the Algerians. If I was Algerian I 
would be in the maquis.” (Fanon, 1961: 265; my translation
344
) At the funeral his 
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father was praised for his “’high moral qualities that had won the hearts of the native 
population’”, while being responsible of dozens of deaths everyday (Fanon, 1961: 
265; my translation
345
). She felt sick, ran away to the village and rejected any help 
from the French administration. 
The last two cases of this set are dedicated to the troubles of refugee populations. 
In Tunis Fanon had been treating Algerian refugees in the Tunisian camps and 
envisaged writing more extensively on the topic. “The pathology of refugees, which 
is highly polyvalent and always very serious, will have to be the focus of a later 
work.” (Fanon, 2018: 488) An extended work on the topic did not come about, but 
this issue was treated in different works and with different formats. In the psychiatric 
notes in Les damnés de la terre he briefly exposes the different pathologies of refugee 
pregnant women and refugee orphan children. He affirms that there are 300.000 
Algerian refugees in the camps of Tunisia and Morocco who live in precarious 
conditions and exposed to the frequent attacks of French military. In this situation, he 
notes, there are few refugee women who do not suffer from acute disorders before or 
after giving birth, ranging from depression and anxiety, to violent agitations or 
deliriums. Fanon notices that different treatments can mitigate the symptoms and 
improve the condition of the patients, but the pathogeny lies in the experience of 
migration, family dislocation and the conditions of poverty and insecurity.  
In the introduction of L’an V de la revolution algérienne, Fanon mentions the case 
of a seven year old child from a refugee camp who had been injured and forced to 
witness the murder of his family. The child said, “‘I have only one wish: to chop a 
French soldier into little pieces’”, Fanon comments:  
                                                                                                                                           
haine. Au fond de moi-même, je leur donnais raison à ces Algériens. Si j'étais algérienne, je serais 
au maquis. » 
345




Does anyone believe it is easy to make this child of seven forget both the 
killing of his parents and his enormous revenge? Is this orphaned childhood 
growing up in an apocalyptic atmosphere the sole message that the French 




The impact of war on children required special attention because of the 
particularities on their age, and because their compromised  future is also the horizon 
of the nation. In the camp, Fanon notices in the children “a great thirst for calm and 
affection”, and also sadistic tendencies (1961: 266; my translation
347
). A program of 
schooling, entertaining and receiving follow up care was implemented. The 
experience of the refugee children was captured in the 1961 short documentary J’ai 
huit ans, directed by Olga Poliakoff and Jann Le Mason and co-prepared by René 
Vautier and Fanon himself. The film is based on the stories and the drawings of the 
children, mostly orphans. And although the film may have other goals such as 
denouncing and exposing French violence and torture, it was “the product of a new 
therapeutic strategy of visualization that Fanon was experimenting” (Mirzoeff, 2011: 
7). Giovanni Pirelli, the militant, intellectual and Fanon’s publisher in Italy proposed 
Fanon to collect the testimonies and the drawings of the children in the book Racconti 
di bambini d'Algeria (“Stories of Algerian Children”), which appeared in Italy in 
1962. The drawings and the written and oral stories aimed at expressing and dealing 
with the traumatic experience of forced displacement and the memories of violence. 
Linking art with therapy is today a generalized practice, for Fanon it was not a closed 
method to be applied, but another way to take into account the singularity of the 
patient so that through the sensory and the visual he or she can grasp and transmit 
what could not be expressed through words.  As Alice Cherki notes, this was also part 
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of the changes that he was introducing in his clinical practice in Tunis, in his 
conception of the asylum, and his growing interest in psychoanalysis through the 
work of the Hungarian psychoanalyst Sándor Ferenczi, whose s pioneering work on 
the trauma and neuroses of war and the active technique of psychoanalysis drew 
Fanon’s attention (Cherki, 2011). 
The third set of the case studies deals with the effects of torture on the tortured. 
Fanon already had written about the direct involvement of psychiatrists in the 
legitimation, the development of techniques and in the practice of tortures. In 
“Algeria Face to Face with the French Torturers”, Fanon observed that torture already 
took place frequently before the outbreak of the war; torture was intrinsic to 
colonialism and coherent with the colonial logic. It was “a mode of the occupant-
occupied relationship” (Fanon, 1964: 73; my translation
348
).  Torture was both a 
means and an end itself, not only to obtain information, but also part of the terror and 
dehumanization that shaped colonial relations. He writes that in a context “in which 
the excuse of the end tends more and more to become detached itself from the means, 
it is normal that torture becomes its own justification” (Fanon, 1964: 77; my 
translation
349
).  Despite the denunciations and the multiple reports that attested it at 
the time, the systematic use of torture in Algeria was only openly admitted in France 
in the 2000’s, after the confession of leading military and police officers (Klose, 
2013). Historian Pierre Naquet-Vidal (1998) notes that the declaration of the state of 
emergency and then of the Pouvoirs speciaux in Algeria did not legalize torture but 
cleared the path to repress any form of native resistance and insurgency in the name 
of the French republic and national security. The organized repression was not limited 
to the Algerian territory but also encompassed the metropolis.  Torture was part of an 
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official and informal, military and civil, system of repression that included secret 
centers of interrogation, and detention, relocation and settlement camps. The question 
of torture in Algeria came into public debate in France at the beginning of the 2000’s 
coinciding with the Iraq war and the War on Terror, conflicts where the use of torture 
and detention centers was also systematic. Studies have shown how the colonial order 
and the decolonization wars, notably the Algerian and the Kenyan wars, have been 
viewed as an “uncanny foretaste” (Klose, 2013: 4), and studied as models for the 
repressive practices in Iraq and the War on Terror (Klose, 2013; Rejali, 2009). Darius 
Rejali exposes that the War on Terror was less about land and wealth than “about 
affirming our way of life, our fundamental identity of liberal democratic society.” 
(Rejali, 2009: 548) Fanon provides the underside of this discourse when he asserts 
that torture is a “lifestyle” and asks whether the torturer “is in contradiction with the 




Fanon classifies his psychiatric notes on torture according to the technique 
employed, he points out that besides the general and deep ravage on the personality, 
each technique of torture has different pathological effects on the body and the 
psyche of the victim. Fanon notes that torture usually targets directly the subjectivity 
in order to modify the attitudes of the individual, but it can also target the body 
without direct physical violence by using the absence of physical pain, or by allowing 
to eat as a reward, as it is used in certain techniques of brain washing. 
 As a consequence of certain forms of torture, he notices that “the most painful 
sequel found in this war” was “the impossibility of explaining and defending a given 
position. Thinking takes place in antithetical couples. Anything that is affirmed can, 
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in the same breath, be denied with the same force.” (Fanon, 1961: 277; my 
translation
351
) Yet Fanon notices that torture does not only have long term physical 
and mental consequences, but part of the purpose of torture is to make ever present 
the act of torture itself to the victim. In the same vein, philosopher and Auschwitz 
survivor Jean Améry recalls that “torture has an indelible character.  Whoever was 
tortured, stays tortured. Torture is ineradicably burned into him, even when no 
clinically objective traces can be detected.” (Améry, 1980: 34) Fanon points out that 
doctors who do not fully understand their patients affirm that “‘All this will disappear 
once this damned war is over.’” (Fanon, 1961: 279; my translation
352
) But what he 
shows is that among the different and adamant consequences, torture seeks to be 
remembered by the victim: The feeling of guilt and permanent dread and uncertainty 
after the truth serum, or the obsessive troubles after brain washing. The policeman 
torturing a suspect realizes that he was not involved in politics: “‘Don’t let him go 
like that. Push a little bit more, so that when he gets out he will keep quiet’.” (Fanon, 
1961: 272; my translation
353
). Or, when the policeman tells the raped woman: “If you 
see the bastard of your husband again, above all don’t forget to tell him what we have 
done to you.” (Fanon, 1961: 245; my translation
354
) As Gibson and Beneduce 
observe:  
Fanon revealed that, apart from the effort of masking the somatic 
consequences of trauma, the paradoxical injunction of not forgetting is 
among the most psychically ruinous and long-lasting effects of this specific 
form of violence. (…)  This injunction to remember the scene of violence, to 
remember what the victim would like to forget, introduces a block in the 
tension between forgetting and remembering, rendering  the victim literally 
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possessed by their memories. (Gibson and Beneduce, 2017: 236; italics in 
the original)  
 
  The fourth series covers the psychosomatic troubles mostly examined in patients 
coming from concentration camps. Fanon emphasizes a particular pathology in 
Algeria that was not reported elsewhere and was already present before the outbreak 
of the war, the contract body. Generalized muscle spam, increasing rigidity, 
impossibility of movement, constantly tense and incapable of release, the face is stiff 
but expressing bewilderment. This is different from “hysterical contraction”, he notes, 
“the patient seems to be made of one piece. (…) ‘You see, I am already stiff like a 




7.9 A New Humanity, violence and the traces of history 
  Fanon’s understanding of the traumatic effects of violence differs substantially 
from the Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), the dominant approach introduced 
by the American Psychiatric Association in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
(DSM) in 1980. The influence of the PTSD extends beyond the psychological and 
psychiatric circles to the legal and humanitarian domains, or emergencies and crisis 
management. PSTD is an umbrella notion that encompasses, and occludes, a disparity 
of symptoms that constitute the syndrome, and is applied to multiple and unrelated 
distressing human experiences, from war, rape, divorce, dismissal, natural disasters or 
childbirth. For that matter, Fanon’s approach prefigures the criticisms of PTSD issued 
in the mid 90’s on the basis of its reductionist cognitivism that locates the trauma 
inside the human mind, its individualized, apolitical, ahistorical, decontextualized and 
deculturalized understanding of traumatic experiences, and its linear treatment of 
human suffering and healing. Also, in its global scope and application, and its 
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apparent neutrality, PTSD homogenizes diverse experiences through a universal 
model of interpretation of suffering, diagnostic and treatment (Cherki, 2011; Gibson 
and Beneduce, 2017).  
Fanon introduced the chapter of the case studies by remarking that it does not 
attempt to be a scientific work where semiological, nosological and therapeutic 
considerations are discussed. However, he actually delves into these dimensions, 
starting by his description of the particularities of the Algerian war and continuing by 
his classification of the case studies into four series and in his observations of the 
cases. His thematization and the criteria to classify the case studies, exceeding purely 
medical classifications and categories, is itself an epistemological intervention. The 
whole analysis of the case studies from diagnostic, prognostic and treatment brings to 
the forefront the political, and the individual and collective responsibility in the 
response to the circumstances. Gibson and Beneduce incisively note that Fanon does 
not connect the mental troubles “to a vague notion of war-related violence”, but 
instead he links them with the particularities of torture, the concrete atmosphere of 
colonialism, acknowledges the “continuum that exists between suffering and its 
historico-political matrix”, and builds thereby “a political nosography of traumatic 
disorders that is structurally linked to people’s social role and agency.” (2017: 235; 
italics in the original).   
Alice Cherki points out that the young Algerian psychiatrists trained in the violent 
decade of the 1990’s attempted to apply the PTSD techniques and, besides the 
therapeutic inadequacy, they “returned almost as wounded as the victims they were to 
treat” (2011: 396: my translation
356
).  Instead, she writes, Fanon 
describes the effects on the subject of the confiscation of language, of the 
violences of history redirected from generation to generation, of the 
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rejection, of the deprecation and exclusion of referents and genealogies, of 
blocked traumatisms, fixed in an impossible elaboration because of denial 




Thereby, and since his doctoral dissertation, Fanon delved into what Beneduce 
calls the “psychic life of History”, that is, a genealogical work that looks at the 
relation of subjectivity to history, politics and culture, takes into account the 
historicity of the symptom, the concrete experience of the subject, its embeddedness 
in the political context and the role of historical events in shaping concrete 
experiences and the building of meaning. This is not tantamount to placing the 
psychical before or over the political, or affect over History, but is the way he 
actually escapes from these recurrent oppositions and shows their intricacy 
(Beneduce, 2012). In Fanon “the political is located within the psychical as a 
powerful shaping force (…) [and] the psychical operates precisely as a political 
formation.” (Fuss: 1999: 322)  
Fanon did not explicitly theorize about it, but interrogating alienation from 
multiple angles enabled him to anticipate the disorders and the different 
manifestations in which the colony would haunt the postcolony, the  continuities and 
transfigurations of colonialism, whether at the economic level, the fratricidal 
violence, the charismatic and despotic leaderships or the deep and lingering effects of 
alienation and mental disorders derived from the colonial wounds (Cherki, 2011; 
Gibson and Beneduce, 2017).  
The damned of the postcolonial world, whether in the banlieu, the ghetto or in the 
medical consultation rooms, whether the refugee, asylum seekers or migrants –whose 
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movement and experiences are often treated as disconnected from colonialism and 
racism– or in the conflicts of racist societies, one can find repeated the same 
defensive positions, hypersensitivity, angst, ideas of persecution, and explosions of 
gratuitous violence (Gibson and Beneduce, 2017). Roberto Beneduce identifies today 
in those whose presence is suspicious and whose existence is precarious and 
threatened the “painful sign of past events, of disappearance and separations rising 
against an oblivion deprived of all redemption.” Such colonial wounds do not appear 
linearly and explicitly, but can be discerned in their faltering speech, the silences, 
denials, hesitations, their adamant demands, the ambiguous memories, the memories 
of numbed practices that appear suddenly, and that contain the possibility of the 
emergence of an unconceivable violence (Beneduce, 2012: 280; my translation
358
). 
Fanon had no crystal ball. But as we saw, for Fanon the psyche is not a part of the 
body, the psyche is constituted by, and constitutes, the history of human relations in 
their economic, cultural, political, social or sexual dimensions. Since Black Skin 
White Masks, trauma, like alienation, is not an individual matter, but a relational and 
historical one, and as Simona Taliani puts it, Fanon asks “what does it mean to 
(re)live the trauma of someone else without managing to get rid of the phantasms, 
which one does not know anymore to whom they belong?” (Taliani, 2012; 288; my 
translation
359
) Trauma for him was an encysted knot in human relations derived from 
the effects of centuries of dehumanization, exploitation and the manifolds forms 
violence of the colonial world. Thus, that the colonial trauma haunts the postcolonial 
world is indicative that formal decolonization, national sovereignty, and the 
establishing of borders has not been accompanied by the repair or a radical 
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transformation of the structural damage of colonialism, but accompanied by new 
forms of exploitation, subordination and humiliation in the postcolonial condition. In 
the conclusion to Les damnés de la terre he poetically puts the individual and 
collective task at hand thusly:  
Let us take up the question of the human. Let us take up the question of the 
cerebral reality and of the cerebral mass of all humanity, whose connections 
must be multiplied, whose networks must be diversified and whose message 




Fanon closed Black Skin White Masks with a prayer to the historically constituted 
black body: “My final prayer: O my body, make me always a man who questions!” 
(1952: 225; my translation
361
) Interrogation entails adopting an active stance and is 
here a liberating movement that turns a closed, overdetermined object into an active 
subject of decolonization. As Alejandro de Oto points out, it is not only a subject who 
interrogates, but the subject himself embodies the interrogation, and as such, locates 
himself outside of the colonial subjectivity without falling into solipsism (De Oto, 
2003). The interrogation turns a site of closure, of sedimented colonial discourses and 
practices, into a site of openness towards oneself and towards the other. Yet, in the 
beauty and the insight of such statement may also lie its limitation: the absent others. 
Despite Black Skin White Masks being an effort to articulate a form of liberating 
knowledge, to understand the intricacy between history, culture, society and 
subjectivity, showing the failures of individual attempts at transformation through 
white recognition, and emphasizing the society as the pathogenic site to be 
transformed, Fanon ends by praying to his own body. The liberating efforts from the 
weight of history remain at the individual level, without articulating the dialectic 
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between the individual and the collective of the historical process of decolonization. 
Les Damnés de la terre also ends up with a universal appeal to openness: “For 
Europe, for ourselves, for the humankind, we have to restart [“faire peau neuve”, 
literally translated, to create a new skin], develop a new thought, and try to build a 
new humanity.” (1961: 305; my translation
362
) Here Fanon is not talking about 
liberation, but about freedom, that is, the responsibility to create a future away from 
the vicious circle of colonialism. As Gordon notes, Fanon distinguished clearly 
between liberty and freedom. Liberty is the absence of a constraint; freedom refers to 
taking responsibility for building ethical human relations. Liberty can be granted by 
others, whereas freedom is a constant activity oriented towards human blossoming 
through which one obtains one’s dignity and self-respect (Gordon, 2008).  
In contrast to the statement that opens the book, decolonization is not the 
replacement of one species of men by another, neither is only about land and bread, 
but rather about “introducing new relations in a society and introducing new relations 
means negating the colonial system.” (Fanon, 2018: 530) Decolonization and the 
creation of new human beings will not be brought automatically by the anticolonial 
revolution or independence, it is instead an ongoing and open process of creating 
institutions, rules, epistemic practices, of transforming and producing new meanings. 
It is in this interplay between the human as creator and concomitantly being created, 
which Fanon explores since his first work, that the new humanity comes into being.  
Decolonization and the new humanity disrupt colonial temporality and introduce 
new temporalities. This is what he points out in the conclusion of Les damnés de la 
terre when he calls not to imitate Europe, to move away from European institutions, 
states and societies and to create new institutions and a new thought. The European, 
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the white man, is no longer the end of history, that is,  following Gordon’s definition 
of modernity, the only legitimate present that is oriented and belongs to the future; the 
black and the colonized are no longer overdetermined by the past and whose only 
possibility of being connected to the future is by becoming or aspiring to be white. 
European humanism, he declares, has provided solutions to many of the problems of 
humanity, but has simultaneously killed the human everywhere while talking about 
and extolling the human. In contrast to European humanism, the new humanism, 
which in his work is being crafted since the earliest pages of Black Skin White Masks, 
is not constituted out of murder, but neither by ignoring violence and war. The “new 
beginning of the story of the human” has to take into account both the “sometimes 
prodigious theses” and the systemic crime against the human in the form of slavery, 
exploitation, or genocide that have co-constituted European humanism (Fanon, 1961: 
304; my translation363). The new temporality of the new humanism some authors have 
understood it as a form tabula rasa (Marriott, 2018; Beneduce, 2012). David Marriott 
(2018) has built his reading of Fanon around his alleged notion of decolonization as a 
tabula rasa at the explicit expense of Fanon’s own dramatic narrative. For Marriott, 
the tabula rasa “as the figure for a teleology without telos” (Marriott, 2018: 29) 
captures the complexity and multiplicity of temporalities of the decolonization 
struggle, but he relates it to the inventiveness and a “radically new beginning” 
(Marriott, 2018: 2) following a destructive process: “From social death to tabula rasa, 
for Fanon, destructive violence is the process through which the socially dead acquire 
a new symbolic form.” (Marriott, 2018:71). For Beneduce, the tabula rasa is a tense 
and instable temporality from where to think the healing of the colonial wounds and 
the “healing of History”, as he understands Fanon’s project (2012: 281).  Fanon 
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conceived the anticolonial revolution as an open and indeterminate process rather 
than an overimposing telos, as Marriott points out about temporality. However, in 
Marriott’s view, Fanon’s account of decolonization as a moment of pure creation 
following one of pure destruction would not only be naïve but it would also replicate 
the colonial logic. As Fanon repeats throughout the book, colonialism saw itself as a 
tabula rasa. Instead, Fanon explains that there is no shortcut to decolonization; 
building a new society and human institutions involves many steps, facing different 
sets of contradictions and pitfalls, and dealing with a legacy of wounds derived from 
violence that the directness of the logic of the tabula rasa as destroying the destructive 
does not take into account. In Notre Journal, the journal of the Blida-Joinville 
hospital, Fanon differs with the view of setting ablaze as the way to start anew. 
Although in a totally different setting this passage may help to understand his notion 
of decolonization as a new beginning: 
To relearn. I find this expression very beautiful. Let’s understand by it that 
what is at issue is not to give to the boarder a stock of movements, attitudes 
and words. At issue is not to add onto an inexistent personality a sum of 
behaviours. At issue is not to create, to produce, to refine, to finish. It is a 
matter of enabling the boarder to reprise, to begin again by helping him or 
her to understand better, to grasp things better, that is to say, to grasp him- or 
herself better again. The point cannot be to say: that is all worthless, it must 
all be destroyed. At issue, once again, is to provide the boarder with frames, 
groups and occasions within which it becomes possible for him or her to 
rediscover what has existed. It is necessary to induce the boarder to 
rediscover the meaning of freedom, which is the first milestone on the way 




If Fanon’s view of decolonization in Les damnés de la terre could be simplified as 
moving from not being able to breath to the creation of a new humanity, “porous to 
all the breaths of the world”, the question of revolutionary violence is merely a minor 




connection and reciprocity between humans. One of his main concerns on such 
process was the possibility of reactivity, imitation, dependency, replacement and the 
repetition of the colonial logic and structures by the newly independent countries. 
This concern, which permeates the book, is present since the first paragraph, in which 
he says that violence is the defining element of colonialism and thus, unavoidable in 
the decolonizing process.  Thus, as a thinker of the colony but also of the postcolony, 
Fanon as a clinician and political thinker delved into the different aspects of violence 
and its multiple shadows.   
Although, or maybe because, his analysis is rooted in a concrete context and 
historical period, his thought on violence has this travelling capacity, as Edward Said 
puts it, and helps to illuminate the different forms and the functioning of violence in 
other contexts in the contemporary world –not necessarily revolutionary contexts or 
questions of armed struggle– but the different forms of violence and dehumanization 
that coloniality entails, and both the political and pathological responses which it 
elicits. This chapter has attempted to take both directions. First, elucidating what he 
understood about violence, its challenges, possibilities and limitations taking into 
account the historical conditions of his thought; and second, it has timidly traveled 







I have conceived this dissertation as an opening or an invitation for peace studies 
to engage and dialogue with Fanon’s work and the diverse intellectual and activist 
communities connected to his work. Among these include thinkers and scholar-
activists in Black and Decolonial studies, race theory, Africana and Caribbean 
philosophy, and critical psychiatry and medicine. As I have stressed in this 
dissertation, it is not a matter of incorporating the excluded or the absent, but also 
questioning at the level of knowledge and politics what have constituted such 
exclusions. That is, it entails questioning and transforming the structures and the 
organization of knowledge, what counts as knowledge, one’s narrative and self-
understanding, the relation to other disciplines, while also interrogating the related 
political assumptions behind the exclusions.  
Race does not function as a mere category to describe human difference, but it is 
rooted in colonial histories of subordination and exploitation. Considering race as the 
measure of humanity and sub-humanity and a constitutive anthropological element of 
European modernity entails taking into account the production of new groups and 
types of people, implies addressing the problems of dehumanization, but also its role 
in the formation of institutions, economic relations, legal frameworks and modern 
forms of knowledge. The question of human difference in the colonial framework 
conceptualized through race was a central element of the origin of modern social 
sciences: to define what is a human being and need to distinguish between the human 
and the subhuman. Therefore, at stake is not only about how race is studied, or to add 
race into the study, but connecting race to the formation of modern knowledge 
production. In this light, as I pointed out in Chapter 2, Firmin, Du Bois, Fanon, 




societies, and to build forms of knowledge oriented towards freedom, required 
questioning paradigms, disciplines’ presuppositions and separations, their 
understanding of the human being, methods, language, and the foundations of 
thought. Dominant political, philosophical, sociological or medical theories are not 
only insufficient to study racism, but following them risks to turn the black and the 
colonized into problems, to put it in Du Bois’ terms. 
In this dissertation I have explored the work of Fanon in its different interrelated 
dimensions, the political, the clinical, the aesthetic, the anticolonial militant, and the 
philosopher of science, of the human being, and the social world. These aspects 
intersect in Fanon’s concern against dehumanization and the restoration of humanity, 
against the obstacles that impede human encounter and interaction, and on the 
relation between history, politics, and alienation. 
Fanon’s reformulation of the zone of non-being, like his questioning of the master- 
slave dialectic and other theories of recognition serve him to account for the condition 
of the black and the colonized in racist societies. In the zone of non-being, they find 
themselves below the level of humanity, and outside of the sphere of sociality and 
ethics.  As Gordon (2015) points out, this displaces political philosophies and theories 
that presuppose a self-other relation, and an underlying yet concealed ethical basis, 
upon which political life is built. The appearance of the colored people, as non-self 
and non-other,the affirmation of their humanity and their aspiration to enter into 
ethical relations is violence to a system that treats itself as just. The challenge faced 
by decolonization is to generate political action so that the conditions for an ethical 
realm can be established.  
Throughout this dissertation I have emphasized that, starting from an 




and outside the clinic, revolves around the exploration of the obstacles, the pitfalls 
and the possibilities to build a world of human interactions. His account of alienation, 
subjectivity and psychic disorders is deeply social, historical and political: from 
language, to romantic love, the visit to the doctor, and the everyday embodied 
consciousness attempting to move and act in the world, perception, imagination, the 
relation with medicine, with technology with one’s culture, racism ensnares and 
thwarts the possibilities of meaningful intervention in the social world, expansion, the 
dimension of being-for-others of the human being, which he constantly brings to the 
forefront. This elicits reactive, self-deceptive, self-deprecating and evasive responses, 
which seal the human in his or herself.  
Individual initiatives seeking recognition from the white, trigger a pathological 
circuit. Instead, it is through a creative work and in the transformative action of time 
and history, social relations, meanings, values, structures and institutions. Fanon 
barely theorized about love explicitly, but is a constant theme in his work. His 
demanding sense of commitment, solidarity and love for the dispossessed and the 
fellow oppressed are more than ethical positions, they are constitutive elements of a 
healthy, relational constitution of the self: “I am for the other” (Maldonado-Torres, 
2008). It is in this process of turning towards the suffering other, and going beyond 
the self, that the self is co-constituted. 
The body plays a central role in Fanon the philosopher, the doctor and the writer. 
The body is understood as a site of the sensory, as the open and frail site of contact 
with and for others and the world. It is also the most visible marker of race; in the 
epidermis lie the traces of what is hidden beneath it: the accumulated histories of its 
constitution by colonial practices, discourses, diagnostics, and violences, the daily 




inferior and also invisible. The body is also as the site suffering, where the political 
and the medical intersect. Racism is lived in the flesh. It threatens life and forms of 
living, produces mental disease, and informs affect, perception, senses, imagination 
and thought. Fanon concluded Black Skin White Masks with an appeal to touch the 
other, to reach the other and to reveal oneself to the other and a prayer to his own 
questioning body. Although expressed differently, his medical thought and practice is 
animated by similar concerns: how to touch, to listen and reach the patient.  
Listening, touching and seeing as a doctor are in Fanon not so much driven by 
empathy, but neither is approached as an objective psycho-anatomical structure with 
its correlative objective diagnostic. Alternatively, it is a form of listening and 
touching sensitive to the historical and the political, driven by the need to understand 
and to identify the overt and the sedimented expressions and manifestations of 
suffering and alienation. 
As I pointed out, throughout his work violence is analyzed from different angles, 
in its different forms and expressions: at the level of knowledge and thought, in 
relation to time and space, symbols, structures, institutions, the atmosphere, its 
impact on the psyche, the muscles, the breath, the imagination, subjectivity and at the 
level of being. Concerning violence and decolonization, he does not affirm that the 
anticolonial revolt has to be carried out by violent means, that violence is therapeutic, 
or violence has a creative aspect; he says that the anticolonial revolt, the appearance 
of the colonized, is considered violent and is itself violence. The importance of 
violence and decolonization does not lie in its revolutionary use, but in how it is 
related to a series of problems, and is inseparable from and informed by the very 
colonial framework it seeks to liberate oneself from, including the formation of the 




does is to issue a set of warnings related to violence.  In any case, Fanon’s conception 
of the violence in the colonial situation goes beyond means and ends and beyond the 
distinction between violence and nonviolence.  
Yet, this is merely the beginning of a historical process. As I pointed out in 
Chapter 7, decolonization is not tantamount to liberation, independence, or a tabula 
rasa. He closes his last book with a call for a new beginning and to build a new 
humanity. The new beginning I understand it, in his terms, as a form of healing 
through re-learning and re-discovering and cultivating what freedom and 
responsibility mean. In my view, a new humanism already started from the earliest 
pages of his first book. This new humanity to which he appeals is not to be 
constituted through violence, like European humanism, but neither turning its back to 
the inherited violence. The new humanity of decolonization entails the introduction of 
a new temporality, the building of human institutions that distribute power, produce 
forms of knowledge and establish new and different types of relations that generate 
new types of human beings.  
As I outline in Chapter 1, although in the last years there is an intensification of the 
engagement with Fanon’ work, it is not a reemergence; the discussion and the uses of 
his work have been consistent.  This is neither a romantic or nostalgic driven retrieval 
of the past, but it points to the mutations and the persistence of the questions and the 
urgencies that Fanon addressed in his time. At the same time, I do not treat Fanon as 
providing all the answers to the problems of his time and context, and of the current 
world. This also has required bringing to this thesis answers from our time also based 
on his work. However, I treat him as posing the significant questions, some of them 




when the human being is abused, constricted, sealed, separated from her humanity 























Conclusión (versión en español) 
He abordado esta tesis como una apertura o una invitación a los estudios de paz a 
abordar y dialogar con el trabajo de Fanon y las diversas comunidades intelectuales y 
activistas conectadas con su trabajo. Estas incluyen pensadores en Black studies, 
pensamiento anticolonial y decolonial, teoría crítica de raza, filosofía caribeña y de la 
diáspora africana, y enfoques críticos de psiquiatría y medicina. Como he enfatizado 
en esta tesis, no se trata tanto de incorporar las ausencias y las exclusiones, sino 
también de cuestionar a nivel político y de conocimiento qué ha constituido esas 
ausencias. Es decir, esto conlleva interrogar qué cuenta como conocimiento, qué 
criterios, la propia narrativa y comprensión de sí misma, la relación con otras 
disciplinas y las presuposiciones metodológicas y políticas tras estas  exclusiones. 
La raza no funciona como una categoría que describe la diferencia humana, sino 
que está anclada en historias coloniales de subordinación y explotación. El tratar la 
raza como medida de humanidad y sub-humanidad y como un elemento 
antropológico constitutivo de la modernidad Europea conlleva tener en cuenta la 
producción de nuevos grupos y tipos de humanos, conlleva abordar el problema de la 
deshumanización, y también su papel en la formación de instituciones, relaciones 
económicas, marcos legales y formas modernas de conocimiento. La cuestión de la 
diferencia humana en el marco colonial conceptualizada a través de la raza fue un 
elemento central en el origen de las ciencias sociales modernas: definir qué es el ser 
humano iba acompañada de la distinción entre el humano y el subhumano. Por lo 
tanto, lo que está en juego no es solo añadir la raza al estudio, y estudiar la raza, 
también está conectarla a la producción intelectual moderna desde su formación. En 
este sentido, como apunté en el capítulo 2, Firmin, Du Bois, Fanon, Gordon y Henry 




producción de formas de conocimiento orientadas a la libertad requería cuestionar 
paradigmas, presuposiciones y separaciones disciplinarias, métodos, lengua, los 
fundamentos del pensamiento, y sus correspondientes concepciones del ser humano. 
Las teorías políticas, filosóficas, sociológicas o médicas no solo no son insuficientes 
para estudiar el racismo, sino que su aplicación puede convertir al negro y al 
colonizado en problemas, diciéndolo en términos de Du Bois. 
En esta tesis he explorado el trabajo de Fanon en sus distintas, aunque imbricadas, 
dimensiones: la política, la clínica, la estética, la del militante anticolonial, la del 
filósofo de la ciencia, del ser humano, y del mundo social. Estos aspectos se 
entrecruzan en su preocupación por la deshumanización y por la restauración de la 
humanidad, por su pensamiento sobre los obstáculos que impiden el encuentro y la 
interacción humana, y en su análisis de la relación entre historia, política y alienación. 
La reformulación de Fanon de la zona de no ser, al igual que su cuestionamiento 
de la dialéctica del amo y del esclavo u otras teorías del reconocimiento, le sirvieron 
para dar cuenta de la condición del negro y el colonizado en sociedades racistas. En la 
zona de no ser, estos se encuentran en el nivel de sub-humanidad y fuera de la esfera 
de la socialidad y la ética. Como apunta Gordon (2015), este movimiento desplaza 
teorías y filosofías políticas que presuponen una relación entre el sí mismo y el otro, y 
una base ética subyacente aunque escondida, sobre la cual edificar la vida política. La 
aparición del negro y el colonizado, como no-otro y no-sí mismo, la afirmación de su 
humanidad, y su aspiración a establecer relaciones éticas es violencia a un sistema 
que se considera justo.  El desafío de la que enfrenta la descolonización es la de 
producir una acción política que produzcan relaciones éticas.  
A lo largo de esta tesis he enfatizado que, partiendo de una comprensión del ser 




clínica, gira alrededor de los obstáculos, las trampas y las posibilidades de construir 
un mundo de interacciones humanas. Su enfoque de la alienación, la subjetividad y 
los trastornos psíquicos, su concepción de la psique son profundamente sociale, 
políticos e históricos: desde el lenguaje, el amor romántico, relaciones familiares, la 
conciencia corporalizada intentando moverse y actual en el mundo, la relación con la 
medicina, con la tecnología, el análisis de la imaginación y percepción, el racismo 
traba y frustra las posibilidades la intervención significativa en el mundo social, la 
expansión y la dimensión del ser-para-otros del ser humano, que él pone en primer 
plano. Esto provoca respuestas reactivas, de autoengaño, evasión y autocrítica, que 
encierran al ser humano en sí mismo.  
Las iniciativas individuales que aspiran al reconocimiento blanco activan un 
circuito patológico. En cambio, Fanon busca el trabajo creativo y la acción 
transformadora sobre el tiempo, historia, relaciones sociales, significados, valores, 
estructuras e instituciones patogénicas. Fanon apenas teorizó explícitamente sobre el 
amor, aunque es un tema constante en su trabajo. Su exigente sentido del 
compromiso, solidaridad y amor por el desposeído y el oprimido son más que 
posiciones éticas, son elementos constitutivos de una constitución relacional y 
saludable del sí mismo: “Yo  soy para el otro”  (Maldonado-Torres, 2008) Es en este 
proceso de volverse hacia el otro sufriente, e ir más allá de uno mismo, en el que el sí 
mismo se co-constitutye. 
El cuerpo juega un papel central en Fanon el filósofo, el doctor y el escritor. El 
cuerpo entendido como el lugar de lo sensorial, como sitio abierto y frágil de contacto 
con y para otros y el mundo. El cuerpo es también el marcador más visible de la raza; 
en la epidermis se encuentran las trazas de lo que yace debajo: las historias 




coloniales, el peso cotidiano de la mirada blanca que sella a la persona en un mero 
cuerpo, haciéndola inferior e invisible. El cuerpo es también el lugar del sufrimiento, 
donde se entrecruzan lo médico y lo político. El racismo se vive en la carne. Amenaza 
la vida y las formas de vida, produce enfermedades mentales y conforma la 
percepción, sentidos, imaginación y pensamiento. Fanon cerró Piel negra, máscaras 
blancas con una llamada a tocar al otro, a alcanzar al otro, a revelarse al otro, y con 
una oración a hacer que su cuerpo interrogue.  Aunque expresado de manera 
diferente, su pensamiento y trabajo médico está motivado por las mismas 
preocupaciones: cómo tocar, escuchar y llegar al paciente. Escuchar, tocar y mirar 
como doctor no están en Fanon animadas por la empatía, ni tampoco por una mirada 
objetiva a una estructura psico-anatómica con su correspondiente diagnóstico. Al 
contrario es una forma de escuchar, mirar y tocar sensible a la historia y la política, 
animada por la necesidad de comprender e identificar las expresiones visibles y las 
sedimentadas de sufrimiento y alienación. 
Como apunté, a lo largo de su trabajo Fanon analiza la violencia desde diferentes 
ángulos, en sus distintas formas y expresiones: a nivel de conocimiento y 
pensamiento, en relación a la temporalidad y al espacio, violencia simbólica, de 
estructuras e instituciones, en la atmósfera, su impacto en la psique, los músculos, la 
respiración, la imaginación, la subjetividad y a nivel del ser. Respecto a violencia y 
decolonización, Fanon no afirma que la revolución anticolonial debe llevarse a cabo 
por medios violentos, que la violencia es terapéutica o que tiene un aspecto creativo. 
Él dice que la revolución anticolonial, la aparición del colonizado, es considerada 
violenta y es violencia en sí misma. La importancia de la violencia y la 
decolonización no reside tanto en su uso revolucionario, más bien en que está ligada a 




conforma y del que es inseparable el momento de liberación, incluyendo la propia 
formación del sujeto colonial y postcolonial. En vez de una justificación o una crítica 
lo que hace Fanon es emitir una serie de advertencias. En todo caso, la concepción de 
la violencia en la situación colonial va más allá de medios y fines y más allá de la 
distinción entre violencia y noviolencia,  
De todas maneras el momento de la violencia es solo el inicio de un proceso 
histórico. Como apunté en el capítulo 7, la decolonización no equivale a la liberación, 
la independencia o es una tabula rasa. Fanon concluye con una llamada a un nuevo 
comieno y a edificar una nueva humanidad. El nuevo comienzo lo entiendo, en sus 
propios términos, como forma de cura a través de volver a aprender, descubrir y 
cultivar el significado de la libertad y la responsabilidad. En mi opinión el nuevo 
humanismo empezó en las primeras páginas de su primer libro. Esta nueva 
humanidad a la que él apela no debe ser constituida mediante la violencia como el 
humanismo Europeo, y tampoco debe darle la espalda a la violencia heredada. La 
nueva humanidad de la decolonización conlleva la introducción de una nueva 
temporalidad, la creación de estructuras que distribuyan el poder, la producción de 
otras formas de conocimiento y cultivar nuevas y diferentes tipos de relaciones que 
generen nuevos tipos de seres humanos. 
Como argumenté en el primer capítulo, aunque en los últimos años está habiendo 
una intensificación en el abordaje del trabajo de Fanon, no se trata de una 
reemergencia; las discusiones y los usos de Fanon han sido consistentes durante 
décadas. Esto no se debe una recuperación nostálgica o romántica del pasado, sino 
que apunta a las mutaciones y a las persistencias de las urgencias que Fanon trató en 
su tiempo. Al mismo tiempo, no me acerco a Fanon como ofreciendo todas las 




tesis respuestas de nuestro tiempo, también a partir de y en conversación con su 
trabajo. Sin embargo, si lo trato como planteando preguntas significativas, algunas de 
ellas, desafortunadamente, no han sido cerradas. De ahí que el trabajo de Fanon ayude 
a pensar cuando el ser humano es abusado, sellado, restringido, separado de su 
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